WASHINGTON: Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s visit to China, which he declared his country’s best friend, makes it harder to sell an angry US public on aid to Islamabad, a key US senator said on Tuesday. “Frankly, I’m getting tired of it, and I think Americans are getting tired of it as far as shovelling money in there at people who just flat don’t like us,” said Republican Senator James Risch. Continued aid to Pakistan, Risch argued, was “a hard sell to the American people” when cash-strapped Washington sends assistance to Islamabad, only to see “the head of Pakistan go to China and… stand up and say ‘you\re our best friend’.” His comments came during a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on sour US-Pakistan ties in the wake of the raid in which elite US commandos killed Osama bin Laden in a military academy town not very far from Islamabad. And they follow Mr Gilani’s arrival in China. Asked at the hearing about the visit, former White House national security adviser Jim Jones said Washington must work to ensure that Mr Gilani’s visit to China does not worsen his country’s already strained India ties. “If any part of Pakistan thinking is that better relations with China make India mad, and that’s therefore a good thing to do, then that’s flawed thinking,” said Jones. “We need to try to ensure that we can make sure that relations don’t get worse as a result of this kind of trip and this kind of rhetoric,” said Jones. He also said Washington must strive to convince countries like China, Brazil and India “that with this great economic power that they’re about to have, and already have in some cases, there comes some great responsibilities in terms of making the world a better place.”—AFP REFERENCE: US senator criticises China visitFrom the Newspaper Yesterday http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/18/us-senator-criticises-china-visit.html
James Risch is a member of following Committees:
Energy and Natural Resources, Member
Foreign Relations, Member
Select Committee on Ethics, Member
Select Committee on Intelligence, Member
Small Business and Entrepreneurship, Member
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Member
Subcommittee on Energy, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on European Affairs, Member
Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs and
International Environmental Protection, Member
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests, Member
Subcommittee on Water and Power, Member
RICHARD NIXON TAPES- China & Changing the World (Kissinger)
Courtesy: http://youtu.be/J4n2P_fZB08
Henry Kissinger February 14, 1972 -- 10:32 PM 020-092 White House Telephone
"QUOTE"
September 1970-July 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66 Edited by William Burr, February 27, 2002 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/
Last week, President Bush visited Beijing on the anniversary of Richard Nixon's visit in February 1972, the first presidential trip to China.(1) To commemorate further the Nixon trip, the National Security Archive and the George Washington University's Cold War Group of the Elliott School of International Affairs are publishing recently declassified U.S. documents on the Sino-American rapprochement. This material documents Nixon's efforts to make contacts with Beijing during 1970-1971 as the basis for rapprochement after decades of hostility. Most of the documents, held in the files of the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at the National Archives, were released in April 2001; they are only the tip of an iceberg of very rich material in the Nixon papers. The new releases make it possible to publish here for the first time, a nearly-complete record --some pages are still classified--of the historic talks between Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger during the latter's secret trip to China in July 1971. September 1970-July 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66 Edited by William Burr, February 27, 2002 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/
This collection opens up with documentation on Nixon's and Kissinger's efforts to establish communication with China in the fall of 1970. Since the beginning of his presidency in early 1969, and even earlier, Nixon had been interested in changing relations with China, not least to contain a potential nuclear threat but also, by taking advantage of the adversarial Sino-Soviet relationship, to open up another front in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. It took time, however, for Nixon and Kissinger to discover how to carry out a new policy toward Beijing and such complications as the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970 created detours in White House efforts to sustain a dialogue with Beijing.(2) September 1970-July 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66 Edited by William Burr, February 27, 2002 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/
