Soul Searching for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

KARACHI, May 16: A Saudi diplomat was gunned down in the DHA area of the city on Monday morning, days after two grenades had been lobbed at the Saudi Consulate building. The attack on the consulate official took place in the relatively peaceful neighbourhood of Khayaban-i-Shahbaz, not far from the consulate. “CCTV footage shows that four men on two motorcycles intercepted Hassan Al Qahtani’s car and opened fire,” Deputy Inspector General of Police (Karachi South) Iqbal Mehmood told Dawn. The official was driving to work and his car carried a diplomatic number plate. Shots were fired from both sides of the car and Mr Qahtani was hit by two bullets, one in the head which caused his death, the DIG said. Police found six spent bullet casings of a 9mm pistol at the place and took the diplomat’s body to the Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre for post-mortem. The body was later handed over to Saudi officials who made arrangements to fly it to Saudi Arabia. An identity card found in the car described Qahtani as a ‘Consulate Agent’. Saudi Ambassador Abdul Aziz Al Ghadeer condemned the attack. “No-one who carries out this kind of attack can be a Muslim,” he said while talking to the Reuters news agency. A police officer said a ‘Bahrain connection’ could not be ruled out as a possible motive for the two attacks, but it was also being investigated whether these were in revenge for the killing of Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. The New York Times, quoting a Pakistani security official, said Qahtani was working on Saudi dissidents who had found refuge in the city and this most probably was the reason behind his killing. Security at all foreign missions in the city was enhanced after the incident. Meanwhile, the Binnoria University International issued a statement condemning the killing and grenade attack and demanding immediate arrest of the attackers. Agencies add: Sindh home ministry official Sharfuddin Memon said a six-member police and intelligence team would investigate the killing and the attack on the Saudi mission. A security official said: “Apart from a possible reaction by militants to Osama’s killing, we also suspect a sectarian link.” Saudi Arabia called on Pakistan to tighten security measures around diplomatic missions, a foreign ministry official was quoted as saying by state media. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar spoke to Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal to express “shock and anger” over the killing and pledged the perpetrators would be brought to justice. “The government of Pakistan will take all necessary measures to ensure the security and protection of diplomats in Pakistan,” the foreign ministry said. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the killing. “Until America stops chasing Al Qaeda and stops drone strikes we will keep carrying out such attacks,” a spokesman for the group said by telephone. REFERENCE: Taliban claim responsibility: Saudi consulate official shot dead in Karachi By S. Raza Hassan | From the Newspaper May 17, 2011 (4 days ago) http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/17/taliban-claim-responsibility-saudi-consulate-official-shot-dead-in-karachi.html

KARACHI: Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif “thought he might be arrested” upon his return to Saudi Arabia after deportation from Pakistan on Sept 10, 2007, but Prince Muqrin, Head of General Intelligence Presidency, Saudi Arabia, gave Sharif “two options – he could either stay at a palace that had been prepared for him, or at his home. He opted to go to his home.” The candid behind-the-scenes details of Mr Sharif’s return to exile in Saudi Arabia shared by Prince Muqrin with the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Ford M. Fraker, are documented in a secret cable from the US consulate in Jeddah on Sept 12, 2007. “During Ambassdor Fraker’s meeting with Prince Muqrin, the Prince first summarised the ten-year agreement, brokered by Rafik Hariri, under which Sharif would live in Saudi Arabia and refrain from participating in Pakistani politics. He added that there was a verbal agreement that after five years, they would hold negotiations to consider reducing that ten year period,” according to the secret cable. Prince Muqrin went on to describe “how Saad Al-Hariri warned Sharif not to return to Pakistan, but how Sharif disregarded the warning and went anyway.” After Sharif’s forcible return from Pakistan to Jeddah, Prince Muqrin received the former Pakistani prime minister at the airport at which point the two discussed where Mr Sharif would stay. Prince Muqrin also told Sharif that there would be “some restrictions” on his activities “for a short while, at least through the November elections, to reduce the likelihood of inciting rioting among his supporters in Pakistan.” Ambassador Fraker was also told that “Sharif will remain in Saudi Arabia until after the Pakistani elections in November.” Sharif eventually returned to Pakistan on Nov 25, 2007, by which point elections were to be held in early 2008. Delving into the complexities of Pakistani politics, Prince Muqrin also “speculated that there is probably an agreement between Sharif and the Pakistani Chief Justice, adding that if the Chief Justice grants Sharif the right to return to Pakistan and Sharif wins, the Chief Justice will become President.” The Saudi prince went on to state “that he is almost certain the Chief Justice will side with Sharif, noting that he believes the run-up to the November election will be tense.” “The Prince explained that, as in Lebanon, the Pakistani constitution requires individuals working within the government to be outside government for two years prior to becoming President. Therefore a constitutional change would be required for Musharraf to become President.” The Saudi intelligence chief was also frank about Saudi preferences: “The Prince explained that King Abdullah views both Sharif and Musharraf as friends, but that he believes that the two together do not equate to Pakistani security. The King feels that Musharraf is the best person to address anti-terrorism issues within Pakistan.” Cable referenced: WikiLeaks # 121856. All cables can be viewed at Dawn.com. REFERENCE: Nawaz Sharif feared arrest after deportation in ’07 By Cyril Almeida | From the Newspaper (20 hours ago) Today http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/21/nawaz-sharif-feared-arrest-after-deportation-in-07.html

Saudi Intelligence Chief seeks Pervez Musharraf 's safe exit.

LONDON: Saad Hariri, the son of the late Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, met former Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif in Scotland in the second week of August before the announcement of the Supreme Court’s verdict in favour of the Sharif brothers. Sources said the secret meeting had taken place at a very short notice on the request of Saad Hariri, who was urged by General Musharraf to intervene in the matter of Sharifs’ proposed return. When contacted by The News, Nadir Chaudhri, the official spokesman of Nawaz Sharif, confirmed that Saad Hariri had met the former prime minister in Scotland. But he refused to give any details of the meeting. Sources close to the Sharif brothers said the meeting took place in Scotland where the former prime minister had gone along with members of his family to spend his holidays, after filing the petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The sources said after the admission of the petition challenging the ban on the return of Nawaz Sharif, the Musharraf government was alarmed and immediately contacted Saad Hariri, who had played a major role in getting the Sharif family out of the Attock Fort on December 10, 2000. Saad was reminded of his role as a guarantor in the deal and asked to stop the former prime minister from breaching the deal. 

