Chagatai Khan

Imran Khan, Maulana Samiul Haq & Sandwich!

2012-02-02T03:14:00.000-08:00

KABEERWALA: President Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (Samiul Haq faction) Maulana Samiul Haq while utilising the Difa-e-Pakistan Council platform, said on Tuesday that Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) chief Imran Khan did not want to anger US just so that he could gain power in the country. He was talking to media after meeting party officials in Kabeerwaala. Haq said his party did not want alterations or modifications in the current political system, but a complete change of the system. The JUI-S president, reacting to the PTI Chief’s decision not to attend the Difa-e-Pakistan Council, said that while the Council had no political destiny, Imran Khan did. He alleged that the former cricketer, unlike them, sought power. The JUI-S president said that Khan had been trying to put PTI on both boats of religious groups and the US. Those boats are on completely different and divergent paths, Haq said. He warned Khan that he would not be able to use religious groups for coming to power and have US support at the same time. Haq said that he and his party harboured hatred against the prevailing political system of Pakistan. Though, at the same time, he maintained that his party had no interests in politics, only the enforcement of an Islamic system. He claimed that they had public support to overthrow the current American system. He claimed that millions of people had attended their conventions all over the Pakistan under the umbrella of Difa-e-Pakistan, and that this was clear evidence that people of Pakistan too did not want a political system ruled by US. “Our gatherings are a clear message to US and it is a referendum for the government of Pakistan to immediately reconsider relations and foreign policy for US and its allies,” Haq said. Religious parties united under the Difa-e-Pakistan umbrella were sufficient to counter the strategies of US and make the US and its allies run away from the region including Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. He said that the image was wrong that US, India or Israel was afraid of Pakistan’s atomic capacity. In fact, Haq claimed, they were afraid of religious madarsahs, mosques, beards and turbans. “Let them be afraid from these realities of our ideology and foundation,” the JUI-S chief said. REFERENCE: Imran Khan catering to religious parties just to gain power: JUI-S By Owais Jafri Published: February 1, 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/330216/imran-khan-catering-to-religious-parties-just-to-gain-power-jui-s/

Imran Khan VS Sheikh Rashid Ahmed

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oToxDouAjWg

Hatred is a powerful motivator. Until the clerics made common cause against America, the six hard-line party leaders were rivals. They stormed each other's mosques and split hairs over ideological disputes dating back to Islam's early days. Their differences were stark: some worship at the tombs of local Sufi saints; others dismiss that practice as blasphemy. Most of the parties want their women veiled from head to toe, although more liberal groups argue that it ought to be the woman's choice. The personalities of the parties' leaders have also clashed. Qazi Hussain Ahmed from the Jamaat-e-Islami is a cultured, well-traveled cleric who speaks with the measured finality of a judge passing a grim sentence. Several of his new brethren, in contrast, are unquestionably flamboyant. Maulana Fazlur Rehman wears robes of golden thread and was dubbed "Maulana Diesel" after allegations were made�though never proven�that he was involved in a fuel scam. Maulana Samiul Haq earned the nickname "Sandwich Sammy" after being photographed (presumably by Pakistani intelligence officers) in an inventive position with several bedmates. "We have our differences, some of them centuries-old," concedes Ahmed, "But we have enough in common." REFERENCE: General's Election By Tim McGirk / khana-khel Monday, Oct. 07, 2002 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,361788,00.html?iid=chix-sphere

Madame Tahira & Mawlana Samiul Haq Sex Scandal THE MUSLIM 19 Dec 1992 p 6
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA343261

AKORA KHATTAK: Located at Akora Khattak on the main Grand Trunk (GT) road between Rawalpindi and Peshawar, the Jama Darul Uloom Haqqania is regional centre of religious instruction and has been a source of both inspiration and muscle for the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The institution has been the ideological training ground for several hundred Afghan Talibs (students), who have gone on to join the ranks of the Taliban militia in Afghanistan. The Afghan border lies a five-hour drive via Peshawar, the capital of the Frontier province and an important way station for Afghanistan. The institution, which comprises primary and secondary schools and a seminary where hundreds of students study and live, is headed by Maulana Sami-ul Haq, a former senator and religious figure in his own right. In a hall, the Maulana holds court, he is busy lamenting with some of his subordinates over why his institution has to pay electricity charges when it is working in the cause of Islam. "In a Muslim country like Pakistan, our institutions should be exempt," he says to no one in particular. Sami-ul Haq has gradually withdrawn from public life and engrossed himself more in his work at the madarssas and towards what he calls, the "glorious spread of Islam." The bearded Sami-ul Haq, nearing 70, has been a bitter critic of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ever since the two parted ways in the early 90s. This parting resulted in the now infamous media cell of Sharif PMDN party publicising the interviews of a certain Madam Tahira, who is supposed to have kept a house of pleasure in Islamabad and whose clients included the rich and famous. In her interviews, Madam Tahira talked about Maulana Sami-ul Haq and certain "positions" he favoured. The media lapped it up and had a ball. Even today some papers refer to Sami-ul Haq as "Sammy Sandwich" in reference to those interviews. While Sharif managed to get Sami-ul Haq off centre stage politics in Pakistan, he may have helped propel the maulana's energies in working towards a "true Islamic revolution in Pakistan," in the words of the maulana. At his institution in Akora Khatak he trains young men wo go forth and propagate the supremacy of the Quran. "There is no other way," says Sami-ul Haq, adding "unless we have supremacy of the Quran, we cannot thrive as a nation." But the maulana isn't impressed with the efforts of Nawaz Sharif towards Islamisation. Commenting on the proposed Shariat Bill, Sami-ul Haq says that it is "only a lollipop". He says that politicians in Pakistan "take refuge in religion when there are other problems at hand." Turning his attention to Afghanistan, he says that the Taliban are not the bad people they have been made out to be. "Look at the violence that was prevailing because of the in-fighting of the so-called Mujahideen. Nobody was safe. Now things have changed for the better," he says. He says Pakistani politicians have used the Taliban card to gain sympathies for themselves from the West: "Benazir Bhutto tries to sell herself as a moderating force. But she is a compulsive liar and a thief." If there is any development that Maulana Sami-ul Haq welcomes in the past year in Pakistan, it is the detonation of a nuclear device. "We have proved our manhood to Mother India," he says with a hint of sarcasm. But he warns that the Pakistani bomb is in the wrong hands; according to him. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif will sell out to America. A tour of his institution reveals a wide array of classrooms, prayer areas, dormitories and exercise grounds. There is even the office of a magazine which the institution publishes and a library. Most interesting was block for central Asian students. Buried in one courtyard is Maulana Abdul Haq, the founder of the institution and father of Maulana Sai-ul Haq, who came to Akora Khattak from Deoband to establish this centre for religious instruction in 1972. When asked whether he sees an Islamic revolution taking place in Pakistan. Sami-ul Haq predicts: "In the next few years." He argues that things have got so bad and people are so frustrated with their leaders that Islam is the only force that they can turn to. And as an afterthought, the maulana says: "And it is here at places like the Dar-ul Uloom that we will provide the next generation of leaders, like we have done for Afghanistan. Here we give out puppets the ultimate weapon - the power of the Islamic knowledge. REFERENCE: In 'Sammy Sandwich' Country, They Get Ready for Islamic Revolution Express visits training school for Taliban, headed by Maulana Sami-ul Haq who disappeared from Centrestage after sex scandals. 7th February 1999 The Indian Express By: Kamal Siddiqi http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives1999/99february7.html

US AID for Jamat-e-Islami & GO AMERICA GO of Jamat-e-Islami.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o626B1S7Edc

MULTAN (February 16 2005): Farooq Maudoodi son of founder of Jamaat-i-Islami, late Abul Aala Maudoodi, has said that Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) had been created by ISI and it is a part and parcel of the military government and cannot part ways with President Pervez Musharraf. Talking to a group of journalists here on Tuesday he said: "Qazi Hussain Ahmed met the then ISI chief, General Ehsan-ul-Haq, then called on General Pervez Musharraf and later met US ambassador, then flew to United States. As soon as he returned, MMA was formed like IJI (Islami jamhoori Ittehad)." He said that IJI was organised by ISI and funds were also provided by it on the assurance of Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who had also played a key role in IJI. "Now he is playing major role in MMA." Bitterly criticising the MMA, Farooq said that the role of MMA is evidence of its loyalties with military regime. It had approved the 17th constitutional amendment which is in favour of the present regime. He said: "Where has the MMA movement gone while its leadership is claiming that it would continue till the achievement of objective of 'Uniform'?" Farooq said that Benazir knew very well about MMA and she had some reservations about it. He said that ISI has complete record of MMA leaders and they cannot escape. He said that politics ended in 1958 when Ayub imposed martial law. He said that plundering of evacuee trust property (Auqaf) and politics of clerics destroyed the politics of the country. Regarding deletion of column of 'religion' from Passport, he said that it was a good step and Ulema should have welcomed it but they made it part of their agitation to hoodwink the innocent Muslims.Farooq said that some bad things were added in the constitution by Zia-ul-Haq, which must be excluded, which had bred many ills. ends 'MMA was created by ISI' RECORDER REPORT [Courtesy Business Recorder 2005] http://www.brecorder.com/index.php?id=198267&currPageNo=12&query=jamhoori&search=1&term=2004-10-012006-12-31&supDate=

Sheikh Rashid Like Wild Women.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4IDwi7bKAN0

THE Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal is heading towards further break-up as internal differences among the already reduced “six-party alliance” have posed major threat to its existence. Despite truce on NSC issue between Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the ideological gulf between the two is fast widening. As frequent splits have already become a serious issue due to sole decisions taken by the two mainstream parties; especially Qazi-Baloch dominated Jamaat-e-Islami, more reasons are cropping up to bring the two heads at loggerheads. Reports suggest that Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Fazlur Rehman have entered into yet another conflict since Maulana Sherani accepted chairmanship of National Assembly’s Standing Committee. “Qazi has lodged a strong protest with Fazlur Rehman over Muhammad Khan Sherani’s acceptance of the office of chairman National Assembly’s Standing Committee of Ports and Shipping”. It is said that Qazi, seeking explanation, also talked to Sherani and expressed great sense of resentment over his becoming chairman of the Standing Committee without taking him, being head of the alliance or the MMA parties, into confidence. “Sherani told Qazi that he obtained permission from Fazlur Rehman before accepting the office whereas Fazl, in his telephonic conversation, denied to have permitted him for the same.” Qazi reminded Fazl and Sherani about the MMA and other opposition parties’ decision that they will not accept any office in the Standing Committees till the Government ensures allocation of the offices under the proportionate system. “Qazi Sahib takes the matter as a sheer violation of the party discipline.” However no disciplinary action is expected to be taken against Maulana Sherani following his position particularly in Balochistan where he is heading the MMA as well as JUI-F besides he has complete backing of Fazlur Rehman. Maulana Sherani is the second from MMA who became chairman of a Standing Committee as JUI-S Chief Maulana Samiul Haq’s son, Maulana Hamidul Haq Haqqani is already holding such position. Qazi’s JI and Fazl’s JUI, the two major components of MMA, are already facing severe differences over the issue of participation of Chief Minister Akram Durrani in NSC and a final decision is still pending. The JUI-F wants to ensure Durrani’s participation in NSC meetings whereas the JI has been left alone among the Majlis parties that are opposing such move since the council was established through an act of Parliament. The MMA parties met on June 23 here in Islamabad to take up different issues including the NSC and maybe Sherani’s acceptance of chairmanship of the Standing Committee besides forming its general council. Making of MMA (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal) is really a great thing. But the initially formed six-party alliance has reduced to a two-party ‘marriage of convenience’. With the death of Allama Shah Ahmed Noorani MMA witnessed the demise of JUP’s active affiliation. Allama Sajid Naqvi virtually declared to quit the alliance. Maulana Sajid Mir has withdrawn his party’s participation. JUI-F and JUI-S are at daggers drawn.

JUI-F itself has further developed differences from within. Hafiz Hussain Ahmed has ‘rebelled’ probably succumbing to JI tactics. Besides, the JUI-F in Balochistan functionally withdrew its support to JUI-F Central in joining the Qazi-led movement against President’s uniform. Hafiz Hussain virtually ditched Maulana Fazl’s reconciliatory approach to have a peaceful political process in the country. It was the result of those splits with the MMA that the agitation, demonstrations, caravans and long marches ended in a futile exercise, as three parties JUI-S, MJAH and JUP-N were reluctant to join solo flight of JI and JUI-F. The recent resignation of MMA Punjab Secretary General Syed Mahfooz Mashhadi also indicated the rifts within. Mashhadi alleged that MMA president and JI Amir Qazi Hussain Ahmed and MMA Secretary General and JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman have created like-minded people in smaller parties of the alliance to easily impose their decisions. “JI leaders hold their meetings on behalf of MMA and try to impose their decisions on the other parties. The provincial leadership of MMA was totally unaware about the decisions being taken in Central Shoora meetings of MMA” he said, adding “JI leader Hafiz Idrees who is also the provincial president of MMA did not take the provincial leadership of the alliance into confidence about the decisions of the supreme council of MMA.” He disclosed that after two years Qazi Hussain Ahmed has now admitted that MMA’s decision about the support of 17th constitutional amendment was wrong. Senator Maulana Samiul Haq of JUI-S parted ways with MMA due to latter’s role in helping the ruling Pakistan Muslim League in passing controversial 17th Amendment while Markazi Jamiat Ahle-Hadith chief Senator Professor Sajid Mir was also annoyed at MMA president Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Secretary General Maulana Fazlurrehman for passage of amendment. Both the leaders have been ignoring the supreme council meetings of the MMA for a long time due to same reason. A central leader of JUP-N disclosed that small parties of religious alliance had reservation on the decision being taken by the central leadership of MMA.

However he said the central leadership was not bound to inform the provincial leadership about their decisions. According to sources Mashhadi resigned from the post of provincial secretary general due to cold attitude showed by the JI Punjab. Hafiz Idrees Ahmed of JI was appointed as president MMA Punjab without taking into confidence other smaller parties who could not activate provincial chapter so far. It is said that JUP-N central secretary general Gen. K M Azhar has constantly been interfering in the matters of JUP-N’s provincial chapter and creating a lobby in the party for not giving an opportunity to Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani’s son Maulana Anas Noorani to become president of the party. Anas Noorani was reportedly not willing also because of the MMA leaders’ attitude towards his father. Anecdote goes that in King Mamoon-ur-Rashid’s era two Hadith tellers once attended a Juma sermon at a mosque near Baghdad where the khateeb was narrating a Hadith, attributed to the Prophet [PBUH], through their source to which both the ravians strongly objected and vehemently denied having said that. “Get off, you are not the only two with those particular names…there are a hundred Zaids and Bakrs”, was the reply. The Imam got them shunted out of the mosque. The trend of “barha letay hein zeb-e-dastaan kay liey” goes on non-stop. The Ulema today are being wrongly dubbed as fundamentalists because in the fundamentals of al-Din there is nowhere to have the facts twisted, or utilize the opportunity to one’s own political ends. This is in sheer violation of “Why ye not do what ye do say?”

The bazaar of politics is infested with masquerading and mimicry, somersaults and gimmicks, telling lies and saving skins. Machiavellian approach continues to prevail upon, come what may. The ulema who have thronged this bazaar are out to ‘Islamise’ the trade of politics to their self-aggrandizement and addiction of ‘leading’ the nation with the interpretations of their deeds on their own. It is pardonable that some of them opposed the making of Pakistan, pleading that practising Islam needs no ‘independent’ State. But it is not pardonable to continue resisting the fundamental principles of Islam. Farooq Haider Maududi, Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi, Dr Asrar Ahmed and the latest desertion in JI Naeem Siddqui speak volumes while exposing the Jamaat leadership for its somersaults. Maulana Abul Ala’a Maududi, they say, had asked for not taking part in politics, but the vested interests allured it to low to resort to making headways in the gimmicks, no matter what the means could have been adopted. Maulana Fazlur Rehman has gone down with the legacy. He justified the “marriages of convenience” with a number of alliances, friends and foes, even PPP. Though cracks have split the Mufti-legacy today, the “marriage of convenience” goes on as a political norm. When they are asked they say in the religion it is forbidden but politics is something different. The contract of petroleum oil was a convenience and the alliance with the PPP was a marriage.● REFERENCE: The never ending split in MMA By Alya Alvi http://pakistantimes.net/2005/07/03/oped3.htm

Sheikh Rashid Flirting with Maya Khan.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AXSi9mEl6m8

Sheikh Rashid Ahmed Flirting with Begum Nawazish Ali. (AAJ TV)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QF4rkWwmUI

Sheikh Rashid Ahmed Insulting CJ Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qp7ZglATyeY

The MMA's boycott of the inaugural session of the National Security Council remains a sort of a 'riddle inside an enigma'. How would the MMA be able to reconcile its support of the passage of the controversial (and basically undemocratic) Legal Framework Order (17th Amendment) with its boycott of the NSC - an integral part and off-shoot of the LFO? Regardless of polemics, the MMA marshalled its parliamentary vote for the LFO as an expedient pro-democracy measure, irrespective of the fact that the LFO tended to violate both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. How can a popularly elected parliament through a joint session at all allow an elected president to stay in his military uniform as army chief even for a short period of time? Ayub, Yahya and Zia all forged devices like LFOs and 'Continuance in Force' laws to legitimize their regimes by an extra-parliamentary executive fiat. Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq had their parliaments indemnify their constitutional violations to close the chapter of their coups. Only Yahya ended with his boots around his neck as a vanquished general. Pliant and muted through Yahya's disastrous reign, the superior judiciary came into action only after his fall to brand him a 'usurper'. Never before, however, it fell to the sad lot of an elected parliament to vote for an army chief to combine in his person the brass and the bowler hat even as an expedient move. Political pragmatism is not the same as party or individual opportunism. While the pragmatist knows where to stop, the opportunist fails to resist the fatal attraction of yet another chance, yet another pasture new around the corner. The MMA's supreme council must ask itself whether or not by supporting the passage of the LFO they did indeed commit a terminal error of judgement. And whether they did not sacrifice their reputedly principled party politics at the altar of expediency and opportunism.

Worse still, they did so at the cost of the united front they had forged with such mainstream parties as the PPP and the Muslim League-N. A major compromise was made with Gen. Pervez Musharraf's regime, now invoking the NSC as the main plank of its future governance. If such were to be the end of the military-mullah alliance, it should not be difficult to see who is the loser. The nexus has been a part of our history, either marginally as under Ayub Khan or covertly as under Yahya Khan or naked and deeply written into the system as under Ziaul Haq. Ayub's secularism as part of the military culture of British Indian Army was like an open book without any fine print. Even the prefix Islamic attaching to the Republic of Pakistan was dropped until restored under the writ of superior judiciary. That continued to be the case until the fateful day of 1965 when India attacked Pakistan along the international border, with Lahore as its principal target. Even in his first address to the nation within hours of the Indian invasion, Ayub went on to recite the 'Kalama-i-Tayyaba' in a stirring, emotion-choked voice.

His subsequent meeting with religious parties - mainly the Jamaat-i-Islami under Maulana 'Abul 'Ala Maududi - marked the beginning of the military-mullah nexus. Yahya would not have much to do with things spiritual until the induction of retired Maj.-Gen. Sher Ali Khan into his cabinet as minister in-charge of information and national affairs. He initiated Yahya into ideological lore and saddled him with the mission of protecting the 'ideology of Pakistan and the glory of Islam'. Yahya's intelligence chief, Major-(later Lieut.) Gen. Muhammad Akbar Khan made no secret of his close liaison with the Jamaat-i-Islami especially in respect of its pro-active role in East Pakistan. The Jamaat was to go even to the extent of certifying Yahya's draft constitution as Islamic. The draft was authored by Justice A.R. Cornelius, Yahya's law minister. As for Zia, he embarked on his Islamization programme even as he assumed his army command. He gave the army the triple motto of 'Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sibil Lillah'. Subsequently, as president, he introduced the Hudood Ordinance and collaborated with the Americans in projecting the Soviet-Afghan war as a jihad. The country continues to pay the bitter wages of Zia's jihad syndrome. Gen Musharraf continued to recognize the Taliban's radical Islamic regime as a legacy of the Nawaz Sharif period and extend muted support to the Kashmiri mujahideen until 9/11. That was the turning point and the defining moment for the future shape of relations between a para-secular government on the one hand and jihad-oriented, religious groups on the other. Musharraf relented on his temporal stance vis-a-vis the religious group under the pressure of political necessity during the general election of October 2002. He placed the mullahs at par with university graduates to qualify for membership of his 'graduate' assembly.

The mullahs returned with strength sufficient to form coalition governments in the NWFP and Balochistan. Once in power they gradually and subtly clanged their religion-based stance into realpolitik where it suited their interest. They supported the LFO to extract from Musharraf the promise that he would shed his uniform by the end of 2004. However, when it came to endorsing the NSC by an act of parliament, they abstained from voting. Hence the present crisis. The MMA's Supreme Council, in no uncertain terms, declared its resolve to 'scrap' the NSC when it 'obtains a simple majority in the house'. The inaugural session of the NSC (June 24) was off to an unhappy and not a little ill-tempered start. Chairing the session, the president was livid over the absence of the leader of the opposition, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, and NWFP Chief Minister Akram Durrani. He took particular note of the latter absenting himself as a government functionary - a somewhat strange observation to make about an elected public leader with a party mandate of his own. The president spoke spiritedly and at some length on the rationale and functions of the NSC. Prior to the NSC, he said, there was no forum where 'key functionaries' including the opposition, provincial heads and armed forces chiefs could debate issues of national importance and 'exercise checks on each other and lend support to each other'. Of course, the defence committee of the cabinet (DCC) was always there, but hardly as a body as comprehensive as the NSC. The question now is: what other body could be either more comprehensive and competent to discuss and resolve all issues of national importance than an elected parliament? Even in the context of a best-case scenario, it won't be easy to rule out a perpetually difficult relationship between parliament and the NSC. REFERENCE: MMA and the NSC By A.R. Siddiqi - The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army. 30 June 2004 Wednesday 11 Jamadi-ul-Awwal 1425 http://archives.dawn.com/2004/06/30/fea.htm#1

Mansoor Ijaz, General (R) Hamid Gul & PML (Nawaz).