Earlier efforts to make contact with China having gone nowhere, in September 1970 Nixon directed Kissinger to renew the effort. An October 1970 meeting with Pakistan's ruler Yahya Khan (see document 3) had some potential for expediting contacts because Pakistan had provided a channel for earlier Sino-American communication in 1969.(3) Nevertheless, as the documents show, Kissinger was also trying other channels, such as the Romanian government and an old friend, Jean Sainteny, who had connections at the Chinese embassy in Paris. The Pakistani channel produced an important message from Zhou in December 1970, which quickly generated a White House response (see documents 5 and 7). In April 1971, both sides were engaged in important signaling---the Chinese with "Ping Pong diplomacy" and Nixon with public statements of interest in visiting China--while Kissinger was waiting for Beijing's response to the message sent in December. On 27 April 1971, he was about to make another effort to contact Sainteny when the Pakistani ambassador delivered Zhou Enlai's belated reply (see document 16). Mao Zedong's and Zhou's interest in receiving a visit from Nixon laid the way for Kissinger's secret trip in July 1971 and the beginning of the U.S.-China effort to discuss the issues that had divided them over the years. September 1970-July 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66 Edited by William Burr, February 27, 2002 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/
The documents show that general agreement on the Taiwan problem was the sine qua non for Nixon's trip and diplomatic normalization generally, although Kissinger elided that issue altogether in his memoirs. Nixon was reluctant to give up too much on Taiwan (see item 32), but he knew that the success of the trip depended on U.S. admission that it did not seek "two Chinas or a "one China, one Taiwan solution." In his talk with Zhou on 9 July, Kissinger did not use Zhou's formulation that "Taiwan was a part of China" but he nevertheless acknowledged it when he declared that "we are not advocating a `two Chinas' solution or a `one China, one Taiwan' solution."(4) Kissinger's declaration prompted Zhou to say what he had not yet said, that he was optimistic about Sino-American rapprochement: "the prospect for a solution and the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries is hopeful" (see document 33 at p. 13). As important as this exchange was, in his 1979 memoir Kissinger misleadingly wrote that "Taiwan was mentioned only briefly during the first session."(5) Yet some 9 pages, nearly 20 percent, of the 46-page record of the first Zhou-Kissinger meeting on 9 July 1971, include discussion of Taiwan, with Kissinger disavowing Taiwanese independence and committing to withdraw two-thirds of U.S. military forces from the island once the Vietnam War ended. Moreover, Kissinger told Zhou that he expected that Beijing and Washington would "settle the political question" of diplomatic relations "within the earlier part of the President's second term." Kissinger did not say what that would mean for U.S. diplomatic relations with Taiwan but undoubtedly Zhou expected Washington to break formal ties with Taipei as a condition of Sino-American diplomatic normalization. September 1970-July 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66 Edited by William Burr, February 27, 2002 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/
Undoubtedly, Kissinger hoped that the Taiwan problem would gradually fade away, with peaceful "evolution" uniting China and its wayward province, but Taiwan proved resilient and the downgrading of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship remained a sore point for Republican Party conservatives during the 1970s. Indeed, Nixon's resignation in 1974 and the political weaknesses of his successor, Gerald Ford, made it impossible for Kissinger to complete the U.S.-PRC normalization process. Ford could not break ties with Taiwan without raising the ire of the Republican right. Undoubtedly, when Kissinger published his memoir he did not want to provoke the conservatives, much less Taipei, by disclosing what he had said to Zhou about Taiwan. September 1970-July 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66 Edited by William Burr, February 27, 2002 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/
The U.S. documentation represents only a partial record of a more complex reality. While Chinese archival sources are largely unavailable, a growing body of scholarship in China and the United States draws upon Chinese language sources to show that Beijing was just as energetic as Washington in trying to signal interest in a new relationship. For example, in his recent book, Mao's China and the Cold War, University of Virginia historian Chen Jian discusses in fascinating detail the internal deliberations in Beijing during the late 1960s and early 70s.(6) One intriguing episode in Chen's account is the story of the four marshals whom Mao instructed in 1969 to report on trends in world politics, especially U.S-Soviet, Sino-Soviet, and Sino-American relations. Worried about a dangerous confrontation with Moscow, two of the marshals, Chen Yi and Ye Jianying, proposed that Beijing play "the card of the United States" to provide leverage with Moscow. During the last decades of the Cold War, top U.S. officials would sometimes recommend playing the "China card," but it is a rare policymaker who understands that the United States may also be the object of other nations' card playing.(7) September 1970-July 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66 Edited by William Burr, February 27, 2002 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/