The sources said after this message from Islamabad, Saad Hariri immediately contacted the Sharif family in London to discuss the situation. As Nawaz was not in London at that time, so Saad Hariri was asked to meet him in Scotland. The sources said during the meeting, Saad is said to have reiterated the position of General Pervez Musharraf and conveyed the message that he should not go to Pakistan before completing his 10 years in exile as agreed under the deal in 2000. The sources said Nawaz did not give any definite reply to Hariri’s son as he was simply waiting for the Supreme Court verdict. They said Nawaz did not take the secret meeting with Saad seriously as before this meeting, he is said to have received a positive message from the Saudis. The Saudis are said to have informed Nawaz that this time they would not interfere in his affairs. The sources said when General Musharraf rushed to meet Benazir Bhutto in Abu Dhabi on July 26 after the restoration of the chief justice of Pakistan on July 20, he also went to meet King Abdullah in Jeddah to ask him to stop Nawaz from flying to Pakistan. They said the disinterested Saudis conveyed a message to Nawaz in London that Musharraf did not want him back in Pakistan before completion of 10 years in exile. But when Nawaz checked with the Saudis’ messenger, the former prime minister was pleasantly surprised to learn that the Saudis would not become a party to his dealings with Musharraf. It was also reported that the Saudis told Musharraf how could they stop a Pakistani citizen from flying to his own country. The sources said after this message, a confident Nawaz knew that the Saudis would not put him under pressure to stop him from flying to Pakistan, particularly when he had been allowed by the Supreme Court. That is why, the sources said, Nawaz was not taking Saad Hariri and his messages seriously.

News Desk adds: Meanwhile, PML-N leaders Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif on Sunday renewed their determination to return to the country very soon, private TV channels reported. Saad Hariri asked the Sharifs to stay out of Pakistan in accordance with the understanding reached for their release, the channels said, quoting a report published in Doha Times. Rafiq Hariri is believed to be the person referred to as gentleman in the understanding signed by Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif, when asked about pressure from Saad Hariri against his return plan, did not deny contact with the Arab leader. He said he had been in contact with Hariri for the last seven years. The contact has also been established recently. He, however, stopped short of confirming the report that they were asked not to go to Pakistan by Hariri, saying that foreign friends, including Saudi Arabia, should not be dragged into the Pakistani politics. He said they were planning to return to Pakistan before the holy month of Ramazan. Shahbaz Sharif said that Nawaz had made it clear to Saad Hariri that Pakistan was passing through a very difficult phase and his return to the country was not his personal matter. Nawaz, according to Shahbaz, told Hariri that after the decision of the Supreme Court, the people of Pakistan wanted him to return. REFERENCE: Hariri meets Nawaz on Musharraf’s prodding Rauf Klasra Monday, August 27, 2007 http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=9798&Cat=13&dt=8/27/2007

"10 Years ago" Cabinet had no idea of exile deal Ansar Abbasi DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending: 16 December 2000 Issue : 06/48 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/dec1600.html#cabi Sharifs lose 80pc of assets, says Qureshi Ansar Abbasi DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending: 16 December 2000 Issue : 06/48 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/dec1600.html#shar Ansar Abbasi (Jang Group) refutes himself & Exposes Kamran Khan (Jang Group) 11 Years Old "LIES" http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2011/01/ansar-abbasi-jang-group-refutes-himself.html Long March of Nawaz Sharif & Memory Loss of Ansar Abbasi. http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2011/02/long-march-of-nawaz-sharif-memory-loss.html

Since 1994 or earlier, the National Security Agency has been collecting electronic intercepts of

conversations between members of the Saudi Arabian royal family, which is headed by King Fahd. The intercepts depict a regime increasingly corrupt, alienated from the country's religious rank and file, and so weakened and frightened that it has brokered its future by channelling hundreds of millions of dollars in what amounts to protection money to fundamentalist groups that wish to overthrow it. The intercepts have demonstrated to analysts that by 1996 Saudi money was supporting Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and other extremist groups in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, and Central Asia, and throughout the Persian Gulf region. "Ninety-six is the key year," one American intelligence official told me. "Bin Laden hooked up to all the bad guys—it's like the Grand Alliance— and had a capability for conducting large-scale operations." The Saudi regime, he said, had "gone to the dark side." In interviews last week, current and former intelligence and military officials portrayed the growing instability of the Saudi regime—and the vulnerability of its oil reserves to terrorist attack—as the most immediate threat to American economic and political interests in the Middle East. The officials also said that the Bush Administration, like the Clinton Administration, is refusing to confront this reality, even in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks. The Saudis and the Americans arranged a meeting between Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and King Fahd during a visit by Rumsfeld to Saudi Arabia shortly before the beginning of the air war in Afghanistan, and pictures of the meeting were transmitted around the world. The United States, however, has known that King Fahd has been incapacitated since suffering a severe stroke, in late 1995. A Saudi adviser told me last week that the King, with round-the-clock medical treatment, is able to sit in a chair and open his eyes, but is usually unable to recognize even his oldest friends. Fahd is being kept on the throne, the N.S.A. intercepts indicate, because of a bitter family power struggle. Fahd's nominal successor is Crown Prince Abdullah, his half brother, who is to some extent the de-facto ruler—he and Prince Sultan, the defense minister, were the people Rumsfeld really came to see. But there is infighting about money: Abdullah has been urging his fellow-princes to address the problem of corruption in the kingdom—unsuccessful ly, according to the intercepts. "The only reason Fahd's being kept alive is so Abdullah can't become king," a former White House adviser told me. REFERENCE: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY King’s Ransom How vulnerable are the Saudi royals? by Seymour M. Hersh OCTOBER 22, 2001 Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security, “King’s Ransom,” The New Yorker, October 22, 2001, p. 35 http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/22/011022fa_FACT1