2012-01-31T11:26:00.000-08:00

ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court hearing the controversial memo case lifted on Monday travel restrictions imposed on former ambassador Husain Haqqani on Dec 1 last year and allowed him to go to Washington to meet his family. A nine-judge larger bench headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry also gave two more months to the SC-constituted judicial commission to complete its probe into the scandal. The three-judge commission had earlier been asked to come up with its report by Dec 30. The commission, at its last proceedings on Jan 24, had directed its secretary to send a request to the Supreme Court to extend the deadline because cross-examination of key witnesses required more time. The court declined to consider for any purpose a secret letter addressed to the chief justice by Mansoor Ijaz, the main character in the scandal. The court directed the registrar to keep the letter with him under seal. In the letter captioned ‘secret’, Mr Ijaz is reported to have disclosed certain information, but the court questioned its authenticity and observed that it was the cardinal principle of law that only court decided the status of a document to be treated as confidential or classified. “We would have appreciated if he (Mansoor Ijaz) had sent such a document to the court through his counsel,” the court said. The court rejected an application moved by Mr Ijaz through his counsel Mohammad Akram Sheikh that his statement be recorded outside Pakistan and asked the counsel to take up the matter with the judicial commission. The commission has already turned down the request. “One feels breathing easier after the stuffy air behind the memogate scandal gushed out after today’s court order,” a senior lawyer commented. REFERENCE: Court lifts Haqqani travel restrictions Nasir Iqbal http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/31/memo-commission-gets-2-month-extension-court-lifts-haqqani-travel-restrictions.html

Milt Bearden (Former CIA Station Chief in Pakistan) talks about Bin Laden Being Trained by CIA

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wn61PJQGCUo

Milt Bearden retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1994, after thirty years in the CIA's clandestine services Bearden rose through the ranks to become one of CIA's most senior officers. His early career was split between German speaking Europe and Hong Kong where he conducted classic Cold War intelligence operations. During the early 1980's he moved to Africa to serve as CIA Chief in Nigeria and later in Khartoum, where he covered Sudan's civil war and the ultimate overthrow of the regime of Jaafar Nimeiri. It was in the Sudan in 1985, that Bearden organized a secret airlift from the Sudanese desert to Israel of the stranded remnants of the Ethiopian Falasha Jews. For his work in Sudan Milt Bearden was awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit, the Agency's second highest decoration. In the spring of 1986, Bearden was selected by Bill Casey to take charge of the CIA Covert Action supporting a flagging Afghan Resistance. The end of the war was symbolically marked by the final march of Soviet troops across Friendship Bridge over the Oxus River on February 15, 1989, thus ending almost ten years of struggle. For his service in Afghanistan Bearden was awarded the agency's highest decoration, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. From 1989-92, Bearden directed the CIA's clandestine operations against a decaying Soviet Empire. During this period Bearden was awarded the CIA's unique Donovan Award, named after its founder. Bearden wound up his CIA career as the CIA Chief in Bonn where he worked with a newly reunified Germany in dealing with its Cold War legacy. For his service in Germany, Milt Bearden was honored by the German President with the Federal Cross of Merit, the only such decoration ever given to a CIA Chief in the Federal Republic. REFERENCE: Milt Bearden Retired Senior CIA Officer http://security.nationaljournal.com/contributors/milt-bearden.php

Memogate storm in Pakistan & Mansoor Ijaz flip-flop on ISI - 1 (NDTV)

As the Memogate scandal continues to create ripples in the Pakistani establishment, all eyes now are centred on US-based Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz – better known as the ‘Memogate man’. He has finally secured a Pakistan visa to travel to the country to depose before a judicial commission that is probing the political scandal. NDTV‘s Barkha Dutt speaks to Ijaz amidst questions by the global media of why the latter missed his date with the court on the 16th of this month and what he would eventually say in his deposition. REFERENCE: I will be in Pakistan before the 26th: Mansoor Ijaz. 20th January 2012 http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/memogate-storm-in-pak-mansoor-ijaz-flip-flop-on-isi/221650?pfrom=home-lateststories&cp http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xru3kFPPttI

WASHINGTON, Nov 3: A senior US official responsible for counter-terrorism on Tuesday directly accused Pakistan of supporting training of militant groups in Afghanistan as well as providing "material support" to some of the Kashmiri militants. "There are numerous Kashmiri separatist groups and sectarian groups involved in terrorism which use Pakistan as a base...We have repeatedly asked Islamabad to end support of terrorist training in Afghanistan," Michael Sheehan, State Department's coordinator for counter-terrorism, told a Senate Foreign Relations sub-committee. The sub-committee hearing was called and presided over by Senator Sam Brownback and the list of experts who testified included a former CIA officer in Pakistan Milt Bearden, president of Stimson Centre Michael Krepon, John Hopkins University Central Asia Institute chairman Dr Fredrick Starr and a Pakistani- American businessman and columnist Mansoor Ijaz. Mr Sheehan recently visited India to coordinate US-Indian responses to terrorist threats but when asked whether he would also visit Pakistan soon, he said: "Hopefully." "Pakistan has frequently acknowledged what it calls moral and diplomatic support for militants in Kashmir who employ violence and terrorism against Indian interests. We have continuing reports of Pakistani material support for some of these militants," Mr Sheehan said. He named several Pakistan-based militant Islamic groups including Lashkar Taiba, Harkatul Jehad Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen, which, he said, "operate freely in Pakistan and support terrorist attacks in Kashmir." Asked by Indian and Pakistani journalists after his hearing whether he found any change in the policy after the overthrow of the Nawaz government, Mr Sheehan said: "We are still waiting for their responses and it is too early to judge whether there is any change." When a correspondent pointed out whether it was "business as usual" with the military government, he crisply said "no" but added: "We hope to work with them on all these issues." REFERENCE: US says Pakistan training militants Shaheen Sehbai DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending: 06 November 1999 Issue : 05/45 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1999/06nov99.html#ussa

Memogate storm in Pakistan & Mansoor Ijaz flip-flop on ISI - 2 (NDTV)

As the Memogate scandal continues to create ripples in the Pakistani establishment, all eyes now are centred on US-based Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz – better known as the ‘Memogate man’. He has finally secured a Pakistan visa to travel to the country to depose before a judicial commission that is probing the political scandal. NDTV‘s Barkha Dutt speaks to Ijaz amidst questions by the global media of why the latter missed his date with the court on the 16th of this month and what he would eventually say in his deposition. REFERENCE: I will be in Pakistan before the 26th: Mansoor Ijaz. 20th January 2012 http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/memogate-storm-in-pak-mansoor-ijaz-flip-flop-on-isi/221650?pfrom=home-lateststories&cp http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xru3kFPPttI

WASHINGTON, Oct 7: A key congressional committee voted unanimously on Wednesday evening to provide President Clinton indefinite waiver authority to lift military and economic sanctions on Pakistan and India. The amendment for the authority, moved by Senator Sam Brownback and

commonly known as Brownback-2, is now almost assured a smooth sailing through the full houses of the Senate and House of Representatives as part of the larger Defence Appropriations Bill. The language approved by the committee practically takes away all the bite and sting of the Pressler Amendment without actually repealing the infamous law and is being viewed on the Hill as the biggest ever Pakistani victory in Congress. The final waiver came only after an epic battle between Pakistani and Indian lobbies and last minute long-distance interventions by Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, Petroleum Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, Pakistani lobbyist Charlie Wilson and a prominent Pakistani-American Mansoor Ijaz, who used his clout with the Clinton Administration and key senators to pull it through. Congressional experts said the waiver authority was enough for President Clinton to remove all restrictions on Pakistan, including those on military sales including aircraft, tanks and other equipment as well as spare parts. "This would be enough for Pakistan to declare that the coercive atmosphere that existed has now been removed, paving the way for Islamabad to sign the CTBT," these experts said. The committee adopted the final version of the amendment after Conference Committee Chairman, Senator Ted Stevens from Alaska, gave his go ahead, but not before Islamabad moved fast and decisively to resolve a multi-million dollar dispute with an Alaskan Pipeline Company. Pakistan's biggest victory against an Indian lobbying juggernaut headed by former Republican Party chief Bob Dole, former congressman Steven Solarz and former senator Larry Pressler was mainly due to the team efforts of the Pakistani- Americans and their lobbyist who used their influence to get the hurdles past upto the last minute. The Embassy coordinated their effort. The last formidable hurdle which threatened to derail the process was the pending problem with an Alaskan pipeline company, VECO, which had lobbied hard on Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens to get their case sorted out before Stevens voted for the waiver law. Stevens, who chairs the key conference committee, and who is also the chairman of the defence appropriations committee with the last word on what his committee passes, put his foot down and in the last 24 hours Islamabad was told to either agree to VECO's demands or risk the entire process being put off for months, or even years. Mansoor Ijaz and Pakistani lobbyist former congressman Charlie Wilson, worked on the telephone for 20 hours, talking several times to Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and other high ups to get the VECO issue out of the way. The matter was rushed to the cabinet meeting on Wednesday morning and a decision was taken to involve the World Bank as an arbitrator in the dispute. REFERENCE: Sanctions waiver approved By Shaheen Sehbai DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending : 09 October 1999 Issue : 05/41 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1999/09oct99.html#sanc

Just how vicious a campaign the CIA was sponsoring is suggested by the Pakistan Brigadier Mohammed Yousuf, who directed the training with and distribution of CIA weapons at that time. In a matter-of-fact passage in his memoirs, he describes the range of assassination tactics and targets he was preparing the mujahideen to take on in Kabul. They ranged from your everyday “knife between the shoulder blades of a Soviet soldier shopping in the bazaar” to “the placing of a briefcase bomb in a senior official’s office.” Educational institutions were considered fair game, he explains, since they were staffed by “Communists indoctrinating their students with Marxist dogma.” {Page 335 Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story Of The Largest Covert Operation in History by George Crile}.

On a CIA sponsored trip to Washington that year, the proud ISI Brigadier was deeply insulted when he was led, virtually blindfolded, to the Agency’s “sabotage school” in North Carolina. Vickers {CIA Official foe Afghan “Jihad} escorted the burly Pakistani Brigadier in a plane whose windows were blacked, then in a car with its shades drawn. Yousuf, who suffers the chip on the shoulder of many proud Third World types, was deeply offended at this slight. He reasoned that if he was trusted enough to be permitted to run the CIA’s operation in Pakistan, why was the Agency treating him as if he were about to reveal the location of the sabotage school? Later Vicker and Avrakotos {CIA Officials for Afghan “Jihad”} take Yousuf and one of his colleagues out for a fancy dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, USA. [Page 351 Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story Of The Largest Covert Operation in History by George Crile].

On page 503 in Charlie Wilson’s War, the author quoted “but it was losing Zia that crushed Charlie. At the state funeral in Islamabad, with a million Pakistanis and Mujahideen crowding up to him, Charlie made his way to Akhtar’s successor, Hamid Gul, and broke into tears. “I have lost my father on this day,” he said. [Reference: Charlie Wilson’s War The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History by George Crile]

She was Zia’s most trusted American adviser, as per Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, She absolutely had his ear, it was terrible,” “Zia would leave cabinet meetings just to take Joanne’s calls. “There was no affair with Zia,” Wilson recalls, but it’s impossible to deal with Joanne and not deal with her on sexual basis. No matter who you are, you take those phone calls.” [Page 67-68 Charlie Wilson’s War The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History by George Crile]

A new book, “Charlie Wilson’s War” by George Crile on the life and good times of a former US congressman is a frank pastiche of a lawmaker who helped Pakistan’s military ruler Gen. Ziaul Haq in procuring American money and weapons for the “holy war” against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. From humble beginnings in Lufkin, Texas, Congressman Charlie Wilson became an Israeli lobbyist and beneficiary of largesse bestowed upon him by the Jewish lobby in the United States and went on to become Ziaul Haq’s personal friend and confidant as they plotted to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan at times using Israeli supplied arms. Charlie Wilson still works as a lobbyist for Pakistan on Capitol Hill and he was spotted at every reception that former Pakistani ambassador Maleeha Lodhi hosted. Wilson, an avowed anti-Communist and anti-Indian, sat on the powerful US House Appropriations Committee. He managed to procure millions of dollars for America’s largest covert operation ever. He has been investigated several times by the FBI for using covert money to support his lifestyle. Wilson reveals in the book that he was introduced to Gen Ziaul Haq by the Houston socialite Joanne Herring who was appointed honorary Pakistani consul-general by the then ambassador of Pakistan, soon to become foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan, when Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was prime minister. Joanne Herring, described as the “Texas Bombshell” in addition to her role as “a social lioness and hostess to the powerful”, was credited with “setting in motion a process that would profoundly impact the outcome of the Afghan war”. “In the pivotal years of the Jihad, she (Herring) became both matchmaker and muse to Pakistan’s Muslim fundamentalist military dictator Ziaul Haq as well as scandal prone Charlie Wilson,” writes Crile. “Herring set the stage. She had called Zia from Houston on his private line and told him not to be put off by Wilson’s flamboyant appearance and not to pay attention to any stories of decadence that his diplomats might relate. She was adamant he win over US Congressman from Texas: he could become Pakistan’s most important ally.” Crile quotes Wilson in the book as saying that “Zia would leave cabinet meetings just to take Joanne’s calls”. When Zia made his maiden visit to the United States during the Reagan administration, he was much reviled by most Americans having hung Mr Bhutto. Ms Herring hosted a most lavish dinner for Zia at a Houston hotel where she defended Zia’s hanging of Bhutto, saying “Zia did not hang Bhutto. He was found guilty. President Zia did not commute the sentence because the Pakistani constitution based on the Quran did not allow it”. At that dinner, Crile writes, “Zia had dangerous decisions to make in the coming months about the CIA’s involvement in his inflamed North-West Frontier, and all of them centred on whether he could trust the United States. Joanne’s startling toast was strangely therapeutic for the much-maligned leader, who remembered how quickly Jimmy Carter had turned on him. In Houston that night, Joanne Herring saw to it that a host of powerful Americans actually honoured him. And that same night, Charlie Wilson provided yet another dimension to Zia’s growing partnership with the United States when he took the general into a side room for a private talk. The congressman had a novel proposition for the Muslim dictator. Would Zia be willing to deal with the Israelis? “This was not the sort of proposal just anyone could have made. But by now, the Pakistanis believed that Charlie Wilson had been decisive in getting them the disputed F-16 radar systems. As he saw it, Wilson had pulled off the impossible. Now the congressman, in his tuxedo, began to take Zia into the forbidden world where the Israelis were prepared to make deals no one need hear about. “He told Zia about his experience the previous year when the Israelis had shown him the vast stores of Soviet weapons they had captured from the PLO in Lebanon. The weapons were perfect for the mujahideen, he told Zia. If Wilson could persuade the CIA to buy them, would Zia have any problems passing them on to the Afghans? “Zia, ever the pragmatist, smiled on the proposal, adding, ‘Just don’t put any Stars of David on the boxes.” With that encouragement, Wilson pushed on. “Pakistan did not have diplomatic relations with Israel, and Wilson certainly had no authority to serve as a quasi secretary of state. In fact, with this kind of talk, the congressman was walking dangerously close to violating the Logan Act, which prohibits anyone other than the (US) president or his representatives from conducting foreign policy. But as the two rejoined Joanne’s party, Zia left the congressman with an understanding that he was authorized to begin secret negotiations to open back channels between Islamabad and Jerusalem. Wilson would leave for Israel in March and travel on to Pakistan to brief Zia immediately afterward. Crile says that the CIA man in Islamabad, Howard Hart, when asked years later, if he knew about Wilson’s efforts to bring the Israelis into the Afghan war, dismissed the story out of hand, insisting that the Pakistanis would never have permitted it. “I would have burst into hysterical laughter and locked myself in the bathroom before proposing such a thing,” he said. “It was bad enough for Zia to be dealing with the Americans, even secretly. But the Israelis were so beyond the pale that it would have been impossible. You have to understand that the Pakistanis were counting on maintaining the image of holding the high moral ground — of a religious brother helping a religious brother. It is beyond comprehension to have tried to bring the Israelis into it.” “Yet right under Hart’s nose,” Crile writes, “Wilson had proposed just such an arrangement, and Zia and his high command had signed on to implement it. Seven years later, Hart still knew nothing about it.” Charlie Wilson’s strategy called for introducing a new weapon into the battle every three months or so, in order to bluff the Red Army into thinking their enemy was better armed and supported than it was, “The Spanish mortar, for example, with its satellite-guided charge, was rarely deployed and may only have succeeded because the Pakistani ISI advisers were along to direct the fire. But the Soviets didn’t know that. When the weapon was first used it wiped out an entire Spetsnaz outpost with a volley of perfect strikes.” But ultimately it was the Reagan administration’s decision to covertly supply the mujahideen with Stinger missiles which changed the course of war. President Zia, Wilson is quoted as saying in the book, was unwilling to deploy Stingers in the war fearing that the Soviets would react harshly. As it is at Leonid Brezhnev’s funeral Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, had threatened “to destroy Zia if he didn’t cut off the Afghan bandits.” In his bid to persuade Zia to allow mujahideen to deploy Stingers, Wilson says that he told the general “that he should consider an important benefit beyond weapon’s battlefield value to mujahideen. The Stinger, he told Zia would become symbol of the special relationship that had been forged between United States and Pakistan.” Crile says Wilson’s importance to Zia and Pakistan went beyond money. “Every year the appropriations sub-committee members fought a battle royal over charges that Pakistan was actively pursuing an Islamic Bomb. And every year Wilson, sometimes single-handedly, beat back those accusations. The fact is, Pakistan was working on the bomb, as Wilson, the CIA and almost everyone knew. Furthermore it was not about to stop. The one thing all serious Pakistani politicians agreed on was the need for a nuclear deterrent. It was the only way, they believed, they could survive against militarily superior India, which had already overrun the country in three previous wars.” Thus, Crile says, “Zia knew that as long as Pakistan was backing the mujahideen, Charlie Wilson would be with them, whether they had the bomb or not.” Hence the crucial decision to deploy the Stingers was made by Zia. REFERENCE: Charlie Wilson’s war July 23, 2003 Wednesday Jumadi-ul-Awwal 22, 1424 http://archives.dawn.com/2003/07/23/fea.htm#2

Memogate storm in Pakistan & Mansoor Ijaz flip-flop on ISI - 3 (NDTV)

As the Memogate scandal continues to create ripples in the Pakistani establishment, all eyes now are centred on US-based Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz – better known as the ‘Memogate man’. He has finally secured a Pakistan visa to travel to the country to depose before a judicial commission that is probing the political scandal. NDTV‘s Barkha Dutt speaks to Ijaz amidst questions by the global media of why the latter missed his date with the court on the 16th of this month and what he would eventually say in his deposition. REFERENCE: I will be in Pakistan before the 26th: Mansoor Ijaz. 20th January 2012 http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/memogate-storm-in-pak-mansoor-ijaz-flip-flop-on-isi/221650?pfrom=home-lateststories&cp http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xru3kFPPttI

A comprehensive blueprint of how and in which direction future relations between Pakistan and the United States would, or should move, is circulating in Washington's three main centres of power the White House, the Senate and the House of Representatives and many believe that there may not be a better practical alternative. President Clinton has acknowledged it, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has adopted some of its proposals, Senator Larry Pressler agrees with most of it and the House of Representatives may not find a better "staged roadmap" to put U.S. Pakistan relations back on track, its sponsors claim. It has been put forward by some influential Pakistani-Americans in the form of a confidential memorandum which takes into account the pressing security and defence requirements of Islamabad as well as provides Washington a framework to achieve its own goals. The fine print, however, needs a deeper study. The man behind the whole idea is a 34-year old American of Pakistani origin, MIT and Harvard educated mechanical engineer turned nuclear physicist turned investment consultant who was introduced to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto by a senior Pakistani diplomat in Washington as "the silent billionaire". Mansoor Ijaz runs a billion dollar investment management firm, claims he dines with President Clinton, is a Managing Trustee of the Democratic Party's National Committee and a Majority Trust Member of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, says he makes heavy donations which do move things for him on the Hill, produces a stack of letters written by almost anyone who is someone on the Capitol Hill, and boasts of his business connections outside the U.S. He is adviser to Nelson Mandela's South Africa, manages investments for many other countries and maintains three homes in New York, Toronto and Paris. His credentials are impressive and CNN and the Dow Jones Business and Financial Weekly "Barron's" provide him international media recognition by interviewing him on investment matters repeatedly. He and his other friends, in similar well placed position, say they have laid the ground work for the changes that have started to show in the U.S. policy towards Pakistan (meaning others were just paying lip service) and they have been at this job eversince the Pressler sanctions were imposed. Their claims are hard to be accepted or rejected at their face value but what has actually taken place in favour of Pakistan including the change of heart in the White House, the sympathetic mood of the Senate and the bipartisan support for an even-handed policy in South Asia, was originally outlined in Mansoor Ijaz's confidential blueprint. That gives his claims a bit more credibility that any Pakistani Government official would make us believe. But this also rings many warning bells as the rest of his plan has some serious implications for Pakistan and its security. Mansoor minces no words in stating that Pakistan and the United States will have to enter into a wider security arrangement in which Washington would have to provide the security umbrella and Pakistan would safeguard the interests of the west in that region as strategically Islamabad is now the only country with which the Americans could have an alliance to check fundamentalism and international terrorism. "Yes what I mean is that the Americans have to be given bases to operate in that part of the world, because they cannot always remain onboard their air craft carriers," he argued with cold logic in a two hour discussion last week. His blue print suggests the same thing in camouflaged language, speaking of "strategic military cooperation" between the two countries. His words may have been taken by me as a routine boast of a well-placed Pakistani, many of whom are in the habit of exaggerating things to incredible limits, just to impress others about their reach and influence. But his words instantly reminded me of an important Congressman of the Democratic Party, David Bonior, who in a speech to the Pakistani American Congress, just a few days back talked of "common defence" between Pakistan and U.S. He had done so when the Ambassador of Pakistan, all other senior diplomats and many prominent Pakistanis were present and no one had questioned him. Ijaz's blueprint suggested modifications to the Pressler Amendment in three stages because easing the sanctions was "in the best national security interests of the United States and no one was interested in allowing Pakistan to fall under partial or complete control of the Iranians." These three stages were restoration of economic assistance, including OPIC, TDA and IMET in the first stage, allowing "non-control list" military spare parts and return of spare parts Pakistan had already paid for, increased military training and cooperation on anti-drug trafficking in stage two and going for strategic military cooperation in the third stage. No conditions were to be attached to the first two stages while the third stage had a hidden agenda, of roping in Pakistan's nuclear programme into the NPT net, if not directly by forcing Pakistan to sign the NPT, by persuading it to sign other international treaties like the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) or asking Islamabad to comply with the requirements of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House of Representatives have already approved the first two stages which would open economic assistance to Pakistan, reinstate OPIC cover for U.S. businesses, restore TDA paradigms and revive the military education and training programme (IMET) between the military establishments of the two countries. The blueprint had suggested there concessions in two stages but Ijaz says the Congress was in such a hurry that both the stages were crossed in one go. The argument he had put forward was that on these two stages there was a consensus that they were in the interest of the United States. His line of thought on restoring IMET was interesting. "For Pakistan the objective was clear: They need officer training and they want it from the best in the world. For its strategic long- term interests America can use the IMET forum to encourage the moderate elements in Pakistan's military (non-nuclear hawks and doves and non-religious extremists) to rise to the top ranks and thereby know intimately the type of minds that

are controlling the panic button...." "American military training will be a step towards containment of 'mullaism' and other forms of extremism as the educational paradigms of Pakistani military," the blueprint argued. "There is also a growing feeling among moderate Pakistani military strategists that if the U.S. wants to see more effective containment of inappropriate Iranian behaviour, America needs to cast a life raft to the Pakistani military-a military that is in essence 'out of shape' to properly withstand the current Iranian offensive," it said. "Military training and spare parts will relieve sufficiently the hawkish pressure on Benazir Bhutto to ask for 'all or none' terms on Pressler modification. It will also get her to the next election date without damaging no confidence motions in Parliament by Nawaz Sharif (a decided nuclear hawk) and give us sufficient time to evaluate the stability of Pakistan's economy, military and politics before engaging in more strategic arms equipment contracts," it argued. For these two stages, Pakistan was supposed to continue cooperation in U.N. peacekeeping missions as well as in other field like checking international terrorism drug trafficking, heroin production, illegal immigration and counterfeit money production, besides reporting tangible progress on existing and outstanding human rights and democracy issues. The third stage of the blue print was the crucial part and though the first two stages have already begun to be implemented, implementation of the last stage could bring in a lot more trouble than anticipated. This stage envisages a "broad range of possibilities, from 'control list' spare parts to strategic armaments that have non- nuclear capable characteristics, to consideration under appropriate conditionality of strategic weaponry that would serve U.S. national security objectives.." It said the time frame of this stage would depend on two critical issues. "First our conditionality on strategic military cooperation that Pakistan be a signatory to the successful negotiation of the FMCT for which the time frame of end of 1995 and early 1996 is indicated. Secondly, and in conjunction with the first issue, will be Pakistan taking tangible steps towards meeting the requirements of the MTCR including progress on the M-11 issue." The conditions stated in the blueprint are clear: Pakistan's inclusion in FMCT which means accepting verifications of the nuclear programme without actually signing the NPT. "FMCT is an elegant roadmap that achieves the most critical non-proliferation objectives of the U.S. within the existing framework of the NPT, without compromising the internal political sensitivities of the non-declared nuclear states," it says. The final proposal of the blueprint is after these three stages are crossed. It proposes that the President of the United States be given the flexibility, under the Pressler Amendment, to certify that the "proposed U.S. military assistance programme will reduce significantly the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their ballistic missile delivery systems." Ijaz explains that by including an "or" instead of an "and" in the Pressler Amendment, the President will be able to certify that in his view whatever military assistance was being provided to Pakistan would not help in its nuclear proliferation goals. "I can tell you that this blueprint is what meets the United States parameters of re writing the Pressler Amendment and it would be done on these lines, come what may. It has already begun to be implemented," he strongly argues brushing aside any other ideas that the Government of Pakistan or its Embassy in Washington may be floating. He says Pakistan should get its money back, keep the money in an escrow account, wait for the President to get the new certification powers and then negotiate the F-16 deal which would then be possible without any congressional interference. Whatever the reaction of the U.S. authorities on these plans and proposals, at least President Clinton acknowledges them. On May 26 Clinton wrote to Ijaz: "Dear Mansoor, Thank You for your letter regarding Pakistan and for your comments about my meeting with Prime Minister Bhutto. I welcome your input on this important matter." Said Clinton: "We need to continue working on ways to solve the difficulties that derive from the Pressler Amendment and the sanctions that have been in place since 1990. I informed the Prime Minister that I was prepared to seek relief from the sanctions and that we would explore our options for return of the F-16s and equipment or of the money that Pakistan paid for U.S. equipment before the sanctions went into effect. I will continue to work with Congress on this important issue. "I appreciate knowing your perspective, and I'am glad you took time to write," Sincerely, Bill Clinton. REFERENCE: Dateline Washington : A blueprint Pakistan cannot ignore Shaheen Sehbai DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending : 15 June, 1995 Issue : 01/23 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1995/15Je95.html#blue

