Through Vice President Mike Pence recently, the White House again warned Islamabad that it has been 'put on notice.' The report says the latest stand-off over the aforementioned Haqqani 'terrorist' might force Trump to follow through with his threats. The report observes that. until now, threats of sanctions against Pakistan have never truly been acted upon due to the support Pakistan has in the Pentagon. However, it says that may not be a factor anymore as members of Trump’s National Security Council, including National Security Adviser Lt Gen H.R. McMaster and senior director Lisa Curtis, do not have the same favourable view of Pakistan. The NYT recalls that Curtis, in particular, has been scathing in her criticism of Pakistan, going as far as suggesting in a February report she co-authored with disgraced former ambassador Hussain Haqqani that "If Pakistan did not take steps to show its commitment to America’s counterterrorism goals, Mr. Trump should strip it of its status as a major non-NATO ally." The same report, however, also mentioned the head of the Pentagon’s Central Command, Gen Joseph L. Votel, who, when quizzed about withholding Pakistan's aid, seemed to suggest that all is not lost and that a channel to work things out with Pakistan is still open. Reference
US considering withholding $255m in aid over Haqqani network operative: NYT December 30, 2017 https://www.dawn.com/news/1379767
Osama claims he has disgraced nukes: If US uses N-arms it will get same response by Hamid Mir (Dawn Nov 10, 2001) Dawn's "Exculsive" News
Dawn Editorial ---> The credibility of the media is at stake here. The controversy surrounding television anchor and columnist Hamid Mir refuses to go away, and for good reason. Many questions remain unanswered. A purported telephone conversation between him and an unknown militant has shocked the country and the journalistic community in particular. If the person on the line is indeed Mr Mir, an explanation is in order about his possible ties with militant organisations. He must also answer allegations that the information he ostensibly provided may have contributed to the killing of Khalid Khawaja, a former ISI official belonging to the air force who had been abducted by the Taliban. Mr Khawaja, believed by many to be a Taliban sympathiser, is repeatedly described as a CIA agent by the man who sounds uncannily like Hamid Mir. Mr Khawaja and his wife are also held responsible in part for the bloodbath at Islamabad's Lal Masjid. The person on the phone also spews venom of the vilest kind on the Ahmadi community. Slain Taliban leaders are referred to as martyrs. Mr Mir denies most of the conversation and has served legal notice on the paper that broke the story. He claims that he and the organisation that employs him are being victimised for their consistent criticism of the PPP government and President Zardari in particular. Hamid Mir, who is not short of detractors even within the media, also maintains that the audio 'recording' is the work of the Intelligence Bureau which took a voice sample and then produced an entire conversation with the help of a “special gadget.” Mr Mir has every right to proclaim his innocence but that alone will not suffice. In this digital age it is child's play for independent experts to confirm whether or not the voice on the tape is Mr Mir's. It is just as simple to distinguish a doctored recording from an unedited conversation. The credibility of the media is at stake here. What is needed is an investigation that is carried out with an open mind and whose outcome is accepted and acted upon by all parties. This is imperative if allegations of unethical conduct by the media and charges of dirty tricks by the government are to be laid to rest. Reference: Hamid Mir saga May 20, 2010 https://www.dawn.com/news/843904 Osama claims he has nukes: If US uses N-arms it will get same response by Hamid Mir November 10, 2001
https://www.dawn.com/news/5647
WASHINGTON, Nov 3: A senior US official responsible for counter-terrorism on Tuesday directly accused Pakistan of supporting training of militant groups in Afghanistan as well as providing "material support" to some of the Kashmiri militants. "There are numerous Kashmiri separatist groups and sectarian groups involved in terrorism which use Pakistan as a base...We have repeatedly asked Islamabad to end support of terrorist training in Afghanistan," Michael Sheehan, State Department's coordinator for counter-terrorism, told a Senate Foreign Relations sub-committee. The sub-committee hearing was called and presided over by Senator Sam Brownback and the list of experts who testified included a former CIA officer in Pakistan Milt Bearden, president of Stimson Centre Michael Krepon, John Hopkins University Central Asia Institute chairman Dr Fredrick Starr and a Pakistani- American businessman and columnist Mansoor Ijaz. Mr Sheehan recently visited India to coordinate US-Indian responses to terrorist threats but when asked whether he would also visit Pakistan soon, he said: "Hopefully." "Pakistan has frequently acknowledged what it calls moral and diplomatic support for militants in Kashmir who employ violence and terrorism against Indian interests. We have continuing reports of Pakistani material support for some of these militants," Mr Sheehan said. He named several Pakistan-based militant Islamic