As useful as the new Chinese materials are in elucidating the story of the rapprochement, for the most part Bejing's archives are closed to all but party insiders. It may be too optimistic to hope that the availability of U.S documentation from the highest levels of the Nixon administration will induce Chinese authorities to disclose their record of these historic developments. Whether archival openness will depend on other steps toward a more politically open society remains to be seen, but until a new archival regime emerges in Beijing, both American and Chinese historians will have to rely on an incomplete U.S. record. September 1970-July 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66 Edited by William Burr, February 27, 2002 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/
"UNQUOTE"
US Declassified Document before the Fall of Dhaka: Handwritten note from President Richard M. Nixon on an April 28, 1971, National Security Council decision paper: "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at this time - RMN" The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 REFERENCE: The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79 Edited by Sajit Gandhi
December 16, 2002 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/
"An statement of an Honest General who was absent minded too" President Yahya Khan On East Pakistan [KEEP IN MIND THE RECENT RANT OF REVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN WITH THE HELP OF HONEST GENERAL]
As per Ms. Anjum Niaz
(Sealed off as 'Top Secret' by the State Department and CIA, now after three decades, 46 declassified documents - some 'sanitized' - and a audio clip of Nixon-Kissinger offer a compelling peek at President Nixon and his security advisor Henry Kissinger giving a sly wink to the Pakistan army to kill, rape and terrorize innocent East Pakistanis during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis)
Inside the Oval Office, August 2, 1971, an exasperated President Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger curse India for wanting to pick up a fight with Pakistan. Actually, the timing is skewed for Nixon who has clandestinely taken a shine to Chou En-Lai facilitated by Pakistan President Gen.Yahya Khan. But the "god-damn Indians" - as Nixon and Kissinger call them - are giving the Americans a run for their money by refusing to sit and watch silently the two siblings - East and West Pakistan - slug it out with each other.
"We have already given 100 million dollars to India for the refugees (pouring in from E. Pakistan)," Kissinger informs Nixon who is convinced the US is "making a terrible mistake" by heaping dollars on New Delhi. "India is economically in good shape, but no one knows how the god-damn Indians are using this money. They are not letting any foreigners enter the refugee areas. Any foreigners, and their record is outrageous!" keens Kissinger.
The White House conversation comes the day after the Beatle George Harrison and his soul mate Ravi Shankar, the Indian sitar player hold a "Concert for Bangladesh"(months before its birth) to raise money for the refugees escaping the reign of terror unleashed by Pakistan army after Mujibur Rehman's Awami League has swept the polls in East Pakistan during the 1970-71 general elections but is now being outlawed.
"So who is the Beatle giving the money to - is it the god-damn Indians?" asks a frustrated Nixon. "Yes," says Kissinger flatly, adding that Pakistan has also been given $150,000 food aid but the major problem "is the god-damn distribution." Nixon jumps in, "we have to keep India away". Kissinger couldn't agree more: "we must defuse the refugee and famine problem in East Pakistan in order to deprive India (read Indira Gandhi) of an excuse to start the war with Pakistan."
"We have to avoid screwing Pakistan that outrageously. It could blow up everything," concurs Kissinger. And the solution according to him is: "we should start our god-damn lecturing on political structures, as much as we can and while there will eventually be a separate East Bengal in two years (he says it so very casually) but it must not happen in the next six months." REFERENCE: When America looked the other way By Anjum Niaz Friday, January 03, 2003
http://www.zcommunications.org/when-america-looked-the-other-way-by-anjum-niaz
NEW DELHI, Dec 18: Newly-declassified papers of the US government reveal that the then President Richard Nixon had ordered his aides not to hamper Gen Yahya Khan’s war effort in East Pakistan, despite warnings from his Dhaka envoy that American weapons were being used to carry out a massacre there, Star News reported on Wednesday. In what was billed as an exclusive report, the New Delhi- datelined report quotes American documents as saying that the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Nixon were poised to cut off diplomatic ties with New Delhi in the middle of the 1971 conflict but they were stopped by Pakistan’s surrender and the ceasefire declared by India. Two days ago, India celebrated Vijay Diwas or Victory Day — the day in 1971 that Pakistan forces agreed to surrender in Dhaka. “Now 31 years later, the US has declassified 46 documents on its role during the crisis,” Star News added.
