A Dialogue with Aamir Mughal: The Analyst World

A Dialogue with Aamir Mughal

http://www.theanalystworld.com/a-dialogue-with-aamir-mughal/

Story of Religio-Political Party PPP by Wusatullah Khan.

هڪ مذهبي سياسي جماعت جي ڪهاڻي

وسعت الله خان

هونئن ته پاڪستان ۾ تمام گهڻيون ننڍيون وڏيون سياسي جماعتون آهن، پر قومي سطح تي جيڪي جماعتون نمايان آهن، انهن ۾ جميعت علماءِ اسلام، جماعت اسلامي ۽ پاڪستان پيپلز پارٽي سرفهرست آهن. جميعت علماءِ اسلام ۽ جماعت اسلامي پاڪستان ٺهڻ کان پهرين وجود ۾ آيون، ۽ انهن جا حامي سڄي ننڍي کنڊ ۾ پکڙيل آهن. خاص طور تي جماعت اسلامي ته پاڪستان کان علاوه ڀارت ۽ بنگلاديش ۾ به متحرڪ آهي. انهن جماعتن جا ”نفاذِِ شريعت“ جا نعرا ۽ دعوائون پنهنجي جاءِ تي، پر عملي ڪارڪردگيءَ جي لحاظ کان ڏٺو وڃي ته، انهن مان ڪابه جماعت پ پ جي برابريءَ جي دعويٰ نٿي ڪري سگهي.

پ پ مذهبي نعرا ڀلي کڻي گهٽ ئي هنيا هجن، پر عملي ڪم سڀني کان گهڻو ڪيو آهي. پ پ جي هميشه ڪوشش اها رهي ته، قومي سطح تي سڀ کان وڌيڪ مذهبي سياسي جماعت هجڻ جي ناتي اها باقي مذهبي سياسي جماعتن کي به انهن جي اوڻائين جي باوجود گڏ وٺي هلي ته جيئن شريعت جي نفاد جي باري ۾ جيڪي به فيصلا ٿين، اهي وسيع تر مفاهمت جي جذبي سان متفقه طور تي ٿين، جيڪڏهن توهان جو خيال آهي ته آئون ڪا ڪاميڊي ڪري رهيو آهيان ته پنهنجي تسليءَ لاءِ  پ پ جي 40 سالن جو رڪارڊ پاڻ ملا خطه فرمايو.

 پ پ جن چئن نعرن جي بنياد تي وجود ۾ آئي، انهن مان پهريون نعرو هو ته اسلام اسان جو دين آهي. توهان ڪنهن ٻي مذهبي سياسي جماعت جو منشور کڻي ڏسو، ڪٿي به توهانکي اهو نعرو سڀ کان مٿي نه ملندو. صرف اهو ئي نه، بلڪه اسلامي سوشلزم جو نظريو به پ پ ڏنو ۽ ان جو ترجمو ”مساوات محمدي“ به پارٽيءَ ئي ڪيو. 1973ع جي آئين کي ان ڪري متفقه مڃيو وڃي ٿو، ڇو ته پ پ حڪومت چونڊيل ۽ اڻ چونڊيل عالمن جي راءِ جي احترام ۾ 11 آگسٽ 1947ع جي قائد اعظم جي تقرير کي نظر انداز ڪندي نه صرف پاڪستان کي هڪ اسلامي نظرياتي رياست قرار ڏيڻ واري ”قرارداد مقاصد“ کي آئيني دستاويز جو ”مهاڳ“ بڻايو، بلڪه اسلامي نظرياتي ڪائونسل جو آئيني ادارو قائم ڪيو. جنهن جو مقصد اهو هو ته، ايندڙ ڏهن سالن جي دوران (1983ع تائين) شريعت سان ٽڪراءَ ۾ ايندڙ سمورا قانون مرحليوار تبديل ڪيا وڃن. 1947ع کان 1973ع تائين پاڪستان ۾ اقليتن جي معاملن واري وزارت هوندي هئي، پر اهو اعزاز پ پ جي پهرين حڪومت کي حاصل آهي ته ان مذهبي معاملن جي وزارت قائم ڪئي ۽ اقليتي معاملن کي به ان وزارت ۾ شامل ڪري ڇڏيو.

1974ع ۾ پ پ حڪومت اهو تاريخي قدم کنيو، جنهن جي توفيق قائد اعظم ۽ لياقت علي خان کان يحيٰ خان تائين پاڪستان جي ڪنهن به فوجي ۽ غير فوجي حڪمران کي نه ٿي سگهي، يعني احمدين کي اقليت قرار ڏيئي شيعه، سني سميت سمورن فرقن جي عالمن ۽ مذهبي سياسي جماعتن جون دليون کٽي ورتيون.1974ع ۾ پ پ عالمِ اسلام کي هڪ پليٽ فارم تي آڻڻ لاءِ اسلامي سربراهه ڪانفرنس منعقد ڪئي، ۽ سڄي مسلم دنيا ۾ پاڪستان جي ميزباني ۽ جذبي جي ايتري ساراهه ٿي جو مراڪش کان انڊونيشيا تائين هڪ هڪ مسلمان کي خبر پئجي ويئي ته پاڪستان جي جاگرافي ڇا آهي! تنهنڪري چئن سالن کانپوءِ 1978ع ۾ ڪميونسٽ ملحدن ۽ روسي ايجنٽن خلاف سڄي مسلم دنيا مان جوشيلا نوجوان ڪجهه ڪري ڏيکارن جو جذبو کڻي پاڪستان اچڻ شروع ٿي ويا ۽ وقت گذرڻ سان گڏوگڏ اهو سلسلو ايترو بابرڪت ٿيندو ويو، جو اڄ انهن نوجوانن جي طفيل مسلم دنيا ته ڇڏيو، غير مسلم دنيا ۾ به پاڪستان جي نالي جو نغارو پيو وڄي.

اپريل 1977ع ۾ جڏهن ڀٽو حڪومت اندرين ۽ ٻاهرين دشمنن جي مڪمل گهيري ۾ هئي، ۽ پوين پساهن ۾ هئي، تڏهن به شريعت جي ڪم کي پوئتي نه رکيو ويو. ڀُٽي جا مخالف ته ”نظامِ مصطفيٰ“ جو نعرو ئي لڳائيندا رهجي ويا، پر ڀٽو حڪومت ويندي ويندي به آچر جي بدران جمعي جي موڪل ۽ شراب تي پابنديءَ جو اهو ڪارنامو ڪري ڏيکاريو، جنهن کي ڪوبه وساري نٿو سگهي. اِهي ئي اُهي قدم هئا، جن مان اتساهه ۽ حوصلو وٺي ضياءُ الحق کي هڪ شاندار اسلامي آئيني ۽ قانوني عمارت جوڙڻ جي همت پيدا ٿي.ڪجهه ماڻهو چون ٿا ته افغان جهاد جو بنياد جنرل ضياءَ رکيو، پر ماڻهو اهو ڀلجي ٿا وڃن ته، جيڪڏهن ڀٽو حڪومت افغان جهاد شروع ٿيڻ کان 3 سال پهرين (1975ع) سردار دائود جي سيڪيولر حڪومت جي مذهبي سوچ رکڻ وارن مخالفن گلبدين حڪمت يار ۽ برهان الدين رباني وغيره جي پاڪستان ۾ ميزباني نه ڪري ها ۽ عملي سهولتون فراهم نه ڪري ها ته جنرل ضياءُ کي افغان جهاد جو عمل هڪ مختصر وقت ۾ موثر نموني ۽ تيز رفتاريءَ سان اڳتي وڌائڻ ۾ ڏکيائي پيش اچي ها.

1988ع ۾ جڏهن محترمه بينظير ڀٽو آزمائشن جي بٺيءَ مان گذري اقتدار ۾ آئي ته ان ديني خدمت جو ڪم اڳتي وڌايو، مولانا فضل الرحمان جهڙي جيد عالم ۽ زيرڪ سياستدان کي مخلوط حڪومت جي حمايت تي راضي ڪيو ويو، مولانا کي محترمه جو جذبو ڏسي قائل ٿيڻو پيو ته، اسلام ۾ عورت جي حڪمراني جي گنجائش موجود آهي. پهرين مولانا کي پرڏيهي معاملن جي ڪاميٽيءَ جو چيئرمين مقرر ڪيو ويو ۽ بعد ۾ پارليامينٽ جي ڪشمير ڪاميٽيءَ جو به نگران بڻايو ويو. محترمه وزير اعظم مٿي تي مستقل رئو ۽ پوتي پائي مُلن جي ان پروپيگنڊه کي به غلط ثابت ڪري ڇڏيو ته، مغربي تعليم يافته ماڻهو پڪا مسلمان ڪونه هوندا آهن. جڏهن محترمه پنهنجي ٻئي حڪومتي دور ۾ وزير داخلا نصير الله بابر، مولانا فضل الرحمان ۽ سعودي تائيد ۽ حمايت سان افغان طالبان جي سرپرستي شروع ڪئي ته محترمه تي سيڪيولر هجڻ جو الزام لڳائڻ وارا سڪتي ۾ اچي ويا. اهڙي ريت ڪشمير ۾ جهاد جي شروعات به محترمه جي پهرئين دور ۾ ٿي ۽ ٻئي دور ۾ اها جهاد عروج تي پهچي ويئي.  صرف اهو ئي نه، پر ملڪ اندر به ننڍن مذهبي گروپن کي مرڪزي جمهوري ڌارا ۾ آڻڻ لاءِ به پ پ گهڻي جاکوڙ ڪئي. مثال طور: جڏهن 1993ع وارين چونڊن کانپوءِ  پ پ جي ساٿ ۽ سهڪار سان پنجاب ۾ پهرين منظور وٽو ۽ پوءِ عارف نڪئيءَ جي وڏ وزارت قائم ٿي ته صوبائي مخلوط حڪومت ۾ سپاهه صحابه جا ٻه وزير به شامل ڪيا ويا. انهن قدمن سبب صوبي ۾ مذهبي رواداريءَ جي چڱي موچاري اوسر ٿي ۽ گهڻن جمهوريت پسندن بينظير حڪومت جي فرقيواراڻي فراخدليءَ کي ساراهيو. اهو ڪريڊٽ پڻ محترمه کي وڃي ٿو ته، هن سيڪيولر حلقن جي مطالبن باوجود شاهدي ۽ حدود وارن قانونن سميت ضياءَ جي لاڳو ڪيل ڪنهن شرعي ضابطي ۾ معمولي ڦير ڦار به نه ڪئي، ڇو ته محترمه ڄاتو ٿي ته ضياءَ الحق جي ويڙهه سياسي ۽ ذاتي ٿي سگهي ٿي، مذهبي نه. بعد ۾ حدود  ۽ توهين رسالت جي قانونن جي نفاذ جي طريقيڪار ۾جيڪا به معمولي ڦير ڦار ٿي، ان جو ثواب ۽ عذاب پرويز مشرف ڏانهن وڃي ٿو.