Memogate storm in Pakistan & Mansoor Ijaz flip-flop on ISI - 4 (NDTV)

As the Memogate scandal continues to create ripples in the Pakistani establishment, all eyes now are centred on US-based Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz – better known as the ‘Memogate man’. He has finally secured a Pakistan visa to travel to the country to depose before a judicial commission that is probing the political scandal. NDTV‘s Barkha Dutt speaks to Ijaz amidst questions by the global media of why the latter missed his date with the court on the 16th of this month and what he would eventually say in his deposition. REFERENCE: I will be in Pakistan before the 26th: Mansoor Ijaz. 20th January 2012 http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/memogate-storm-in-pak-mansoor-ijaz-flip-flop-on-isi/221650?pfrom=home-lateststories&cp http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xru3kFPPttI

Soon after lush green meadows started reappearing from beneath the melting snow, the Indian Army and the paramilitary forces had begun relentless search operations and a crackdown in north Kashmir’s Kupwara district in the spring of 2000. Reason—the military intelligence (MI) sleuths from across the LoC had informed that Abdul Majeed Dar, chief operational commander of the only formidable Kashmiiri militant outfit Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) was missing from its headquarters in Muzaffarabad. According to intelligence inputs gathered by the MI and some other agencies, Dar was last seen travelling towards a border village to sneak into Indian territory. The air was already thick with rumours about his movements and meetings with the top brass of HM. Little did they know that external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had a major scoop up its sleeve. In a successful operation, they had airlifted Dar to Srinagar via Karachi, Dubai and Delhi in May 2000, to enable him to announce a unilateral ceasefire. And the man, who negotiated and mediated the short-lived truce, was believed to be Mansoor Ijaz, a Pakistani American businessman, now at the centre of controversy, nicknamed 'Memogate', that is taking a toll on the civilian government of Pakistan President Asif Zardari in Islamabad. Later, Ijaz was also involved in brokering a Kashmir solution between India and Pakistan in 2000 and 2001, as an unofficial interlocutor, it was claimed, for then United States President Bill Clinton. Though India opposes any third party mediation on Kashmir, the then National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee accorded Ijaz a status that befits only high-profile emissaries and, at least, on two occasions he visited Delhi on special "out-of-passport" visa, with full secrecy of his identity and itinerary. Ijaz made half a dozen trips to India and Pakistan at that time to arbitrate the Kashmir dispute. In an interaction with the media at a hotel in the outskirts of Delhi, he denied acting on behalf of the US government but claimed that he was drawn to the Kashmir problem because "oppressed people have no capacity to speak for themselves and stop violations that occur against them in the name of religion or politics or money." Ijaz, a nuclear physicist and a New York-based investment banker as also a member of the influential US Think Tank Council on Foreign Relations, had given contours of his efforts in an interview to Pakistani daily The News International on 25 December, 2001, seven months before the Agra summit between Vajpayee and President Musharraf Pervez failed, dashing the initiatives he had taken. He described the HM ceasefire as “a momentous event in the tumultuous history of the Kashmir valley,” which opened a door to search for an earnest resolution of the conflict.

Recalling his visit to Delhi, Ijaz heaped praise on Chandar D Sahay, then point-man on Kashmir in the RAW, (he later became its chief). Sahay, he believed, was the key man who made India's hawks understand that peace in Kashmir meant giving the Kashmiris a stake—economic, moral, emotional— in the success of their choice to remain with India or become a semi-autonomous region. “In my hotel suite in New Delhi in November 2000, I brought Sahay and a prominent Kashmiri activist, Yasin Malik, together after nearly a year of painstaking negotiations following the military coup in Pakistan,” he claimed. Maintaining that Malik had taken unprecedented risks in dealing with Sahay secretly, Ijaz claimed having persuaded even the toughest Kashmiri loyalist, Syed Geelani, to not oppose progress towards permanent peace. Ijaz revealed that Khalid Khawaja, a former ISI official, who had piloted Osama bin Laden's aircraft in Afghanistan during the Afghan resistance, had also taken unprecedented risks in bringing him in contact with Syed Salahuddin, the chief of HM and also allowed him to hand-carry his written messages back to President Clinton at the time. Khawaja was murdered by Taliban militants in April 2010. In his interview with The News International, Ijaz had claimed: "The process of empowering both civilian and militant Kashmiri voices remains the central objective of our efforts at present because a strong Kashmir provides Pakistan and India with face-saving exit strategies."

Ijaz also spoke of a mid-January 2001 meeting of political and militant leaders in Islamabad to set a common agenda for talks with New Delhi and take General Musharraf into confidence about the merits and rationale for the talks. "There will also be a clear effort made to deal with the so-called mercenary problem whether or not to allow non-indigenous Pakistani-backed insurgents a seat at the peace table. Once the internal agenda is agreed upon and the various Kashmiri parties are united on a message and a delegation, Indo-Kashmiri dialogue can begin," said he. Ijaz also referred to ground ceasefire modalities and a possible Musharraf-Vajpayee summit and said in that interview that "the Kashmiris will be free to suggest Pakistan's inclusion either partially or wholly in political dialogue aimed at a permanent solution. Delhi understands this as a condition for beginning talks with the Kashmiris." Stressing that "Pakistan is a party to the (Kashmir) dispute, Ijaz had gone on to affirm: "But General Musharraf is rapidly, flexibly and correctly adapting the Pakistani position to the reality that Islamabad's pursuit of Jihad-based resistance in Kashmir has not worked.

As head of state rather than just head of the army, his responsibility to the larger interests of the Pakistani people go far beyond the narrow pursuit of an ideological war that is decimating an innocent population while deeply scarring the image and vitality of Pakistan as a nation. "That is why General Musharraf is wisely preparing the people of Pakistan for a policy of maximum flexibility in its negotiating stance. By doing so, he accommodates growing Kashmiri willpower to test India's sincerity for peace and resolution while maintaining a firm bottom line that protects Pakistan's security interests." Ijaz’s 'Mission Kashmir' did not take toll on the Vajpayee government for allowing a mediator against India's declared policy as he always maintained a low profile unlike an article he wrote for a British paper last month to strengthen President Zardari’s stance, which boomeranged. He narrated how he felt threatened from encroachments by Pakistani Army chief General Ashfaq Kayani. If he is to be believed then Zardari had sought him out, after the US Navy Seal raid to extract Osama bin Laden from Abbottabad in May, to convey its insecurity to Admiral Mike Mullen, the then Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff and avowed "friend" of General Kayani to fend off a possible coup. Ijaz reportedly drafted and dispatched a secret "memo" portraying the Pakistani military as being part of the problem rather than the solution to America's dilemma in Afghanistan.

Once the "memogate" became public, Ijaz tried to prove his credibility by revealing all, even though he may no longer be sought by anyone any longer as a credible and confidential interlocutor. It is because of his reveal-all mess that the Pakistan military has turned its guns on Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan's ambassador to Washington. Running afoul of Musharraf in 2002 for his critical newspaper columns in Urdu and English, Haqqani had fled to the US where he wrote his seminal book on the unholy historical nexus between the mosque and military in Pakistan. Since he was appointed ambassador to Washington in 2008, the Pakistan military has since embarked upon a campaign to defame him, he reasoned. Iftikhar Gilani is a Special Correspondent with Tehelka.com. iftikhar@tehelka.com REFERENCE: Memogate’s Mansoor Ijaz was once an NDA guest The Pakistani-American businessman played a key role in facilitating talks between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir dispute Iftikhar Gilani New Delhi Posted on 21 November 2011 http://www.tehelka.com/story_main51.asp?filename=Ws211111Pakistan.asp

Memogate storm in Pakistan & Mansoor Ijaz flip-flop on ISI - 5 (NDTV)

As the Memogate scandal continues to create ripples in the Pakistani establishment, all eyes now are centred on US-based Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz – better known as the ‘Memogate man’. He has finally secured a Pakistan visa to travel to the country to depose before a judicial commission that is probing the political scandal. NDTV‘s Barkha Dutt speaks to Ijaz amidst questions by the global media of why the latter missed his date with the court on the 16th of this month and what he would eventually say in his deposition. REFERENCE: I will be in Pakistan before the 26th: Mansoor Ijaz. 20th January 2012 http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/memogate-storm-in-pak-mansoor-ijaz-flip-flop-on-isi/221650?pfrom=home-lateststories&cp http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xru3kFPPttI

ISLAMABAD: A spokesman for Husain Haqqani, former ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, has expressed surprise at the publication as an article of the diatribe by Mohammad Akram Sheikh, the lawyer for the American businessman responsible for the memo accusations. “It is sad and highly unprofessional for a lawyer representing a party in a case to simultaneously pretend to be an impartial commentator and The News should not have published the article,” the spokesman said in a rejoinder to Mohammad Akram Sheikh’s viewpoint ‘Memogate: Stop insulting our honourable judges’, published in The News on Thursday. Following is the text of the spokesman’s rejoinder: “Mr Akram Sheikh has attacked Mr Haqqani for crimes he never committed. For him to write such a personal attack on the person of Mr Haqqani, after having been his advocate as well as having known him personally for many years raises serious questions about the honourable counsel’s motives. Mr Haqqani respects Mr Akram Sheikh for ably defending him in the high court in 1999 and securing bail for him when the then government of Mr Nawaz Sharif put him through three days of torture and more than 70 days of detention on trumped up charges that were later thrown out by court. Mr Sheikh might have forgotten but many people remember Mr Sheikh offering sweets after the Musharraf coup in 1999, such was his bitterness against Mr Sharif. He had had fallen out with the Sharif government not because he had chosen to stand with Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, as he claims. The newspapers of the era testify that the real falling out was failure of Mian Nawaz Sharif to appoint Mr Sheikh as Attorney General of Pakistan. Mr Haqqani, on the other hand, stood by Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto consistently since joining the PPP in 1993. Mohtarma has given the only certificate Mr Haqqani needs of being “a loyal friend” in her final book, ‘Reconciliation.’

Mr Sheikh has cited distorted personal stories to suggest a close relationship between Mr Haqqani and the Musharraf regime in its early days. But Mr Haqqani could not have been as close to anyone in power as an eminent lawyer like Mr Sheikh at the time. If Mr Sheikh was made an offer to represent the military regime in court, that offer must have come from the well known legal and constitutional wizard and ‘Advisor’ to Musharraf with whom Mr Sheikh has maintained a very long association. Mr Sheikh did not need Mr Haqqani’s support or reference. Now that he has accepted his latest high profile client’s brief it is obvious that the only reason he refused a brief on behalf of the Musharraf regime must have been a case of the fee not being right. Only Mr Sheikh’s ethics allow him to write a lengthy article attacking a person without mentioning once that he represents his accuser in pending legal proceedings. Mr Sheikh sahib also objects to Mr Haqqani’s standing and respect in American academic circles though he never mentioned that criticism on any of the occasions he met Mr Haqqani during visits to the United States. The only valid response to an academic work based on research would be an equally well researched and coherent book that counters the arguments of Mr Haqqani’s international respected book. Someone whose entire life has depended solely on a loud voice and verbosity may never be able to find time to read Mr Haqqani’s 400-page book, let alone write one countering its arguments.

Mr Sheikh has also expressed irritation at the support Mr Haqqani has received from a large section of civil society. Mr Haqqani has no qualms in accepting the label of ‘Born again liberal.’ He has written sufficiently on his life journey explaining the transformation of his thought process and is proud of what he has achieved in terms of developing his critical thinking faculties. Mr Sheikh could next serve as a lawyer for Mumtaz Qadri if he so chooses and Mr Haqqani would have no problem with that. It is the culture of labeling people one disagrees with as ‘Kafirs’ or ‘traitors’ that all fair-minded Pakistanis object to. There is no justification of seeking to ridicule, abuse and lynch anyone who does not follow the ideological agenda of Mr Sheikh, whatever that might be. Mr Haqqani’s political stand is clear and he is thankful to all those who have supported him. In the so-called Memo case, he is confident of his innocence, leaving his lawyers make the legal arguments. Mr Haqqani fully respects the Supreme Court and Pakistan’s judiciary. His lawyers have submitted proper legal arguments before the honourable court and they still feel that they have a solid case. That is why they are moving the apex court for a review of its judgement. Before Mr Sheikh ventures into another diatribe against Mr Haqqani in print he should be mindful of the long association he has had with him. He may want to recall the day he wept in front of Mr Haqqani, seeking his assistance against the media propaganda campaign relating to his personal life that he claimed had been launched by the Nawaz Sharif government. At that time, Mr Sheikh did not accept Mr Haqqani’s advice to sue the newspapers, seeking support on the media front instead. Political lives have their ups and downs and lawyers must represent their clients but there is no reason to lower the level of discussion to make it vulgar or personal.” REFERENCE: Haqqani respects judiciary Friday, January 06, 2012 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=11531&Cat=13

LIE with General (R) Hamid Gul on ARY! AGAIN & AGAIN & AGAIN.

2012-01-31T03:59:00.000-08:00

Now, we come to the second generation of officers who were in key decision-making positions during 80s. Former Director General (DG) of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant General (Retd) Hameed Gul’s anti-American rhetoric in post-retirement phase makes headlines off and on in national news media. It is interesting that when he was DGISI, US ambassador attended the meetings of Afghan Cell of Benazir government. In fact the major decision of Jalalabad offensive in 1989 was made in one of those fateful meetings. To date there has been no evidence (no statement by any other participants of those meetings or by General Hameed Gul himself) that Mr. Gul made any objection to the presence of US ambassador in these meetings, which had wide ranging impact on national security. It is probable that Mr. Gul was at that time a top contender for the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) race, therefore he didn’t wanted to be on the wrong side of the civil government. When he was sacked, then he found the gospel truth that US was not sincere. Another example is of former Chief of Afghan Cell of ISI, Brigadier (Retd) Muhammad Yusuf. For five long years, he was a major participant in a joint CIA-ISI venture of unprecedented scale in Afghanistan. During this time period, he worked with several different level US officials and visited CIA headquarters in Langley. In his post-retirement memoirs, he tried his best to distance himself from the Americans. His statements like, ‘Relations between the CIA and ourselves were always strained’, ‘I resorted to trying to avoid contact with the local CIA staff’, ‘I never visited the US embassy’ and vehement denial of any direct contact between CIA and Mujahideen shows his uncomfortability of being seen as close with the Americans.5 Pakistan’s former foreign minister Agha Shahi in a conversation with Robert Wirsing said that in 1981 during negotiations with US, he gave a talk to a group of Pakistani generals on the objectives of Pakistan’s policy toward US. He stressed the importance of non-alignment and avoidance of over dependence on superpowers. Few days later one of the generals who attended Shahi’s briefing met him and told him that Americans should be given bases in return for the aid.6 The officer would not dare to make that statement public in view of the prevailing sentiments of the public. The hawkish generals of Zia reassured US about the full Pakistani support. John Reagan, the CIA station chief in Islamabad stated, “Their attitude was that Agha Shahi was doing his own thing, that we needn’t be concerned about it”.7 General Zia and DGISI Akhtar Abdur Rahman had very cordial relations with CIA director William Casey. To offset that uncomfortable closeness with Americans, Zia and Akhtar were portrayed as holy warriors of Islam and modern day Saladins. According to one close associate of Akhtar, ‘They (Casey and Akhtar) worked together in harmony, and in an atmosphere of mutual trust’.8 The most interesting remarks about the death of CIA Director, William Casey were made by Brigadier Yusuf. He states that, “It was a great blow to the Jehad when Casey died”.9 He did not elaborate whether by this definition one should count Casey as Shaheed (warrior who dies in battle in the cause of Islam). It will quite be amusing for Americans to know that one of their former CIA director is actually a martyr of Islam. In fifty-five years, we have come full circle, and in 2002, a retired Major General laments about the US and gives a long list of grievances. He states, “Discarding General Ziaul Haq when no more needed must never be forgotten. The treatment meted out to Pakistan after the victory in Afghanistan in late eighties cannot be forgiven ... It can be safely presumed that before mobilizing its armed forces on the borders of Pakistan, the US has (take it for sure) given a nod to India... Remember the visit of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the USA and getting a silent approval from there before attacking East Pakistan in 1971. And the Pakistanis kept waiting for the seventh fleet to come to our rescue... They have already done a great damage to Pakistan by imposing an anti-Pakistan government in Afghanistan”.10 Very limited knowledge, paranoia, disregard of the facts, total lack of perception and extreme simplicity is quite evident from the statement and not a very good sign of the intellectual level of senior officers at highest decision making process. REFERENCE: Tale of a love affair that never was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations Columnist Hamid Hussain analyses an ON and OFF affair. http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/june/loveaffair.htm

General Hamid Gul supported Pervez Musharraf on 12 Oct 1999

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRXOjCGcoRI

Hamid Gul, a retired general, accuses Mr Sharif of having presided over an administration which had failed to deliver the goods. "Sharif turned out to be a great destroyer of national institutions," he told the BBC. "Look at what he did to the judiciary. "He stripped them of power, put a set of judges against the chief justice, did the same to the press. "He gagged the parliament and finally he wanted to do the same to the army." REFERENCE: World: South Asia Pakistan's coup: Why the army acted Wednesday, October 13, 1999 Published at 23:20 GMT 00:20 UK http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/473297.stm

On 26th January 2012, General (R) Hamid Gul shamelessly lied again on many thing and shamelessly declared that Objective Resolution should be declared National Motto, he also praised General Ziaul Haq for many pristine qualities whereas the truth is this that General Zia himself subverted the Objective Resolution which is recently unearthed by the none other than the Supreme Judiciary of Pakistan.