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 1

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 2

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 3

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 4

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 5

During "Judicial Crisis in 2007" the same Saudi Arabia and their Vile, Corrupt, Pervert, Rascal Princes tried to Bribe the Chief Justice of Pakistan at the behest of Musharraf. The Honourable Chief Justice of Pakistan should have written letter to King Abdullah on this Naked Fascism of Saudi Arabia. Jang Group has removed [permanently] many news stories from their web cache to lie blatantly without being caught. Now in 2010 that lick-spittle Prince Prince Bandar bin Khalid bin Faisal Al-Saud Offices: Chairman of the board of directors, AL-WATAN newspaper http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/saudi/cards10.html is writing a letter to CJP on Corruption??? Where was this suddenly found conscience when they kept watching silently the Judicial Murder of Bhutto and not only that they also accepted rather arranged the Exile of Mr. Nawaz Sharif [why the Prince didn't write any letter], instead of writing letters these "2000" Saudi Princes should take a deep breath and do some soul searching. My intention is not to condone corruption but unearth this "double standard" because the same Jang Group had viciously attacked Saudi Diplomat and Sheikh Sudais [Imam Kaaba] when they intervened in Lal Masjid Affair.

ISLAMABAD: The Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan Ali S Awadh Asseri met the deposed Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, to extend an invitation for Haj, an offer that was politely declined. “Saying thank you, the deposed CJ told the ambassador he could not go abroad in the present crisis,” a family source said. Asseri went to see Justice Chaudhry at 10 am and remained with him for almost half-an-hour, the source told The News. The Interior Ministry, however, said it had no knowledge of the meeting but the interior minister said the ambassador did not need any prior permission to see the deposed CJ and he could go whenever he wanted. Although, many Western diplomats have been meeting politicians, Asseri is the first diplomat who was allowed to see Justice Chaudhry since his house arrest on November 3. Deposed Justice Bhagwan Das confirmed that he was in the picture about the meeting but said he did not know its details. A close confidante of Justice Chaudhry and leading lawyer, Athar Minallah, told The News that the Saudi ambassador went to see Justice Chaudhry for extending him an invitation of Haj. Minallah said that Saudi ambassador had also invited Justice Chaudhry before March 9 when he was first sacked. Later, the Saudi government had again extended the invitation after his restoration, he said. And now when the time for performing Haj is getting nearer with many intending pilgrims already flown to Makkah, Ambassador Asseri did not forget his last commitment and again went to remind Justice Chaudhry about this standing offer.

Minallah said Justice Chaudhry thanked the ambassador for inquiring his well being and extending the Haj invitation but said he could not accept it at this point of time. Justice Chaudhry told the ambassador that the people of Pakistan were passing through a critical phase of history. It would be therefore unwise on his part to leave them alone and to go for Haj. But he said he was deeply grateful for the invitation extended by the Saudi government. Justice Chaudhry also told the ambassador that he was entirely committed to the cause of rule of law and the restoration of the judiciary. According to Minallah, Justice Chaudhry was firm on his previous stand and no let-up was noticed in his strong determination. He said the continued confinement has failed to break Justice Chaudhry and he was as optimistic today as was before November 3.Tariq Butt adds: “The former chief justice wants to perform Haj along with his family. We are prepared to facilitate his pilgrimage,” Ambassador Asseri told The News. He said Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry had requested to the embassy for visa to perform Haj, and “my meeting with him was about that.” The diplomat said there was also an outstanding invitation to Chaudhry for visit to Saudi Arabia that was extended to him five months back. At the time, he was the chief justice of the Supreme Court. On being approached by this correspondent, Caretaker Interior Minister Lt-Gen (retd) Hamid Nawaz said that to his knowledge, the deposed judge had so far made no request to the government, indicating his intention to go for Haj. “First, he has to write to the government showing his keenness for performing Haj. Only then, we will consider his case,” he said.

The government has repeatedly stated that none of the deposed judges is confined to his house and every one of them has free access to movement. However, no visitor is allowed to meet any of these justices as police continue to man different barricades on roads leading to the Judges’ Enclave and elsewhere. The latest refusal to a meeting with the former chief justice came when former prime minister Nawaz Sharif had made a bid on Thursday. “I will find out whether or not the former judge is going for Haj,” Interior Ministry spokesman Brig (retd) Javed Iqbal Cheema told The News. “I will let you know,” he said but did not call back. The Saudi ambassador said he did not discuss with the former judge any matter concerning Pakistan’s internal affairs. The deposed chief justice was not available for comment. Asseri’s meeting has assumed great importance in the prevailing situation when a logjam exists between the government and the judges of the Supreme Court and the high courts, who had either refused or were not called to take oath under the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) that President General Pervez Musharraf issued on Nov 3. REFERENCE: Jang Group has removed [permanently] many news stories from their web cache to lie blatantly without being caught, here is the source for the quote : http://www.paklinks.com/gs/pakistan-affairs/271499-ex-cj-iftikhar-meets-saudi-ambassador-exile-deal-offered.html Saudi envoy meets deposed CJ, invites him for Haj Iftikhar declines invitation; says he cannot leave country in present situation By Umar Cheema Dec 7th, 2007 07:46 PMhttp://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story...l.asp?Id=11593

ISLAMABAD: Saudi Ambassador, Ali Awaz Al Asiri called on confined former chief Justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry at his residence. Intelligence sources told that this meeting between the Saudi ambassador and the former chief justice lasted for about an hour at the Judges Colony, where the demands for the re-instatement of the Judges and other options deliberated. Sources told that following the parley with the chief justice, Saudi ambassador also visited the foreign office here and discussed matters of national importance. REFERENCE: Saudi envoy meets former CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry Updated at Friday, December 07, 2007 1330 PSThttp://thenews.jang.com.pk/updates.asp?id=33504 REFERENCE: Jang Group has removed [permanently] many news stories from their web cache to lie blatantly without being caught, here is the source for the above Umar Cheema's quote : http://www.paklinks.com/gs/pakistan-affairs/271499-ex-cj-iftikhar-meets-saudi-ambassador-exile-deal-offered.html