It quoted the documents as saying showing “how America blatantly violated its own arms embargo in arming Pakistan, despite ground reports of a systematic genocide by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan,” the report said. “To all hands, don’t squeeze Yahya at this time,” said a handwritten note by President Richard Nixon in April 1971 — perhaps the clearest indicator of US interests in backing Pakistan’s military dictator. Only a month earlier in March 1971, the American consul-general in Dhaka wrote to his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saying: “Am deeply shocked at massacre by Pakistani military in East Pakistan, appalled at possibility these atrocities are being committed with American equipment, and greatly concerned at United States vulnerability to damaging allegations of association with reign of military terror.” With the American administration choosing to ignore such warnings it was up to the Indian government to internationalise the killings in East Pakistan, the report added. “The genocide in East Pakistan caught the world media’s attention because world media happened to be in West Bengal for the elections and we who were in eastern command would send them to places where they could shoot for themselves,” said Star News quoting India’s Gen Sethna, former Vice Chief of Army Staff, as saying.
Despite the media pressure Richard Nixon continued to support Yahya Khan sometimes for reasons, which seem implausible. “In all honesty, Dr Kissinger pointed out, the President has a special feeling for President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life,” says an extract from the Memorandum of Conversation: Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President to Kenneth Keating and US ambassador to India. It was perhaps this “fact of life” which saw the US completely disregarding its own arms embargo by transferring F-5 fighters then considered state of the art to Pakistan, less than 10 days after the ceasefire. According to the American embassy in Tehran: “Three F-5A fighter aircraft with Pakistani markings and piloted by Pak pilots transited Tehran en-route from Turkey to Pakistan on December 26. Aircraft were noted by several employees including a Pakistani who spoke with one Pak pilot and the reported pilot indicated, that the aircraft had come from US.” As Indian armed forces gained upper hand in the war, the mood in the White House grew increasingly desperate. The documents show both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had decided on breaking diplomatic ties with the India but the Pakistani surrender and the Indian ceasefire brought a quick end to the Indo-US diplomatic standoff, the agency said. REFERENCE: Don’t squeeze Yahya Khan, Nixon told aides in 1971 By Jawed Naqvi December 19, 2002 Thursday Shawwal 14, 1423 http://www.dawn.com/2002/12/19/top11.htm
DHAKA: March 25, 1971. We didn’t know about that until the next morning. I was then living in an apartment in a multi-ethnic, middle-class locality of Dhaka. For years we had lived in amity with our neighbours sharing each other’s joys and sorrows. But feelings were changing. Friendships were giving way to animosity. Suspicion and distrust soured relationships. When the curfew was lifted for a few hours in the morning of March 26, I stepped out of my apartment to shop for some food for the family. Suddenly I was stopped by a car that screeched to a halt besides me. The occupants asked me brusquely where I was going. When I told them why I was out on the street at a time when most preferred the safety of their homes, they offered to take me to the market which was not far and insisted that I accompany them. I realised that all was not well and they were looking for easy targets. I then began talking to them in highly Persianised Urdu to establish my ethnic identity. I was wearing a kurta and pyjama that was and still remains the attire of Muslim Bengalis. By then the urban population had discarded the lungi which previously distinguished the natives from the migrants. After driving a short distance, my ‘benefactors’ realised that this was a case of mistaken identity. They lost interest in including me in their wild killing spree. Hurriedly, they dropped me by the roadside saying they had an urgent chore and therefore could not take me to the market. I thanked my stars. We never came to know how many people were killed on that terrible night. Later we learnt that among the unfortunate victims were leading intellectuals, writers, professors, artists, poets and exceptionally bright professionals. Among those innocent people were Prof Guha, Prof Thakur Das and Munier Choudhry. They were patriots working tirelessly for the improvement of their homeland. The list of potential victims had been meticulously prepared with the help of the leaders and activists of some newly formed organisations called Al Shams and Al Badr. Though such allegations were refuted vociferously by the government, it was generally believed that there was a great deal of truth in the rumours that were circulating. The bodies of the slain were later discovered scattered in the vicinity of Mohammadpur, a housing colony which was founded by Field Marshal Ayub Khan for the rehabilitation of Muslims uprooted from India. The massacre of March 25 backfired. The public anger at the killing of Bengali intellectuals exposed the minority Urdu-speaking population to the vendetta that was inevitable. They were isolated and thereafter lived in perpetual fear that instilled in them a ghetto mentality they could never shed. For years they had chased illusions and false images while claiming a sham superiority in number and intellect that simply did not exist. REFERENCE: March 25 — a watershed By Akhtar Payami March 25, 2008 Tuesday Rabi-ul-Awwal 16, 1429 http://archives.dawn.com/2008/03/25/op.htm#4
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