groups including Lashkar Taiba, Harkatul Jehad Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen, which, he said, "operate freely in Pakistan and support terrorist attacks in Kashmir." Asked by Indian and Pakistani journalists after his hearing whether he found any change in the policy after the overthrow of the Nawaz government, Mr Sheehan said: "We are still waiting for their responses and it is too early to judge whether there is any change." When a correspondent pointed out whether it was "business as usual" with the military government, he crisply said "no" but added: "We hope to work with them on all these issues." REFERENCE: US says Pakistan raining militants Shaheen Sehbai DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending : 06 November 1999 Issue : 05/45 https://asianstudies.github.io/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1999/06nov99.html#ussa
Half Truth on Husain Haqqani
Calling Davis a “diplomat” was, technically, accurate. He had been admitted into Pakistan on a diplomatic passport. But there was a dispute about whether his work in the Lahore Consulate, as opposed to the American Embassy in Islamabad, gave him full diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And after the shootings in Lahore, the Pakistanis were not exactly receptive to debating the finer points of international law. As they saw it, Davis was an American spy who had not been declared to the I.S.I. and whom C.I.A. officials still would not admit they controlled. General Pasha, the I.S.I. chief, spoke privately by phone and in person with Leon Panetta, then the director of the C.I.A., to get more information about the matter. He suspected that Davis was a C.I.A. employee and suggested to Panetta that the two spy agencies handle the matter quietly. Meeting with Panetta, he posed a direct question. Was Davis working for the C.I.A.? Pasha asked. No, he’s not one of ours, Panetta replied. Panetta went on to say that the matter was out of his hands, and that the issue was being handled inside State Department channels. Pasha was furious, and he decided to leave Davis’s fate in the hands of the judges in Lahore. The United States had just lost its chance, he told others, to quickly end the dispute. That the C.I.A. director would be overseeing a large clandestine network of American spies in Pakistan and then lie to the I.S.I. director about the extent of America’s secret war in the country showed just how much the relationship had unraveled since the days in 2002, when the I.S.I. teamed with the C.I.A. in Peshawar to hunt for Osama bin Laden in western Pakistan. Where had it gone so wrong? Reference: How a Single Spy Helped Turn Pakistan Against the United States
By MARK MAZZETTI APRIL 9, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/magazine/raymond-davis-pakistan.html
General Pervez Musharraf's War on Terror
President Pervez Musharraf was speaking at a ceremony to launch the test transmission of Dawn News television & i.e. after giving Karachi a bloodbath on 12 May 2007 ! Ah Disgraced Ambassador Husain Haqqani ---> KARACHI, May 25: President Pervez Musharraf on Friday described the media as the country’s first line of defence and assured of unhindered support for the freedom of expression, but at the same time warned against the growing trend of sensationalisation, and said that repeated projection of gory incidents and violence on television was brutalising society. He was speaking at a ceremony to launch the test transmission of DawnNews television. While praising the launching of the country’s first 24-hour English language news channel, President Musharraf described it as a unique event. But at the same time he did not hesitate in taking full credit for the mushrooming of private television channels, saying that whatever freedom there was in the country it was only because of him. “I alone had insisted that we must give them freedom so that the media could hold everyone accountable,” he said while recalling the early years in power when he had framed the media policy. Reference: ‘Media first line of defence’: DawnNews TV’s test transmission May 26, 2007 https://www.dawn.com/news/248849 - Pakistani Women get themselves Raped to get Foreign Visa, said General Pervez Musharraf --> Interview with Pakistan president Musharraf
September 23, 2005 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/audio/2005/09/23/AU2005092301253.html - This is nine minutes of a 50-minute interview with the Washington Post, Pakistan president Gen. Pervez Musharraf said that claiming rape has become a "moneymaking concern" in Pakistan. Musharraf later denied saying this to the Post. The remark, in regards to the case of Mukhtar Mai, an illiterate woman who spoke publicly about having been gang-raped on the orders of a village council in 2002, was quoted in the 12th paragraph of an article on Sept. 12. --- Riots disrupts Karachi calm: 34 killed, 134 injured . rivals trade allegation . 13 May 2007 https://www.dawn.com/news/246766 The recent disclosures of Brig (retd) Imtiaz seem to be at the behest of MQM or some one else, said former corps commander Quetta Lt Gen (retd) Tariq Pervez while participating in the Private TV Channel programme. He quoted the then chief of the staff Gen Iqbal that Musharraf used to visit ‘90’ (MQM headquarters) in the staff car when he was a brigadier. Tariq Pervez said the instant appearance of Brig Imtiaz and his disclosures obviously force every one to doubt his sincerity. He said the MQM is the major beneficiary in this regard. Tracing the background of Brig Imtiaz in the intelligence department, he said every one under him used to be afraid of him as he had the tendency not only to tease people on different excuses but at times had spoiled their careers. Reference: Musharraf had already made up mind to remove Nawaz: Gen Tariq 01 September, 2009 (The News) & Pak Tribune http://paktribune.com/news/Musharraf-had-already-made-up-mind-to-remove-Nawaz-Gen-Tariq-218739.html