Saudi Arabia is ready to offer Pakistan's sacked chief justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, shelter in the kingdom, Pakistani government sources told Adnkronos International (AKI). High-level sources told AKI, on condition of anonymity, that this was discussed when the Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan, Ali Awaz Al Asiri, called on the deposed chief justice at his residence in the capital Islamabad on Friday. They said that the meeting was set up by the Pakistani government. Al Asiri is believed to have invited Chaudhry and his family to make the Haj or Muslim pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, this year. The Haj is scheduled to take place this month. Al Asiri is also believed to have offered Chaudhry and his family a prolonged stay in Saudi Arabia. Sources within the Saudi consulate in Karachi, on the condition of anonymity, also confirmed to AKI the offer of shelter to Chaudhry and said that the government of Saudi Arabia had tried to bring stability to Pakistan. Chaudhry was sacked as chief justice after President Pervez Musharraf declared a state of emergency in Pakistan on 3 November, citing rising extremism and an unruly judiciary. The former head of the Supreme Court was placed under house arrest. While opposition leader and former prime minister Nawaz Sharif was prevented from meeting Chaudhry on Thursday, just a day later Al Asiri was allowed to meet him. It is believed that the potential deal would help break the deadlock within opposition parties who are divided on whether to contest the January general elections if the sacked judges are not reinstated. A Saudi-brokered deal would be a face-saving gesture for Chaudhry and the entire opposition who need to deal with Musharraf's government and also support an independent judiciary to gain public support. REFERENCE: Jang Group has removed [permanently] many news stories from their web cache to lie blatantly without being caught, here is the source for the above Umar Cheema's quote :http://www.paklinks.com/gs/pakistan-affairs/271499-ex-cj-iftikhar-meets-saudi-ambassador-exile-deal-offered.html 

The American intelligence officials have been particularly angered by the refusal of the Saudis to help the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. run "traces"—that is, name checks and other background information—on the nineteen men, more than half of them believed to be from Saudi Arabia, who took part in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. "They knew that once we started asking for a few traces the list would grow," one former official said. "It's better to shut it down right away." He pointed out that thousands of disaffected Saudis have joined fundamentalist groups throughout the Middle East. Other officials said that there is a growing worry inside the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. that the actual identities of many of those involved in the attacks may not be known definitively for months, if ever. Last week, a senior intelligence official confirmed the lack of Saudi coöperation and told me, angrily, that the Saudis "have only one constant—and it's keeping themselves in power." The N.S.A. intercepts reveal the hypocrisy of many in the Saudi royal family, and why the family has become increasingly estranged from the vast majority of its subjects. Over the years, unnerved by the growing strength of the fundamentalist movement, it has failed to deal with the underlying issues of severe unemployment and inadequate education, in a country in which half the population is under the age of eighteen. Saudi Arabia's strict interpretation of Islam, known as Wahhabism, and its use of mutawwa'in—religious police—to enforce prayer, is rivalled only by the Taliban's. And yet for years the Saudi princes—there are thousands of them—have kept tabloid newspapers filled with accounts of their drinking binges and partying with prostitutes, while taking billions of dollars from the state budget. The N.S.A. intercepts are more specific. In one call, Prince Nayef, who has served for more than two decades as interior minister, urges a subordinate to withhold from the police evidence of the hiring of prostitutes, presumably by members of the royal family. According to the summary, Nayef said that he didn't want the "client list" released under any circumstances. The intercepts produced a stream of sometimes humdrum but often riveting intelligence from the telephone calls of several senior members of the royal family, including Abdullah; Nayef; Sultan, whose son Prince Bandar has been the Saudi ambassador to the United States since 1983; and Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia's capital. There was constant telephoning about King Fahd's health after his stroke, and scrambling to take advantage of the situation. On January 8, 1997, Prince Sultan told Bandar about a flight that he and Salman had shared with the King. Sultan complained that the King "barely spoke to anyone," according to the summary of the intercept, because he was "too medicated." The King, Sultan added, was "a prisoner on the plane." Sultan's comments became much more significant a few days later, when the N.S.A. intercepted a conversation in which Sultan told Bandar that the King had agreed to a complicated exchange of fighter aircraft with the United States that would bring five F-16s into the Royal Saudi Air Force. Fahd was evidently incapable of making such an agreement, or of preventing anyone from dropping his name in a money-making deal. In the intercepts, princes talk openly about bilking the state, and even argue about what is an acceptable percentage to take. Other calls indicate that Prince Bandar, while serving as ambassador, was involved in arms deals in London, Yemen, and the Soviet Union that generated millions of dollars in "commissions. " In a PBS "Frontline" interview broadcast on October 9th, Bandar, asked about the reports of corruption in the royal family, was almost upbeat in his response. The family had spent nearly four hundred billion dollars to develop Saudi Arabia, he said. "If you tell me that building this whole country . . . we misused or got corrupted with fifty billion, I'll tell you, 'Yes.'. . . So what? We did not invent corruption, nor did those dissidents, who are so genius, discover it." REFERENCE: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY King’s Ransom How vulnerable are the Saudi royals? by Seymour M. Hersh OCTOBER 22, 2001 Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security, “King’s Ransom,” The New Yorker, October 22, 2001, p. 35 http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/22/011022fa_FACT1

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 6

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 7

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 8

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 9

"QUOTE"

Excerpts from a book: Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror By Hassan Abbas published by An East Gate Book. M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York, London England. “The Khomeini revolution in Iran already bolstered the confidence of the Shias, and they were not about to take Sunni dictates in religious matters lying down. Hard-liners among Sunni, for their part, felt that such dictation was their right, and those on the extreme right of the Sunni spectrum simply cut the Gordian knot by taking a position that, correct or not, Pakistan had a Sunni majority and as such it should be declared a Sunni Muslim state in which Shia should be treated as a minority. Since achievement of this holy goal would likely to take some time, some of them decided that the interregnum ought not to be wasted. Thus in 1985 they formed Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba (ASS) – an organization piously dedicated to ridding the country of the nettlesome presence of the Shias by eliminating them physically. Later, when they realized what the organization’s acronym meant in English, they changed the name to Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).”