شايد ان لاءِ ئي قدرت انعام طور پ پ کي محترمه جي شهادت کانپوءِ ڇوٿون ڀيرو پاڪستان جي حڪمراني عطا ڪئي. ماڻهو چون ٿا ته موجوده پ پ اصل ۾ نظرياتي پ پ جي ڀيٽ ۾ هڪ بدليل پارٽي آهي. پر ديني خدمتن جي معاملي ۾ اها بدليل پارٽي  به ڪنهن کان پوئتي نه آهي. مولانا فضل الرحمان جي ذات بابرڪت ڊگهي عرصي کان حڪومت ۾ به شامل رهي ۽ پوءِ مخالف ڌر ۾ ويهڻ جي باوجود مولانا ايتري مهرباني ضرور ڪئي جو اسلامي نظرياتي ڪائونسل جي واڳ پنهنجي هٿ ۾ رکي، ته جيئن پ  پ حڪومت جو قبلو درست رخ ۾ رهي. توهان ڏسو ته جڏهن گورنر سلمان تاثير توهين مذهب جي قانون ۾ ترميم جي گهر ڪئي ته پ پ ان کان لاتعلقيءَ جو اظهار ڪيو. ايتريقدر جو ان جي قتل تي ڪو واضح موقف اختيار نه ڪري شريعت سان پنهنجي محبت تي حرف اچڻ نه ڏنو. اهڙي ريت پ پ جي برک رڪن شيري رحمان اسيمبليءَ ۾ توهين مذهب جي قانون ۾ ترميم جو خانگي بل پيش ڪيو، ته پارٽيءَ ان جي اهڙي حرڪت کان مڪمل اجنبيت ظاهر ڪئي. جڏهن شيري پنهنجي گستاخيءَ تي ندامت جو اظهار ڪيو ته، کيس ان جو سفارتي انعام ملي ويو. تاريخ ۾ ارڙهين ترميم جي متفقه منظوريءَ ذريعي جناب رضا رباني 1973ع جي آئين ۾ ڪيل سموريون غير جمهوري ترميمون بدلائڻ ۾ سوڀارو ٿي ويو. ايتريقدر جو ضياءَ جي نالي سان گڏ صدر جي عهدي کي به حذف ڪرايو ويو، پر جنرل ضياءَ کان پهرين ۽ ان جي دور ۾ نافذ ڪيل ڪنهن به شرعي قانون کي ارڙهين ترميم جي آڱر سان به نه لوڏيو ويو. تنهنڪري دشمنن جي ڪوشش باوجود موجوده حڪومت کي ان جي نيت جو ڦل پنج سال مڪمل ڪرڻ جي صورت ۾ ملي رهيو آهي.

پ پ جي حڪومت کي تازه ترين اعزاز اهو مليو آهي ته پ پ ملڪي تاريخ ۾ پهريون ڀيرو يومِ عشق رسول صه ملهائڻ جي ڪامياب روايت وڌي ويئي، ان موقعي تي جيڪي ڪجهه ٿيو، سو ٿيو، پر مخلوط حڪومت جي هڪ وفاقي وزير شرانگيز فلم ٺاهڻ وارن جي سر جي قيمت هڪ لک ڊالر لڳائيندي اتحاد بين المسلمين جي جذبي کان سرشار ٿي طالبان ۽ القاعده کي به ان خير جي ڪم ۾ حصو وٺڻ جي دعوت ڏني. ڪجهه گمراهه کي ماڻهو اها توقع ڪري رهيا هئا ته، ان وزير کي ڪابينا مان ئي نيڪالي ڏني ويندي، پر اڄ به اهو  معزز وزير پنهنجي بيان ۽ قلمدان تي ڄمي بيٺل آهي ۽ ڪوبه راجا ان جو وار به ونگو نٿو ڪري سگهي. هاڻي ته ماشاءَ الله طالبان به وزير موصوف جون اڳيون پويون خطائون معاف ڪري ان سان دشمني ختم ڪرڻ جو اعلان ڪيو آهي. جنهن کي الله رکي، تنهن کي ڪير چکي.

انهن گذارشن کانپوءِ مونکي اميد آهي ته هاڻي جيڪڏهن ڪنهن حاسد پ پ جهڙي مقبول ۽ ملڪ گير مذهبي سياسي جماعت تي هڪ جديد سيڪيولر جماعت هجڻ جو الزام هنيو ته توهان سڀ پ پ جو ديني جوش ۽ جذبي سان ڀرپور دفاع ضرور ڪندا. هن جماعت 1973ع کان جيڪا ڦلواڙي لڳائي، هاڻ اها الحمد الله هڪ گهاٽو باغ بڻجي ويئي آهي. ان باغ ۾ طرح طرح جا ديسي بديسي ٻوٽا اسري رهيا آهن ۽ انهن جي ڇانوَ، ميوي ۽ خوشبوءَ سان اسلامي جمهوريه پاڪستان سميت سڄي دنيا ڀرپور فائدو وٺي رهي آهي.

Pakistani Mullahs/Govt. Insulted Islam on Friday 21 Sept 2012

The Lord says in Holy Quran: O ye who believe! When the call is heard for the prayer of the day of congregation, haste unto remembrance of Allah and leave your trading. That is better for you if ye did but know. And when the prayer is ended, then disperse in the land and seek of Allah's bounty, and remember Allah much, that ye may be successful. (Surah Al Jummah - Chapter 62 The Friday Verse 9 and 10) - Friday 21 September 2012 Friday which was designated by the government to demonstrate love of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and condemn the anti-Islam video produced in the US by some extremists was hijacked by our home-grown extremists who turned it into a day of unbridled violence, killings, arson and robbery. At least 23 people were killed and over 200 injured and violence in some places continued till late in the night. The internal security system virtually collapsed, giving way to tens of thousands of violent protesters to rule the streets in several cities, from Peshawar and Islamabad to Lahore and Karachi, burn down shops, cinema houses and police vehicles, and ransack whatever else that came in the way. For most part of the day it was complete anarchy in several cities, including the federal capital, leaving a trail of death and destruction in large parts of the country. Highly charged, and in places armed and well-equipped, the protesters tore down barricades, removed or overturned huge containers that had been put up by the authorities to block main thoroughfares, and to protect government buildings and diplomatic compounds, and set ablaze government and private property. Within a matter of a few hours it became quite evident that the ill-equipped and poorly trained, and perhaps ill-motivated, police force was not in a position to push back the violent protesters. The extensive use of tear gas and rubber bullets proved futile as in many cases the riot police had to take the beating with protesters throwing back the tear gas canisters and stones at them. As violence intensified in places like Peshawar and Karachi, riot police first fired live ammunition in the air, and then at places directly into the crowd. In Peshawar and Karachi, and some other places, several bystanders and journalists got trapped as protesters and police clashed, using bricks, stones, tear gas and even live ammunition. There were deaths and injuries on both sides, with a number of people, including member of a television crew, becoming victim of this madness.

Saudi Arabian Fatwa Against Terrorism and Killing Non-Muslims (Non-Combatants) Saudi Arabian Fatwa Against Terrorism and Killing Non-Muslims (Non-Combatants)  http://www.scribd.com/doc/105040768/Saudi-Arabian-Fatwa-Against-Terrorism-and-Killing-Non-Muslims-Non-Combatants

Saudi Arabian Fatwa Against Terrorism and Killing Non-Muslims (Non-Combatants)

Saudi Arabia is also an Islamic country and more Islamic than Innovative and Polytheist Islamic Country like Pakistan. Suadi Grand Mufti says this, 

 RIYADH: The Kingdom’s Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Asheikh, yesterday denounced attacks on diplomats and embassies as un-Islamic after deadly protests against a US-made anti-Islam film swept the Middle East. At the same time, he called on the international community to take steps to criminalize any act of abusing great prophets and messengers such as Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad (peace be upon them). In a statement issued yesterday, Al-Asheikh also appealed to world Muslims to react to any attempt to denigrate Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) by strictly adhering to the values advocated by the Prophet (pbuh) instead of unleashing violence against innocent people, the SPA reported. “Condemnation of the attempts to abuse the Prophet (pbuh) should be within the Law of Allah and Sunnah of the Prophet. The Muslims should not shed the blood of innocent people, or vandalize properties or of public institutions,” the Grand Mufti said. The mufti said the hatred of Islam through such movies would not harm the great personality of the Prophet (pbuh) or any aspect of Islam but would only backfire on the people who spread venomous ideas. "Such animosity only helps in spreading the glory of the Prophet (pbuh) with greater vigor,” he said. The mufti also warned that the enemies of the Prophet (pbuh) and Muslims achieve their goals when Muslims resort to violence. “Muslim rage is playing into the hands of their enemies when Muslims attack innocent people and set fire to public or private institutions. Such acts, in fact, damage the image of Islam, a situation the enemies of Islam seeks to create. Such acts go against the teachings of the Prophet (pbuh) and are deplorable,” the mufti said, while reminding the faithful that all Muslims are willing to sacrifice their lives and properties for the cause of their dear Prophet (pbuh). “The goal of those who abuse Islam and Muslims is to divert the energy of Muslims from building their nations and efforts for unity and development,” the mufti warned. Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal yesterday reiterated the Kingdom’s strong disapproval of the film and also stressed the principles of interfaith dialogue in a telephone talk with the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The prince condemned the attack on the US diplomatic missions. Meanwhile, the Taleban claimed responsibility for an attack on a base that killed two American Marines, saying it was a response to the film. Hundreds of Muslims took to the streets of Sydney, some throwing rocks and bottles in clashes with police. Police stormed into Cairo’s Tahrir Square and rounded up hundreds of people early yesterday after four days of clashes and demands from protesters for the US ambassador’s expulsion. Libyan authorities said they had identified 50 people who were involved in the attack in which Ambassador Christopher Stevens died. REFERENCE: Grand Mufti denounces violence against embassies ARAB NEWS Sunday 16 September 2012 http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/grand-mufti-denounces-violence-against-embassies

Bounty Hunters, Honour Killings & Bacha Khan.