ISLAMABAD: Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry remarked that it was a criminal negligence to bring changes in the documents like Objectives Resolution as former president General (retd) Zia ul Haq tampered with the Constitution in 1985 however, the sitting parliament had done a good job by undoing this tampering. At one point Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry observed that the word ‘freely’ was omitted from the Objectives Resolution in 1985 by a dictator, which was an act of criminal negligence, but the then parliament surprisingly didn’t take notice of it. He said the Constitution is a sacred document and no person can tamper with it. The chief justice said credit must go to the present parliament, which after 25 years took notice of the brazen act of removing the word relating to the minorities’ rights, and restored the word ‘freely’ in the Objectives Resolution, which had always been part of the Constitution. The chief justice further said that the court is protecting the fundamental rights of the minorities and the government after the Gojra incident has provided full protection to the minorities. “We are bound to protect their rights as a nation but there are some individual who create trouble.” - DAILY TIMES - ISLAMABAD: Heading a 17-member larger bench of the Supreme Court on Tuesday, Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry termed as criminal negligence the deletion of a word about the rights of minorities from the Objectives Resolution during the regime of General Ziaul Haq in 1985. Ziaul Haq had omitted the word “freely” from the Objectives Resolution, which was made substantive part of the 1973 Constitution under the Revival of Constitutional Order No. 14. The clause of Objectives Resolution before deletion of the word ‘freely’ read, “Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to ‘freely’ profess and practice their religions and develop their culture.” DAILY DAWN - ISLAMABAD: Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry on Tuesday praised the parliament for undoing a wrong done by the legislature in 1985 (through a constitutional amendment) when it removed the word ‘freely’ from a clause of the Objectives Resolution that upheld the minorities’ right to practise their religion. The word “freely” was deleted from the Objectives Resolution when parliament passed the 8th Amendment after indemnifying all orders introduced through the President’s Order No 14 of 1985 and actions, including the July 1977 military takeover by Gen Zia-ul-Haq and extending discretion of dissolving the National Assembly, by invoking Article 58(2)b of the Constitution. After the passage of the 18th Amendment, the Objectives Resolution now reads: “Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their culture.” The CJ said: “Credit goes to the sitting parliament that they reinserted the word back to the Objectives Resolution.” He said that nobody realised the blunder right from 1985 till the 18th Amendment was passed, even though the Objectives Resolution was a preamble to the Constitution even at the time when RCO (Revival of Constitution Order) was promulgated. REFERENCES: CJ lauds parliament for correcting historic wrong By Nasir Iqbal Wednesday, 09 Jun, 2010 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/ziaera-deletion-from-objectives-resolution-criticised-cj-lauds-parliament-for-correcting-historic-wrong-960 - CJP raps change in Objectives Resolution * Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry says deletion of clause on rights of minorities was ‘criminal negligence’ * Appreciates incumbent parliament for taking notice of removal of clause by Gen Zia’s govt in 1985 By Masood Rehman Wednesday, June 09, 2010 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=201069\story_9-6-2010_pg1_1 CJ lauds parliament for undoing changes in Objectives Resolution Wednesday, June 09, 2010 Says minorities’ rights have to be protected; Hamid says parliament should have no role in judges’ appointment By Sohail Khan http://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=29367

General (R) Hamid Gul dubious Role after General Zia's Death

When I got to Pakistan in February and called upon General Hamid Gul, the Director General of the ISI, I found out that political events had apparently overtaken this mandate. He told me that his agency had called off its investigation at the request of the government and had transferred the responsibility for it to a "broader based" government authority headed by a civil servant called F.K. Bandial. It was not using the resources of his intelligence service and, as far as he knew that committee had not begun the work. His tone suggested that, he did not expect any immediate resolution of the crime. REFERENCE: Who Killed Zia? VANITY FAIR September 1989 by Edward Jay Epstein http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/archived/zia_print.htm http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/archived/zia.htm

LIE with General (R) Hamid Gul on ARY - 1 (Off the Record 26 Jan 2012)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZvY8UT7SM4Q

One week after a major explosion at a Pakistani ammunition dump, Defense Department officials say that they believe that the explosion was the work of agents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. The United States still has no firm proof that this was an act of sabotage, according to Administration officials. And some experts at the Central Intelligence Agency are said to believe that it is possible that the explosion was an accident. One Government expert said the ''overwhelming majority'' of the equipment at the installation was intended for the Afghan guerrillas. He said the supplies that were destroyed included Stinger antiaircraft missiles, antitank missiles and long-range mortars. This expert said the Stinger missiles destroyed in the blast constituted about one-third of the total supply of antiaircraft missile systems for the Afghan guerrillas. A Defense Department official said the explosion fits a pattern of recent attacks against military and civilian installations in Pakistan by agents of the Kabul regime. Comments Are Contradictory. ''Our opinion is that it was sabotage,'' said the Defense Department official, referring to the explosion last week. The explosion occurred last Sunday in an ammunition depot between the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. The explosion killed at least 93 people and wounded about 1,100 people. Pakistani leaders have made contradictory comments about the blast. At first, President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq called the explosion ''an extraordinary accident.'' But on Friday, President Zia said the blast was the result of sabotage. Over the last week, there have been differing intelligence reports about the possible cause of the explosion. One report said the blast was triggered when a truck bearing Afghan license plates and carrying an incendiary device entered the compound and exploded. Another report suggested the explosion might have been triggered when a Pakistani enlisted man dropped a white phosphorous shell. Circumstances Assessed Defense Department officials say they believe that the blast was the result of sabotage because of the circumstances surrounding the explosion. One Defense Department official said the explosion appeared to be part of a pattern of attacks last weekend, including an attempted rocket attack on an oil storage installation in Peshawar that ''didn't work,'' a fire at an ordnance factory in Lahore and a bomb that was discovered and defused in Islamabad. A State Department official offered a more cautious assessment. ''It could have been an accident. But it could equally have been sabotage.'' Officials at the Defense Department and the State Department disagree about what action the United States should now take in light of the explosion, according to a Government official. Guerrillas' Needs Cited. Defense Department officials are reported to have argued that the weapons destroyed are relatively long-range ones that are needed by the guerrillas to attack well-defended garrisons as well as Kabul, the fortified seat of the Soviet-supported regime. Defense Department officials are reported to have argued that more weapons of this type should be sent to the Afghan rebels. They have reportedly asserted that Soviet forces have recently been trying to destroy caches of the guerrillas' arms in Afghanistan in an effort to prolong the life of the Kabul regime. But State Department officials insist the significance of the explosion is exaggerated. One State Department official said that the Afghan rebels had a ''big cushion'' of weapons and said that the explosion would ''not have a big effect.'' This official added that he did not expect very intense fighting over the next couple of weeks, since the Russians appear to be intent on keeping casualties down while withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan. He asserted that the United States had been ''planning conservatively'' by sending significant quantities of weapons to insure that the Afghan guerrillas will have all the arms they need. A Defense Department official said that the United States did not believe that a bomb attack last weekend at a Saudi Arabian airlines office in Karachi was the work of the Kabul agents. He said that the United States believed that this bombing was the work of Iran, which is trying to strike back at Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has said that it would restrict the number of Iranian pilgrims to Mecca this year because of demonstrations by Iranian pilgrims in Mecca last summer. U.S. Officials Link Pakistan Blast to Kabul Regime By MICHAEL R. GORDON, Special to the New York Times Published: April 17, 1988 http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/17/world/us-officials-link-pakistan-blast-to-kabul-regime.html http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/17/world/us-officials-link-pakistan-blast-to-kabul-regime.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm

LIE with General (R) Hamid Gul on ARY - 2 (Off the Record 26 Jan 2012)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kt75YzZy4eI

ISLAMABAD, April 9: Twenty years have passed but the images of destruction caused by the Ojhri Camp disaster are still fresh in the minds of many residents of Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Over 100 men, women and children were killed and many times more were wounded by the missiles and projectiles which exploded mysteriously and rained death and destruction on the twin cities on this day in 1988. Physical scars of the tragedy may have healed but the nation is unaware till this day what, and who, caused that disaster and why. An investigation was conducted into the disaster but, like in the case of all other probes into national tragedies, its report was not made public. The then prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo appointed two committees, one military and the other parliamentary, to probe the military disaster. His action so infuriated military dictator Gen Ziaul Haq that he dismissed his handpicked prime minister on May 29, 1988 - the main charge being that he failed to implement Islam in the country. While the parliamentary committee, headed by old politician Aslam Khattak, went out with the Junejo government, the military committee under Gen Imranullah Khan submitted its report before the government’s dismissal. Subsequent governments of prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif which followed Gen Zia’s fiery death in a mysterious plane crash on August 17, 1988, also kept Gen Imranullah Khan’s findings under covers. Some opposition members called for making it public during the last five years of Gen Pervez Musharraf’s military rule but the PML-Q government took the position that it would not be “in the larger national interest”. Neither political observers expect the PPP and the PML-N doing so even when they have been swept into power again by the people and run a coalition government. Interestingly, when contacted, leaders of both the parties agreed that the Ojhri Camp inquiry report should be made public but refused to commit to do so. Junejo’s defence minister Rana Naeem Ahmed had told Dawn in an interview last year that he had received the report but said it did not fix responsibility on any one and declared the huge disaster an accident. Even then the ISI seized it in a raid on his office the day after the Junejo government was dismissed, he claimed. “They returned all my belongings, except the briefcase that contained the report,” he said, disclosing that the report was inconclusive and focused just on the causes of the blast. It was a bright and sunny morning on April 10, 1988, when the citizens of Islamabad and Rawalpindi were startled by huge explosions and swishing sounds as if fireworks were going off. Thousands of missiles and projectiles soon started raining down on the two cities the Ojhri Ammunition Depot, situated in the densely-populated Faizabad area, blew up. Officially the death toll was 30, but independent estimates put the figure much higher. Prominent among those killed was a federal minister Khaqan Abbasi whose car was hit by a flying missile while he was on his way to Murree, his hometown. His son accompanying him was hit in the head. He went into deep coma and died some two years ago after remaining on artificial respiration for 17 years. The Ojhri Camp was used as an ammunition depot to forward US-supplied arms to Afghan Mujahideen fighting against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. There were reports that a Pentagon team was about to arrive to take audit of the stocks of the weapons and that allegedly the camp was blown up deliberately to cover up pilferage from the stocks. Some reports said that Ojhri Camp had about 30,000 rockets, millions of rounds of ammunition, vast number of mines, anti-aircraft Stinger missiles, anti-tank missiles, multiple-barrel rocket launchers and mortars worth $100 million in store at the time of blasts that destroyed all records and most of the weapons thus making it impossible for anyone to check the stocks. Prime minister Junejo had promised to the National Assembly that the inquiry report would be made public and the guilty would be punished but was sacked by Gen Zia. Senior members of the PPP and the PML-N admit that their governments in the past made no serious effort to make the report public. A PPP member however claimed that the second Benazir Bhutto government did attempt to do that but failed due to resistance from the “concerned quarters”. There are some elements in the Charter of Democracy, signed by the PPP and the PML-N, which could be pursued to make such reports public, he said. REFERENCE: 20 years on, Ojhri Camp truth remains locked up By Amir Wasim April 11, 2008 Friday Rabi-us-Sani 4, 1429 http://archives.dawn.com/2008/04/11/nat26.htm

A recently published book of Begum Kalsoom Saifullah `Meri Tanha Parvaz` (My Solo Flight) is selling quickly in the local market because of its controversial material. However, some of the disclosures in the book have created a breach among PML-Like-minded leaders. The first edition of Ms Safiullah`s autobiography was released on Wednesday (Sept 14) but the second one will not come for sale unless some of its chapters are withdrawn or removed. In the book, Begum Safiullah narrates the events of her 50 years worth of political experience. The author relates her version of the truth from the time of former Prime Minister and founder of present ruling Pakistan People`s Party (PPP) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto`s (ZAB) era to Nawaz Sharif`s tenure as prime minister in her autobiography. Her book includes her experiences of working with ZAB and other political figures as well as high ranking military officials. Ms Safiullah started writing the book two years ago when she probably had not considered the possibility that those very same people who she labels “opportunists” would later end up as political aides for her sons. “Gen Zia once told me when he came to Peshawar, he brought his wife in a Tonga. Similarly, Gen Akhtar Abdur Rehman told me that he could not even afford to buy a cycle. However, these people went on accumulating wealth and property in a manner which is incomprehensible,” she wrote. However, since writing these words and including other allegations in her book, her son Salim Saifullah, along with other leaders of Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q) have made a separate faction within the party. Furthermore, her son became the head of PML-Likeminded group and Humayum Akhtar, son of Gen Akhtar Abdul Rehman, acquired the position of secretary general in the disgruntled faction. “We are in trouble because I am president of the party and the book annoyed my secretary general Humayun Akhtar,” said Salim Saifullah. In order to control the damage, Saifullah`s family tendered an apology to General Akhtar`s family. “We tendered our apologies not only to General Akhtar`s family but also to others who have been hurt by Begum Kalsoom`s revelations,” said Mr Saifullah. Mr Saifullah blamed the editor of the book instead of the author for what should not have been published in the autobiography. “I did not go through the book as I was out of the country and my elder brother Anwar Saifullah was handling the publication, but it is the editor`s fault that he did not remove controversial paragraphs from the book. My mother first met General Akhtar when he was a serving general and what she wrote about his past was on the basis of what she had heard from others.” Humanyun Akhtar said that Begum Kulsoom and Senator Salim Saifullah Khan contacted his family and apologised for the book`s comments about his father. “Begum Kulsoom is a very illustrious lady but because of old age and her eyesight problem, the book has been written and edited by other people. As a result these remarks inadvertently appeared in the book,” he said. He added: “Saifullah`s family assured us these remarks have been removed from all the remaining books and any future publications of it.” Interestingly, although Begum Kalsoom`s book has been distributed to book shops in large numbers, Salim Saifullah says that only 2,000 were originally marketed and that no new edition would be sent to the market for sale unless controversial remarks are removed from it. Book sellers in Islamabad said the book is doing good business and a large number of people are coming to buy it. The cost of the book is Rs500. “We have sold 300 books in only two days but we have been asked that the new edition be sent after some corrections,” said an employee of Mr Books in Jinnah Super Market. However, nothing can be done with the sold books and no one can be stopped in future from quoting it in their writings and speeches. Some other interesting disclosures in the book are that: ZAB could have saved his life had he controlled his tongue in the jail. ZAB`s attitude was rigid and inflexible after his arrest. During Bhutto`s imprisonment, some of his colleagues were busy arranging their marriages. On the Ojhri Camp tragedy, the author wrote, “I can confidently say that some Stinger missiles were taken out of the Ojhri Camp on orders from General Zia so that they can be provided to Iran, and Gen Zia ordered that Ojhri Camp be blown up before the arrival of the US inspection team.” REFERENCE: Begum Saifullah`s book lands Like-minded in trouble Syed Irfan Raza September 18, 2011 http://www.dawn.com/2011/09/18/begum-saifullahs-book-lands-like-minded-in-trouble.html Begum Sahiba’s not-so-solo flight by Waseem Altaf Hamuyun threw one crore rupees on the table and then asked the other party to begin the negotiations. This was being done by someone whose father could not even afford a bicycle http://www.viewpointonline.net/begum-sahibas-not-so-solo-flight.html

LIE with General (R) Hamid Gul on ARY - 3 (Off the Record 26 Jan 2012)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkX6Epsg75w

Steve Coll ends his important book on Afghanistan -- Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to 10 September 2001 http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1594200076/nationbooks08 --by quoting Afghan President Hamid Karzai:"What an unlucky country." Americans might find this a convenient way to ignore what their government did in Afghanistan between 1979 and the present, but luck had nothing to do with it. Brutal, incompetent, secret operations of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, frequently manipulated by the military intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, caused the catastrophic devastation of this poor country. On the evidence contained in Coll's book Ghost Wars, neither the Americans nor their victims in numerous Muslim and Third World countries will ever know peace until the Central Intelligence Agency has been abolished.

It should by now be generally accepted that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 was deliberately provoked by the United States. In his memoir published in 1996, the former CIA director Robert Gates made it clear that the American intelligence services began to aid the mujahidin guerrillas not after the Soviet invasion, but six months before it. In an interview two years later with Le Nouvel Observateur, President Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski proudly confirmed Gates's assertion."According to the official version of history," Brzezinski said,"CIA aid to the mujahidin began during 1980, that's to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. But the reality, kept secret until now, is completely different: on 3 July 1979 President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And on the same day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained that in my opinion this aid would lead to a Soviet military intervention."

Asked whether he in any way regretted these actions, Brzezinski replied:

Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea. It drew the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? On the day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, saying, in essence: 'We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.'

Nouvel Observateur:"And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists?"

Brzezinski:"What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?"

Even though the demise of the Soviet Union owes more to Mikhail Gorbachev than to Afghanistan's partisans, Brzezinski certainly helped produce"agitated Muslims," and the consequences have been obvious ever since. Carter, Brzezinski and their successors in the Reagan and first Bush administrations, including Gates, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, and Colin Powell, all bear some responsibility for the 1.8 million Afghan casualties, 2.6 million refugees, and 10 million unexploded land-mines that followed from their decisions. They must also share the blame for the blowback that struck New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. After all, al-Qaida was an organization they helped create and arm.

A Wind Blows in from Afghanistan

The term"blowback" first appeared in a classified CIA post-action report on the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953, carried out in the interests of British Petroleum. In 2000, James Risen of the New York Times explained:"When the Central Intelligence Agency helped overthrow Muhammad Mossadegh as Iran's prime minister in 1953, ensuring another 25 years of rule for Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the CIA was already figuring that its first effort to topple a foreign government would not be its last. The CIA, then just six years old and deeply committed to winning the Cold War, viewed its covert action in Iran as a blueprint for coup plots elsewhere around the world, and so commissioned a secret history to detail for future generations of CIA operatives how it had been done . . . Amid the sometimes curious argot of the spy world -- 'safebases' and 'assets' and the like -- the CIA warns of the possibilities of 'blowback.' The word . . . has since come into use as shorthand for the unintended consequences of covert operations."

"Blowback" does not refer simply to reactions to historical events but more specifically to reactions to operations carried out by the U.S. government that are kept secret from the American public and from most of their representatives in Congress. This means that when civilians become victims of a retaliatory strike, they are at first unable to put it in context or to understand the sequence of events that led up to it. Even though the American people may not know what has been done in their name, those on the receiving end certainly do: they include the people of Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1959 to the present), Congo (1960), Brazil (1964), Indonesia (1965), Vietnam (1961-73), Laos (1961-73), Cambodia (1969-73), Greece (1967-73), Chile (1973), Afghanistan (1979 to the present), El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua (1980s), and Iraq (1991 to the present). Not surprisingly, sometimes these victims try to get even.

There is a direct line between the attacks on September 11, 2001 -- the most significant instance of blowback in the history of the CIA -- and the events of 1979. In that year, revolutionaries threw both the Shah and the Americans out of Iran, and the CIA, with full presidential authority, began its largest ever clandestine operation: the secret arming of Afghan freedom fighters to wage a proxy war against the Soviet Union, which involved the recruitment and training of militants from all over the Islamic world. Steve Coll's book is a classic study of blowback and is a better, fuller reconstruction of this history than the Final Report http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393326713/nationbooks08 of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the"9/11 Commission Report" published by Norton in July).

From 1989 to 1992, Coll was the Washington Post's South Asia bureau chief, based in New Delhi. Given the CIA's paranoid and often self-defeating secrecy, what makes his book especially interesting is how he came to know what he claims to know. He has read everything on the Afghan insurgency and the civil wars that followed, and has been given access to the original manuscript of Robert Gates's memoir (Gates was CIA director from 1991 to 1993), but his main source is some two hundred interviews conducted between the autumn of 2001 and the summer of 2003 with numerous CIA officials as well as politicians, military officers, and spies from all the countries involved except Russia. He identifies CIA officials only if their names have already been made public. Many of his most important interviews were on the record and he quotes from them extensively.

Among the notable figures who agreed to be interviewed are Benazir Bhutto, who is candid about having lied to American officials for two years about Pakistan's aid to the Taliban, and Anthony Lake, the U.S. national security adviser from 1993 to 1997, who lets it be known that he thought CIA director James Woolsey was"arrogant, tin-eared and brittle." Woolsey was so disliked by Clinton that when an apparent suicide pilot crashed a single-engine Cessna airplane on the south lawn of the White House in 1994, jokers suggested it might be the CIA director trying to get an appointment with the President.

Among the CIA people who talked to Coll are Gates; Woolsey; Howard Hart, Islamabad station chief in 1981; Clair George, former head of clandestine operations; William Piekney, Islamabad station chief from 1984 to 1986; Cofer Black, Khartoum station chief in the mid-1990s and director of the Counterterrorist Center from 1999-2002; Fred Hitz, a former CIA Inspector General; Thomas Twetten, Deputy Director of Operations, 1991-1993; Milton Bearden, chief of station at Islamabad, 1986 -1989; Duane R."Dewey" Clarridge, head of the Counterterrorist Center from 1986 to 1988; Vincent Cannistraro, an officer in the Counterterrorist Center shortly after it was opened in 1986; and an official Coll identifies only as"Mike," the head of the"bin Laden Unit" within the Counterterrorist Center from 1997 to 1999, who was subsequently revealed to be Michael F. Scheuer, the anonymous author of Imperial Hubris: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1574888498/nationbooks08 Why the West is Losing the War on Terror. (See Eric Lichtblau, "CIA Officer Denounces Agency and Sept. 11 Report")

In 1973, General Sardar Mohammed Daoud, the cousin and brother-in-law of King Zahir Shah, overthrew the king, declared Afghanistan a republic, and instituted a program of modernization. Zahir Shah went into exile in Rome. These developments made possible the rise of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a pro-Soviet communist party, which, in early 1978, with extensive help from the USSR, overthrew President Daoud. The communists' policies of secularization in turn provoked a violent response from devout Islamists. The anti-Communist revolt that began at Herat in western Afghanistan in March 1979 originated in a government initiative to teach girls to read. The fundamentalist Afghans opposed to this were supported by a triumvirate of nations -- the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia -- with quite diverse motives, but the U.S. didn't take these differences seriously until it was too late. By the time the Americans woke up, at the end of the 1990s, the radical Islamist Taliban had established its government in Kabul. Recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, it granted Osama bin Laden freedom of action and offered him protection from American efforts to capture or kill him.

Coll concludes:

The Afghan government that the United States eventually chose to support beginning in the late autumn of 2001 -- a federation of Massoud's organization [the Northern warlords], exiled intellectuals and royalist Pashtuns -- was available for sponsorship a decade before, but the United States could not see a reason then to challenge the alternative, radical Islamist vision promoted by Pakistani and Saudi intelligence . . . Indifference, lassitude, blindness, paralysis and commercial greed too often shaped American foreign policy in Afghanistan and South Asia during the 1990s.

Funding the Fundamentalists

The motives of the White House and the CIA were shaped by the Cold War: a determination to kill as many Soviet soldiers as possible and the desire to restore some aura of rugged machismo as well as credibility that U.S. leaders feared they had lost when the Shah of Iran was overthrown. The CIA had no intricate strategy for the war it was unleashing in Afghanistan. Howard Hart, the agency's representative in the Pakistani capital, told Coll that he understood his orders as:"You're a young man; here's your bag of money, go raise hell. Don't fuck it up, just go out there and kill Soviets." These orders came from a most peculiar American. William Casey, the CIA's director from January 1981 to January 1987, was a Catholic Knight of Malta educated by Jesuits. Statues of the Virgin Mary filled his mansion, called"Maryknoll," on Long Island. He attended mass daily and urged Christianity on anyone who asked his advice. Once settled as CIA director under Reagan, he began to funnel covert action funds through the Catholic Church to anti-Communists in Poland and Central America, sometimes in violation of American law. He believed fervently that by increasing the Catholic Church's reach and power he could contain Communism's advance, or reverse it. From Casey's convictions grew the most important U.S. foreign policies of the 1980s -- support for an international anti-Soviet crusade in Afghanistan and sponsorship of state terrorism in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

Casey knew next to nothing about Islamic fundamentalism or the grievances of Middle Eastern nations against Western imperialism. He saw political Islam and the Catholic Church as natural allies in the counter-strategy of covert action to thwart Soviet imperialism. He believed that the USSR was trying to strike at the U.S. in Central America and in the oil-producing states of the Middle East. He supported Islam as a counter to the Soviet Union's atheism, and Coll suggests that he sometimes conflated lay Catholic organizations such as Opus Dei with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian extremist organization, of which Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's chief lieutenant, was a passionate member. The Muslim Brotherhood's branch in Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami, was strongly backed by the Pakistani army, and Coll writes that Casey, more than any other American, was responsible for welding the alliance of the CIA, Saudi intelligence, and the army of General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan's military dictator from 1977 to 1988. On the suggestion of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization, Casey went so far as to print thousands of copies of the Koran, which he shipped to the Afghan frontier for distribution in Afghanistan and Soviet Uzbekistan. He also fomented, without presidential authority, Muslim attacks inside the USSR and always held that the CIA's clandestine officers were too timid. He preferred the type represented by his friend Oliver North.