“The zealous emissaries of the Iranian Revolutionary Regime started financing their organization Tehreek-e-Nifza-e-Fiqah-e-Jafaria (TNFJ – Movement for the Implementation of Jafaria Religious Law) and providing scholarships for Pakistani student to study in Iranian religious seminaries. For the Zia regime though, the problematic issue was Shia activism leading to a strong reaction to his attempts to impose Hanafi Islam (a branch of Sunni sect). For this he winked to the hard-liners among the Sunni religious groups in order to establish a front to squeeze the Shias. It was in this context that Jhangvi was selected by the intelligence community to do the needful. It is also believed that the JUI recommendation played the decisive part in this choice. The adherents of the Deobandi School were worried about Shia activism for religious reasons anyhow. State patronage came as an additional incentive. Consequently, in a well-designed effort, Shia assertiveness was projected as their disloyalty to Pakistan and its Islamic Ideology.” “In a few months, Saudi funds started pouring in, making the project feasible. For Saudi Arabia, the Iranian revolution was quite scary, for its ideals conflicted with that of a Wahabi monarchy. More so, with an approximately 10% Shia population, Saudi Arabia was concerned about the expansion of Shia activism in any Muslim country. Hence, it was more than willing to curb such trends in Pakistan by making a financial investment to bolster its Wahabi Agenda. According to Vali Raza Nasr, a leading expert on the sectarian groups of Pakistan, the flow of these funds was primarily routed through the Pakistan Military and the ISI. It is not known whether American support for this scheme was readily available, but the Zia regime knew well that the United States would be glad to acquiesce, given the rising US – Iran hostility. However, some analyst believe that CIA funds were involved in the venture.”

"UNQUOTE"

The intercepts make clear, however, that Crown Prince Abdullah was insistent on stemming the corruption. In November of 1996, for example, he complained about the billions of dollars that were being diverted by royal family members from a huge state-financed project to renovate the mosque in Mecca. He urged the princes to get their off-budget expenses under control; such expenses are known as the hiding place for payoff money. (Despite its oil revenues, Saudi Arabia has been running a budget deficit for more than a decade, and now has a large national debt.) A few months later, according to the intercepts, Abdullah blocked a series of real-estate deals by one of the princes, enraging members of the royal family. Abdullah further alarmed the princes by issuing a decree declaring that his sons would not be permitted to go into partnerships with foreign companies working in the kingdom. Abdullah is viewed by Sultan and other opponents as a leader who could jeopardize the kingdom's most special foreign relationship— someone who is willing to penalize the United States, and its oil and gas companies, because of Washington's support for Israel. In an intercept dated July 13, 1997, Prince Sultan called Bandar in Washington, and informed him that he had told Abdullah "not to be so confrontational with the United States." The Fahd regime was a major financial backer of the Reagan Administration' s anti-Communist campaign in Latin America and of its successful proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Oil money bought the Saudis enormous political access and leverage in Washington. Working through Prince Bandar, they have contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to charities and educational programs here. American construction and oil companies do billions of dollars' worth of business every year with Saudi Arabia, which is the world's largest oil producer. At the end of last year, Halliburton, the Texas-based oil-supply business formerly headed by Vice-President Dick Cheney, was operating a number of subsidiaries in Saudi Arabia. In the Clinton era, the White House did business as usual with the Saudis, urging them to buy American goods, like Boeing aircraft. The kingdom was seen as an American advocate among the oil-producing nations of the Middle East. The C.I.A. was discouraged from conducting any risky intelligence operations inside the country and, according to one former official, did little recruiting among the Saudi population, which limited the United States government's knowledge of the growth of the opposition to the royal family. REFERENCE: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY King’s Ransom How vulnerable are the Saudi royals? by Seymour M. Hersh OCTOBER 22, 2001 Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security, “King’s Ransom,” The New Yorker, October 22, 2001, p. 35 http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/22/011022fa_FACT1

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 10

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 11

'A picture speaks a thousand words' Sons of Late. King Faisal [Great Great Great Maternal Grandson of Mutawwa Sheikh Mohammad Bin Abd Al Wahab] Turki Al Faisal and Saud Al Faisal with NEO CON Ex- US Vice President Dick" Cheney [Wahabis are one big fraud] - Prince Saud, Prince Turki,Vice President and Mrs. Cheney http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2006/news/page562.aspx Man is known by the company he keeps DEATH SQUADS: Seymour Hersh, Dick Cheney & Secret Assassination Wing http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2009/05/seymor-hersh-dick-cheney-secret.html 