PESHAWAR: A Pakistani federal minister has announced a bounty of $100,000 on the maker of the American film “Innocence of Muslims” disrespecting the Holy Prophet (PBUH), DawnNews reported. Speaking here at a press conference on Saturday, the Federal Minister for Railways Ghulam Ahmed Bilour said that he was aware that it was a crime to instigate the people for murder, but he was ready to commit the crime. He added that there was no way to instill fear among blasphemers other than taking this step. The minister also called on members of the Taliban and al Qaeda for their support, saying that if members of the banned militant organisations kill the maker of the blasphemous movie, they will also be rewarded. The low-budget film titled ‘Innocence of Muslims’ has sparked fury and rage across the much of the Muslim world, including Pakistan. At least 23 people were killed and over 200 injured across the country on Friday — a day designated by the government to demonstrate love for the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and condemn the anti-Islam video. REFERENCE: Pakistan minister announces $100,000 bounty on anti-Islam film maker http://dawn.com/2012/09/22/pakistan-minister-announces-100000-bounty-on-anti-islam-film-maker/

1999 The Case of Samia Sarwar : There have been several reported cases of fathers bringing charges of zina against their daughters for marrying of their own accord. In one such case a woman, Sher Bano had eloped with a man who she had willfully married and was apprehended and arrested under the Zina Ordinance. On August 6, 1997 she was shot dead by her brother as she emerged from the court room in Peshawar (AI 15). In this way the Hudood Ordinance reinforces the practice of honor killing by legally formalizing the social control of women and their status as bearers of honor. One of the most widely publicized recent cases was that of Samia Sarwar (also referred to as Samia Imran). Samia Sarwar married her cousin in 1989 in Peshawar. During the time of her marriage she was subjected to years of severe physical abuse at the hands of her husband. In April of 1995, she returned to her family's home to escape her abusive husband because he had thrown her down the stairs while she was pregnant with her second child. Though she was allowed to live with her parents, they would not allow her to get a divorce. When Sarwar expressed her 38 intention to get a divorce, her parents threatened to kill her. Hina Jilani, SaIWar's lawyer said, "Samia was a frightened, unhappy woman who felt very alone in a predicament that she couldn't deal with confidently." On March 26, 1999, Samia took the opportunity of her parents' absence for a pilgrimage to Mecca to flee to Lahore and seek help at the AGHS (a law firm that works on won1en's issues) and refuge in the AGHS-run shelter, Dastak. Because her life had been threatened, Sarwar refused to meet with any of her male relatives. However, because she needed her marriage papers in order to get a divorce, Sarwar agreed to meet with her mother. Their meeting was set for April 6, 1999, in the office ofHina Jilani. Samia's mother came accompanied by her uncle Yunus Sarwar and a driver, Habibur Rehman. When Jilani asked the men to leave the room, Samia'a mother said that she needed the driver's help in order to walk. At that point Habibur Rehman pulled out a gun and shot Samia in the head, killing her instantly. Jilani was also fired at, but the bullet missed. Shortly after Samia was killed, the gun-man, Rehman was shot as a result of his having threatened a security guard. Yunus Sarwar who was waiting in the antechamber, took hold of the AGHS paralegal Shahtaj Qisalbash and escaped with Samia's mother. Qisalbash was taken with them and she claims to have heard the father ask the two if"the job was done." Qisalbash was released unharmed (AI 20)(HRW Summary). Though this crime was committed in full public view with several witnesses, nothing has been done to prosecute Sarwar's family. On April 20, police officers went to Sarwar's village to issue warrants for the family's arrest, but they were "shooed away" according to human rights organizations. Several reports were filed thereafter. The media reported that the response in NWFP oveIWhelmingly sided with the murderers. This attitude also surfaced in the Pakistani Senate. When Pakistan People's Party Senator Iqbal Haider presented a resolution condemning the killing, Senator Ilyas Bilour said in reference to Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani: "'We have 39 fought for human rights and civil liberties all our lives but wonder what sort of human rights are being claimed by these girls in jeans "'(AI 21). This exhibits the complete disregard for women's rights even at the most superficial level of rhetoric by some Pakistani political leaders. The fact that a cold-blooded murder was argued in such a fashion, even when there was such wide international media coverage, speaks to the absence of any public support for women in Pakistan. The Sarhad Chamber of Commerce of which Samia's father was the president issued a statement on April 8 and 9, demanding that Jahangir and Jilani be dealt with in accordance with "tribal and Islamic law" and be arrested for "misleading women in Pakistan and contributing to the country's bad image abroad." Severalfatwas Xi were also issued against both activists with reward money stipulated for their murderers. Finally, in April of 1999 Jahangir issued a First Information Report (FIR) with the police against 16 people for threatening the lives of her and her sister. She also called on the government to investigate over 300 cases of honor killings reported in 1998. At the time of Amnesty's report, the state had taken no action (AI 21). The case ofSamia Sarwar is one of many such cases reported in the last year. I have focused on this one specifically because it received wide international attention especially through the networks of women's human rights organizations. However, even with the international outcry against this injustice, the state did not act. This case also exemplifies the dangerous nature of organizing for women's rights in Pakistan. Even at risk of their own lives, Jilani and Jahangir continue to speak out about injustices in Pakistan. REFERENCE: Women's Rights as Human Rights: The Case of Pakistan Nida Kirmani Senior Thesis Projects, 1993-2002 Dated: 1-1-2000 Recommended Citation Kirmani, Nida, "Women's Rights as Human Rights: The Case of Pakistan" (2000). Senior Thesis Projects, 1993-2002. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_interstp2/47/

2011: PESHAWAR: There are many names for pornographic movies, from the euphemistic (‘adult cinema’) to the nostalgic (‘under-the-counter videos’) to the plain short (‘porn’). Here is a relatively new one: ‘barband,’ which means porn in Pashto. At the Shama Cinema in Peshawar, every show is a full house. The ups and downs of the Pakistan film industry are irrelevant to this crowd. The harsh winters do not deter punters either. Even terrorism has no effect. Thanks to the alleged protection of the influential Bilour family and the active negligence of the ruling Awami National Party and its predecessor the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (a defunct umbrella group for religious parties), the audience is in safe hands. Khaklay Navay (Beautiful Bride) is the name of one pornographic movie recently shown on the cinema’s big screen. It ran for two months, opening on Eidul Fitr. A new film called Khaklay Jankay (Beautiful Girls) — which sounds like the prequel, though this is unconfirmed — was released in time for Eidul Azha. It is currently running, though there was a small break for 10 days out of respect for the holy month of Muharram. Four shows run every day. For early risers, there is the 11am screening. This is followed by shows at 3pm, 6pm and 9pm. The films are promoted through racy, raunchy posters pasted on the walls of Peshawar, often side-by-side with graffiti from religious groups. What’s more, the local industry seems to be a grower. Exciting news for enthusiasts is that in addition to the screening of adult English-language adult movies, the management has started the screening of porn in Pashto. Most of the films thus far have been dubbed into Pushto. Many have been foreign and often feature curvy Californian blondes, proving that anti-Americanism is not all-pervasive in Khyber-Pakhtunkwa. Most, though, seemed to have been produced in Lahore or other non-Pastho-speaking parts of Pakistan. Fans outside the cinema said that the exchange of Pakistani currency in some scenes proves the films are made within the country; in a boost for Pakistan’s ailing film industry, the cinema-goers also said the sound and camerawork is often of the highest quality. An employee at the cinema who, perhaps fearing his mother’s reaction, did not want his name publicised, said that Pushto adult movies are proving a bigger hit than English ones. He went on to say that drug-taking is an integral part of the experience; a haze of hashish smoke floats above the seats instead of more standard sensory accompaniments to the cinema experience, such as the crunch of popcorn. The employee added that a nearby cinema called Sabreena is also doing great business. For those with an image of Peshawar and its environs as a medieval-minded war-zone, the Shama Cinema sounds scarcely believable. This is a region where girls schools and shrines are destroyed, yet neither the religious parties nor the government have objected to porn being screened. Locals say there’s an easy explanation: the cinema is owned by the powerful Bilour family, which also happens to be tied to the Awami National Party. Who is behind such open secrecy? Everyone in Peshawar says the same name: the Bilour family. The family, however, denies any involvement. According to sources in the city, the cinema was once owned by senior minister Bashir Ahmed Bilour. It was passed on to Aziz Ahmed Bilour, federal secretary for industries, as the family assets were distributed. The cinema, it is believed, is now managed by close relatives of the Bilour brothers. When contacted by The Express Tribune, Aziz Ahmed Bilour said he had been busy doing public service in Islamabad since he left Peshawar two decades ago. He said he has not gone to the cinema since then. Aziz also insisted he does not own any cinema and does not know who owns the Shama Cinema. Indeed, as far as Aziz knows, the Bilour family has no involvement in the cinema business at all. However, he generously offered to lend a helping hand: “If it is transferred in my name, then it will be good and I shall look after the affair.” And so the Shama Cinema will carry on rolling the reels. The audience, no doubt, will keep on coming. Published in The Express Tribune, December 19th, 2011. REFERENCE: Peshawar’s open secret: Hardcore fun for a hard-line city By Fida Muhammad Adeel Published: December 19, 2011 http://tribune.com.pk/story/308659/peshawars-open-secret-hardcore-fun-for-a-hard-line-city/

Indo-Pak War of 1965 (Courtesy: Maj (R) AH Amin & Col (R) SG Mehdi)

Agha Humayun Amin Major (r) Tank Corps: 13 Years service in Pakistan Army (PAVO 11 Cavalry,29 Cavalry,58 Cavalry,15 Lancers,5 Independent Tank Squadron,14 Lancers,15 SP) and 31 years research . Ex Editor Globe , Ex Assistant Editor Defence Journal , Ex Editor Journal of Afghanistan Studies. Publications: More than 200 articles in News, Nation , PRAVDA,Pakistan Army Journal , Citadel Magazine of Command and Staff College,Journal of Afghanistan Studies,Indian Strategic Review,Dawn ,Friday Times,Outlook Afghanistan ,Afghanistan Times,Frontier Post,Globe,Defence Journal,Media Monitors Network,Pakistan Army till 1965 held at US Army War College Library,US Army Command and Staff College Library,Indo Pak Wars a Strategic and Operational Analysis,Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted, The Essential Clausewitz,Man's Role in History: Education/Credentials : Masters (History). Past/Present Clients: Various Think Tanks , Afghanistan Research Associates,Centre for Study of Non State Militant Actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. REFERENCE: Military History/Expert Profile http://www.allexperts.com/ep/669-79767/Military-History/Agha-Humayun-Amin-Major.htm A.H Amin-Books and Publications http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/