Meet the Graceful Diplomat Munir Akram (Now a Columnist in Daily Dawn)
On the morning of December 10, Akram's girlfriend, Marijana Mihic (pronounced Mariana), called the emergency 911 number at 1.36 am, asking for help. She told the police dispatcher that a man, whom she identified as her husband, had smashed her head into a wall. She said that her arm also was hurting and that he was a repeat offender. The dispatcher noted, "female caller states husband has diplomatic immunity". When the NY police arrived, guns on the ready and red light flashing, at the posh address in the upper reaches of Manhattan, Mihic changed her story a bit and said that Akram, 22 years her senior, was her "boyfriend". She had tried to leave after a heated argument but he grabbed her and she fell. Police officers noticed a bruise on her head but she declined a visit to the hospital. Akram reluctantly identified himself to the police as Pakistan's UN ambassador. Reference: Sex, Rhetoric And Diplomatic ImpunityIslamabad is hard pressed to withdraw its 'diplo-basher'. New Delhi is only too relieved. by SEEMA SIROHI and AMIR MIR (27 January 2003) https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/sex-rhetoric-and-diplomatic-impunity/218720 Graceful Diplomat Munir Akram's Archive in Graceful Daily Dawn https://www.dawn.com/authors/368/munir-akram
In Afghanistan last November, the Northern Alliance, supported by American Special Forces troops and emboldened by the highly accurate American bombing, forced thousands of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to retreat inside the northern hill town of Kunduz. Trapped with them were Pakistani Army officers, intelligence advisers, and volunteers who were fighting alongside the Taliban. (Pakistan had been the Taliban’s staunchest military and economic supporter in its long-running war against the Northern Alliance.) Many of the fighters had fled earlier defeats at Mazar-i-Sharif, to the west; Taloqan, to the east; and Pul-i-Khumri, to the south. The road to Kabul, a potential point of retreat, was blocked and was targeted by American bombers. Kunduz offered safety from the bombs and a chance to negotiate painless surrender terms, as Afghan tribes often do. Surrender negotiations began immediately, but the Bush Administration heatedly—and successfully—opposed them. On November 25th, the Northern Alliance took Kunduz, capturing some four thousand of the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. The next day, President Bush said, “We’re smoking them out. They’re running, and now we’re going to bring them to justice.” Even before the siege ended, however, a puzzling series of reports appeared in the Times and in other publications, quoting Northern Alliance officials who claimed that Pakistani airplanes had flown into Kunduz to evacuate the Pakistanis there. American and Pakistani officials refused to confirm the reports. On November 16th, when journalists asked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld about the reports of rescue aircraft, he was dismissive. “Well, if we see them, we shoot them down,” he said. Five days later, Rumsfeld declared, “Any idea that those people should be let loose on any basis at all to leave that country and to go bring terror to other countries and destabilize other countries is unacceptable.” At a Pentagon news conference on Monday, November 26th, the day after Kunduz fell, General Richard B. Myers, of the Air Force, who is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked about the reports. The General did not directly answer the question but stated, “The runway there is not usable. I mean, there are segments of it that are usable. They’re too short for your standard transport aircraft. So we’re not sure where the reports are coming from.” Pakistani officials also debunked the rescue reports, and continued to insist, as they had throughout the Afghanistan war, that no Pakistani military personnel were in the country. Anwar Mehmood, the government spokesman, told newsmen at the time that reports of a Pakistani airlift were “total rubbish. Hogwash.” In interviews, however, American intelligence officials and high-ranking military officers said that Pakistanis were indeed flown to safety, in a series of nighttime airlifts that were approved by the Bush Administration. The Americans also said that what was supposed to be a limited evacuation apparently slipped out of control, and, as an unintended consequence, an unknown number of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters managed to join in the exodus. “Dirt got through the screen,” a senior intelligence official told me. Last week, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did not respond to a request for comment. Reference: The Getaway Questions surround a secret Pakistani airlift. By Seymour M. Hersh January 28, 2002 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/01/28/the-getaway-2