- From left to right: Dick Cheney, Prince Bandar, Condoleezza Rice, and George W. Bush, on the Truman Balcony of the White House on September 13, 2001. [Source: White House] - Defense Secretary Dick Cheney takes a leading role in drawing up the plans for the US invasion of Iraq (see December 1990). He is appalled by what he calls the “lack of creativity” of the initial plans, drawn up by a number of senior generals. Cheney and Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell spend days poring over the plans, with Cheney pressuring both Powell and the generals to make wide-ranging changes. But the generals respect Cheney’s input. “He wasn’t a micromanager like McNamara,” one general later recalls, referring to former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who planned much of the US’s Vietnam strategies. “And he wasn’t arrogant like [former Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld. He wanted this one done right.” Overwhelming Force - Cheney joins Powell in advocating the “enhanced option,” adding 100,000 more troops to the initial invasion force to bring troop strength up to nearly half a million US forces slated to go into Iraq. Powell and Cheney have no intention of being undermanned by Iraq’s large ground forces. And Cheney wants to slough off the remnants of what many call the “Vietnam syndrome.” He wants a resounding victory. “The military is finished in this society if we screw this up,” he tells Saudi Arabia’s Prince Bandar (see August 5, 1990 and After). While Powell and Cheney see eye-to-eye on most invasion-related issues, they do disagree on one fundamental issue: the possible use of the Army’s tactical nuclear arsenal (see Mid-August, 1990). (Nuclear weapons will not be used in the Iraq invasion.) Limited Role of Congress? - Cheney sees no reason for Congress to have anything more than a peripheral role in the entire affair (see December 1990). Authors Lou Dubose and Jake Bernstein later write: “Despite the fact that going to war with Iraq would be a larger undertaking than the D-Day invasion of Normandy, Cheney argued that the president did not need the consent of Congress. He seemed more understanding of King Fahd’s polling of the royal family and calling Arab leaders (see August 5, 1990 and After) than he was of [President] Bush’s willingness to go to Congress for consent” (see January 9-13, 1991). [DUBOSE AND BERNSTEIN, 2006, PP. 101-102] REFERENCE: Late 1990: Defense Secretary Cheney Helps Plan Iraq Invasion http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=alate90invade#alate90invade Profile: Bandar bin Sultan a.k.a. "Bandar Bush", Prince Bandar http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=bandar_bin_sultan

In 1994, Mohammed al-Khilewi, the first secretary at the Saudi Mission to the United Nations, defected and sought political asylum in the United States. He brought with him, according to his New York lawyer, Michael J. Wildes, some fourteen thousand internal government documents depicting the Saudi royal family's corruption, human-rights abuses, and financial support for terrorists. He claimed to have evidence that the Saudis had given financial and technical support to Hamas, the extremist Islamic group whose target is Israel. There was a meeting at the lawyer's office with two F.B.I. agents and an Assistant United States Attorney. "We gave them a sampling of the documents and put them on the table," Wildes told me last week. "But the agents refused to accept them." He and his client heard nothing further from federal authorities. Al-Khilewi, who was granted asylum, is now living under cover. The Saudis were also shielded from Washington's foreign-policy bureaucracy. A government expert on Saudi affairs told me that Prince Bandar dealt exclusively with the men at the top, and never met with desk officers and the like. "Only a tiny handful of people inside the government are familiar with U.S.-Saudi relations," he explained. "And that is purposeful." In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the royal family has repeatedly insisted that Saudi Arabia has made no contributions to radical Islamic groups. When the Saudis were confronted by press reports that some of the substantial funds that the monarchy routinely gives to Islamic charities may actually have gone to Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks, they denied any knowledge of such transfers. The intercepts, however, have led many in the intelligence community to conclude otherwise. REFERENCE: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY King’s Ransom How vulnerable are the Saudi royals? by Seymour M. Hersh OCTOBER 22, 2001 Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security, “King’s Ransom,” The New Yorker, October 22, 2001, p. 35 http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/22/011022fa_FACT1

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 12

King Fahd presented Kalashnikov to another pervert Saddam Hussein [Fahd ordered Mutawwas to Issue Fatwa against the Same Saddam when Saddam fingered Wahabi Kuwait [Kuwait is even worst than Saudi Arabia] Enjoy the picture and after the pictutre read about the Debauch, Womanizer, Gambler Khadimul Haramian Sharifain.

http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/Third_Party_Photo/2006/12/29/1167409329_2813.jpg

Khadim ul Harmain Sharifain - Shah Fahad The Debauch - In reality, it was a test of the ebullient Fahd’s capacity to govern. The Crown Prince would have to live down his personal reputation as a reckless womanizer, drinker, and gambler. REFERENCE: King Fahd’s Saudi Arabia by Harvey Sicherman August 12, 2005http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050812.middleeast.sicherman.fahdsaudiarabia.html

Real Face of King Fahd: There were stories of all night sessions at seedy clubs in Beirut, of affairs with belly dancers, and of the wife of a Lebanese businessman paid $100,000 a year to make herself available. Then in 1969, Fahd was said to have lost $1,000,000 in a single dusk-to-dawn marathon of Scotch-fuelled gambling at the tables of a MonteCarlo nightclub. He was summoned back to Riyadh by his brother, the then King Faisal Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. REFERENCE: Life and legacy of King Fahd By Paul Wood BBC defence correspondent Last Updated: Monday, 1 August 2005, 10:14 GMT 11:14 UK http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4734505.stm

Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd: [The Mutawwa in Chief due to his fingering Streets of Pakistan are burning] Real Face: His visits with his retinue of 3,000 had earned the local tradesmen riches indeed. It is estimated that an extra €30,000 (£21,000) a day was spent just in Puerto Banus. As heir apparent, Fahd first visited Marbella in 1974 and stayed at the Incosol hotel and spa. He booked 100 rooms but some of the princesses didn’t like the decor so he ordered the dark carpets to be changed to white. As a reward, Fahd left the hotel a tip of $300,000 — enough for the entire staff to receive, in effect, an extra year’s salary. He told one Spanish journalist that he liked Marbella because “it was a land blessed by Allah”, referring to the Arab occupation of most of Spain from the 8th to the 13th century. In the early 1980s he started the construction of his Mar Mar Palace, a replica of the White House. Because of increasing ill health (he suffered a stroke 10 years ago), he last visited in August 2002, just after a £134m refurbishment of the palace. REFERENCE: Marbella mourns its own King Midas King Fahd’s epic spending enriched his favourite part of Spain, says Deirdre Fernand From The Sunday Times August 7, 2005 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article552402.ece