2005: Nur Khan reminisces ’65 war: ISLAMABAD, Sept 5: Air Marshal (retired) Nur Khan, the man who led the airforce achieve complete superiority over the three times bigger Indian airforce on the very first day of the 1965 war, had all but resigned the post the very day that he took command of Pakistan Air Force on July 23, 1965. “Rumours about an impending operation were rife but the army had not shared the plans with other forces,” Air Marshal Nur Khan said. Sharing his memoirs with Dawn on the 40th anniversary of 1965 war, Air Marshal Khan said that he was the most disturbed man on the day, instead of feeling proud. Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan while handing over the command to Nur Khan had not briefed him about any impending war because he was not aware of it himself. So, in order to double check, Nur Khan called on the then Commander-in-Chief, General Musa Khan. Under his searching questions Gen Musa wilted and with a sheepish smile admitted that something was afoot. Nur Khan’s immediate reaction was that this would mean war. But, Gen Musa said you need not to worry as according to him Indians would not retaliate. Then he directed a still highly skeptical Nur Khan to Lt-Gen Akhtar Hasan Malik, GOC Kashmir, the man in-charge of “Operation Gibraltar” for further details. The long and short of his discussion with Gen Malik was, “don’t worry, because the plan to send in some 800,000 infiltrators inside the occupied territory to throw out the Indian troops with the help of the local population”, was so designed that the Indians would not be able retaliate and therefore the airforce need not get into war-time mode. A still incredulous Nur Khan was shocked when on further inquiry he found that except for a small coterie of top generals, very few in the armed forces knew about “Operation Gibraltar”. He asked himself how good, intelligent and professional people like Musa and Malik could be so naive, so irresponsible. For the air marshal, it was unbelievable. Even the then Lahore garrison commander had not been taken into confidence. And Governor of West Pakistan, Malik Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh did not know what was afoot and had gone to Murree for vacations. It was at this point that he felt like resigning and going home. But then he thought such a rash move would further undermine the country’s interests and, therefore, kept his cool and went about counting his chickens — the entire airforce was too young and too inexperienced to be called anything else then — and gearing up his service for the D-day. The miracle that the PAF achieved on September 6, to a large extent, is attributed to Nur Khan’s leadership. He led his force from up front and set personal example by going on some highly risky sorties himself. But then no commander, no matter how daring and how professional, can win a battle if his troops are not fully geared to face such challenges and that too within 43 days of change in command. The full credit for turning the PAF into a highly professional and dedicated fighting machine goes to Air Marshal Asghar Khan who was given charge of the service in 1957. Thank God, unlike the other service no darbari or sifarishi was given the job. And by the time he left on July 23, 1965, Asghar Khan had turned the PAF into a well-oiled, highly professional and dedicated fighting machine and had trained them on the then best US made fighters, bombers and transport planes. Those who flew those machines and those who maintained them on ground worked like a team, and each one of the PAF member performed beyond the call of duty to make a miracle. The PAF performance had crucially allowed the Army to operate without interference from the Indian airforce. “The performance of the Army did not match that of the PAF mainly because the leadership was not as professional. They had planned the ‘Operation Gibraltar’ for self-glory rather than in the national interest. It was a wrong war. And they misled the nation with a big lie that India rather than Pakistan had provoked the war and that we were the victims of Indian aggression”, Air Marshal Khan said. When on the second day of war President Gen Ayub wanted to know how we were faring, Musa informed him that the Army had run out of even ammunition. That was the extent of preparation in the Army. And the information had shocked Gen Ayub so much that it could have triggered his heart ailment, which overtook him a couple of years later. This in short is Nur Khan’s version of 1965 war, which he calls an unnecessary war and says that President Ayub for whom he has the greatest regard should have held his senior generals accountable for the debacle and himself resigned. This would have held the hands of the adventurers who followed Gen Ayub. Since the 1965 war was based on a big lie and was presented to the nation a great victory, the Army came to believe its own fiction and has used since, Ayub as its role model and therefore has continued to fight unwanted wars — the 1971 war and the Kargil fiasco in 1999, he said. In each of the subsequent wars we have committed the same mistakes that we committed in 1965. Air Marshal Khan demanded that a truth commission formed to find out why we failed in all our military adventures. It is not punishment of the failed leadership that should be the aim of the commission but sifting of facts from fiction and laying bare the follies and foibles of the irresponsible leaders in matters with grave implications for the nation. It should also point out the irregularities committed in training and promotions in the defence forces in the past so that it is not repeated in future. Mr Khan believes that our soldiers when called upon have fought with their lives but because of bad leadership their supreme sacrifices went waste. And after every war that we began we ended up taking dictation from the enemy — at Tashkant, at Simla and lastly at Washington. He said at present Pakistan is engaged in another war, this time in Waziristan. This war can also end up in a fiasco and politically disastrous for the federation if it is fought with the same nonchalance and unprofessionally as we did the last three wars. He, therefore, called for an immediate change of command at the GHQ insisting that President Gen Pervez Musharraf should appoint a full-time Chief of Army Staff and restore full democracy in the country. He suggested appointment of an independent chief election commissioner in consultation with all the political parties. “Look at India. There a religious party comes in power and nobody cries foul and it goes out of power and nobody alleges rigging. We can also do this,” he added. And we must make unified efforts to restore the country in the vision of the Quaid-i-Azam. Turn it into a non-theocratic and truly democratic state. And all the three forces should model themselves on the lines set by Asghar Khan when he was commanding the PAF, he suggested. REFERENCE: Nur Khan reminisces ’65 war By Our Special Correspondent September 6, 2005 Tuesday Shaban 01, 1426 http://archives.dawn.com/2005/09/06/nat2.htm 

War Area of Indo-Pak War of 1965 Courtesy Major Retd. Agha Humayun Amin

Revisiting 1965 Part 1 (Courtesy: Dawn News)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXB-iVcCvhQ

2001:  1965 analysed Columnist A H AMIN analyses the 1965 war dispassionately .1965 was a watershed in Indo-Pak history! The war instead of being dispassionately analysed became a ground to attack and condemn political opponents! Complete books were written out of sheer motivation based on pure and unadulterated venom! To date the trend continues at the cost of serious research and history writing! Most of these books were written by beneficiaries of the usurper Ayub or Bhutto haters! Men with a naive knowledge of military history made worse by a desire to settle personal scores! Jaundiced history of the worst kind! This article is an overall analysis of the 1965 war based on military facts rather than any motivation to settle political scores based on matters of ego rather than any serious objective considerations! It is hoped that after 36 years readers would be more interested in hard facts rather than pure and unadulterated polemics by men who did not know the division of battle “more than a spinster”!

Timing of 1965 War

This has been the subject of many controversies and myths! In 1965 India was recovering from the effects of the China War. Indian Army was engaged in a process of massive expansion with units and divisions half trained half novice! Something like the Austrian Army of 1809! Outwardly expanding and larger but lacking the military virtue and military spirit identified by Carl Von Clausewitz as the key elements in an military machines effectiveness! There was no overwhelming Indian numerical superiority unlike 1971 and many parts of the Indo-Pak border like the vast bulk of Shakargarh bulge were unmanned on the Indian side! Qualitatively Pakistan had a tangible superiority by virtue of possession of relatively superior tanks and artillery! The Centurion tank which was the backbone of Indian army was concentrated in the Indian Armoured division while the vast bulk of Indian infantry divisions were equipped with the obsolete Shermans! Even in quality of command there were serious drawbacks! The Indian 1 Corps had been just raised and the GOC of the Indian 1st Armoured Division was about to retire! Indian Mountain Divisions brought into the plains lacked sufficient antitank resources and were not in the ideal fighting condition. Some 38 plus Indian Infantry Battalions were absorbed by the blotting paper of Indian Army i.e a tract known as Kashmir! All these battalions were deployed north of Chenab River. Indian Army was in the process of expansion and the Indian Army had no strategic reserves in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor against the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division. Setting aside the ethical dilemma whether war is the best instrument of policy to settle political disputes militarily 1965 was the ideal time for Pakistan to settle its political problems with India. This point was realized by some mid- ranking senior officers in the Pakistan Army which included the Pakistani DMO Gul Hassan, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and by some civilians like Foreign Minister Z.A Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad. On the other hand Musa the Pakistani C-in-C was opposed to war! This was not because Musa was a pacifist but because Musa lacked military competence and was enjoying his second four-year-term as C-in-C of the Pakistan Army! Ayub the military ruler was initially against any military adventure but revised his ideas after Pakistani military successes in Rann of Katch. In Clausewitzian terms 1965 was the ideal time for Pakistan to start a war. The following quotation illustrates the rationale; ‘Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that with each year its position will become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages but it will rather increase the disparity of forces — but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account’.1

Comparative Level of Planning-Strategic

At the strategic level the Pakistani plan was superior. Its initial thrust launched with an infantry division-tank brigade size force against Akhnur was enough to cause a crisis of strategic level in the Indian Army. The situation with Akhnur in Pakistani hands would have been disastrous for India. All the Indian plans to launch the 1 Corps against the MRL would have been thrown to winds and Indians would have spent the entire war redressing the imbalance caused due to loss of Akhnur! On the other hand the Pakistani thrust in Khem Karan would have bottled up three Indian Infantry divisions in the Beas-Ravi corridor and three Indian divisions would have been forced to surrender. 1965 could have then been a Pakistani strategic success rather than a tactical draw as it turned out to be. On the other hand the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division was well poised to deal with any Indian armoured thrust launched in the Ravi-Chenab corridor.

Pakistani failure lay in poor execution and understanding at the strategic level rather than planning

It was in implementation rather than planning that the Pakistani GHQ and Ayub failed miserably at the strategic level. The reason was simple. Both Ayub and Musa lacked strategic insight! They lacked the resolution and strategic coup d oeil to conduct decisive warfare. Both were extremely defensive in their approach and saw war as reacting to enemy countermoves rather than making the enemy react to their moves. Thus Musa as late as 1983 naively claimed in his book “My Version” that the aim of Grand Slam was not to capture Akhnur but to merely threaten it. In other words Musa saw a move which had the potential to cause a severe strategic imbalance in the Indian High Command as a tactical move to relieve pressure on Muzaffarabad! Allah be praised! Even a foreigner saw the immense importance of capturing Akhnur. Thus the remarks of Marshall Chen Yi the Foreign Minister of China who was visiting Pakistan at the time of Grand Slam. Chen Yi thus “made a sharp cutting movement at the little finger; ‘knock them out at Akhnoor’.That will help the freedom fighters and also guarantee the security of East and West Pakistan. With the little finger gone, the whole hand becomes useless”!2 So thought a veteran of a many decade long civil war! This was Greek for a man who was elevated to the rank of Army Chief because of political considerations! This was Greek for a man accused of tactical timidity in Burma!

Inability to develop a doctrine of decisive warfare

The principal reason of failure of both the armies was “failure or inability to develop a doctrine of decisive warfare”. This was a colonial legacy. The Indian Army of pre-1947 was an internal security machine designed for defence while the main forces of the empires allies came into action on other decisive fronts. The concentration on both sides was to have tactical concepts while no doctrine integrating tactics with operational strategy and national strategy existed to give coherence to the whole business of warfare.

Lack of Resolution in the Ayub-Musa duo to energetically conduct the war

1965 was a failure in resolution at the highest level. Both the president and his handpicked chief lacked the resolution to provide strategic direction to a well oiled machine which had the potential to inflict a severe strategic defeat on the enemy.

Failure of Pakistani GHQ to effectively supervise execution of plans or to create alternative organization or command arrangements to supervise the conduct of war

The job of an army HQ is not just to formulate plans but to effectively supervise the execution of plans. Ayub in words of a British contemporary was devoid of “operational experience” “organizational understanding” and “lacked tactical flair”.3 Thus Ayub and Musa saw no need to have intermediate corps headquarters to over insure the success of the army’s main attack involving a force of an infantry division and an armoured division. This was a case of extreme naivette rather than a minor error of judgement. Probably the supreme commander was too busy with Five Year Plans and big business and had lost sight of the business of soldiering! His handpicked proxy chief wanted a peaceful tenure in which he would not be forced to exercise any strategic judgement! The 12 Divisional organizational failure, one of the main reasons of Grand Slam’s failure, was another glaring case of lack of organizational insight on part of Ayub and Musa. While the Indians had bifurcated their forces in Kashmir based on north and south of Pir Panjal range right from 1948 and early 1950s Pakistan’s military supremos naively thought that one divisional headquarter was sufficient to manage a front of 400 miles in a mountainous territory spanning the Himalayas, Karakorams and the Pir Panjal!