Over time, Casey's position hardened into CIA dogma, which its agents, protected by secrecy from ever having their ignorance exposed, enforced in every way they could. The agency resolutely refused to help choose winners and losers among the Afghan jihad's guerrilla leaders. The result, according to Coll, was that"Zia-ul-Haq's political and religious agenda in Afghanistan gradually became the CIA's own." In the era after Casey, some scholars, journalists, and members of Congress questioned the agency's lavish support of the Pakistan-backed Islamist general Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, especially after he refused to shake hands with Ronald Reagan because he was an infidel. But Milton Bearden, the Islamabad station chief from 1986 to 1989, and Frank Anderson, chief of the Afghan task force at Langley, vehemently defended Hekmatyar on the grounds that"he fielded the most effective anti-Soviet fighters."

Even after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988, the CIA continued to follow Pakistani initiatives, such as aiding Hekmatyar's successor, Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban. When Edmund McWilliams, the State Department's special envoy to the Afghan resistance in 1988-89, wrote that"American authority and billions of dollars in taxpayer funding had been hijacked at the war's end by a ruthless anti-American cabal of Islamists and Pakistani intelligence officers determined to impose their will on Afghanistan," CIA officials denounced him and planted stories in the embassy that he might be homosexual or an alcoholic. Meanwhile, Afghanistan descended into one of the most horrific civil wars of the 20th century. The CIA never fully corrected its naive and ill-informed reading of Afghan politics until after bin Laden bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998.

Fair-weather Friends

A co-operative agreement between the U.S. and Pakistan was anything but natural or based on mutual interests. Only two weeks after radical students seized the American Embassy in Tehran on November 5, 1979, a similar group of Islamic radicals burned to the ground the American Embassy in Islamabad as Zia's troops stood idly by. But the U.S. was willing to overlook almost anything the Pakistani dictator did in order to keep him committed to the anti-Soviet jihad. After the Soviet invasion, Brzezinski wrote to Carter:"This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy." History will record whether Brzezinski made an intelligent decision in giving a green light to Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons in return for assisting the anti-Soviet insurgency.

Pakistan's motives in Afghanistan were very different from those of the U.S. Zia was a devout Muslim and a passionate supporter of Islamist groups in his own country, in Afghanistan, and throughout the world. But he was not a fanatic and had some quite practical reasons for supporting Islamic radicals in Afghanistan. He probably would not have been included in the U.S. Embassy's annual"beard census" of Pakistani military officers, which recorded the number of officer graduates and serving generals who kept their beards in accordance with Islamic traditions as an unobtrusive measure of increasing or declining religious radicalism -- Zia had only a moustache.

From the beginning, Zia demanded that all weapons and aid for the Afghans from whatever source pass through ISI hands. The CIA was delighted to agree. Zia feared above all that Pakistan would be squeezed between a Soviet-dominated Afghanistan and a hostile India. He also had to guard against a Pashtun independence movement that, if successful, would break up Pakistan. In other words, he backed the Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan on religious grounds but was quite prepared to use them strategically. In doing so, he laid the foundations for Pakistan's anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir in the 1990s.

Zia died in a mysterious plane crash on August 17, 1988, four months after the signing of the Geneva Accords on April 14, 1988, which ratified the formal terms of the Soviet withdrawal. As the Soviet troops departed, Hekmatyar embarked on a clandestine plan to eliminate his rivals and establish his Islamic party, dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, as the most powerful national force in Afghanistan. The U.S. scarcely paid attention, but continued to support Pakistan. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the implosion of the USSR in 1991, the U.S. lost virtually all interest in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was never as good as the CIA thought he was, and with the creation in 1994 of the Taliban, both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia transferred their secret support. This new group of jihadis proved to be the most militarily effective of the warring groups. On September 26, 1996, the Taliban conquered Kabul. The next day they killed the formerly Soviet-backed President Najibullah, expelled 8,000 female undergraduate students from Kabul University, and fired a similar number of women schoolteachers. As the mujahidin closed in on his palace, Najibullah told reporters:"If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will continue for many years. Afghanistan will turn into a center of world smuggling for narcotic drugs. Afghanistan will be turned into a center for terrorism." His comments would prove all too accurate.

Pakistan's military intelligence officers hated Benazir Bhutto, Zia's elected successor, but she, like all post-Zia heads of state, including General Pervez Musharraf, supported the Taliban in pursuit of Zia's"dream" -- a loyal, Pashtun-led Islamist government in Kabul. Coll explains:

Every Pakistani general, liberal or religious, believed in the jihadists by 1999, not from personal Islamic conviction, in most cases, but because the jihadists had proved themselves over many years as the one force able to frighten, flummox and bog down the Hindu-dominated Indian army. About a dozen Indian divisions had been tied up in Kashmir during the late 1990s to suppress a few thousand well-trained, paradise-seeking Islamist guerrillas. What more could Pakistan ask? The jihadist guerrillas were a more practical day-to-day strategic defense against Indian hegemony than even a nuclear bomb. To the west, in Afghanistan, the Taliban provided geopolitical"strategic depth" against India and protection from rebellion by Pakistan's own restive Pashtun population. For Musharraf, as for many other liberal Pakistani generals, jihad was not a calling, it was a professional imperative. It was something he did at the office. At quitting time he packed up his briefcase, straightened the braid on his uniform, and went home to his normal life.

If the CIA understood any of this, it never let on to its superiors in Washington, and Charlie Wilson, a highly paid Pakistani lobbyist and former congressman for East Texas, was anything but forthcoming with Congress about what was really going on. During the 1980s, Wilson had used his power on the House Appropriations Committee to supply all the advanced weapons the CIA might want in Afghanistan. Coll remarks that Wilson"saw the mujahidin through the prism of his own whisky-soaked romanticism, as noble savages fighting for freedom, as almost biblical figures." Hollywood is now making a movie, based on the book Charlie Wilson's War http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0871138549/nationbooks08 by George Crile, glorifying the congressman who"used his trips to the Afghan frontier in part to impress upon a succession of girlfriends how powerful he was." Tom Hanks has reportedly signed on to play him.

Enter bin Laden and the Saudis

Saudi Arabian motives were different from those of both the U.S. and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia is, after all, the only modern nation-state created by jihad. The Saudi royal family, which came to power at the head of a movement of Wahhabi religious fundamentalists, espoused Islamic radicalism in order to keep it under their control, at least domestically."Middle-class, pious Saudis flush with oil wealth," Coll writes,"embraced the Afghan cause as American churchgoers might respond to an African famine or a Turkish earthquake":"The money flowing from the kingdom arrived at the Afghan frontier in all shapes and sizes: gold jewelry dropped on offering plates by merchants' wives in Jedda mosques; bags of cash delivered by businessmen to Riyadh charities as zakat, an annual Islamic tithe; fat checks written from semi-official government accounts by minor Saudi princes; bountiful proceeds raised in annual telethons led by Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh." Richest of all were the annual transfers from the Saudi General Intelligence Department, or Istakhbarat, to the CIA's Swiss bank accounts.

From the moment agency money and weapons started to flow to the mujahidin in late 1979, Saudi Arabia matched the U.S. payments dollar for dollar. They also bypassed the ISI and supplied funds directly to the groups in Afghanistan they favored, including the one led by their own pious young millionaire, Osama bin Laden. According to Milton Bearden, private Saudi and Arab funding of up to $25 million a month flowed to Afghan Islamist armies. Equally important, Pakistan trained between 16,000 and 18,000 fresh Muslim recruits on the Afghan frontier every year, and another 6,500 or so were instructed by Afghans inside the country beyond ISI control. Most of these eventually joined bin Laden's private army of 35,000"Arab Afghans."

Much to the confusion of the Americans, moderate Saudi leaders, such as Prince Turki, the intelligence chief, supported the Saudi backing of fundamentalists so long as they were in Afghanistan and not in Saudi Arabia. A graduate of a New Jersey prep school and a member of Bill Clinton's class of 1964 at Georgetown University, Turki belongs to the pro-Western, modernizing wing of the Saudi royal family. (He is the current Saudi ambassador to Great Britain and Ireland.) But that did not make him pro-American. Turki saw Saudi Arabia in continual competition with its powerful Shia neighbor, Iran. He needed credible Sunni, pro-Saudi Islamist clients to compete with Iran's clients, especially in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan, which have sizeable Shia populations.

Prince Turki was also irritated by the U.S. loss of interest in Afghanistan after its Cold War skirmish with the Soviet Union. He understood that the U.S. would ignore Saudi aid to Islamists so long as his country kept oil prices under control and cooperated with the Pentagon on the building of military bases. Like many Saudi leaders, Turki probably underestimated the longer term threat of Islamic militancy to the Saudi royal house, but, as Coll observes,"Prince Turki and other liberal princes found it easier to appease their domestic Islamist rivals by allowing them to proselytize and make mischief abroad than to confront and resolve these tensions at home." In Riyadh, the CIA made almost no effort to recruit paid agents or collect intelligence. The result was that Saudi Arabia worked continuously to enlarge the ISI's proxy jihad forces in both Afghanistan and Kashmir, and the Saudi Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, the kingdom's religious police, tutored and supported the Taliban's own Islamic police force.

By the late 1990s, after the embassy bombings in East Africa, the CIA and the White House awoke to the Islamist threat, but they defined it almost exclusively in terms of Osama bin Laden's leadership of al-Qaida and failed to see the larger context. They did not target the Taliban, Pakistani military intelligence, or the funds flowing to the Taliban and al-Qaida from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Instead, they devoted themselves to trying to capture or kill bin Laden. Coll's chapters on the hunt for the al-Qaida leader are entitled,"You Are to Capture Him Alive,""We Are at War," and"Is There Any Policy?" but he might more accurately have called them"Keystone Kops" or"The Gang that Couldn't Shoot Straight."

On February 23 1998, bin Laden summoned newspaper and TV reporters to the camp at Khost that the CIA had built for him at the height of the anti-Soviet jihad. He announced the creation of a new organization -- the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders -- and issued a manifesto saying that"to kill and fight Americans and their allies, whether civilian or military, is an obligation for every Muslim who is able to do so in any country." On August 7, he and his associates put this manifesto into effect with devastating truck bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

The CIA had already identified bin Laden's family compound in the open desert near Kandahar Airport, a collection of buildings called Tarnak Farm. It's possible that more satellite footage has been taken of this site than of any other place on earth; one famous picture seems to show bin Laden standing outside one of his wives' homes. The agency conceived an elaborate plot to kidnap bin Laden from Tarnak Farm with the help of Afghan operatives and spirit him out of the country but CIA director George Tenet cancelled the project because of the high risk of civilian casualties; he was resented within the agency for his timidity. Meanwhile, the White House stationed submarines in the northern Arabian Sea with the map co-ordinates of Tarnak Farm preloaded into their missile guidance systems. They were waiting for hard evidence from the CIA that bin Laden was in residence.

Within days of the East Africa bombings, Clinton signed a top secret Memorandum of Notification authorizing the CIA to use lethal force against bin Laden. On 20 August 1998, he ordered 75 cruise missiles, costing $750,000 each, to be fired at the Zawhar Kili camp (about seven miles south of Khost), the site of a major al-Qaida meeting. The attack killed 21 Pakistanis but bin Laden was forewarned, perhaps by Saudi intelligence. Two of the missiles fell short into Pakistan, causing Islamabad to denounce the U.S. action. At the same time, the U.S. fired 13 cruise missiles into a chemical plant in Khartoum: the CIA claimed that the plant was partly owned by bin Laden and that it was manufacturing nerve gas. They knew none of this was true.

Clinton had publicly confessed to his sexual liaison with Monica Lewinsky on August 17, and many critics around the world conjectured that both attacks were diversionary measures. (The film Wag the Dog had just come out, in which a president in the middle of an election campaign is charged with molesting a Girl Scout stand-in"Firefly Girl" and makes it seem as if he's gone to war against Albania to distract people's attention.) As a result Clinton became more cautious, and he and his aides began seriously to question the quality of CIA information. The U.S. bombing in May 1999 of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, allegedly because of faulty intelligence, further discredited the agency. A year later, Tenet fired one intelligence officer and reprimanded six managers, including a senior official, for their bungling of that incident.

The Clinton administration made two more attempts to get bin Laden. During the winter of 1998-99, the CIA confirmed that a large party of Persian Gulf dignitaries had flown into the Afghan desert for a falcon-hunting party, and that bin Laden had joined them. The CIA called for an attack on their encampment until Richard Clarke, Clinton's counter-terrorism aide, discovered that among the hosts of the gathering was royalty from the United Arab Emirates. Clarke had been instrumental in a 1998 deal to sell 80 F-16 military jets to the UAE, which was also a crucial supplier of oil and gas to America and its allies. The strike was called off.

The CIA as a Secret Presidential Army

Throughout the 1990s, the Clinton administration devoted major resources to the development of a long-distance drone aircraft called Predator, invented by the former chief designer for the Israeli air force, who had emigrated to the United States. In its nose was mounted a Sony digital TV camera, similar to the ones used by news helicopters reporting on freeway traffic or on O.J. Simpson's fevered ride through Los Angeles. By the turn of the century, Agency experts had also added a Hellfire anti-tank missile to the Predator and tested it on a mock-up of Tarnak Farm in the Nevada desert. This new weapons system made it possible instantly to kill bin Laden if the camera spotted him. Unfortunately for the CIA, on one of its flights from Uzbekistan over Tarnak Farm the Predator photographed as a target a child's wooden swing. To his credit, Clinton held back on using the Hellfire because of the virtual certainty of killing bystanders, and Tenet, scared of being blamed for another failure, suggested that responsibility for the armed Predator's use be transferred to the Air Force.

When the new Republican administration came into office, it was deeply uninterested in bin Laden and terrorism even though the outgoing national security adviser, Sandy Berger, warned Condoleezza Rice that it would be George W. Bush's most serious foreign policy problem. On August 6, 2001, the CIA delivered its daily briefing to Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas, with the headline"Bin Laden determined to strike in U.S.," but the president seemed not to notice. Slightly more than a month later, Osama bin Laden successfully brought off perhaps the most significant example of asymmetric warfare in the history of international relations.

Coll has written a powerful indictment of the CIA's myopia and incompetence, but he seems to be of two minds. He occasionally indulges in flights of pro-CIA rhetoric, describing it, for example, as a"vast, pulsing, self-perpetuating, highly sensitive network on continuous alert" whose"listening posts were attuned to even the most isolated and dubious evidence of pending attacks" and whose"analysts were continually encouraged to share information as widely as possible among those with appropriate security clearances." This is nonsense: the early-warning functions of the CIA were upstaged decades ago by covert operations.

Coll acknowledges that every president since Truman, once he discovered that he had a totally secret, financially unaccountable private army at his personal disposal, found its deployment irresistible. But covert operations usually became entangled in hopeless webs of secrecy, and invariably led to more blowback. Richard Clarke argues that"the CIA used its classification rules not only to protect its agents but also to deflect outside scrutiny of its covert operations," and Peter Tomsen, the former U.S. ambassador to the Afghan resistance during the late 1980s, concludes that"America's failed policies in Afghanistan flowed in part from the compartmented, top secret isolation in which the CIA always sought to work." Excessive, bureaucratic secrecy lies at the heart of the Agency's failures. Given the Agency's clear role in causing the disaster of September 11, 2001, what we need today is not a new intelligence czar but an end to the secrecy behind which the CIA hides and avoids accountability for its actions. To this day, in the wake of 9/11 and the false warnings about a threat from Iraq, the CIA continues grossly to distort any and all attempts at a Constitutional foreign policy. Although Coll doesn't go on to draw the conclusion, I believe the CIA has outlived any Cold War justification it once might have had and should simply be abolished. REFERENCE: Are We to Blame for Afghanistan? Chalmers Johnson Sunday, November 21, 2004 - 18:38 http://hnn.us/articles/8438.html Mr. Johnson's latest books are Blowback (Metropolitan, 2000) and The Sorrows of Empire (Metropolitan, 2004), the first two volumes in a trilogy on American imperial policies. The final volume is now being written. From 1967 to 1973, Johnson served as a consultant to the CIA's Office of National Estimates.

Shia Killings, Jundullah, Mossad & Iran-Pakistan Pipeline.

2012-01-28T00:34:00.000-08:00

EVEN as concerns about Iran`s nuclear programme have led to tougher sanctions by the United States and the European Union, Pakistan seems determined to continue with the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. For this country there are two separate issues at hand. One is the question of Iran building nuclear weapons. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran must not be enriching uranium to levels required for weapons and should remain under inspection. As such, one hopes Tehran is dec-laring the full scope of its nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency and is only, as it claims, using nuclear material for energy and other peaceful purposes. Also, from the perspective of geopolitical priorities, the presence of another nuclear-armed neighbour is not in Pakistan`s interests, regardless of the current nature of the relationship with Iran. At the same time, Pakistan`s energy emergency has now become a matter of both prosperity and security. The country needs to pursue any practical and affordable sources of energy it can acquire, especially those that can begin delivering sooner than others. Along with LNG imports, gas from Iran is one such option and execution could be completed in two years if started in earnest today. The Tapi pipeline is beset with challenges, not the least of which is the security situation in Afghanistan. Given Pakistan`s limited options, it is hard to argue that the Iran project should not be pursued, despite America`s discouragement and its contention that there are quicker ways that Pakistan could explore to resolve its energy problem. According to the Foreign Office, the pipeline would not violate United Nations sanctions. And regulations are still being finalised to implement the latest US sanctions which will make it harder for foreign financial institutions that transact with certain Iranian banks to conduct business in America. If sanctions are indeed applied, an exception should be granted for the pipeline on the grounds that Pakistan`s gas and power needs pose urgent economic, political and security risks. Nor should Coalition Support Funds or funding from international lending agencies be held back as a form of pressure. Iran can be asked for assurances that proceeds from the pipeline will in no way contribute to the development of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Pakistan will still have to do the tough work of improving efficiency in power and gas delivery, creating a sustainable pricing structure, developing indigenous resources and taking other steps to set its own house in order. The Iran-Pakistan pipeline should be pursued but it will not be a silver bullet. REFERENCE: Iran-Pakistan pipeline http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/28/iran-pakistan-pipeline.html

JSOC - Americas Assassination Division

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nz3K-TZS2kg

QUETTA, Jan 26: The Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) urged the government on Thursday to take action against the elements involved in the killing of the people of Hazara community. Addressing a meeting organised to mark the third death anniversary of HDP president Hussain Ali Yousufi, they appealed to the international community to raise its voice against the targeted killing of the Hazaras. Khaliq Hazara, Ahmed Ali Kohzad, Mirza Hussain Hazara, Reza Wakil and Asmat Naiz paid homage to the late leader for his struggle for the rights of Hazaras and other communities. They said Mr Yousufi was a moderate, progressive and nationalist who believed in co-existence. They said extremists and terrorists were targeting the Hazaras with impunity and the government had failed to arrest the killers. They expressed concern over the killing of missing and kidnapped people in the province and throwing of their bodies. They said it was the government’s responsibility to trace those behind these cruel acts. They said the Hazara Democratic Party was ready to launch a struggle in collaboration with other communities and democratic forces against the anti-people forces to protect the lives of innocent persons. REFERENCE: Non-stop killings on sectarian grounds Hazaras demand protection from government Amanullah Kasi http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/27/non-stop-killings-on-sectarian-grounds-hazaras-demand-protection-from-government.html

When the State of Israel was declared, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, expressed his views on the necessity of creating intelligence agencies to operate on behalf of the nascent state. On June 7, 1948, he held his first meeting on this matter with intelligence officials. On December 13, 1949, following detailed staff work, Ben-Gurion appointed foreign ministry special operations’ adviser and former Jewish Agency state department official, Reuben Shiloah, to establish and head the ‘Institute for Collating and Co-ordinating Intelligence Operations.’ This date is considered the date the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations was established. On March 2, 1951, as a result of the experience gained in running State intelligence agencies, particularly in overseas’ operations, Ben-Gurion ordered Reuben Shiloah to set up the ‘Directorate,’ within the Institute for Coordination, to take all overseas intelligence operations under its wing. The ‘Directorate’ was the initial incarnation of the main collection unit in the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations. REFERENCE: The Mossad http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/mossad.html

Mossad also gathers genuine passports of other countries from immigrants to Israel on the pretext of "saving the Jews". These genuine passports are studied to prepare fake passports. Ostrovski identifies four kinds of passports used by Mossad for their operations; "top quality, second quality, field operation and throwaway". The low quality throwaway kind is mostly stolen from others and put in use when "needed only to flash them". They are not used for identification, since it cannot withstand through scrutiny. The field operation kind is "used for quick work in a foreign country, but not used when crossing borders". The second quality passport is a perfect one, "without no real persons behind" the details provided in it. The top-quality passport is the perfect kind, "which could stand up completely to any official scrutiny, including a check by the country of origin". The motto of Mossad in such delicate forgery is that, "no operation should be bungled by a bad document". Other tit-bits offered by Ostrovsky relating to the operation of Mossad are quite interesting.

“Sympathy for the Tamils runs high in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where 40 Million Tamils live. Many Sri Lankan Tamils, escaping the bloodshed, have sought refuge there, and the Sri Lankan government has accused Indian officials of arming and training the Tamils. They should be cursing the Mossad.” The Tamil were training at the commando naval base, learning penetration techniques, mining landings, communications, and how to sabotage ships similar to the Devora. There were about 28 men in each group, so it was decided that Yosy should take the Tamils to Haifa that night while I took the Sinhalese to Tel Aviv, thus avoiding any chance encounters. The real problem started about two weeks into the courses, when both the Tamils and Sinhalese – unknown to each, of course – were training at Kafr Sirkin. “ Look, we have a problem,” said Amy. “We have a group of 27 SWAT team guys from India coming in.” “ My God,” I said, “What is this? We’ve got Sinhalese, Tamils, and Now Indians. Who’s next?” Page 130.

1) "The Mossad’s main computer contained more than 1.5 million names in memory.

2) The London station of Mossad "owns more than 100 safe houses and rents another 50".

3) "In London alone, there are about 2,000 active sayanim (Jewish volunteer helpers) who are active, and another 5,000 on the list".

4) Margaret Thatcher was always called inside the Mossad as "the bitch", because "they had her tagged as anti-Semite".