Seymour Hersh on Bin Laden and Al 'Qaeda's escape from Afghanistan
Seymour Hersh on Bin Laden and Al 'Qaeda's escape from Afghanistan
Seymour Hersh on JSOC - Americas Assassination Division
Pakistan’s leader, General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a 1999 coup, had risked his standing with the religious fundamentalists—and perhaps his life—by endorsing the American attack on Afghanistan and the American support of the Northern Alliance. At the time of Kunduz, his decision looked like an especially dangerous one. The initial American aim in Afghanistan had been not to eliminate the Taliban’s presence there entirely but to undermine the regime and Al Qaeda while leaving intact so-called moderate Taliban elements that would play a role in a new postwar government. This would insure that Pakistan would not end up with a regime on its border dominated by the Northern Alliance. By mid-November, it was clear that the Northern Alliance would quickly sweep through Afghanistan. There were fears that once the Northern Alliance took Kunduz, there would be wholesale killings of the defeated fighters, especially the foreigners. Musharraf won American support for the airlift by warning that the humiliation of losing hundreds—and perhaps thousands—of Pakistani Army men and intelligence operatives would jeopardize his political survival. “Clearly, there is a great willingness to help Musharraf,” an American intelligence official told me. A C.I.A. analyst said that it was his understanding that the decision to permit the airlift was made by the White House and was indeed driven by a desire to protect the Pakistani leader. The airlift “made sense at the time,” the C.I.A. analyst said. “Many of the people they spirited away were the Taliban leadership”—who Pakistan hoped could play a role in a postwar Afghan government. According to this person, “Musharraf wanted to have these people to put another card on the table” in future political negotiations. “We were supposed to have access to them,” he said, but “it didn’t happen,” and the rescued Taliban remain unavailable to American intelligence. According to a former high-level American defense official, the airlift was approved because of representations by the Pakistanis that “there were guys— intelligence agents and underground guys—who needed to get out.” Reference: The Getaway Questions surround a secret Pakistani airlift.
By Seymour M. Hersh January 28, 2002 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/01/28/the-getaway-2
Foreign Policy & National Security Policy of General Pervez Musharraf Regime :
Waziristan truce went wrong: Gen Ehsan http://www.dawn.com/news/274074 November 03, 2007 Did Saudis, Libyans pay dollars to JUI-F? Pasha hinted so https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/613798-did-saudis,-libyans-pay-dollars-to-jui-f?-pasha-hinted-so May 14, 2011 - 2009: Was Qaddafi funding Sipahe Sahaba? http://www.dawn.com/news/631599 May 25, 2011 (Ludhiyanvi name and TTP in Faisalabad) Local Taliban open office in Miranshah https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/645796-local-taliban-open-office-in-miranshah September 28, 2006 - Govt inks peace deal with Swat militants https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/657207-govt-inks-peace-deal-with-swat-militants May 22, 2008 - NWA Taliban threaten to scrap peace accord https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/139717-nwa-taliban-threaten-to-scrap-peace-accord October 14, 2008 - Musharraf told a lie on drone attacks https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/540189-musharraf-told-a-lie-on-drone-attacks December 2, 2014 - Written and unwritten peace deals with Taliban since 2004 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/483603-written-and-unwritten-peace-deals-with-taliban-since-2004 February 7, 2014 North Waziristan militants unilaterally scrap peace deal https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/651442-north-waziristan-militants-unilaterally-scrap-peace-deal July 16, 2007 -- Hectic efforts to save Waziristan deal https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/651458-hectic-efforts-to-save-waziristan-deal July 17, 2007 - Militants were paid to repay Al Qaeda debt http://www.dawn.com/news/401686 February 09, 2005 - How an ex-Army commando became a terrorist https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/666946-how-an-ex-army-commando-became-a-terrorist September 20, 2009 by Hamid Mir https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/666946-how-an-ex-army-commando-became-a-terrorist Army official calls Baitullah Mehsud, Fazlullah ‘patriots’ https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/661042-army-official-calls-baitullah-mehsud,-fazlullah-‘patriots’ December 1, 2008 by Hamid Mir -- Mehsud described as soldier of peace http://www.dawn.com/news/151243 August 07, 2005 Is this a joke? https://tribune.com.pk/story/336328/is-this-a-joke/ By Ejaz Haider Published: February 14, 2012 If a Shia, you are on your own https://tribune.com.pk/story/512887/if-a-shia-you-are-on-your-own/ By Ejaz Haider Published: February 26, 2013 - Peace deal with militant leader being finalized http://www.dawn.com/news/381583 January 31, 2005 Peace deal ends http://www.dawn.com/news/841665 July 01, 2009 --- 2008: ANP skeptical about South Waziristan deal https://www.dawn.com/news/630917 May 22, 2011 Why the Waziristan deal is a hard sell http://www.dawn.com/news/214890 October 14, 2006 - Baitullah calls off S. Waziristan deal: Govt claims accord is intact http://www.dawn.com/news/261972 August 19, 2007 -- Talking peace again http://www.dawn.com/news/1084592 by Babar Sattar February 03, 2014 -- Convoy ambush toll rises to 27: Taliban scrap N. Waziristan peace deal http://www.dawn.com/news/855375 June 30, 2009 --