Indian and Pakistani armour failures compared

At the strategic level both India and Pakistan got an opportunity to knock out the other side. Pakistan got it twice, first at Akhnur and then at Khem Karan. India got it once at Gadgor on 8th September. Both the sides failed. On the Pakistani side the failure had more to do with lack of strategic insight at Akhnur, ordering a change of horses in the middle of a crucial operation. Then at Khem Karan the Pakistani failure was at divisional level i.e failure to pump in all five armoured regiments on the 8th or 9th September thus achieving a decisive breakthrough.The situation was made worse by absence of Corps Headquarter. The Indian failure at Gadgor had more to do with failure at brigade and divisional level in actual execution despite the fact that the Indians had the mains “available” as well as “physically available” to achieve a breakthrough. The failure was Brigadier K.K Singh Commander Indian 1st Armoured Division who saw a threat to his flanks which in reality was a tank squadron of 62 Cavalry which had lost its way and blundered into the Indian artillery echelons opposite Rangre. The Indians had the means to achieve a breakthrough but failed primarily because lack of coup d oeil and resolution at brigade level. This was a command and execution failure. In Khem Karan on the other hand Pakistan had the resources but failed to bring them into the battle area because of poor staff work and planning at divisional level. Thus on the decisive 8th September Pakistan did not have the means to achieve a breakthrough and this had more to do with poor initial planning and staff work at div and brigade level rather than at the command or execution level. Thus the Pakistani failure was a staff and planning failure in which all from brigade till GHQ were included while the Indian failure was a command failure in which the prime culprits were the armoured brigade and divisional commander. On the Pakistani side the success at Gadgor had more to do with outstanding leadership at squadron and unit level rather than any operational brilliance at brigade or divisional level. In the Indian success at Khem Karan, however, an important role was played by Indian higher headquarters at divisional corps and army command level.

Triumph of Defence and Failure of Offence as a Form of War

1965 was a failure of offence and triumph of defence. Except in Grand Slam where initial overwhelming superiority enabled Pakistan to achieve a breakthrough, on both sides defence triumphed as a way of war. Both the armies were more used to defence because of British colonial military experience and comparative relative lack of difference in weaponry also ensured that defence triumphed over attack. Thus the attackers failed at Gadgor, Chawinda, Assal, Uttar and Valtoha regardless of religion of the defender! Both the armies lacked the dynamism to conduct attack a far more complicated form of war and totally outside the pre-1947 experience of fighting divisional and brigade level defensive battles till overwhelming superiority enabled the Britisher to resume the offensive as at Alalamein and that too with non-Indian formations like the purely British armoured divisions or in Burma where the British-Indians had overwhelming superiority against the Japanese in tanks and air.

Ignored aspects of the war

There are certain points which are conveniently forgotten or not understood at all. Although the paratroopers failed in Pathankot area their dropping delayed the move forward of 14 Indian Infantry Division to support Indian 1st Armoured Division operations opposite Chawinda. The latter fact was acknowledged by a man no less eminent than the Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh.4

Conclusion

While Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh admitted that the Pakistani attack opposite Khem Karan could have been decisive we in Pakistan have twisted 1965 war into a case of blaming the civilians for intriguing against the army and leading it into an aimless military adventure. Even today India’s top military thinker Ravi Rikhye admits that Khem Karan had the potential to be India’s Fourth Battle of Panipat. Pakistan failed because its military leaders lacked the strategic insight which was necessary to transform its tangible qualitative superiority in equipment and manpower at the tactical level into a victory! 1965 was an undoubted strategic failure on part of Pakistani higher command. Pakistan paid the price six years later. Success would have meant unity. Defeat led to civil war and secession. The fault lay in lack of strategic insight at the military level. REFERENCE: OPINION: 1965 analysed Columnist A H AMIN analyses the 1965 war dispassionately. Defence Journal Monthly September 2001 http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/september/1965.htm

Revisiting 1965 Part 2 (Courtesy: Dawn News)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=djhkiqttu24

1998: 1965 War Operation Gibraltar Role of SSG Para Commandos Col SG MEHDI:  Mian Arshad Hussain, a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan had demanded a judicial probe in the events leading to the 1965 war. On Oct. 23, 1977, Mian Sahib addressed the nation through a statement released to the Pakistan Times, Lahore. I quote; Following Col. Mehdi's articles on the 1965 war, there has been an expression of interest in this momentous event as can be seen from the letters which appeared in this columns. In my opinion, the 1965 war bred the 1971 war and is thus an important contributory cause of the latter and the tragic events that have followed the conflict. Is it not time that a full-fledged inquiry was held into the causes, the conduct and the consequences of 1965 war? Mian Arshad Hussain had excellent reasons to demand a probe into the concept, conduct and consequences of 1965 war' as he was Pakistan's High Commissioner at Delhi during that fateful period. He sent a warning on 4th September 1965 to the foreign office of Pakistan through Turkish Embassy that the Indians were planning to attack Pakistan, on 6th September. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary through a press statement acknowledged that such a warning was indeed received by the Foreign Office. But the debate on this warning issue' remained inconclusive, in that Aziz Ahmed maintained that the warning was received two days after war had already started! Only probe by a high powered judicial commission can separate shadows from the substance.

1965 war :'Without deliberate intent' : In 1965, the Pakistan Army found itself at war with India without deliberate intent which achieved a measure of surprise....'This is the opening sentence of the foreword by General Zia-ul-Haq, written for The Pakistan Army, War 1965' compiled by Major General Shauket Riza from hundreds of interviews and documents. General Mohammed Musa who commanded the Army in the 65 War, gives a graphic account of how the Indians surprised the GHQ, the C-in-C and the Supreme Commander Field Marshal Ayub Khan on September 6, 1965. Narrates Musa Khan on page 48 of his book My Version'. India launched her ignominious, undeclared and blatant aggression on our homeland at about 0330 hours on 6 September. The Supreme Commander was informed about the invasion by Air Commander Akhtar of the Pakistan Air Force, who was on duty at the Air Defence Headquarters at Rawalpindi on night of 5/6 September. Indian troop movements across the frontier had been reported to him by the border posts of the PAF Wireless Observer wing. The President then rang me up to ascertain whether or not GHQ had received any information about the Indian attack and the whereabouts of the field army that morning'.

How did the GHQ allow Indians to Achieve Surprise?: Let General Musa describe the genesis of the surprise' Indian attack on 6th September in his own words. The then Foreign Minister Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and the Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed spurred on by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, who was commander of our troops in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Indian held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities there and to help, on a long term basis, the locals in organising a movement with a view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power. Continues the former C-in-C on page 6 of his book, the sponsors and supporters of the raids had at last succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict with India' ....... To the extent that the concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held Kashmir, code named Gibraltar' was the brain-child of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the simple truth and nothing but the truth. But General Musa, the C-in-C, assumed full responsibility for the development of the concept, its planning and coordination of the entire operation. This is graphically stated by him on page 35 of his book: After the Government finally decided that deep raids should be launched in Indian-held Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, to prepare a draft plan for the operation, code-named Gibraltar' in consultation with GHQ and within the broad concept we had specified. GHQ approved it after making certain changes in it. With the help of sand model, he went over the final plan in Murree before it was put into effect on 7 August, 1965 under our overall control. The Supreme Commander and his Military Secretary were present. He also agreed with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General Sher Bahadur) and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence (Brigadiers Gul Hasan and Irshad Ahmed Khan respectively). No civil official attended this briefing. Broadly the plan envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruptions of communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of occupied Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement there with a view to starting an uprising in the valley eventually. The push towards Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was considered as one of the likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt our activities would have an escalating effect.

When Akhtar Malik was pointing out on the sand model the various targets of the raiding parties of Gibraltar, the President did say why don't you go for Akhnur also? Akhtar Malik replied that, too, could be considered, but it was not raided because no Gibraltar force had been organised for that purpose.

Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing Azad Kashmir territory in Tithwal and Haji Pir Pass areas, we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by threatening Akhnur through the Chamb valley in order to release the pressure in the north. The simple truth emerging from the preceeding statement of General Musa is clear cut, in that, while the concept of Gibraltar' did originate from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Musa, whatever he might say after the event, went along with it in a half heartedly and non serious manner.

Revisiting 1965 Part 3 (Courtesy: Dawn News)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yotJV7AyBsw

Operation Gibraltar and the SSG Involvement : This writer is a personal witness to the unfolding of this tragedy as I had the honour to command our Army's Corps de elite, the Special Service Group (SSG) at this critical juncture. In late May 1965, I was directed by the Vice Chief of General Staff, (late Major General Abid Bilgrami) to go to Murree and see GOC 12 Division, Akhtar Hussian Malik. The GOC's briefing of the outline plan of Gibraltar operation left me stunned. The plan was so childish, so bizarre as to be unacceptable to logical, competent, professionally sound military persons anywhere in the world. I frankly told General Akhtar Malik that the Operation was a non starter and that I would render the same advice to the Chief and Vice Chief of General Staff. At GHQ, the same day I briefed the CGS and VCGS, who listened to me patiently. The result of my presentation however was barren of the result. Major General Malik Sher Bahadur (The CGS), posed only one question. You (Mehdi) say that operation Gibraltar as planned stands no chance of succeeding, but Akhtar Malik (COG 12 Division) feels confident of its success. My reply to the Chief of the General Staff was that, the conflicting view point of Mehdi and Akhtar Malik not withstanding, as Chief of General Staff of Pakistan Army, he should also have an opinion on this important matter as we were not playing a peace time war game, but with the destiny of Pakistan itself. To this date I remember the reaction of the CGS. He went red right up to his ears, and after a painful pause got up, extended his hand to shake and brought the interview to an end with the remarks that it is always interesting to listen to you!! 

Undaunted by the rebuff at Murree and later at the GHQ, I decided to reduce my arguments in writing, as to the reasons why Gibraltar shall fail. These, in brief, were:

1. No ground had been prepared before launching of the operation, in concert with people of the valley.

2. The raids were to be launched in total logistical vacuum relying exclusively of what the troops would carry in their packs or living off the countryside. Without any covert support across the Ceasefire Line, this living off the land proved fatal to the security of the guerrillas. Most of them were betrayed.

3. GHQ had mixed up classic guerrilla operations with Commandos raids.

4. All SSG and other officers, responsible for training and later leading groups across the ceasefire line were critical of the soundness of the plan, unsure of the means and uncertain of the end.

SSG records at Cherat shall substantiate the points made above: The simple truth emerging from the narrative is, that neither the C-in-C Army nor General Staff had the guts to stand up to the President, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and tell him that his advisers in the ministry of Foreign Affairs supported by GOC 12 Division, Akhtar Malik were taking him on a long ride commencing with Gibraltar, leading to his downfall via Tashkent, as it eventually proved! The loser in the final analysis was Pakistan, described so feelingly by General K.M. Arif in an analysis carried by daily Dawn', 6th September 1990. How and why Pakistan blundered into war .......... At that time, the policy making in the country was highly personalised. The institutions were weak and by-passed. Pakistan's Foreign Office with Mr. Aziz Ahmed as the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto as the Foreign Minister called the martial tunes. It had miscalculated that despite operation Gibraltar, the fighting was likely to remain confined inside the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Foreign Office is on record to have assessed that India was not in a position to risk a general war with Pakistan......for inexplicable reasons the General Headquarters based its operational plan in Kashmir on a wishful logic. The misplaced ego, the high ambition and the naive approach of a selected few plunged the country into an armed conflict. The outcome of the war, or the lack of it, eclipsed Ayub's position.