Vice-President George H. W. Bush returns from his trip to the Middle East, where he has passed along a message to Iraq to step up its air war against Iran (see July 23, 1986). The covert machinations nearly become public knowledge when US embassy officials in Saudi Arabia, learning of the Saudi transfer of US arms to Iraq earlier in the year (see February 1986), question the Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar. Bandar, fully aware of the arms transfer, tells the officials that the transfer was “accidental” and the amount of arms transferred was negligible. The State Department is also curious about the transfer, warns that the arms transfer violates the Arms Export Control Act, and says it must inform Congress of the transfer. Such a notification would endanger the entire process, and possibly short-circuit another arms deal in the works, a $3.5 billion transfer of five AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, of which Congress has already been informed. But after the White House notifies the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar (R-IN), and mollifies Lugar by telling him the arms sales to Iraq were “inadvertent,” “unauthorized,” and involved only a “small quantity of unsophisticated weapons,” Lugar agrees to keep silent about the matter. Another senator later approaches Lugar about rumors that Saudi Arabia is sending US arms to Iraq, and recalls that “Dick Lugar told me there was nothing to it, and so I took his word.” [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992] REFERENCE: August 5, 1986: Covert Arms Sales to Iraq Nearly Revealed http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=us_iraq_80s_134#us_iraq_80s_134 Profile: Bandar bin Sultan a.k.a. "Bandar Bush", Prince Bandar http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=bandar_bin_sultan

Shaking Hands: Iraqi President Saddam Hussein greets Donald Rumsfeld, then special envoy of President Ronald Reagan, in Baghdad on December 20, 1983. REFERENCE: US NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82 Edited by Joyce Battle February 25, 2003 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/ 

The Bush Administration has chosen not to confront the Saudi leadership over its financial support of terror organizations and its refusal to help in the investigation. "As far as the Saudi Arabians go, they've been nothing but coöperative," President Bush said at a news conference on September 24th. The following day, the Saudis agreed to formally cut off diplomatic relations with the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. Eight days later, at a news conference in Saudi Arabia with Prince Sultan, the defense minister, Donald Rumsfeld was asked if he had given the Saudis a list of the September 11th terrorist suspects for processing by their intelligence agencies. Rumsfeld, who is admired by many in the press for his bluntness, answered evasively: "I am, as I said, not involved with the Federal Bureau of Investigation that is conducting the investigation. . . . I have every reason to believe that that relationship between our two countries is as close, that any information I am sure has been made available to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." The Saudis gave Rumsfeld something in return—permission for U.S. forces to use a command-and- control center, built before the Gulf War, in the pending air war against the Taliban. Over the past few years, the Saudis have also allowed the United States to use forward bases on Saudi soil for special operations, as long as there was no public mention of the arrangements. While the intelligence- community members I spoke with praised the Air Force and the Navy for their performance in Afghanistan last week, which did much to boost morale in the military and among the American citizenry, they were crestfallen about an incident that occurred on the first night of the war—an incident that was emblematic, they believe, of the constraints placed by the government on the military's ability to wage war during the last decade. REFERENCE: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY King’s Ransom How vulnerable are the Saudi royals? by Seymour M. Hersh OCTOBER 22, 2001 Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security, “King’s Ransom,” The New Yorker, October 22, 2001, p. 35 http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/22/011022fa_FACT1

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 13

Really sometime "This Muslim Ummah" is so hypcortie that one wants to puke.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, accompanied by senior aide Paul Wolfowitz and US CENTCOM commander-in-chief General Norman Schwarzkopf, visits Saudi Arabia just four days after Iraq invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990). [SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 8/3/2000; DUBOSE AND BERNSTEIN, 2006, PP. 100] Cheney secures permission from King Fahd for US forces to use Saudi territory as a staging ground for an attack on Iraq. Cheney is polite, but forceful; the US will not accept any limits on the number of troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, and will not accept a fixed date of withdrawal (though they will withdraw if Fahd so requests). Cheney uses classified satellite intelligence to convince Fahd of Hussein’s belligerent intentions against not just Kuwait, but against Saudi Arabia as well. Fahd is convinced, saying that if there is a war between the US and Iraq, Saddam Hussein will “not get up again.” Fahd’s acceptance of Cheney’s proposal goes against the advice of Crown Prince Abdullah. [SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 8/3/2000; DUBOSE AND BERNSTEIN, 2006, PP. 100-101] With Prince Bandar bin Sultan translating, Cheney tells Abdullah, “After the danger is over, our forces will go home.” Abdullah says under his breath, “I would hope so.” Bandar does not translate this. [MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 9/2002; HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, 1/13/2003] On the same trip, Cheney also visits Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, who rejects Cheney’s request for US use of Egyptian military facilities. Mubarak tells Cheney that he opposes any foreign intervention against Iraq. [SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 8/3/2000] US forces will remain in Saudi Arabia for thirteen years (see April 30-August 26, 2003). REFERENCE: August 5, 1990 and After: Cheney Secures Permission for US Forces to Attack Iraq from Saudi Arabia http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a080590cheneysaudi#a080590cheneysaudi Profile: Bandar bin Sultan a.k.a. "Bandar Bush", Prince Bandar http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=bandar_bin_sultan 

That night, an unmanned Predator reconnaissance aircraft, under the control of the C.I.A., was surveilling the roads leading out of Kabul. The Predator, which costs forty million dollars and cruises at speeds as slow as eighty miles an hour, is equipped with imaging radar and an array of infrared and television cameras that are capable of beaming high-resolution images to ground stations around the world. The plane was equipped with two powerful Hellfire missiles, designed as antitank weapons. The Predator identified a group of cars and trucks fleeing the capital as a convoy carrying Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader. Under a previously worked-out agreement, one knowledgeable official said, the C.I.A. did not have the authority to "push the button." Nor did the nearby command-and- control suite of the Fifth Fleet, in Bahrain, where many of the war plans had been drawn up. Rather, the decision had to be made by the officers on duty at the headquarters of the United States Central Command, or CENTCOM, at MacDill Air Force Base, in Florida. The Predator tracked the convoy to a building where Omar, accompanied by a hundred or so guards and soldiers, took cover. The precise sequence of events could not be fully learned, but intelligence officials told me that there was an immediate request for a full-scale assault by fighter bombers. At that point, however, word came from General Tommy R. Franks, the CENTCOM commander, saying, as the officials put it, My JAG"—Judge Advocate General, a legal officer—"doesn' t like this, so we're not going to fire." Instead, the Predator was authorized to fire a missile in front of the building—"bounce it off the front door," one officer said, "and see who comes out, and take a picture." CENTCOM suggested that the Predator then continue to follow Omar. The Hellfire, however, could not target the area in front of the building—in military parlance, it could not "get a signature" on the dirt there—and it was then agreed that the missile would attack a group of cars parked in front, presumably those which had carried Omar and his retinue. The missile was fired, and it "obliterated the cars," an official said. "But no one came out." REFERENCE: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY King’s Ransom How vulnerable are the Saudi royals? by Seymour M. Hersh OCTOBER 22, 2001 Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security, “King’s Ransom,” The New Yorker, October 22, 2001, p. 35 http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/22/011022fa_FACT1