5) For a long time since 1977, Mossad has hired "Durak Kasim, (Yasser) Arafat’s driver and personal bodyguard" as their agent, and "he was reporting to them almost daily, sending messages through a burst radio communications system, receiving $2,000 a report. He also telephoned information and mailed it periodically..." REFERENCE: BY WAY OF DECEPTION An Insider’s Devastating Expose of The Mossad by Claire Hoy & Victor Ostrovsky {Arrow Books 1988} http://www.amazon.com/Way-Deception-Making-Mossad-officer/dp/0971759502

Buried deep in the archives of America's intelligence services are a series of memos, written during the last years of President George W. Bush's administration, that describe how Israeli Mossad officers recruited operatives belonging to the terrorist group Jundallah by passing themselves off as American agents. According to two U.S. intelligence officials, the Israelis, flush with American dollars and toting U.S. passports, posed as CIA officers in recruiting Jundallah operatives -- what is commonly referred to as a "false flag" operation. The memos, as described by the sources, one of whom has read them and another who is intimately familiar with the case, investigated and debunked reports from 2007 and 2008 accusing the CIA, at the direction of the White House, of covertly supporting Jundallah -- a Pakistan-based Sunni extremist organization. Jundallah, according to the U.S. government and published reports, is responsible for assassinating Iranian government officials and killing Iranian women and children. But while the memos show that the United States had barred even the most incidental contact with Jundallah, according to both intelligence officers, the same was not true for Israel's Mossad. The memos also detail CIA field reports saying that Israel's recruiting activities occurred under the nose of U.S. intelligence officers, most notably in London, the capital of one of Israel's ostensible allies, where Mossad officers posing as CIA operatives met with Jundallah officials. REFERENCE: False Flag A series of CIA memos describes how Israeli Mossad agents posed as American spies to recruit members of the terrorist organization Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran. BY MARK PERRY JANUARY 13, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=0,0

Seymour Hersh- US is funding Al-Qaeda to counter Iran - 1

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnUWcjXvdlo

The officials did not know whether the Israeli program to recruit and use Jundallah is ongoing. Nevertheless, they were stunned by the brazenness of the Mossad's efforts. "It's amazing what the Israelis thought they could get away with," the intelligence officer said. "Their recruitment activities were nearly in the open. They apparently didn't give a damn what we thought." Interviews with six currently serving or recently retired intelligence officers over the last 18 months have helped to fill in the blanks of the Israeli false-flag operation. In addition to the two currently serving U.S. intelligence officers, the existence of the Israeli false-flag operation was confirmed to me by four retired intelligence officers who have served in the CIA or have monitored Israeli intelligence operations from senior positions inside the U.S. government. The CIA and the White House were both asked for comment on this story. By the time this story went to press, they had not responded. The Israeli intelligence services -- the Mossad -- were also contacted, in writing and by telephone, but failed to respond. As a policy, Israel does not confirm or deny its involvement in intelligence operations. There is no denying that there is a covert, bloody, and ongoing campaign aimed at stopping Iran's nuclear program, though no evidence has emerged connecting recent acts of sabotage and killings inside Iran to Jundallah. Many reports have cited Israel as the architect of this covert campaign, which claimed its latest victim on Jan. 11 when a motorcyclist in Tehran slipped a magnetic explosive device under the car of Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, a young Iranian nuclear scientist. The explosion killed Roshan, making him the fourth scientist assassinated in the past two years. The United States adamantly denies it is behind these killings. REFERENCE: False Flag A series of CIA memos describes how Israeli Mossad agents posed as American spies to recruit members of the terrorist organization Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran. BY MARK PERRY JANUARY 13, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=0,0

Seymour Hersh- US is funding Al-Qaeda to counter Iran - 2

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mmk9FbGZC7U&feature=related

According to one retired CIA officer, information about the false-flag operation was reported up the U.S. intelligence chain of command. It reached CIA Director of Operations Stephen Kappes, his deputy Michael Sulick, and the head of the Counterintelligence Center. All three of these officials are now retired. The Counterintelligence Center, according to its website, is tasked with investigating "threats posed by foreign intelligence services." The report then made its way to the White House, according to the currently serving U.S. intelligence officer. The officer said that Bush "went absolutely ballistic" when briefed on its contents. "The report sparked White House concerns that Israel's program was putting Americans at risk," the intelligence officer told me. "There's no question that the U.S. has cooperated with Israel in intelligence-gathering operations against the Iranians, but this was different. No matter what anyone thinks, we're not in the business of assassinating Iranian officials or killing Iranian civilians." Israel's relationship with Jundallah continued to roil the Bush administration until the day it left office, this same intelligence officer noted. Israel's activities jeopardized the administration's fragile relationship with Pakistan, which was coming under intense pressure from Iran to crack down on Jundallah. It also undermined U.S. claims that it would never fight terror with terror, and invited attacks in kind on U.S. personnel. "It's easy to understand why Bush was so angry," a former intelligence officer said. "After all, it's hard to engage with a foreign government if they're convinced you're killing their people. Once you start doing that, they feel they can do the same." REFERENCE: False Flag A series of CIA memos describes how Israeli Mossad agents posed as American spies to recruit members of the terrorist organization Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran. BY MARK PERRY JANUARY 13, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=0,0

Seymour Hersh- US is funding Al-Qaeda to counter Iran - 3

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nD6pyqtV9lc&feature=related

A senior administration official vowed to "take the gloves off" with Israel, according to a U.S. intelligence officer. But the United States did nothing -- a result that the officer attributed to "political and bureaucratic inertia." "In the end," the officer noted, "it was just easier to do nothing than to, you know, rock the boat." Even so, at least for a short time, this same officer noted, the Mossad operation sparked a divisive debate among Bush's national security team, pitting those who wondered "just whose side these guys [in Israel] are on" against those who argued that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." The debate over Jundallah was resolved only after Bush left office when, within his first weeks as president, Barack Obama drastically scaled back joint U.S.-Israel intelligence programs targeting Iran, according to multiple serving and retired officers. The decision was controversial inside the CIA, where officials were forced to shut down "some key intelligence-gathering operations," a recently retired CIA officer confirmed. This action was followed in November 2010 by the State Department's addition of Jundallah to its list of foreign terrorist organizations -- a decision that one former CIA officer called "an absolute no-brainer." Since Obama's initial order, U.S. intelligence services have received clearance to cooperate with Israel on a number of classified intelligence-gathering operations focused on Iran's nuclear program, according to a currently serving officer. These operations are highly technical in nature and do not involve covert actions targeting Iran's infrastructure or political or military leadership. REFERENCE: False Flag A series of CIA memos describes how Israeli Mossad agents posed as American spies to recruit members of the terrorist organization Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran. BY MARK PERRY JANUARY 13, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=0,0

Seymour Hersh- US is funding Al-Qaeda to counter Iran - 4

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwkrsenuEl0&feature=related

"We don't do bang and boom," a recently retired intelligence officer said. "And we don't do political assassinations." Israel regularly proposes conducting covert operations targeting Iranians, but is just as regularly shut down, according to retired and current intelligence officers. "They come into the room and spread out their plans, and we just shake our heads," one highly placed intelligence source said, "and we say to them -- 'Don't even go there. The answer is no.'" Unlike the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the controversial exiled Iranian terrorist group that seeks the overthrow of the Tehran regime and is supported by former leading U.S. policymakers, Jundallah is relatively unknown -- but just as violent. In May 2009, a Jundallah suicide bomber blew himself up inside a mosque in Zahedan, the capital of Iran's southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan province bordering Pakistan, during a Shiite religious festival. The bombing killed 25 Iranians and wounded scores of others. The attack enraged Tehran, which traced the perpetrators to a cell operating in Pakistan. The Iranian government notified the Pakistanis of the Jundallah threat and urged them to break up the movement's bases along the Iranian-Pakistani border. The Pakistanis reacted sluggishly in the border areas, feeding Tehran's suspicions that Jundallah was protected by Pakistan's intelligence services. The 2009 attack was just one in a long line of terrorist attacks attributed to the organization. In August 2007, Jundallah kidnapped 21 Iranian truck drivers. In December 2008, it captured and executed 16 Iranian border guards -- the gruesome killings were filmed, in a stark echo of the decapitation of American businessman Nick Berg in Iraq at the hands of al Qaeda's Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In July 2010, Jundallah conducted a twin suicide bombing in Zahedan outside a mosque, killing dozens of people, including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. REFERENCE: False Flag A series of CIA memos describes how Israeli Mossad agents posed as American spies to recruit members of the terrorist organization Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran. BY MARK PERRY JANUARY 13, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=0,0

Seymour hersh and Scott Ritter on Iran 1-3

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17pghiRDcms

The State Department aggressively denies that the U.S. government had or has any ties to Jundallah. "We have repeatedly stated, and reiterate again that the United States has not provided support to Jundallah," a spokesman wrote in an email to the Wall Street Journal, following Jundallah's designation as a terrorist organization. "The United States does not sponsor any form of terrorism. We will continue to work with the international community to curtail support for terrorist organizations and prevent violence against innocent civilians. We have also encouraged other governments to take comparable actions against Jundallah." A spate of stories in 2007 and 2008, including a report by ABC News and a New Yorker article, suggested that the United States was offering covert support to Jundallah. The issue has now returned to the spotlight with the string of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists and has outraged serving and retired intelligence officers who fear that Israeli operations are endangering American lives. "This certainly isn't the first time this has happened, though it's the worst case I've heard of," former Centcom chief and retired Gen. Joe Hoar said of the Israeli operation upon being informed of it. "But while false-flag operations are hardly new, they're extremely dangerous. You're basically using your friendship with an ally for your own purposes. Israel is playing with fire. It gets us involved in their covert war, whether we want to be involved or not." REFERENCE: False Flag A series of CIA memos describes how Israeli Mossad agents posed as American spies to recruit members of the terrorist organization Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran. BY MARK PERRY JANUARY 13, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=0,0

Seymour hersh and Scott Ritter on Iran 2-3

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IMnadXCMBfo&feature=related

The Israeli operation left a number of recently retired CIA officers sputtering in frustration. "It's going to be pretty hard for the U.S. to distance itself from an Israeli attack on Iran with this kind of thing going on," one of them told me. Jundallah head Abdolmalek Rigi was captured by Iran in February 2010. Although initial reports claimed that he was captured by the Iranians after taking a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, a retired intelligence officer with knowledge of the incident told me that Rigi was detained by Pakistani intelligence officers in Pakistan. The officer said that Rigi was turned over to the Iranians after the Pakistani government informed the United States that it planned to do so. The United States, this officer said, did not raise objections to the Pakistani decision. Iran, meanwhile, has consistently claimed that Rigi was snatched from under the eyes of the CIA, which it alleges supported him. "It doesn't matter," the former intelligence officer said of Iran's charges. "It doesn't matter what they say. They know the truth." REFERENCE: False Flag A series of CIA memos describes how Israeli Mossad agents posed as American spies to recruit members of the terrorist organization Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran. BY MARK PERRY JANUARY 13, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=0,0

Seymour hersh and Scott Ritter on Iran 3-3

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gntZXoA46aM&feature=related

Rigi was interrogated, tried, and convicted by the Iranians and hanged on June 20, 2010. Prior to his execution, Rigi claimed in an interview with Iranian media -- which has to be assumed was under duress -- that he had doubts about U.S. sponsorship of Jundallah. He recounted an alleged meeting with "NATO officials" in Morocco in 2007 that raised his suspicions. "When we thought about it we came to the conclusion that they are either Americans acting under NATO cover or Israelis," he said. While many of the details of Israel's involvement with Jundallah are now known, many others still remain a mystery -- and are likely to remain so. The CIA memos of the incident have been "blue bordered," meaning that they were circulated to senior levels of the broader U.S. intelligence community as well as senior State Department officials. What has become crystal clear, however, is the level of anger among senior intelligence officials about Israel's actions. "This was stupid and dangerous," the intelligence official who first told me about the operation said. "Israel is supposed to be working with us, not against us. If they want to shed blood, it would help a lot if it was their blood and not ours. You know, they're supposed to be a strategic asset. Well, guess what? There are a lot of people now, important people, who just don't think that's true." REFERENCE: False Flag A series of CIA memos describes how Israeli Mossad agents posed as American spies to recruit members of the terrorist organization Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran. BY MARK PERRY JANUARY 13, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=0,0

"QUOTE"

2008: Do not to allow Iran toehold in Pakistan: US

DAWN.COM

(7 hours ago) Today

174700 10/22/2008 8:58

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018

TAGS: PGOV, PK, PREL, PTER

SUBJECT: ZARDARI EXPRESSES DELIGHT WITH CHINA VISIT, LOOKS

TO FRIENDS FOR HELP ON CHALLENGES

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: In a wide-ranging discussion with visiting SCA Assistant Secretary Boucher, President Zardari expressed complete satisfaction with his just concluded visit to China, reviewed planning for the Friends of Pakistan, and reiterated his determination to press the fight against extremism and the militancy in the tribal areas. He linked his ability to sustain the counter-insurgency fight to progress on addressing Pakistan,s economic woes, however, and chastised the IMF for only wanting to &take away8 in its negotiations. Zardari alerted Boucher to Iran’s offer of concessional oil for Pakistan, an offer he did not believe he could refuse. Boucher reminded him of the Deputy Secretary’s recent caution not to allow Iran to gain a toehold in Pakistan. End Summary.

2. (SBU) Visiting Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher called on President Zardari at the Aiwan-e-Sadr, October 18. He was accompanied by the Ambassador, DCM (notetaker), and SCA Senior Advisor Hayden. Minister of Information Sherry Rehman joined Zardari.

China Visit

————-

3. (S/NF) Zardari told Boucher his visit to China was

&great.8 He confirmed that the Chinese had committed to building two additional nuclear power plants for Pakistan ) Chashma 3 and 4. He noted, however, that construction would not start until the completion of the Chashma 2 reactor, which he anticipated would require an additional five years. Commenting that the Chinese were providing only old technology, Zardari said that Pakistan had no choice but to accept &junk.8 Boucher told Zardari we would examine the implications of the new nuclear deal vis–vis the International Atomic Energy Agency and let the Pakistanis know if we anticipated any problems with the deal.

4. (S/NF) Zardari also told Boucher that the Chinese had committed to providing assistance to Pakistan,s security forces. Arguing that China was Pakistan,s only affordable option for needed security items, Zardari said the government plans to acquire armored vehicles, body armor, and small arms from China. The Chinese also plan to provide large scanners to Pakistan to help check the contents of trucks. Boucher and the Ambassador reminded Zardari that the U.S. is working with the Frontier Corps on a comprehensive train and equip program. (Comment: Embassy is preparing a letter to Zardari reviewing the details of the U.S. government’s extensive support to the Frontier Corps. End Comment)

5. (C) Although silent on the question of possible Chinese balance of payments support to Pakistan, Zardari lauded Chinese &out-of-box8 thinking about business investment in Pakistan. As an example, he described a project to build a dam that would irrigate land that Zardari would then grant to women, who would grow flowers on the land for export to the Emirates. The Chinese will manage the marketing for the

project.

Friends of Pakistan

———————–

6. (C) Zardari confirmed that he wants to formally change the name of the group to Friends of Democratic Pakistan. In response to Boucher’s question about the Saudi position, he provided Boucher with a convoluted description of his discussions with Prince Turki bin Abdullah, who requested Zardari,s participation in the Interfaith Dialogue that the King is organizing in New York. In exchange, Zardari expects that the Saudis will be full participants in the Friends group (see septel).

7. (C) As for other possible additions to the Friends group, Boucher suggested that Spain and the Scandinavians might be ISLAMABAD 00003339 002 OF 003 good additions. Zardari assented, and asked Boucher if the U.S. would support Libya’s inclusion, to which Boucher agreed. Zardari suggested to Boucher that he would like China added to the steering group. Boucher was open to the idea but noted that the steering committee needed to remain small.

8. (C) Boucher reminded Zardari that the Friends group is not a &checkbook8 organization. He noted that we need to sit with the steering group and consider issues like membership and the role of the UN. We are hoping that the UN will help drive the process by providing a secretariat function. After the next meeting in Abu Dhabi, the U.S. vision would be to launch a series of experts meeting that would consider Pakistani policies and initiatives in a sector-by-sector review.

9. (S/NF) In an aside, Zardari mentioned that Iran has offered to provide Pakistan with concessional oil. How could he go to the National Assembly and tell them Iran had offered the assistance and Pakistan had turned it down, he asked rhetorically. Boucher reminded him of Ambassador Haqqani,s recent conversation on this issue with Deputy Secretary Negroponte in which the Deputy cautioned against providing Iran with a toehold in Pakistan.

Counter-Insurgency

———————–

10. (S) Zardari stressed repeatedly his determination to carry through with the fight against extremism and militancy. &I don’t believe in talking to the Taliban,8 he said. &We won’t do it on our side of the border.8 He noted that he has built a good relationship with the military and praised the leadership of Chief of Army Staff Kayani, ISI Director General Pasha, and Frontier Corps General Tariq Khan. To challenge the fundamentalists, however, Zardari needs to gain the confidence of the Army, the National Assembly, and the people. To do that, he believes he must address the economic situation and demonstrate that he can deliver on his economic promises. Zardari chastised the IMF for just wanting to &take away8 from Pakistan in the negotiations over a bailout package.

11. (C) In response to Boucher,s question about the National Assembly debate on Pakistan,s counter-insurgency strategy, Zardari expressed confidence that he would succeed in winning from the Assembly a consensus resolution on the government,s policy. (N.B.: A day earlier, both National Security Advisor Durrani and Information Minister Rehman expressed skepticism that an acceptable consensus resolution was achievable.) Nawaz Sharif,s Pakistan Muslim League is offering no help on Pakistan,s counter-terrorism policy, Zardari opined. Rehman added that Nawaz and Chaudhry Nisar have a &good cop/bad cop8 routine. Nawaz says good things about his party’s commitment to cooperation, but Nisar does the opposite in the Assembly.

12. (C) Describing his legislative strategy going forward, Zardari said that proposed revisions to the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) are nearly ready to bring to the Assembly. He anticipates that the extension of the Political Parties Act to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (permitting political parties to organize and campaign in the tribal areas under the same regulations as apply to the rest of the country) would be introduced within three months. Zardari also described a de-radicalization program he plans on introducing in the Assembly. Zardari will propose a criminal regime for &small fries8 that would sentence them to seven years in a &special prison8 to be constructed for handling reforming militants. While in the prison, the militants would receive job training and would receive lenient treatment, including conjugal rights. &I won’t stop pressing,8 Zardari declared, &either he (the militant) dies or he takes the option.8 Anyone caught a second time after going through the reform program will be sent to prison for ISLAMABAD 00003339 003 OF 003 life, Zardari declared.

13. (S) Turning to the fighting in Bajaur, Zardari asserted that the government needs a mechanism to get compensation into the hands of the victims of the fighting, suggesting that he thought one billion U.S. dollars might be sufficient. Responding that we anticipate the financial requirement would be less than that, Boucher and the Ambassador assured Zardari we are looking for ways that we can help. Zardari asked if the Friends of Democratic Pakistan might be of help, but Boucher reiterated that such assistance would likely fall outside the mandate of the group. Zardari then suggested that the Saudis could provide the necessary funds, noting that &the problem leads back to them.8 Rehman interjected that the National Assembly members were asking how the militants were getting their funds and raised the flow of funds from the Gulf to extremists in Pakistan. (DCM observed that efforts to stop funding terrorist groups were not helped by Pakistan,s obstruction of work in the UN 1267 Committee, mentioning specifically the hold on Katrina. Zardari expressed surprise that Pakistan was playing such a role, and Rehman made note of the issue.)

14. (S) As for the Pakistan-Afghanistan mini-jirga scheduled for Islamabad in a week’s time, Zardari expressed the hope that it will re-occupy political space in the tribal areas. He expressed the hope that the jirga could re-consolidate the government,s position among the majority of the tribes, noting that the government,s greatest challenge in rooting out the extremists is when they are able to shelter among the population in the area. As for leadership of the Pakistani delegation to the jirga, Sherry Rehman noted that Asfandyar Wali Khan, who had been proposed as the senior Pakistani, will not be back in Pakistan in time for the meeting. She suggested that Asfandyar is in &bad shape8 following the terrorist attack on his home near Charsadda. Zardari indicated separately that he is helping Asfandyar relocate his family to Dubai and would provide him with an armored vehicle when he returns to Pakistan.

Friends: the U.S. and the UK

———————————–

15. (C) Zardari mused about the need to reach out to the new U.S. Administration after the elections and suggested that he would like to organize a &road show8 to visit the U.S. and explain Pakistan,s situation. Boucher suggested that such an effort could emphasize U.S.-Pakistani cooperation on the border coordination centers, the Joint Military Operations Coordination Center, and the Frontier Corps train and equip program.

16. (S/NF) As for the UK, Zardari expressed some concern that their support was getting wobbly. He believes that their views reflect their conviction that Zardari would fail and would be replaced by Nawaz Sharif. Boucher thought that the concerns are more a reflection of attitude than policy. If Zardari achieves results, he asserted, then the British will come around.

Comment

- – - -

17. (S/NF) Zardari was clearly buoyed by his visit to China and in good spirits as he looks ahead to the serious challenges that confront him and the country. He ran through numerous ideas for new initiatives to deal with the political, economic, and security problems, nearly all of which come with high price tags. In that regard, Zardari continues to express considerable optimism that, ultimately, his friends will ride to his rescue despite little evidence to support that view.

PATTERSON

2008: Do not to allow Iran toehold in Pakistan: US

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/24/2008-do-not-to-allow-iran-toehold-in-pakistan-us.html

"UNQUOTE"

Pervert "Fasiq" Mansoor Ijaz & Friendly Judiciary.