S.S.G. COMMANDO PARA DROPS : The 1965 War cannot be worthy of study unless the story of Pakistani commando drops on Adampur, Helwara and Pathankot air bases are briefly recounted. John Fricker calls this operation as an unmitigated disaster'. This operation conceived initially by PAF Chief who obtained the nod' of Ayub Khan in May/June 1965 while planning for operational contingencies in the event of an Indian aggression. Such advance operational planning is normal to all service HQ in peace time. GHQ passed the buck on to the commander of SSG- this writer. On being told by Vice Chief of General Staff Brigadier Bilgrami who had these instructions conveyed to him from Musa and Sher Bahadur the Chief of General Staff, I emphatically pointed out that the concept of operation was faulty as no raids of this nature, after the breakout of war, could have even a remote chance of success against fully alerted targets.

On my persistent refusal, GHQ told me that I should give my reasons for not undertaking the envisaged operation direct to the HQ, PAF. At a briefing arranged at SSG Parachute Training School at Peshawar in the presence of two senior officers of my command, Lt. Col. Abdul Matin, the Commander of No. 1 Commando Battalion, now retired and the brilliant Operations Staff Officer Maj. E. H. Dar, (Late Major General E. H. Dar) Air Force Chief were told that only a pre-emptive operation like the Israeli crippling raids against the front line Arab State's air bases as in 1956 Arab Israel War, could have probability of success. To this, the Air Chief observed that a decision to carry out pre-emptive operation as suggested could only be taken by the Government-meaning the President. Technically the observation made was correct but in that case the operation should have been based on the hypothesis of pre-emptive' alone. I had also objected to the para-commandos after being dropped, just left there in the void, in the heart of 100% hostile population with no equivalent of French Maquis to hide, feed and organise the escape of commandos.

That this was an unmitigated disaster from beginning to end is correct but for no fault of the brave band of commandos or their officers. I have already rendered a full account of this in my testimony to Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission, besides submission of a report to the Chief of General Staff and C-in-C in 1967.

Tribute: No objective study of this war would be complete without paying tribute to the great fighting spirit and unparalleled heroism of all ranks of the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force and notably of the SSG. The war of 1965 into which the country stumbled, with GHQ Surprised' and the army, its 25% of its strength still on leave, thus became a series of stray and isolated battles without any strategic concept and perspective. The Ghazis of the army, janbaz of the SSG, Shaheens of our Air force and Barbaroosas' of Pak Navy fought against the betrayal within and India's regimented hordes to an honourable draw. They also fought against international conspiracy of Anglo Saxon powers.

Conclusion: Had our Government initiated a probe into concept, conduct and consequences of 1965 War', and raised the curtain from the acts of gross omission or that of the criminal commission, the ignominy of 1971 could have been avoided. REFERENCE: 1965 War Operation Gibraltar Role of SSG Para Commandos Col SG MEHDI, MC who commanded the SSG till just before the 1965 war, gives a fascinating account of SSG operations during the conflict Defence Journal Monthly July 1998 http://www.defencejournal.com/july98/1965war.htm 

Air Marshal (R) Asghar Khan: Pak Started 1965 War with India (Express News)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KLXnz4Bkdww

Lessons of the 1965 war Wednesday, September 07, 2005 : Reminiscing about the 1965 war with India in which the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) emerged victorious, Pakistan’s ex-air chief, Air Marshal (Retd) Nur Khan, makes the shocking revelation that he almost resigned from the job the day he took over from Air Marshal Asghar Khan. “Rumours about an impending operation were rife but the army had not shared the plans with the other forces,” he said. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, he says, also did not brief him of what lay ahead while handing over charge. To double-check, Nur Khan spoke to the then Commander-in-Chief, General Musa Khan, who reluctantly parted with the information that Pakistan was about to launch an operation inside Held Kashmir. Nur Khan then spoke to Lt-Gen Akhtar Malik, GOC Kashmir, and was told that Pakistan was launching “Operation Gibraltar” with 800,000 infiltrators “to throw out the Indian troops with the help of the local population”. Since the air force would not be needed, Nur Khan was told, it was not informed. Nur Khan says he went on to discover that even the Lahore garrison commander did not know; and that the powerful governor of West Pakistan, Malik Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh, did not know either, having departed for Murree for vacations.

One can’t blame Nur Khan for wanting to resign. In the event, nothing went as Generals Ayub and Musa had calculated. The Indians opened up on Lahore and everybody had to scramble into action at the last moment, letting the Indians come pretty close to the city. No one will doubt that our air force bailed us out in 1965. It gave us almost complete mastery in the air over an enemy many times larger. Within 43 days of the change in command, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fought like a lion under Nur Khan. He had good officers under him, none tainted by the greed of power and property as happened in later years. Isolated from the take-over blight that had befallen the army, the PAF had reared itself as a professional institution under two consecutively competent leaders. Nur Khan goes on to say, “The performance of the Army did not match that of the PAF mainly because the army leadership was not as professional. They had planned ‘Operation Gibraltar’ for self-glory rather than in the national interest. It was a wrong war. And they misled the nation with a big lie that India rather than Pakistan had provoked the war and that we were the victims of Indian aggression.”

There was lack of imagination behind the strategy that led to the 1965 war. That’s why on the second day General Musa told Ayub that his army had run out of ammunition. The war didn’t last long and Pakistan was forced to sign a ceasefire at Tashkent that finally brought General Ayub down. Nur Khan says it was an “unnecessary war” and he compares it to the equally unnecessary 1999 Kargil Operation where the Pakistan Navy was kept out of the loop and prime minister Nawaz Sharif had to run off to Washington to sue for peace because India was said to have moved its fleet and was preparing to threaten Karachi. The first big lesson is that Pakistan as a state should not think in military terms. It should not credit the Pakistani generals’ belief that only military victories will ensure Pakistan’s future. The Argentine general who fought the Falklands war to present “the gift of the Malvinas” (Argentina’s Kashmir) to the Argentine nation was drummed out of power by the very people who had egged him on. The victory General Ayub had dreamed about did not materialise because it was based on the erroneous belief that India was too cowardly to attack. This was based on another theory — which dismembered Pakistan in 1971 — that the defence of West Pakistan contained a level of deterrence that India would not challenge. East Pakistan discovered that its defence was non-existent because it depended only on the defence of West Pakistan.

General Ayub’s 1965 war ruined the good economic indicators his era had achieved. The military leaders who followed him kept interfering in politics and feeding the nation more lies. The 1965 war was well fought because of superior US equipment which was not meant to be used against India. The war proved that Pakistan had joined the US pacts under false pretences. Later the army turned anti-American and made the textbooks say that America had let Pakistan down in 1965 and 1971. Declassified papers relating to the Nixon era inform us that Nixon had indeed prevented India from attacking West Pakistan in 1971. The lesson from 1965 is the same as drawn by Nur Khan: that the military should stay away from political power, that Pakistan should demilitarise its mind and think of options other than war to ensure its survival, that the economy should be given the primacy it deserves; and that, last but not least, Pakistan should consolidate itself internally, re-establish the social contract with the people that it has lost because of its coercive ideology, and focus on the internal threats that confront it. * REFERENCE: VIEW: Lessons of the 1965 war Wednesday, September 07, 2005 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_7-9-2005_pg3_1

Air Marshal (R) Asghar Khan:  Pak Started All Wars with India (ARY NEWS)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7rGVpiWH-QI

2005: Pakistan sent infiltrators to Kashmir in ’65: Nur Khan  ISLAMABAD, Aug 1: Pakistan Air Force and Navy were not taken into confidence by the top army command as they started a secret operation to launch infiltrators into Kashmir — an operation which finally led to Pakistan-India war in 1965, said former chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Nur Khan, here on Monday. The 82-year-old retired former Air chief revealed this to Dawn as he shared his memories of leading PAF from the front during the 1965 war, a fact also acknowledged in a recently published article by Air Marshal S. Raghavendran of the Indian Air Force (IAF). Air Marshal Khan said the decision to launch the infiltrators in Kashmir in 1965 was taken by the then President, Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Gen Muhammad Musa Khan and the divisional commander with some in cabinet and the foreign ministry also being on board. “It was a very secretive operation. Only the president, the divisional commander, who was directly involved in that operation in sending people, and the commander-in-chief knew about it,” he said.

Asked who gave the orders for launching infiltrators into Kashmir, Air Marshal Khan said, “Gen Musa. Naturally with president’s approval and knowledge of some in cabinet and the foreign office. But, again, a clique within the government rather than the whole government.” He said the top decision makers at that time were mistakenly self-assured that the theatre of operations would be restricted only to Kashmir. “The army too was not prepared that there could be a war,” he said. “They had not taken the Air Force into confidence at all that they needed their help or the PAF should be ready. Navy was not told about it, “ he said. Air Marshal Khan said, “the earliest when the infiltrators started going into Kashmir was by August 6. When the Indians came to know about it in mid-August they were surprised and thought something big was coming up. Kashmir was under pressure and in trying to defend that area it escalated into a war.”

Asked if the PAF was taken into confidence when the Kargil operation was launched in late 90s, Air Marshal Nur Khan said, “I think there was a little more openness in Kargil and they (Army) thought they would need the air force.” In reply to a question if all the martial laws in the country were imposed with the consensus of the three armed forces, Air Marshal Nur Khan said, “No. Not at all.” He said imposition of martial laws had always been on army’s decision. “I don’t think they (army) consider them (PAF and PN) important enough. The air force and navy just go along. The values have eroded. Even during the Ayub’s martial law, Asghar Khan and the naval chief had no active participation.” Asked if President Gen Musharraf had offered him to become caretaker prime minister, Air Marshal Nur Khan said, “Rubbish. We never talked. I think only once I talked to him, at the beginning, trying to put things in perspective.”

“I have been with all the three martial laws and seen them closely. I opposed the martial law of Gen Yahya”. Air Marshal Khan dismissed as absurd a theory that there was a tacit understanding between the top commanders of PAF and IAF in 1965 not to attack each other’s air force in the bases as alluded to by Air Marshal Raghavendran in a recent article available on Bharat-Rakshak website in which he says that PAF attacked only targets of “opportunity,” enabling the IAF to be up and fighting the next day. Giving an account of the Pathankot strike, Air Marshal Raghavendran said, “fortunately for us, the Pakistani attackers committed the same mistake that the Japanese did at Pearl Harbour. They attacked and certainly caused loss of aircraft, but the infrastructure such as refuelling capabilities and armament stores were left intact. So were the runway and the taxi tracks. So, we were operationally ready immediately afterwards - and were on Combat Air Patrol from the next morning, throughout the day.” REFERENCE: Pakistan sent infiltrators to Kashmir in ’65: Nur Khan By Arshad Sharif August 2, 2005 Tuesday Jumadi-us-Sani 25, 1426 http://archives.dawn.com/2005/08/02/nat4.htm

The Gladiators: Arabs, Camel Jockey Slave Kids & WikiLeaks.