Taliban in North Waziristan threaten to end peace deal http://www.dawn.com/news/614614 March 20, 2011 -- Waziristan peace deal scrapped by militants http://www.dawn.com/news/256634 July 16, 2007 -- N. Waziristan Taliban revoke peace accord; tell locals to leave - http://www.dawn.com/news/1109540 by Zahir Shah Sherazi Updated May 30, 2014 -- US endorses Waziristan peace deal http://www.dawn.com/news/210632 by Anwar Iqbal September 16, 2006
Waziristan accord signed http://www.dawn.com/news/209220 by Pazeer Gul September 06, 2006
From Jinnah to General Ayub Khan
Immediately after independence in 1947, Pakistan’s apprehension about the designs of a hostile large neighbour, India prompted it to try to develop friendly defence relations with large powers (US and later China). Very early in the game, politicians lost the control of defence related matters due to their lack of experience and constant squabbles. This allowed the British trained bureaucrats and military officers to take control of the affairs especially those related to defence. Defence and foreign policy are closely linked to each other, therefore, invariably a particular decision about defence has both foreign policy and domestic impact thus complicating the picture. A glimpse of thought process of the decision makers will help to understand why a particular decision was taken whenever they got the chance of acting on their thoughts. Governor General Ghulam Muhammad during his conversation with Vice President Nixon, pleading for military aid stated that, “... were the US not grant aid now, especially in view of all publicity, it would like taking a poor girl for a walk and then walking out on her, leaving her only with bad name”.1 Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan was more candid when in 1954, during a meeting with Governor Stassen asking for more aid stated, “It was Pakistan’s belief that the “beggar’s bowl” should never be concealed”.2 Ayub Khan frustrated with slow pace of negotiations with US during his visit to Washington went to Henry Byroad’s office and told him, ‘I didn’t come here to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you want us. But let’s make a decision’.3 The thinking pattern of key decision makers of Pakistan about security is quite revealing and shows total lack of indepth analysis and long term strategic vision. It also illustrates lack of understanding of the decision making process of the United States. One retired Lieutenant General is of the view that Ayub was shrewd, knew the US machinations but was trying to outsmart them to get maximum military aid.4 More close analysis of Ayub’s own writings and his policies of over a decade does not support this argument. In the first few years of independence of Pakistan, US was aware of the importance of Pakistan in the region but did not have any concrete plans. The first US ambassador, Paul Alling who arrived in 1947 but spent only five months and died subsequently of an illness. It was not until 1950 when US sent the replacement of the first ambassador.13 On the part of Pakistan, despite repeated polite rebuffs of US, it continued the quest for military aid. In 1950-53, a flurry of Pakistani officials landed in US asking for assistance. Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, C-in-C Ayub Khan, Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah, Finance Minister Ghulam Muhammad, Defence Secretary Sikander Mirza and special envoy Mir Laiq Ali made US visits with main theme of getting aid. Each one of them believing that he is the most capable one who could do the job of getting American assistance better than anybody else. There was neither an organized, coordinated and institutional effort nor any attempt to study US decision-making process to achieve the goal. Americans were smart enough to very quickly grasp the mediocre Pakistani leadership. They would use this to their maximum benefit in future negotiations. Events in Iran relating to Prime Minister Mussadiq in 1951 and successful detonation of Hydrogen Bomb by Soviet Union in 1953 resulted in National Security Council’s document ‘Basic National Security Policy’ which was approved by President Eisenhower. References: ale of a love affair that never was:
United States-Pakistan Defence Relations Columnist Hamid Hussain analyses an ON and OFF affair. http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/june/loveaffair.htmFOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1947, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH; EUROPE, VOLUME III 845.00/7–1147: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v03/d105
General Yahya Khan, Bhutto, Bangladesh and USA
