Punjabi Judiciary or Sindhi Judiciary - 4

--- On Mon, 3/23/09, jaag trust wrote:

rasool buksh plejo in his visit to lahore called all sindhi nationalist parties as Agents of powerful real rulling elite. they play on anti=punjab feelings. if such people r in forfornt then no point to talk about pml nawaz or quaidiazam. those who r in centre has there specific interests, no matter they r sindhies or pukhtoon or punjabis while those who r in parovincial level have different interests. a real devolutiuon of power upto union councils is the ultimate solution of such problems provided our political gods can understand it.

aamir riaz www.awamijamhoriforum.org Lahore
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Aamir Sahab,

You are correct, instead of inciting hatred Mr. Manzoor Chandio and Mr Aajiz Jamali should have read an Excellent and very Explosive book "Pakistan Kay Siyasi Waderay" by Mr Aqeel Abbas Jaferi, to learn as to how these big families have strengthened their stranglehold on Power, Resources and Assemblies, Senate and Military too by adopting inter- provincial marriages [the facts in the books would startle you to your very core] . This, practice should be envouraged amongst Upper Middle and Middle class to put out the flame of Ethnic Hatred. Another soultion is given by Daily Dawn's Editorial which basically strengthens your point i.e. Power devolved from Federation to Provinces and then Provinces to Union Councils:

Need for consensus September 12, 2005 Monday Sha’aban 7, 1426

http://www.dawn.com/2005/09/12/ed.htm

REPORTS that the federal government is planning to transfer more subjects to the provinces out of the concurrent list deserve to be welcomed. Such a move was overdue, because restricted autonomy has been cause of much resentment among the provinces. Even though federal in nature, the 1973 Constitution has a strong bias in favour of the centre. According to article 142- (c), a provincial assembly has the power to make laws “with respect to any matter not enumerated in either the federal legislative list or the concurrent list”. Significantly, the fourth schedule has only two lists — federal and concurrent — and does not have a provincial list. The federal list contains 67 subjects (59 in Part I and eight in Part II). The concurrent list consists of 47 subjects, leaving very little for the federating units to legislate on. In other words, the provinces have the right to legislate on very small number of subjects “not enumerated either in the federal legislative list or in the concurrent list”. In matters of tax collection especially, the Basic Law virtually denies the constituent units any worthwhile sources of revenue. As a perusal of taxation powers will show, the federal government has reserved for itself almost all sources of revenue. The federal taxes mentioned in the fourth schedule — points 43 to 54 — include virtually all taxes, except, very significantly, “taxes on income other than agricultural income”.

If Pakistan’s federal structure is to strengthen itself, it must be based on a system where the constituent units feel fully accommodated as an equal part of the state rather than an adjunct of the federal government. That the denial of legitimate provincial rights could prove disastrous is evident from the 1971 tragedy. The Ayubian constitution of 1962 was presidential, with the federation consisting of only two provinces. Yet the way it existed in principle and in operation, created resentment in East Pakistan that generated political tensions and ultimately led to the 1971 trauma. We have similar problems with the 1973 Constitution, because small provinces have grievances which have at times caused serious differences. Balochistan, the country’s largest province territorially, has for decades felt aggrieved on two counts: first, it feels that the quantum of provincial autonomy mentioned in the 1973 Constitution is inadequate; two, even the existing provisions relating to provincial rights are not fully implemented in letter and spirit.

Now that an 18th amendment bill is on the anvil, let there be a national debate on the issues involved. Often, the subject of provincial autonomy falls victim to the politico-emotional rhetoric of politicians. This inhibits a meaningful debate that could settle the question and lead to a national consensus on such a vital question as provincial autonomy. There is also no agreement yet on the national finance award for sharing of resources. This has as much to do with the constitutional provisions as with our failure to work the federal system wisely. One hopes that the government will release the draft of the bill before it is formally tabled in parliament. This will help constitutional experts, parliamentarians and the media discuss the issue threadbare and develop a constitutional scheme that will reconcile the viewpoints of the protagonists of maximum provincial autonomy and those who believe in a strong centre and also ensure that existing provisions such as the Council of Common Interest are strengthened and fully implemented.