The Roman Gladiator: Adopted from the earlier Etruscans, perhaps by way of Campania, gladiatorial games (munera) originated in the rites of sacrifice due the spirits of the dead and the need to propitiate them with offerings of blood. They were introduced to Rome in 264 BC, when the sons of Junius Brutus honored their father by matching three pairs of gladiators. Traditionally, munera were the obligatory funerary offerings owed aristocratic men at their death, although the games did not have to be presented then. Elected aedile in 65 BC, Julius Caesar commemorated his father, who had died twenty years before, with a display of 320 pairs of gladiators in silvered armor (Pliny, XXXIII.53: Plutarch, V.9). Still mindful of Spartacus' rebellion, a nervous Senate limited the number of gladiators allowed in Rome (Suetonius, X.2). In 46 BC, after recent victories in Gaul and Egypt, Caesar again hosted elaborate games at the tomb of his daughter Julia, who had died in childbirth eight years earlier (together with stage plays and beast fights, they included the first appearance of a giraffe). The display was criticized, however, for its extravagance and the number slain, including several of Caesar's own soldiers, who protested that none of the money was being allotted to them (Dio, XLIII.24). During the Republic, munera had been privately financed by the family, whose duty it was to present them. Increasingly a display of aristocratic wealth and prestige, the ritual lost much of its religious significance and became more overtly political. To limit this power, Augustus assigned the games to the praetors and restricted the number of shows to two per year and sixty pairs (Dio, LIV.2.4). Eventually, the games were assumed by the emperors, themselves, as enactments of their own power. Indeed, by the end of the second century AD, Tertullian could criticize in De Spectaculis (XII) that "this class of public entertainment has passed from being a compliment to the dead to being a compliment to the living." After the slave revolt of Spartacus in 73 BC, the State assumed greater control of public games (ludi), and large numbers of gladiators were trained in imperial schools. (Interestingly, ludus means "game" and "school," because both required imitation and repetition.) Under the tutelage of a manager (lanista), a troupe (familia) of gladiators could be sold or hired out, and many were retained privately by politicians and wealthy citizens as bodyguards, especially in times of civil unrest. Most gladiators were prisoners of war, slaves bought for the purpose, or criminals sentenced to serve in the schools (damnati ad ludos). At a time when three of every five persons did not survive until their twentieth birthday, the odds of a professional gladiator being killed in any particular bout, at least during the first century AD, were perhaps one in ten. But for the criminal who was to be publicly executed (damnati ad mortem) or for Christian martyrs who refused to renounce their faith and worship the gods, there was no hope of survival in the arena. Seneca, who once arrived at the amphitheater in the middle of the day, between the wild-beast shows that occurred in the morning and the gladiatorial shows presented in the afternoon, protested this lunch-time slaughter of common criminals. "The men have no defensive armour. They are exposed to blows at all points, and no one ever strikes in vain....There is no helmet or shield to deflect the weapon. What is the need of defensive armour, or of skill? All these mean delaying death....The spectators demand that the slayer shall face the man who is to slay him in his turn; and they always reserve the latest conqueror for another butchering. The outcome of every fight is death, and the means are fire and sword. This sort of thing goes on while the arena is empty" (Epistle VII). REFERENCE: The Roman Gladiator http://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/encyclopaedia_romana/gladiators/gladiators.html

LAHORE, Pakistan, 28 June 2005 - Fifteen-year-old Ghulam Sarwar spent almost half of his young life racing camels far away from his home in Pakistan. His parents sent him to the United Arab Emirates seven years ago to work as a camel jockey. In exchange, the family received a recruitment fee, and Ghulam was paid a few dollars a month. “Sometimes I had enough to eat, and sometimes not. They would hit us when we made mistakes,” said Ghulam during a recent interview with UNICEF. “The job is very tiresome. We have to work from morning to night, tenting the camels, training them, cleaning their waste, and racing in the games. I was lonely. I missed my parents. I didn’t like it there at all, but I had no way out.” Ghulam said that there were more than 100 children – mainly from Sudan, Pakistan and Bangladesh – who worked alongside him as camel jockeys. “I have won seven races during the past 7 years. At the beginning, I was scared. As I grew older, I become better, and no longer felt fear when riding the camels,” said Ghulam. Convention on the Rights of the Child: Camel racing is a popular sport in the United Arab Emirates, and using children as jockeys is equally common. But subjecting children to the danger posed by participating in the race, economically exploiting them and depriving them of an education are all in violation of the rights mandated by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Almost all countries, including the United Arab Emirates, have ratified the Convention. As time passed, it seemed to Ghulam that he would never have a chance to go back home and return to school. But following an agreement between UNICEF and the United Arab Emirates, the government banned the use of children under 16, or weighing less than 45 kg, as camel jockeys. On 21 June, the first group of 22 children, including Ghulam, returned to their home country of Pakistan. At the Allama Iqbal International Airport in Lahore City, Pakistan, government officials and UNICEF representatives were on hand to meet the returning children. As an interim measure, the children were then placed in a child protection institute where food, clothing, and medical care are provided. Reclaiming a lost childhood: The resilience displayed by these children is impressive. “We have worked with all kinds of children in Pakistan, mostly street children and beggars. We have never seen children this clever, confident, and brave,” said Zubair Ahmad, Assistant Director of Pakistan’s Child Protection and Welfare Bureau. “However, there are signs of psychological trauma, and some of the children are definitely malnourished.” The next step will be to reunite the children with their families. This could turn out to be a very long and difficult process. “Some of the children left home many years ago,” says Mr. Ahmad. “They have forgotten who their parents are and where they lived. It may take DNA testing in some cases. “For those whose origins we can’t trace, we will provide education and vocational training, to help them be better prepared to return to society one day.” The government of the United Arab Emirates has now agreed to send an estimated 3,000 child camel jockeys back to their home countries. UNICEF and its partners will be there to repatriate the children, helping them reintegrate into their societies, and reclaim their lost childhood. REFERENCE: Child camel jockeys return home By A. Sami Malik and Kun Li http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/pakistan_27517.html

The United Arab Emirates: Background and U.S. Relations : The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (principalities): Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujayrah, Umm Al Qawayn, and Ras Al Khaymah. National authority rests in the hands of a Federal Supreme Council, which is composed of the hereditary rulers of the country’s constituent emirates and elects the national president from among its members. Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, was elected UAE president in 2004 following the death of his father Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who had ruled Abu Dhabi since 1966 and served as UAE president since 1971. Sheikh Khalifa was reelected for a second five-year term in November 2009. In practice, the wealthier and more powerful emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai exercise the strongest influence over the country’s affairs; under current convention, the ruler of oil-rich Abu Dhabi serves as the UAE president, and the ruler of the UAE’s commercial hub, Dubai, serves as vice president. The Supreme Council appoints the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers (cabinet), which initiates legislation for ratification by the Supreme Council and the president. The United States and the UAE have enjoyed close and cooperative relations in recent years, in spite of periodic differences with regard to political reform, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, counterterrorism, and U.S. policies regarding Iraq and Iran. Military cooperation and arms sales form a key pillar of U.S.-UAE relations. The UAE hosts frequent port calls and shore visits for U.S. naval vessels and allows the U.S. military to use Al Dhafra air base in support of a variety of missions in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations. In 2007 and 2008, the Bush Administration notified Congress of over $19.4 billion in potential arms sales to the UAE, including what would be the first overseas sale of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense system. In 2009 and 2010, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a further $8.8 billion in potential sales, including the potential sale of 60 remanufactured and new AH-64D Block III APACHE helicopters. Bilateral trade has increased in recent years, with 2009 U.S. exports valued at over $12.2 billion, making the UAE the largest U.S. export market in the Middle East. The Bush Administration began negotiating a free trade agreement with the UAE in 2004, but did not conclude the negotiations. The United States does not import a significant amount of oil from the UAE. However, the UAE exports over 2 million barrels of oil per day, making it a key global energy producer. REFERENCE: The United Arab Emirates: Background and U.S. Relations http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40344.pdf

UAE - Camel Jockey Slave Kids - 1

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFUSl4GCIVs

WikiLeaks 2011 KARACHI: A US official in a cable sent to the State Department stated that “financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith clerics in south Punjab from organisations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments.” The cable sent in November 2008 by Bryan Hunt, the then Principal Officer at the US Consulate in Lahore, was based on information from discussions with local government and non-governmental sources during his trips to the cities of Multan and Bahawalpur. Quoting local interlocutors, Hunt attempts to explain how the “sophisticated jihadi recruitment network” operated in a region dominated by the Barelvi sect, which, according to the cable, made south Punjab “traditionally hostile” to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith schools of thought. Hunt refers to a “network of Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith mosques and madrassahs” being strengthened through an influx of “charity” which originally reached organisations “such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Al-Khidmat foundation”. Portions of these funds would then be given away to clerics “in order to expand these sects’ presence” in a relatively inhospitable yet “potentially fruitful recruiting ground”. Outlining the process of recruitment for militancy, the cable describes how “families with multiple children” and “severe financial difficulties” were generally being exploited for recruitment purposes. Families first approached by “ostensibly ‘charitable’” organisations would later be introduced to a “local Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith maulana” who would offer to educate the children at his madrassah and “find them employment in the service of Islam”. “Martyrdom” was also “often discussed”, with a final cash payment to the parents. “Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rs 500,000 (approximately USD 6,500) per son,” the cable states.

Children recruited would be given age-specific indoctrination and would eventually be trained according to the madrassah teachers’ assessment of their inclination “to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture” versus their value as promoters of Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith sects or recruiters, the cable states. Recruits “chosen for jihad” would then be taken to “more sophisticated indoctrination camps”. “Locals identified three centres reportedly used for this purpose”. Two of the centres were stated to be in the Bahawalpur district, whereas one was reported as situated “on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city”. These centres “were primarily used for indoctrination”, after which “youths were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas”. The cable goes on to quote local officials criticising the PML-N-led provincial and the PPP-led federal governments for their “failure to act” against “extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-i-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar”. The Bahawalpur district nazim at the time told Hunt that despite repeatedly highlighting the threat posed by extremist groups and indoctrination centres to the provincial and federal governments, he had received “no support” in dealing with the issue unless he was ready to change his political loyalties. The nazim, who at the time was with the PML-Q, “blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties…neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan People’s Party federal governments would take his requests seriously”. REFERENCE: Saudi Arabia, UAE financing extremism in south Punjab By Qurat ul ain Siddiqui | From the Newspaper | 22nd May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/22/saudi-arabia-uae-financing-extremism-in-south-punjab/ Cable referenced: WikiLeaks # 178082. 2008: Extremist recruitment on the rise in south Punjab madrassahs DAWN.COM | 22nd May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/22/2008-extremist-recruitment-on-the-rise-in-south-punjab-madrassahs/

UAE - Camel Jockey Slave Kids - 2

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFUSl4GCIVs

WikiLeaks 2009/2011: Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d): 1. (SBU) Summary: Though the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) continue to grab headlines for terrorist violence, poor and underdeveloped regions in the rest of “”settled”" Pakistan are increasingly the recruiting and training ground for extremism and militancy. Areas such as the Southern Punjab’s Seraiki-speaking belt and interior northern Sindh are mired in choking poverty and underdevelopment. This lack of prosperity is coupled with a rising number of disaffected youth who have a window to the outside world through television and the internet, but no prospects for social mobility. Moreover Pakistanis in these areas have lost their traditional patronage structure, be it the religious Sufi Pirs or the landlords, who once protected the basic needs of their citizens and delivered simple justice. In such places, as well as parts of urban Karachi and Quetta, religious extremists, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), find fertile ground to spread their ideology and recruit new militants. End Summary.