Oil Wars The Kingdom Part 14

It was learned later from an operative on the ground that Omar and his guards had indeed been in the convoy and had assumed at the time that the firing came from rocket-propelled grenades launched by nearby troops from the Northern Alliance. A group of soldiers left the building and looked for the enemy. They found nothing, and Omar and his convoy departed. A short time later, the building was targeted and destroyed by F-18s. Mullah Omar survived. Days afterward, top Administration officials were still seething about the incident. "If it was a fuckup, I could live with it," one senior official said. "But it's not a fuckup—it's an outrage.This isn't like you're six years old and your mother calls you to come in for lunch and you say, 'Time out.' If anyone thinks otherwise, go look at the World Trade Center or the Pentagon." A senior military officer viewed the failure to strike immediately as a symptom of "a cultural issue"—"a slow degradation of the system due to political correctness: 'We want you to kill the guy, but not the guy next to him.' No collateral damage." Others saw the cultural problem as one of bureaucratic, rather than political, correctness. Either way, the failure to attack has left Defense Secretary Rumsfeld "kicking a lot of glass and breaking doors," the officer said. "But in the end I don't know if it'll mean any changes." A Pentagon planner also noted that some of the camps the bombers were hitting were empty. In fact, he added, it became evident even before the bombing that troops of the Northern Alliance had moved into many of the unused Taliban camps. The Alliance soldiers came up with a novel way of alerting American planners to their new location, the officer said: "They walked around holding up white sheets so when the satellites came by they're saying, 'Hey, we're the good guys.' " The American military response has triggered alarm in the international oil community and among intelligence officials who have been briefed on a still secret C.I.A. study, put together in the mid-eighties, of the vulnerability of the Saudi fields to terrorist attack. The report was "so sensitive," a former C.I.A. officer told me, "that it was put on typed paper," and not into the agency's computer system, meaning that distribution was limited to a select few. According to someone who saw the report, it concluded that with only a small amount of explosives terrorists could take the oil fields off line for two years. The concerns, both in America and in Saudi Arabia, about the security of the fields have become more urgent than ever since September 11th. A former high-level intelligence official depicted the Saudi rulers as nervously "sitting on a keg of dynamite"—that is, the oil reserves. "They're petrified that somebody's going to light the fuse." "The United States is hostage to the stability of the Saudi system," a prominent Middle Eastern oil man, who did not wish to be cited by name, told me in a recent interview. "It's time to start facing the truth. The war was declared by bin Laden, but there are thousands of bin Ladens. They are setting the game—the agenda. It's a new form of war. This fabulous military machine you have is completely useless." The oil man, who has worked closely with the Saudi leadership for three decades, added, "People like me have been deceiving you. We talk about how you don't understand Islam, but it's a vanilla analysis. We try to please you, but we've been aggrieved for years." The Saudi regime "will explode in time," he said. "It has been playing a delicate game." As for the terrorists responsible for the September 11th attacks, he said, "Now they decide the timing. If they do a similar operation in Saudi Arabia, the price of oil will go up to one hundred dollars a barrel"—more than four times what it is today. REFERENCE: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY King’s Ransom How vulnerable are the Saudi royals? by Seymour M. Hersh OCTOBER 22, 2001 Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security, “King’s Ransom,” The New Yorker, October 22, 2001, p. 35 http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/22/011022fa_FACT1

In the nineteen-eighties, in an effort to relieve political pressure on the regime, the Saudi leadership relinquished some of its authority to the mutawwa'in and permitted them to have a greater role in day-to-day life. One U.S. government Saudi expert complained last week that religious leaders had been allowed to take control of the press and the educational system. "Today, two-thirds of the Saudi Ph.D.s are in Islamic studies," a former Presidential aide told me. There was little attempt over the years by American diplomats or the White House to moderate the increasingly harsh rhetoric about the U.S. "The United States was caught up in private agreements"—with the Saudi princes—"while this shit was spewing in the Saudi press," the former aide said. "That was a huge mistake." A senior American diplomat who served many years in Saudi Arabia recalled his foreboding upon attending a training exercise at the kingdom's most prestigious military academy, in Riyadh: "It was hot, and I watched the cadets doing drills. The officers were lounging inside a suradiq"—a large pavilion—"with cold drinks, calling out orders on loudspeakers. I thought to myself, How many of these young men would follow and die for these officers?" The diplomat said he came away from his most recent tour in Saudi Arabia convinced that "it wouldn't take too much for a group of twenty or thirty fundamentalist enlisted men to take charge. How would the kingdom deal with the shock of something ruthless, small, highly motivated, and of great velocity?" There is little that the United States can do now, the diplomat said. "The Saudis have been indulged for so many decades.They are so spoiled. They've always had it their way. There's hardly anything we could say that would impede the 'majestic instancy' of their progress. We're their janissaries. " He was referring to the captives who became élite troops of the Ottoman Empire. "The policy dilemma is this," a senior general told me. "How do we help the Saudis make a transition without throwing them over the side?" Referring to young fundamentalists who have been demonstrating in the Saudi streets, he said, "The kids are bigger than the Daddy." REFERENCE: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY King’s Ransom How vulnerable are the Saudi royals? by Seymour M. Hersh OCTOBER 22, 2001 Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security, “King’s Ransom,” The New Yorker, October 22, 2001, p. 35 http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/22/011022fa_FACT1