2012-01-26T02:30:00.000-08:00

Approved For Reporting. - CONSTITUTION PETITIONS NO.77 TO 85 & 89 OF 2011 & CMA NO.5505/2011 IN CONST.P.79 OF 2011 - Jawwad S. Khawaja, J. “And ye shall know the Truth, and the Truth shall set you free” (John8:32). Thus spake Hazrat Isa, the Messiah and champion of the oppressed. In the same vein, the Persian savant Hakeem Sinai Ghaznavi said: “embrace the truth and become free of grief and torment”. It is these Biblical and sage sentiments and other similar sensibilities which appear to have inspired an important change in the Constitution – the recent incorporation of Article 19A in the Chapter on fundamental rights. The said Article stipulates that “every citizen shall have the right to have access to information in all matters of public importance subject to regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed by law”. Most petitioners and respondents, and their learned counsel seem to have ignored or glossed over the significance of this major constitutional change. While the circumstances in which these cases arise have been elaborated in fair detail in the reasoning of Hon’ble the Chief Justice, I only reiterate this salient aspect of the case. REFERENCE: Detailed Order in Memo Gate Case IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN (Original Jurisdiction) http://pakistanconstitution-law.org/detailed-order-in-memo-gate-case/

Mujra (Dance Party) of Lahore Bar Association Conference. (Judges are also selected from Lawyers)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VYnqufjo2zI

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Once they were heroes, cloaked justices at the vanguard of a powerful revolt against military rule in Pakistan, buoyed by pugnacious lawyers and an adoring public. But now Pakistan’s Supreme Court is waging a campaign of judicial activism that has pitted it against an elected civilian government, in a legal fight that many Pakistanis fear could damage their fragile democracy and open the door to a fresh military intervention. From an imposing, marble-clad court on a hill over Islamabad, and led by an iron-willed chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, the judges have since 2009 issued numerous rulings that have propelled them into areas traditionally dominated by government here. The court has dictated the price of sugar and fuel, championed the rights of transsexuals, and, quite literally, directed the traffic in the coastal megalopolis of Karachi. But in recent weeks the court has taken interventionism to a new level, inserting itself as the third player in a bruising confrontation between military and civilian leaders at a time when Pakistan — and the United States — urgently needs stability in Islamabad to face a dizzying array of threats. Judges say their expanded mandate comes from the people, dating back to the struggle against the military rule of Gen. Pervez Musharraf that began in 2007, eventually helping to pry him from power. Memories linger of those heady days, when bloodied lawyers clashed with riot police officers, and judges were garlanded and paraded as virtual saints. In recent months, however, the Supreme Court has ventured deep into political peril in two different cases. Last week, as part of a high-stakes corruption case, it summoned Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani to testify in court under threat of contempt charges that, if carried to conviction, could leave him jailed and ejected from office. The court has also begun an inquiry into a scandal known here as Memogate, a shadowy affair with touches of soap-opera drama that has engulfed the political system since November. It has claimed the job of Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States and now threatens other senior figures in the civilian government, under accusations that officials sought American help to head off a potential military coup. Propelled by accounts of secret letters, text messages and military plots, the scandal has in recent days focused on a music video featuring bikini-clad female wrestlers that is likely to be entered as evidence of immorality on the part of the central protagonist, Mansoor Ijaz, an American businessman of Pakistani origin. Hearings resume Tuesday when Mr. Ijaz is due to give evidence. The fact that the courts have become the arena for such lurid political theater has reignited criticism, some from once-staunch allies, that the Supreme Court is worryingly overstepping its mark. “In the long run this is a very dangerous trend,” said Muneer A. Malik, a former president of the Supreme Court Bar Association who campaigned for Justice Chaudhry in 2007. “The judges are not elected representatives of the people and they are arrogating power to themselves as if they are the only sanctimonious institution in the country. All dictators fall prey to this psyche — that only we are clean, and capable of doing the right thing.” The court’s supporters counter that it is reinforcing democracy in the face of President Asif Ali Zardari’s corrupt and inept government. On Saturday, Justice Chaudhry pushed back against the critics. The court’s goal was to “buttress democratic and parliamentary norms,” he told a gathering of lawyers in Karachi. Deep-rooted corruption was curtailing justice in Pakistan, he added. “Destiny of our institution is in our own hands,” he said. Mr. Chaudhry was appointed to the Supreme Court under General Musharraf in 2000. Two years later he wrote a judgment that absolved the military ruler for his 1999 coup. But Mr. Chaudhry shocked his patron and his country seven years later with decrees that challenged General Musharraf’s pre-eminence. Senior security officials were ordered to track down individuals being illegally held by the military intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, in some cases working with the F.B.I. and C.I.A. The privatization of state companies came under sharp scrutiny. Then, on March 9, 2007, General Musharraf tried to fire Justice Chaudhry and placed him under house arrest. Protesting lawyers rushed into the streets in support of the chief justice. New cable television channels broadcast images of the tumult across the country. Power drained from General Musharraf, who resigned 18 months later. The euphoria was soon tempered, however, by growing tensions with the new government. Mr. Zardari hesitated to reinstate Mr. Chaudhry, believing that he was too close to his political rivals and the military. The standoff led to fresh street protests in 2009, led by the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif. That March, amid dramatic scenes that included a threatened march on the capital, Mr. Zardari relented and Justice Chaudhry returned to the bench. Within months, the Supreme Court had cleared the way for the possible prosecution of Mr. Zardari in a Swiss corruption case dating to the 1990s. The government cited Mr. Zardari’s presidential immunity, and argued, along with some international analyst groups, that the court was specifically targeting the president. But among the wider public, the court was winning broad support. It engaged in a series of muscular interventions to champion the cause of ordinary Pakistanis, some of which broke new ground. Judges expanded the civil rights of hijras, transgendered people who traditionally suffered discrimination, called senior bureaucrats and police officials to account, halted business ventures that contravened planning laws, including a McDonald’s restaurant in Islamabad and a German supermarket in Karachi, and issued a decree against the destruction of trees along a major road in Lahore. The court’s populist bent has infuriated the government but won cheers from urban, middle-class Pakistanis — the same people who had supported the lawyers’ drive against General Musharraf. Largely young, frustrated by traditional politics and angered by official graft, they constitute a political class that has in recent months flocked to Imran Khan, the cricket star turned politician who is enjoying a sudden surge in popularity, and is a strong defender of the judiciary. But the court’s activism has also taken many erratic turns. Justice Chaudhry has fought trenchant battles to win control of judicial appointments, a process traditionally in the government’s purview. While the judiciary has vigorously pursued Mr. Zardari, it absolved Mr. Sharif of his alleged crimes. And critics accuse Mr. Chaudhry of failing to reform the chaotic lower courts, which remain plagued by long backlogs. “Three years after the restitution of the chief justice, the delivery of justice remains as poor as it has ever been,” said Ali Dayan Hasan, of Human Rights Watch. The gravest charges, though, swirl around the memo scandal. Mr. Ijaz claims to hold an unsigned memorandum showing that Mr. Zardari’s government sought covert United States government help to avert a military coup in the poisonous aftermath of the American raid that killed Osama bin Laden in May. But the memo’s provenance is unclear and Mr. Ijaz’s credibility has come under assault in the news media. Last week a music video that went viral on the Internet showed Mr. Ijaz acting as the ringside commentator in a wrestling contest between two bikini-clad women and that, in one version, featured full nudity — a shocking sight in conservative Pakistan. The furor, which made front-page news, injected a fresh sense of absurdity into proceedings that already were under question, and that many here insist would never have started without military intervention: the Supreme Court ordered the inquiry on Dec. 30 at the direct request of the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and the ISI director general, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who harbor little love for Mr. Zardari. Also, the court ignored other claims by Mr. Ijaz that the army secretly sheltered Bin Laden, and sought outside support to mount a coup — acts that, if proven, could be equally treasonous. Suspicions about the court’s impartiality were renewed last Friday, when Mr. Chaudhry ordered the government to disclose whether it intended to fire General Kayani or General Pasha — even though such decisions are normally the government’s prerogative. The titanic three-way struggle among generals, judges and politicians comes at a time when Pakistan has become increasingly chaotic. Taliban insurgents continue to roam the northwest, the economy is in dire straits and urgently needed reforms in education, health and other social sectors have been largely ignored. From the standpoint of the United States, the deadlock has diverted the spotlight from military airstrikes that killed 26 Pakistani soldiers in November and brought the two countries’ troubled relationship to a new low. But it has also drawn attention away from a pressing priority of the United States in Pakistan: engaging cooperation here to help negotiate a peace settlement with the Afghan Taliban as a major troop withdrawal slated for 2014 draws near. “In the midst of this institutional wrangling, nobody has a clear plan as to how politics or foreign policy are going to move forward, said Dr. Paula Newberg of Georgetown University, who has written a book about Pakistani constitutional politics. “Pakistan could easily have a much brighter future. But it gets itself worn down by these incessant disputes about where power lies.” REFERENCE: Pakistan Court Widens Role, Stirring Fears for Stability By DECLAN WALSH Published: January 22, 2012 - A version of this article appeared in print on January 23, 2012, on page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Pakistan Court Widens Role, Stirring Fears. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/world/asia/pakistan-high-court-widens-role-and-stirs-fears.html?_r=2

Mansoor got in the club with his Indian friends and stayed in the club for quite a while before certain youth from the Asian descent spotted and booed him, reported Dunya News. The club’s security, locally called bouncers, told Mansoor off the club premises. Mansoor was caught on camera trying to hide the lense in order to avoid being filmed. His latest discovery at a striptease club comes only days after emergence of a video that showed him acting as a commentator for women wrestling where women ripped to bare skin. Mansoor had then pleaded he didn’t know about the ripping part. On the other hand, in the memo case, Mansoor has refused to visit Pakistan citing security concerns. The latest shame would definitely sink his reputation further and lower along with him the credibility of his testimony if ever elicited regarding the memo trial. REFERENCE: Memo's Mansoor booed off London's striptease club Last Updated On 26 January,2012 About 14 hours ago http://dunyanews.tv/index.php?key=Q2F0SUQ9MiNOaWQ9NjIyMTE=

Bolta Pakistan 25 January 2012

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HoZRGphNb4Y

Behind the “Memogate” affair that has embroiled Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States. and the civilian government he represents, there is a quixotic accuser named Mansoor Ijaz who seems like a character in a fanciful spy novel of his own design. Ijaz is an American businessman of Pakistani descent who lives in high style on the French Riviera. He made money as an investor, but his fame has come as a writer of op-ed pieces and a sometime intermediary with Pakistani and American officials. He has alleged that Husain Haqqani, the former ambassador, encouraged him to write a memo to Adm. Mike Mullen last May urging tighter controls on the Pakistani military. That charge has snared Haqqani and triggered a crisis pitting Pakistan’s civilian government against its military. But even if Ijaz’s allegation is true, it’s reasonable to ask: So what? Haqqani doesn’t appear, even from Ijaz’s evidence, to have done anything illegal — or even outside his job as diplomatic representative of the government. Pakistan’s supreme court is scheduled to begin hearing the case on Tuesday. But before it gets too deep into the blizzard of alleged electronic messages between Ijaz and Haqqani, the court should ask whether the fundamentals of the case make sense — and whether it will prove an embarrassment to both the military and the civilian leadership. A review of the evidence suggests there may be less to the case than all the noise would suggest. That’s the view of Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council and an authority on the Pakistani military, with which he has close contacts. “This is now a sideshow that is taking on importance beyond the needs of the country,” Nawaz told me Sunday. “There is no evidence that the security of the state has been compromised. Husain Haqqani has already been removed from his post. Perhaps it would be best to close this matter and move on to more serious things.” Let’s start with the memo itself. Ijaz outed the story in an Oct. 10, 2011, opinion piece in the Financial Times in which he said that on May 9, a “senior Pakistani diplomat” had had contacted him with an “urgent request” that he convey a message to Mullen urging the U.S. to back tighter controls on Pakistan’s military and intelligence. Ijaz later identified that diplomat as Haqqani, who denies that he was the instigator. In any event, Ijaz wrote a memo making the argument — including a statement that a new “national security team” in Islamabad would abolish the notorious “S” wing of Pakistani intelligence, which maintains liaison with the Taliban and other jihadist groups. He then arranged for Jim Jones, the former national security adviser, to send the memo to Mullen. Ijaz’s memo was a stronger statement of arguments he had made publicly back in May, in the Financial Times and a Washington Post blog, after the death of Osama bin Laden. “Taken advantage of properly by U.S. policymakers, exposed treachery [in bin Laden’s long residence in Pakistan] could usher in a new era of transparency in Pakistan’s internal affairs,” he wrote in the Post item. Haqqani, as a representative of the civilian government, probably shared a similar feeling that Pakistani military and intelligence had been embarrassed by the fact that bin Laden had been living for years inAbbotabad. But he hardly needed Ijaz’s help in conveying his views to people like Mullen. He was in daily contact with top U.S. officials, trying to represent President Asif Ali Zardari. The Pakistani military had a representative of its own, a respected military attaché who could speak on the generals’ behalf. Ijaz seems to have relished his role as a freelance adviser. His relationship with Jones, who passed the memo, is a case in point: They had met in 2006, and Jones, who was then NATO commander, had asked Ijaz to join a strategic advisers group and travel with him to Afghanistan. Later, Ijaz was asked to join the board of the Atlantic Council, where Jones is a former chairman. But his stint as a board member didn’t last long, nor did he make major donations to the group. When a government official asked several years ago for a CIA check on Ijaz’s background in international matters, he is said to have received an “orange flag” — nothing that would rule out dealing with him, but a caution that he had a taste for publicity and sometimes talked more than he delivered. One of the intriguing aspects of Ijaz’s role is whether, in his contacts with Mullen, he was in effect acting as a representative of Zardari. Jones said in an affidavit for the Pakistani court that Ijaz “mentioned that he has a message from the ‘highest authority’ in the Pakistan government.” And in his cover letter to Jones, accompanying the infamous memo, Ijaz wrote: “This document has the support of the President of Pakistan.” (The cover note, along with all the other documentation, has been submitted to the court in Pakistan.) Which leads some critics of Ijaz to raise the question: If Ijaz was acting on Zardari’s behalf (or Haqqani’s, for that matter) should he have registered as an agent of a foreign government? That’s just one of the wrinkles in a story so colorful and unlikely that it would have been branded unrealistic if written as fiction. REFERENCE: Mansoor Ijaz, instigator behind Pakistan’s ‘Memogate’ By David Ignatius Posted at 09:41 PM ET, 01/22/2012 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/mansoor-ijaz-instigator-behind-pakistans-memogate/2012/01/22/gIQAcRdjJQ_blog.html

Mansoor Ijaz in London Striptease - 1 (26 January 2012 Dunya News TV)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AgblRrfduU4

A multi-millionaire American businessman at the center of a political crisis in Pakistan refused to travel to Islamabad Monday to testify before a Supreme Court commission, saying he feared for his personal safety. Mansoor Ijaz, whose international travel has him dividing time between the US, Europe, and the Middle East, claims he helped Pakistan’s former ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, deliver a confidential memorandum on behalf of the government requesting US help to curtail the country’s military in exchange for a series of pro-US policies. Mr. Haqqani vehemently denies the claim, though he has since stepped down. The affair, known as “Memo-gate," has led to a high-stakes Pakistan Supreme Court case that pits the historically powerful military, who back Mr. Ijaz’s claims, against a resurgent civilian government wrestling for constitutional supremacy. A whistle blowing hero to some, a villain doing the military's dirty work to others, Ijaz is above all a mysterious anomaly. That a private citizen has been able to wield such influence over Pakistan’s internal affairs speaks, at the very least, to a political system at an early stage of maturity, says Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council. “Pakistan has failed to set up institutional systems for analyzing and dealing with issues so often, you have freelancers who take it upon themselves to act as surrogates for the government,” he says, adding: “The matter only took a life of its own when [opposition leader] Nawaz Sharif filed the court petition. So it’s not so much Mr. Ijaz’s doing as much as Mr. Ijaz having the spotlight being thrust upon him by domestic squabbling within Pakistan.” In an interview with the Monitor, Ijaz who has long lobbied through op-eds – including several in the Monitor – against Pakistan’s shadowy spy agencies including the ISI for their backing of religious militants, bristles at criticism. He says his actions have strengthened Pakistan’s democracy by helping to create a culture of transparency. “Those people who argue that I helped the very forces I have fought against for decades cannot comprehend the nuance of difference in this day and time. I still am against the ISI interfering.... I am still against the military being an umbrella for the proliferation of extremism.” "Husain Haqqani lied – that lie was of such a magnitude that even [US Gen.] Jim Jones was misled into making a false statement in his affidavit, and Admiral Mullen [former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] was misled to falsely deny the memorandum existed." REFERENCE: Who is Mansoor Ijaz? The US businessman behind Pakistan's 'Memo-gate' A whistle blowing hero to some, a villain doing the Pakistan military's dirty work to others, Ijaz is above all a mysterious anomaly. By Issam Ahmed, Correspondent / January 25, 2012 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2012/0125/Who-is-Mansoor-Ijaz-The-US-businessman-behind-Pakistan-s-Memo-gate

Mansoor Ijaz in London Striptease - 2 (26 January 2012 Dunya News TV)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPm_yGr5G6M

An American childhood: A hedge-fund manager and venture capitalist by profession, Ijaz says his involvement in Pakistani affairs stems from his father’s dying wish that he help to change the ways in which America would interact with the Muslim world. Ijaz was born in August 1961 in Tallahasse, Florida, the eldest son of Pakistani immigrants Mujaddid and Lubna Ijaz, both graduates of Florida State University’s nuclear physics program. His father worked on Pakistan’s nuclear program in some capacity and had ties to Prime Minister Zulfiqar Bhutto before becoming a professor at Virginia Tech. The family moved first to Ohio then on to Virginia, where Ijaz played tennis for his high school team and graduated at the top of his class in 1979. After earning a Bachelor’s degree in nuclear physics from the University of Virginia, where he was a champion weightlifter, Ijaz went on to earn his Master’s in Mechanical Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In Boston he also studied at Harvard Medical School in the Medical Physics program. Ijaz stared working on Wall Street in 1986, then formed his own successful investment firm, Crescent Investment Management, which showed assets of more than $800 million in 1999. But, he says, “As my assets grew, my thirst to do something else grew as well. I was no longer content with the penthouse apartments, fast cars, and jet-setting around the world.” Between 1993 and 1996 Ijaz either gave personally or raised more than $1 million for President Clinton’s re-election campaign, about the same time, entering a select group who can claim “Friends of Bill” inner circle status – fulfilling his desire to become “a real voice at the political table,” with that connection, he says. REFERENCE: Who is Mansoor Ijaz? The US businessman behind Pakistan's 'Memo-gate' A whistle blowing hero to some, a villain doing the Pakistan military's dirty work to others, Ijaz is above all a mysterious anomaly. By Issam Ahmed, Correspondent / January 25, 2012 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2012/0125/Who-is-Mansoor-Ijaz-The-US-businessman-behind-Pakistan-s-Memo-gate/(page)/2

Mansoor Ijaz in London Striptease - 3 (26 January 2012 Dunya News TV)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eAPItgrSCbo

Friend of 'Bill' to Sudan negotiator: Ijaz had a friend who was developing oil fields in southern Sudan. The friend called him up one day to talk about an op-ed Ijaz had written on Pakistan’s government. Ijaz says his friend challenged him to do the same with his own government, and start with Sudan. “What [my friend] said that got my attention was ‘If you think Benazir tells lies wait till you see what your government does.’ All of a sudden it gripped my head. "This was a completely obscure reason for going. So I took it as a challenge. "When I got there, I saw we were calling them a terrorist nation but they didn’t have capacity to fly a plane from one end to the other of the country.” With the help of his connections there he was able to try and negotiate a deal between the Sudanese government and the US for the handover of intelligence data on the sprouting terror network of Osama bin Laden, who had only months earlier at the time been deported to Afghanistan. Ijaz says that offer, made in April 1997 by Sudan's military strongman, resulted in newly appointed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to send American diplomats back into Sudan in late September, a decision that was overturned by the White House. "It was one of the great foreign policy failures of our time," said Ijaz. Ijaz’s claims over his role in Sudan were backed by Timothy Carney who served as US ambassador to Sudan from August 1995 to November 1997 in an op-ed written in the Washington Post. Ijaz provided the Monitor with what appeared to be copies of letters from senior political leader Hasan Turabi in Sudan to President Clinton to back his assertions. According to numerous contemporary reports in the regional press including Gulf News and The Times of India, Ijaz was also a key negotiator in bringing about the 2000 cease-fire in Kashmir between Indian security forces and Pakistan-backed militants. "The real architects of the dramatic but short-lived ceasefire between militants based in Pakistan and the Indian Government in Jammu and Kashmir in 2000 were Mansoor Ijaz and C.D. Sahay,[C.D Sahay was the former chief of India's Research and Analysis Wing],” wrote Neena Gopa, foreign editor of Gulf News in 2005. Ijaz to dodge testimony? At a hearing on Tuesday, the commission refused Ijaz's request to be deposed abroad and gave him one final opportunity to appear before the Supreme Court commission in Pakistan with revised security arrangements by Feb. 9. "My family, my business partners, and I will now reassess the revised commitments of the government made today and then determine our next steps," Mr. Ijaz told the Monitor. Over the weekend, Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik said that Ijaz could be placed on an Exit Control List, preventing him from leaving the country. REFERENCE: Who is Mansoor Ijaz? The US businessman behind Pakistan's 'Memo-gate' A whistle blowing hero to some, a villain doing the Pakistan military's dirty work to others, Ijaz is above all a mysterious anomaly. By Issam Ahmed, Correspondent / January 25, 2012 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2012/0125/Who-is-Mansoor-Ijaz-The-US-businessman-behind-Pakistan-s-Memo-gate/(page)/3

Mansoor Ijaz in London Striptease - 4 (26 January 2012 Dunya News TV)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l133qaPtKsM

"I have said from the outset that I would travel to Pakistan without hesitation as long as the security arrangements were impartial and adequate. I never asked for an army battalion, nor did I seek any special attention in securing my visit. This was all government hype. I simply wanted to ensure there would be no interference, political or otherwise, with the electronic data and other physical evidence in my hands, and that I would be allowed the right of safe passage to return to my family. Rehman Malik complicated that equation greatly during the last week; I will see how he and others charged with my security behave in the coming week and then we will make a final go-no-go decision," Ijaz says. While it is now uncertain whether Ijaz will appear before the court or not, some of Pakistan’s political opposition leaders are now coming out to back him. On Monday, cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, whose popularity has soared in recent months, said if the government succeeds in preventing Ijaz from testifying, it would prove all his allegations to be true. Rasul Baksh Rais, head of Political Science at Lahore University of Management Sciences, says, “I think Mansoor Ijaz is bold. He has courage, he has a sense of responsibility and a commitment to greater values like peace, stability, and democratic order.” Adds Mr. Rais: “There are public intellectuals who speak their mind, but those who dominate the system are not committed to constitutional democracy.... Countries like Pakistan not only need internal awakening but sometimes rude awakening [from outside].” Others are not as impressed. In an editorial, Pakistan’s liberal Express Tribune Monday described Ijaz as “a publicity hound with a healthy sense of self-regard,” adding: “As a US citizen, Mr. Ijaz has every right to absent himself from Pakistani legal proceedings. But to continue making statements that will never face judicial scrutiny but place the government at risk is highly irresponsible at best.” Ijaz himself is adamant that the government of Pakistan is placing roadblocks to prevent his testimony in order to save themselves from the embarrassment his “six new revelations,” which he won’t disclose, could bring. “The current civilian leadership is not interested in a true liberal value system that is representative of the people's needs, wishes, aspirations, and hopes. They are only interested in the acquisition of power and the systematic looting of the national treasury,” he says, adding that the affair, “has allowed an activist judiciary to hold a wayward civilian government to account.... And that is good for the ordinary person just trying to survive day-to-day.” But Ijaz’s criticism is not limited to the civilian leadership, with whom he has developed a high-level of personal animosity. Asked whether Pakistan’s traditionally pro-military judiciary should be doing more to probe his allegations that ISI chief Gen. Shuja Pasha met with Arab leaders to discuss the possibility of a coup, Ijaz responds: “You're damn right they ought to ask that question. If the Supreme Court is not willing to, you can be sure [I will].” For Mr. Nawaz, the analyst, the bizarre and colorful affair has now become a distraction that the country can do without. “There are very serious issues that Pakistan faces – economic issues, the rolling over in debt, repayment of IMF loans, a need to adjust the economy. Those are the ones that the government needs to be spending time on rather than getting embroiled on this particular case.” REFERENCE: Who is Mansoor Ijaz? The US businessman behind Pakistan's 'Memo-gate' A whistle blowing hero to some, a villain doing the Pakistan military's dirty work to others, Ijaz is above all a mysterious anomaly. By Issam Ahmed, Correspondent / January 25, 2012 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2012/0125/Who-is-Mansoor-Ijaz-The-US-businessman-behind-Pakistan-s-Memo-gate/(page)/4