BROKEN AGRICULTURE & FAILING EDUCATION

—————————————

2. (C) Both Southern Punjab and Northern Sindh are still mainly agricultural societies with few other viable industries. Traditionally, the economies of these areas have been dominated by large landowners who outsource their farming to tenant farmers. Additionally, the highest rates of bonded labor in Pakistan are found in these regions, with most of such labor concentrated in agriculture, brick kilns, and carpet weaving. With the old agricultural system failing and “”modern”" farming taking hold, farming alone can no longer support the region’s labor pool.

3. (C) As farming disappears as a source of income for the populace, government education systems fail to prepare their students for anything else. Public schools are yielding young graduates who can not find jobs, even when they move to large cities such as Lahore and Karachi. Many young high school and college graduates are frustrated because the years they spend in government schools do not provide them any employable skills. This common occurrence is reflected in the story of Ajmal Kasab, the sole surviving Mumbai attacker, who by his own admission graduated from a Southern Punjab government school and unsuccessfully looked for jobs in Lahore. He ended up pursuing unskilled labor, then petty crime, and ultimately was lured to LeT with promises of money and adventure. Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director of the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), described the extremism in Southern Punjab not as “”talibanization”" but rather as a battle between haves and have-nots. He stressed that the education system had to be rationalized so that it led to real job opportunities, otherwise jobless youth would find a source of income in militant organizations. Those that actually graduate from public high schools are in the upper echelon of have-nots; illiteracy rates are high, and even primary school enrollment low, in these areas.

4. (U) Unlike in the recent past, the poor and jobless youth are no longer cut off from the outside world. Increasingly free media and internet access show these disaffected youth the wealth and corruption that exist outside their immediate circles. Also, newly rich local merchants who benefit from corruption, along with lavish foreign-financed madrassas, stand in stark contrast to the meager existence of this disaffected generation.

TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP VACUUM & EXTREME IDEOLOGY GROWTH

——————————————— ———–

5. (SBU) Several academic studies, including a recent look at the connection between poverty and militancy by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, have found that while poverty alone is not sufficient to give rise to extremism, it is a contributing factor pushing people towards militancy, provided an enabling environment exists. Poverty has long existed in Pakistan well beyond southern Punjab and northern Sindh; however, recent changes to the power structures and ideologies in both regions have provided the conducive environment for militancy to take hold.

ISLAMABAD 00002576 002 OF 004

6. (C) Traditionally, landlords and religious Sufi Pirs (who were often the same individual) lived among their communities and were largely protective patrons. Tenant farmers and Sufi devotees, while poor, could count on their leaders to deliver basic justice, food, and protection against corrupt police or other government functionaries. Peasants tolerated a feudal system because it also provided them protection through their individual benefactors. In the last several decades, exploitative landlords have increasingly moved to big cities and Pirs no longer deliver community uplift. The breakdown of the traditional systems – similar to the breakdown and corruption within the FATA’s malik system – has left the populace without a social welfare net or any real access to justice.

7. (C) Many have claimed that a region so steeped in Sufi mysticism could not fall prey to militancy. To a certain extent peaceful Barelvi ideology and Sufism can act as a bulwark against extremism; however, Sufi and Barelvi leaders alone can not fight poverty, underdevelopment, and bad governance. Additionally, the new generation of Sufi leadership has not been able to articulate its religious doctrine to the region’s disaffected youth. In contrast, since the Zia ul-Haq regime, the growth of Deobandi and Salafi madrassas and religious institutions in Southern Punjab has been exponential. The gap in Barelvi and Sufi welfare services is now filled by well-heeled, foreign-financed Deobandi madrassas. Poor Barelvi families often are forced to send their children to Deobandi madrassas to receive food, boarding, and monthly stipends. According to defense analyst Aisha Siddiqa, the number of Deobandi madrassas increased 140% between 1988 (1320) and 2000 (3152). These religious seminaries and their accompanying evangelical wings have worked on converting communities to Salafism and neutralizing resistance to more rabid interpretations of Islam. Secondly, madrassa students are indoctrinated about jihad at these institutions, which can lead them to joining any number of militant groups on their own. Lastly, according to Siddiqa, the madrassas can act as transit points where kids from government schools are shown the social mobility that can accompany militancy and are offered a doctrinal justification for militant action.

ACTIVE MILITANT RECRUITMENT

—————————-

8. (C) Across Southern Punjab and increasingly in Quetta and Karachi, Pakistani militant groups openly recruit young men with promises of a better life, adventure, money, and a way to express their frustration against the status quo. The social fabric of northern Sindh is also breaking down in similar ways, which could allow more extremist influence in the future. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), have graffiti emblazoned on buildings and schools openly inviting young recruits to join up. Often militant groups invite young disaffected men to come visit them for a few days and show them a better life, plying them with money and other perks before sending them home to “”think”" about their options. Many of these young men are jobless government school graduates, while others are recruited from madrassas. Most join militant groups without the knowledge of their families. There are several active militant groups based in Punjab which have vast networks across Pakistan, and also have developed recent ties with the Taliban. Pakistani military and intelligence agencies have funded many of these groups in the past, and the extent of current establishment support is unclear. Regardless of government support, analysts argue that the majority of current militant funding comes from foreign and domestic donors, as well as criminal activities such as extortion and kidnapping.

MILITANT GROUPS

—————

9. (C) The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) was formed in 1985 in Jhang, Punjab by anti-Shia clerics. This banned terrorist organization is focused on sectarian violence and the group was originally supported by Zia-ul-Haq’s government in a move to counter Shia Iran’s influence in Pakistan. The funding for SSP comes from both external and local sources such as the trader-merchant class in Jhang. SSP was responsible for the rise in sectarian violence in the 1980s and 1990s. SSP advocates Deobandi ideology and has served as the basic ideological and militant birthing ground for other militant groups. The group was linked with the 1997 attack on former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, and they take credit for killing several Shia doctors in Karachi in 2001. Recently, the SSP has resurged in Southern Punjab and has links with other militant outfits. Qari Hussain, the most feared deputy of Tehreek Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) recently killed leader, Baitullah Mehsud, came out of SSP and many of the TTP’s foot soldiers are from SSP ranks. (Note. The SSP is also believed to be behind the violence against Christians in Punjab in late August and early September 2009. End Note.)

10. (C) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) grew out of SSP and was founded in Bhakkar, South Punjab. The Deobandi organization was initially focused on the elimination of Shias, but after 9/11 its attention shifted to fighting the war on terror against the United States. According to Siddiqa, LeJ was the first militant group to send recruits to Al-Qaeda, through LeJ’s contacts with wealthy Arabs who visited Southern Punjab. LeJ has strong connections with prominent terrorists, including Khaled Sheikh Mohammad and Abu Musab al Zarqawi. The LeJ and Taliban currently have linked networks that allow the Taliban to carry out terrorist attacks in Punjab with LeJ assistance. According to Amir Rana, Director of Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, LeJ also has powerful networks in Karachi and Quetta.

11. (C) Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) is another SSP breakaway Deobandi organization that was started by Masood Azhar of Bahawalpur after he returned from India in 2000. (Note: Azhar was arrested in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1993, was exchanged by the Indian government for passengers hijacked to Afghanistan on an Indian Airlines flight in 1999, and subsequently returned to Pakistan with the help of Afghanistan’s then-Taliban government and Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. End Note.) JeM has had a long-standing relationship with intelligence agencies, and according to Rana, it is the only militant outfit still under Inter-Service Intelligence’s (ISI) protective umbrella. JeM continues to be dedicated to the Kashmir fight; however, the group maintains ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Umar Saeed Sheikh, Daniel Pearl’s convicted murderer, was also part of JeM.

12. (C) Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is an organization based in the Central Punjab city of Muridke, but has spread across Southern Punjab as well. It is ideologically Wahhabi, making it different from its militant Deobandi cousins. LeT, and its subsequent cover charitable organization Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), attract a broad range of supporters, including women, through their welfare work in the Seraiki belt, earthquake-affected Azad Jammu-Kashmir, and among Swat’s internally displaced population. The Mumbai attacks were masterminded by LeT operatives and they continue to focus on militancy against India. The group was created and trained by Pakistani intelligence services to fight a proxy war against India. According to Rana, LeT leadership has ideological and operational disagreements with TTP and does not allow its militants to attack the Pakistani government.

13. (C) Since the 1980s, there has been a history of Punjabi extremists fighting and training alongside Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Rabbani, and now the Taliban in Afghanistan. Siddiqa estimates 5000-9000 Punjabi youth are fighting currently in the FATA and Afghanistan. CRSS’s Gul argues that TTP has strong network links with radical groups such as SSP and LeJ, and many Taliban leaders have studied at madrassas in Southern Punjab. Rana explained that the TTP are capitalizing on the pool of militant recruits already indoctrinated by JeM, LeT, and LeJ in these areas, but the actual arms training takes place in the NWFP and FATA. The Taliban is using the Punjabi militant network to carry out many of the terrorist attacks in Islamabad, Lahore, and other settled areas of Pakistan. FATA parliamentarians claim that many of the Taliban fighters in their agencies are actually Seraiki, and that much of the training comes from existing Punjabi militant commanders.

14. (C) Comment: Aisha Siddiqa, who herself is from Southern Punjab, maintains that the message of militancy is quite potent, especially in terms of the dreams it sells young disillusioned village boys. Dismantling not just the infrastructure but also the potent message of militancy is a complicated problem. Punjab and Sindh represent the heart of Pakistan and deploying the military in these areas, as was done in Swat and FATA, is politically untenable and practically impossible. In the immediate future, the Pakistani government must dismantle both public and state support for militant groups. Many of these networks exist in the open, and until the message against them is clear, average people will continue to be drawn to them. The harder and longer-term solution is to offer real alternatives to disaffected potential recruits. Although the actual number of militant recruits is a small percentage of the population, the sympathy for such groups runs deep. New industries and real economic development would reinvigorate these regions. More importantly, relevant education, including vocational training, that offers people a better future and social mobility will be the best disincentive to joining militant groups. In terms of access to justice and ideology, traditional Sufi bulwarks against extremism and new social welfare nets need to give citizens confidence that their futures are secure. Pakistan’s challenge is to offer alternate and positive dreams to the disillusioned and frustrated youth. We should anticipate and mitigate backlash from the feudals, who are accustomed to having an ignorant and weak peasant class to tend their fields. In order to prevent traditional secular and religious powers in these areas from subverting needed reforms, they will have to believe that reforms are needed to forestall a revolution. End Comment. PATTERSON. REFERENCE: 2009: Southern Punjab extremism battle between haves and have-nots DAWN.COM | 22nd May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/22/2009-southern-punjab-extremism-battle-between-haves-and-have-nots/ 2009: Was Qaddafi funding Sipahe Sahaba? 26th May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/26/2009-was-qaddafi-funding-sipahe-sahaba/