Mansoor Ijaz as a Commentator in Sexy Women Wrestling Music Video

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B0QvR1eP2yg

Islamabad: A music video featuring businessman Mansoor Ijaz, the central character in the memo scandal, and scantily clad female wrestlers has been creating a buzz among Pakistani users of social networking and micro-blogging websites. The video for DJ and remixer Junior Jack's 2007 hit song 'Stupidisco', which features Ijaz as a commentator at a female wrestling competition, was posted on Twitter late on Tuesday night. It was subsequently shared by Pakistani users at other social networking websites. The video for a song with a pulsating backbeat, which reached the number 20 slot in the UK singles charts, has Ijaz commenting on a wrestling match between two wrestlers named "Ms Double D" and "Nasty Nasty". At one stage, he is heard saying: "Look at that, we've got some real tumbling going on here". Ijaz laughs and describes the action at the match, saying, "Ms Double D's got the take down, she's on top. She's the reigning world champion. Oh she's giving it to her good now". As some users of Twitter raised questions about the authenticity of the video, one enterprising blogger even tracked down an even racier making-of video that showed Ijaz participating in the shoot for the music video. Ijaz created a storm in Pakistan's political circles and triggered a confrontation between the civilian government and the military after he made public what he claimed was a memo that had sought US help to stave off a possible coup after the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May last year. The Pakistani-American businessman failed to make a scheduled appearance before a Supreme Court-appointed commission that is probing the memo issue on January 16. The commission has now directed Ijaz to appear before it on January 24. Media reports on Wednesday said Ijaz had been issued a visa by the Pakistani Embassy in Switzerland and would fly from London to a military airbase in Rawalpindi on January 24. Ijaz's appearance in the music video also generated jokes in the virtual world. Cafe Pyala, a leading Pakistani blog, referred to the video and said in a post: "Some new evidence has come to light related to 'Memogate' that we think should be placed in front of the commission investigating whether any crime was committed..." REFERENCE: Video featuring Mansoor Ijaz creates Internet buzz Pakistan | Posted on Jan 18, 2012 at 03:17pm IST http://ibnlive.in.com/news/video-featuring-mansoor-ijaz-creates-internet-buzz/221997-56.html

Making of Junior Jack "Stupidisco"

http://www.myspace.com/video/d-productions/making-of-junior-jack-quot-stupidisco-quot/52892118

It was unclear why the wrestling video, which was made in 2004 and has been viewed for years on the Internet, came to light only now. Ijaz’s role was apparently spotted by a blogger late Tuesday and spread quickly through social media. Ijaz told The Associated Press he thought the video’s emergence was part of an effort by Haqqani to discredit him ahead of his testimony but conceded he had no evidence of this. He confirmed that the video was not a hoax. Ijaz appears in two versions of the same video for “Stupidisco,” a house music track by Italian producer Junior Jack that was a club hit in 2004. One clip features bikini-clad women wrestlers ‘Double D’ and ‘Nasty Nancy,’ who end up grappling on a mat in a sexually provocative fashion. The other is the same until the final 30 seconds, when the women remove each other’s clothes. Ijaz’s scenes and dialogue feature in both versions. “She’s giving it to her good now! You’ve got some real tumbling going on here. Nancy’s got that mean look,” he says, as the two women wrestle in front of him. At one point, Ijaz’s eyes widen and his mouth gapes as the video cuts to the women ripping each other’s bikinis off. REFERENCE: American at center of scandal threatening Pakistan’s president shown in naked wrestling video By Associated Press, Published: January 18 | Updated: Thursday, January 19, 12:03 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistani-prime-ministers-lawyer-says-no-harm-in-reopening-graft-case-against-president/2012/01/18/gIQAfk5P7P_story.html?tid=sm_btn_tw

Mansoor Ijaz's Uncensored Version of Naked Women Wrestling

Stupid Disco (Uncensored) - Junior Jack
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USA is Behind Shia Killings in Pakistan & Elsewhere.

2012-01-25T20:58:00.000-08:00

WASHINGTON: United States has confirmed that it has stepped up efforts to lobby Pakistan to abandon gas purchases from its western neighbour Iran. During a daily press briefing, the state department’s spokesperson Nuland Victoria said that US was talking to countries around the world to cut global dependence on Iran, adding that Pakistan was one of the countries that the US was working with. Replying to a question, the spokesperson that she didn’t have anything specific that where those conversations with Pakistan were leading. She said that US was talking about all kinds of diversification. According to the British website, the officials from USAID have taken part in a meeting at Pakistan’s petroleum ministry to indicate that LNG could be made available by the US at $4.5 per mmbtu. REFERENCE: US talking with Pak to abandon gas purchases from Iran http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-32559-US-for-Pak-to-abandon-Iran-gas-purchase

KARACHI: Three lawyers were shot dead and a fourth was wounded here on Wednesday in what appeared to be a targeted sectarian attack. Gunmen sprayed the lawyers’ car with bullets on Maulana Din Mohammad Wafai Road near Pakistan Chowk when they were going home from City Courts. One of the deceased was a senior lawyer and the others his son and nephew. Four men on two motorcycles carried out the attack at around 3:06 pm, according to SDPO Preedy Subdivision ASP Ali Asif. They intercepted the car and two pillion-riders got down and opened fire. Although the lawyer who was driving the car suffered bullet wounds, he drove the vehicle to Civil Hospital, SSP South Naeem Ahmed Shaikh said. “They fired five to six shots, we have found four spent bullet casings of a 9mm pistol and one casing of a 30-bore pistol,” he said. The windscreen of the car was smashed. The assailants managed to flee despite the presence of a police van outside the nearby office of a daily newspaper. Three policemen, who were in the van but did not act to arrest or kill the assailants, were detained by police on the orders of the SSP South pending a departmental inquiry. The policemen were part of the security escort of the editor of the newspaper. Badar Munir Jafri, 65, his son Gohar Shakil Jafri, 34, and nephew Kafil Ahmed Jafri were pronounced dead at the hospital, while the injured, Babar Ali Jafri, was taken to the operation theatre and after surgery shifted to the Surgical ICU. Kafil Ahmed Jafri was to get married on 17 Rabiul Awwal. According to police and some lawyers, the four advocates were members of the legal aid committee of the Shia Lawyers Forum, but at present they were not handling any high-profile case. The bodies were shifted to Husaini Jamia Masjid in Malir, Saudabad. The incident sparked protests in the localities of Malir, Saudabad and Jafar Tayyar Society. Protesters started firing in the air and forced businesses to close. Reports of tension were also received from other areas, including Rizvia Society, Abbas Town and Ancholi in Federal B. Area. A portion of the National Highway was closed to traffic after enraged people erected barricades and burned tyres. An Edhi ambulance was set on fire in Malir. The Shia Ulema Council has announced three days of mourning. The funeral prayers will be offered at Sharea Faisal (National Highway) after Zohr prayers on Thursday. On the call of the Karachi Bar Association, legal fraternity will observe a complete boycott of courts on Thursday. KBA President Mahmoodul Hasan condemned the murders and said the lawyers would stay away from courts and hold a condolence reference. He called upon the government to take immediate steps to stop the killing of lawyers. Sindh Bar Council’s Vice Chairman Iftikhar Javed Qazi also condemned the killings and said the SBC had endorsed the call given by the Pakistan Bar Council and Supreme Court Bar Association for a countrywide strike.On Jan 11, Advocate Maqboolur Rehman was killed on New M.A. Jinnah Road in the Jamshed Quarters area. Last year, 20 lawyers were killed in Sindh, 15 of them in Karachi, according to the Karachi Bar Council. REFERENCE: Three lawyers killed in Karachi sectarian attack S. Raza Hassan http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/26/three-lawyers-killed-in-karachi-sectarian-attack.html

QUETTA: Gunmen shot dead three Shia Muslims on Wednesday in the southwestern city of Quetta , police and local intelligence officials said. “Two gunmen riding a motorbike opened fire on a car in Quetta city, killing three Shia Muslims including two government officials and a local television artist,” senior local police official, Muhammad Tariq told AFP. He said it seemed like a sectarian attack, but the police had launched an investigation into the incident. A local intelligence official also confirmed the incident. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Hundreds of civilians have been killed since Baluch rebels rose up in 2004 against the federal Pakistani government, demanding political autonomy and a greater share of profits from the region’s oil, gas and mineral resources. REFERENCE: Three people shot dead in Quetta: police http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/25/three-people-shot-dead-in-quetta-police.html

WASHINGTON: The United States said on Tuesday that a gas pipeline project Pakistan was negotiating with Iran could violate US restrictions on major financial deals with Tehran and Washington was already discussing this issue with Islamabad. At a briefing at the State Department, spokesperson Victoria Nuland also said that a bill President Barack Obama signed into law on Saturday would not lead to an automatic suspension of US aid to Pakistan. At a Dec 27 public rally in Larkana, President Asif Ali Zardari had said that Pakistan would go ahead with the gas pipeline agreement with Iran despite US reservations. But the law President Obama signed on Saturday forbids dealing with central Iranian banks. Experts say that this restriction could make it difficult for Pakistan to implement the project. When the question was raised at the State Department briefing, Ms Nuland said it was a cause of concern for the US as well. “We’ve made absolutely clear over many months now our concern about this deal and we will continue to talk to Pakistan about it. Were it to go forward, how it might be impacted — again, this is the kind of conversation that we have to have with Pakistan and that we’re starting to have now,” she said. Also, Ms Nuland indirectly confirmed a recent statement by a Pakistani official that Pakistan had not received anything from the coalition support fund since June 2010 and only $400 million from the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill were received during 2011. “You do know that some of the money on the military-to-military side, it was difficult to spend because some of those programmes had been suspended and because of the state of the relationship in counter-terrorism cooperation,” she said. When a reporter reminded her that new congressional restrictions — included in the law President Obama signed during the weekend — could also adversely affect the US-Pakistan relationship, Ms Nuland said: “These are certification requirements in the bill. So obviously, we’re going to have to certify that cooperation is going well in order to release money. So it’s essentially a continuation of some of the issues that we’ve had before.” REFERENCE: Pak-Iran gas pipeline to violate sanctions: US January 4, 2012 http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/04/pak-iran-gas-pipeline-to-violate-sanctions-us.html

USA is Funding Al-Qaeda: Seymour Hersh on CNN (2007)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pKor9oXCqfA

In the past few months, as the situation in Iraq has deteriorated, the Bush Administration, in both its public diplomacy and its covert operations, has significantly shifted its Middle East strategy. The “redirection,” as some inside the White House have called the new strategy, has brought the United States closer to an open confrontation with Iran and, in parts of the region, propelled it into a widening sectarian conflict between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has coöperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda. One contradictory aspect of the new strategy is that, in Iraq, most of the insurgent violence directed at the American military has come from Sunni forces, and not from Shiites. But, from the Administration’s perspective, the most profound—and unintended—strategic consequence of the Iraq war is the empowerment of Iran. Its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has made defiant pronouncements about the destruction of Israel and his country’s right to pursue its nuclear program, and last week its supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said on state television that “realities in the region show that the arrogant front, headed by the U.S. and its allies, will be the principal loser in the region.” After the revolution of 1979 brought a religious government to power, the United States broke with Iran and cultivated closer relations with the leaders of Sunni Arab states such as Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. That calculation became more complex after the September 11th attacks, especially with regard to the Saudis. Al Qaeda is Sunni, and many of its operatives came from extremist religious circles inside Saudi Arabia. Before the invasion of Iraq, in 2003, Administration officials, influenced by neoconservative ideologues, assumed that a Shiite government there could provide a pro-American balance to Sunni extremists, since Iraq’s Shiite majority had been oppressed under Saddam Hussein. They ignored warnings from the intelligence community about the ties between Iraqi Shiite leaders and Iran, where some had lived in exile for years. Now, to the distress of the White House, Iran has forged a close relationship with the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The new American policy, in its broad outlines, has been discussed publicly. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that there is “a new strategic alignment in the Middle East,” separating “reformers” and “extremists”; she pointed to the Sunni states as centers of moderation, and said that Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah were “on the other side of that divide.” (Syria’s Sunni majority is dominated by the Alawi sect.) Iran and Syria, she said, “have made their choice and their choice is to destabilize.” Some of the core tactics of the redirection are not public, however. The clandestine operations have been kept secret, in some cases, by leaving the execution or the funding to the Saudis, or by finding other ways to work around the normal congressional appropriations process, current and former officials close to the Administration said. A senior member of the House Appropriations Committee told me that he had heard about the new strategy, but felt that he and his colleagues had not been adequately briefed. “We haven’t got any of this,” he said. “We ask for anything going on, and they say there’s nothing. And when we ask specific questions they say, ‘We’re going to get back to you.’ It’s so frustrating.” The key players behind the redirection are Vice-President Dick Cheney, the deputy national-security adviser Elliott Abrams, the departing Ambassador to Iraq (and nominee for United Nations Ambassador), Zalmay Khalilzad, and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi national-security adviser. While Rice has been deeply involved in shaping the public policy, former and current officials said that the clandestine side has been guided by Cheney. (Cheney’s office and the White House declined to comment for this story; the Pentagon did not respond to specific queries but said, “The United States is not planning to go to war with Iran.”) The policy shift has brought Saudi Arabia and Israel into a new strategic embrace, largely because both countries see Iran as an existential threat. They have been involved in direct talks, and the Saudis, who believe that greater stability in Israel and Palestine will give Iran less leverage in the region, have become more involved in Arab-Israeli negotiations. The new strategy “is a major shift in American policy—it’s a sea change,” a U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel said. The Sunni states “were petrified of a Shiite resurgence, and there was growing resentment with our gambling on the moderate Shiites in Iraq,” he said. “We cannot reverse the Shiite gain in Iraq, but we can contain it.” “It seems there has been a debate inside the government over what’s the biggest danger—Iran or Sunni radicals,” Vali Nasr, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, who has written widely on Shiites, Iran, and Iraq, told me. “The Saudis and some in the Administration have been arguing that the biggest threat is Iran and the Sunni radicals are the lesser enemies. This is a victory for the Saudi line.” REFERENCE: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY THE REDIRECTION Is the Administration’s new policy benefitting our enemies in the war on terrorism? by Seymour M. Hersh MARCH 5, 2007 Efforts to curb Iran’s influence have involved the United States in worsening Sunni-Shiite tensions. A STRATEGIC SHIFT http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/05/070305fa_fact_hersh

Jamat-e-Islami Supports AL-QAEDA for Anarchy in Saudi Arabia.

2012-01-20T02:22:00.000-08:00

For example, after the 9/11, the former JI Amir Qazi Hussain Ahmad stated that al-Qaeda was a figment of the Americans’ imagination. On the contrary, the then JI Secretary General Syed Munawar Hassan, the current chief of the party, said that al-Qaeda leaders were our brethren (Nawa-i-Waqt, October 13, 2002). Commenting on these statements, Prof. Ahmad said: ‘There is no contradiction between the two. The Muslims in al-Qaeda are our brethren. They should be punished if they are criminals!’ He sounded mightily reluctant to hold Al-Qaeda responsible for 9/11. He even refused to give any credence to Gulbadeen Hikmatyar’s statement that Al-Qaeda was responsible for 9/11. (It may be added here that Hikmatyar is Jamaat-i-Islami’s favorite Afghan leader.) Instead, he finds “dozens of scholarly books” casting doubt on the official version more credible. REFERENCE: The Muslims in al-Qaeda are our brethren, says the top Jamaat-i-Islami ideologue Prof. Khurshid Ahmad Dec 16th, 2010 By Shakil Chaudhary and Mohammad Shehzad http://www.pol-dev.com/?p=678

Jamaat-i-Islami ideologue Prof. Khurshid Ahmad - 1

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqZDGxRx1pQ

He justified the two-nation theory saying, the Hindus and the Muslims coexisted peacefully only under the Muslim rule and such an existence was otherwise impossible. ‘The colonial rule divided the Hindus and the Muslims…that resulted in the 1947 riots!’ He admitted that during the last 15-20 years, the Pakistani society had become increasingly intolerant. He conceded that the blasphemy laws were being misused, but he did not favor amending them. ‘The punishment for blasphemy is death – in Christianity, the Old Testament, the New Testament, the Quran and the precepts of the Holy Prophet Mohammad.’ The blasphemy does not apply to serious academic debate, he said. ‘It applies only to derogatory remarks.’ He dismissed the argument that the Barelvis consider the Deobandis and the Ahl-i-Hadith blasphemers. On the Kashmir jihad, Prof. Ahmad said that the JI has no organizational relationship with the Hizbul Mujahideen. ‘But of course, we do meet and whatever the Hizb is doing, it is its fundamental right.’ The JI India and JI Pakistan have different ideas on certain issues such as Kashmir though the source of inspiration for them was the same. He justified it saying that they became different and independent organization after the partition because the political situation had changed. He said that Israel was an illegitimate country, but did not support the annihilation of the Israeli Jews. In fact, he supported the idea of a single state in which the Jews and the Palestinians live together. He acknowledged that the US and NATO played some positive role in the Balkans, but they allowed the massacre of the Muslims to continue. Their intervention was aimed at preventing the revival of Islamic movements there. REFERENCE: The Muslims in al-Qaeda are our brethren, says the top Jamaat-i-Islami ideologue Prof. Khurshid Ahmad Dec 16th, 2010 By Shakil Chaudhary and Mohammad Shehzad http://www.pol-dev.com/?p=678

Jamaat-i-Islami ideologue Prof. Khurshid Ahmad - 2

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0sSaxB-45B0

Jamat-e-Islami Links with Al-Qaeda

Terror mastermind captured – Terror mastermind captured – Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is thought to be the man who masterminded the attacks on 11 September. His capture in Pakistan was seen as a key success in the US fight to counter al-Qaeda. BBC News Online presents key video reports following the arrest. Tuesday, 4 March, 2003, 22:56 GMT http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/2820179.stm - KARACHI – Under immense pressure from the United States, a slow and gradual operation has begun in Pakistan against the strongest political voice of Islamists and the real mother of international Islamic movements, of which Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front is the spoiled child. In a surprise move this week, Pakistan’s federal minister of the interior, Faisal Saleh Hayat, listed a number of incidences in which members of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the premier fundamentalist party in the country, had been tied to al-Qaeda, and called on it to “explain these links”. “It is a matter of concern that Jamaat-e-Islami, which is a main faction of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal [MMA], has neither dissociated itself from its activists having links with the al-Qaeda network nor condemned their activities,” Faisal said, adding that “one could derive a meaning out of its silence”. The MMA is an alliance of six religious parties that gained unprecedented electoral victories in national elections in 2002. One of its members is the leader of the opposition in the Lower House, while the MMA controls the provincial government in North West Frontier Province. It also forms part of a coalition government in Balochistan province. The MMA has 67 seats in the 342-seat National Assembly, with just under a third of them held by the JI. Asia Times Online predicted that the JI would be targeted (Jihadi’s arrest a small step for Pakistan , Aug 10) and now contacts confirm that moves have already started against associates of the JI in its strongest political constituency, Karachi. The next phase will most likely be in Rawalpindi and southern Punjab. Several close affiliates are believed to have been arrested by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) without charges being laid against them. Pakistan turns on itself By Syed Saleem Shahzad Aug 19, 2004 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FH19Df05.html Khalid: A test for US credibility By Syed Saleem Shahzad Mar 6, 2003 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EC06Df04.html Profile: Al-Qaeda ‘kingpin’ Page last updated at 14:04 GMT, Friday, 13 November 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2811855.stm http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12964158 ‘THE MASTERMIND’ For smug KSM, federal court could be perfect arena By Peter Finn Washington Post Staff Writer Saturday, November 14, 2009 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/11/13/ST2009111300917.html?sid=ST2009111300917

Jamaat-i-Islami ideologue Prof. Khurshid Ahmad - 3

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FPDHeH8yphU

ISLAMABAD: One of the top security agencies on Wednesday picked up Raja Ehsan Aziz, a member of Tehrik-e-Islami (TI), for his alleged connections with terrorists who had attacked the Parade Lane Mosque in Rawalpindi and Moon Market in Lahore. Tehrik-e-Islami is a splinter group of the JI. Two female members of the Tehrik have already been taken into custody. Sarwat Wahid, another female member whose son’s car was used in the Parade Lane Mosque attack, is missing. Also her son, Jawad, who was studying in Faisalabad after doing A Level from Beacon House School System, is missing. Aziz, a graduate of Columbia University who also served on senior positions at the Foreign Office, is a retired professor of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University. His elder son is an Army doctor. Aziz was taken away from his house in G/10-3 on Wednesday evening by sleuths of the Counter-Terrorism Cell, his wife Amira Aziz told The News. Amira, an ex-MNA of Jamaat-e-Islami and now a Shura member of the Tehrik, is a religious scholar and writes columns in an Urdu daily. Aziz’s driver, Phool Zeb from Nowshera, has already been arrested as investigators found a mobile SIM allegedly used for conversation during the attacks on the Parade Lane Mosque and Moon Market, was issued in his name. Likewise, the car used in the mosque attack belonged to Jawad, the son of a Tehrik-e-Islami woman, Sarwat Wahid, a resident of I-8 Sector, Islamabad. Both of them are missing since then. Likewise, Aziz’ son, Omer, a student of Islamic International University, has not returned home for the last five days. JI splinter group leader, females held for links to suicide attackers Friday, December 18, 2009 By Umar Cheema http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=214063&Cat=2&dt=12/21/2009

Jamat e Islami Terrorist Dr. Usman was mastermind of Attack on GHQ
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SeUXYXiAkyM&feature=player_embedded

Aziz has been picked up for the second time, his wife said, denying any links of the family with terrorism incidents. “I’m a sworn enemy of America and can pay any price for it but I strongly oppose terrorism within Pakistan,” Amira Aziz told The News. She said the intelligence operatives had been following the women activists of Tehrik-e-Islami for the last six months and harassed them. She alleged that her husband was beaten black and blue when picked up last time and kept in illegal custody for a night. Amira said her son, Omer, a heart patient, was very upset when intelligence guys kept his father in their custody for a night. A female member of Tehrik, Najma Sana, who lives in G-9/1, is already in the agency’s custody for the last 10 days. Sarwat Wahid, after being chased by the intelligence agency, left Islamabad for Karachi where she was again pursued by the police. Her sister and children in Karachi have been arrested to press for recovery of Sarwat who has gone underground there. Sarwat’s son, Jawad, is also missing. Tahira Mumtaz, another female member of the Tehrik, was twice called for investigation over her alleged assistance to Sarwat to flee the capital. Altaf Aziz Khattack, SHO, said he was not aware of any such incident. He asked this correspondent to take up the matter with the R A Bazaar police in whose jurisdiction the mosque was attacked. When contacted, officials of the concerned police station said that they had not arrested Ehsan Aziz, adding the Army was investigating the attack and the matter may be taken up with them. The DG ISPR could not be contacted. REFERENCE: JI splinter group leader, females held for links to suicide attackers Friday, December 18, 2009 By Umar Cheema http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=214063&Cat=2&dt=12/21/2009

Saudi Arab's Fatwa (Religious Edict) against Al-Qaeda & Osama Bin Laden