(Sealed off as ‘Top Secret’ by the State Department and CIA, now after three decades, 46 declassified documents – some ‘sanitized’ – and a audio clip of Nixon-Kissinger offer a compelling peek at President Nixon and his security advisor Henry Kissinger giving a sly wink to the Pakistan army to kill, rape and terrorize innocent East Pakistanis during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis) Inside the Oval Office, August 2, 1971, an exasperated President Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger curse India for wanting to pick up a fight with Pakistan. Actually, the timing is skewed for Nixon who has clandestinely taken a shine to Chou En-Lai facilitated by Pakistan President Gen.Yahya Khan. But the “god-damn Indians” – as Nixon and Kissinger call them – are giving the Americans a run for their money by refusing to sit and watch silently the two siblings – East and West Pakistan – slug it out with each other. “We have already given 100 million dollars to India for the refugees (pouring in from E. Pakistan),” Kissinger informs Nixon who is convinced the US is “making a terrible mistake” by heaping dollars on New Delhi. “India is economically in good shape, but no one knows how the god-damn Indians are using this money. They are not letting any foreigners enter the refugee areas. Any foreigners, and their record is outrageous!” keens Kissinger. References: When America looked the other way By Anjum Niaz https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/when-america-looked-the-other-way-by-anjum-niaz/ - World Chaos and World Order: Conversations With Henry Kissinger The former secretary of state reflects on war, peace, and the biggest tests facing the next president. by JEFFREY GOLDBERG NOV 10, 2016 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/kissinger-order-and-chaos/506876/ The Flaw in Kissinger's Grand Strategy The U.S. wields enormous power, but its success in using it depends on the actions of other nations. The Bangladesh crisis is a case in point. HUSAIN HAQQANI NOV 14, 2016 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/the-flaw-in-kissingers-grand-strategy/507680/ The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 - National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79 Edited by Sajit Gandhi
December 16, 2002 https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/
Textbooks containing Jihadi literature/rhetoric were printed in University of Nebraska during Afghan War. (Zbigniew Brzezinski , Former Adviser of Jimmy Carter & Obama with Afghans)
Asked whether he in any way regretted these actions, Brzezinski replied:
Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea. It drew the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? On the day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, saying, in essence: 'We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.'
Nouvel Observateur:"And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists?"
Brzezinski:"What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?" Reference: Are We to Blame for Afghanistan? News Abroad by Chalmers Johnson 11-21-04 http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/8438
US President Jimmy Carter & General Ziaul Haq's Afghan Jihad
Even though the demise of the Soviet Union owes more to Mikhail Gorbachev than to Afghanistan's partisans, Brzezinski certainly helped produce"agitated Muslims," and the consequences have been obvious ever since. Carter, Brzezinski and their successors in the Reagan and first Bush administrations, including Gates, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, and Colin Powell, all bear some responsibility for the 1.8 million Afghan casualties, 2.6 million refugees, and 10 million unexploded land-mines that followed from their decisions. They must also share the blame for the blowback that struck New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. After all, al-Qaida was an organization they helped create and arm. Brzezinski wrote to Carter:"This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy." History will record whether Brzezinski made an intelligent decision in giving a green light to Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons in return for assisting the anti-Soviet insurgency. Pakistan's motives in Afghanistan were very different from those of the U.S. Zia was a devout Muslim and a passionate supporter of Islamist groups in his own country, in Afghanistan, and throughout the world. But he was not a fanatic and had some quite practical reasons for supporting Islamic radicals in Afghanistan. He probably would not have been included in the U.S. Embassy's annual"beard census" of Pakistani military officers, which recorded the number of officer graduates and serving generals who kept their beards in accordance with Islamic traditions as an unobtrusive measure of increasing or declining religious radicalism -- Zia had only a moustache. Reference: Are We to Blame for Afghanistan? News Abroad by Chalmers Johnson 11-21-04 http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/8438
US President Ronald Reagan & General Ziaul Haq's Afghan Jihad (1)
A new book, “Charlie Wilson’s War” by George Crile on the life and good times of a former US congressman is a frank pastiche of a lawmaker who helped Pakistan’s military ruler Gen. Ziaul Haq in procuring American money and weapons for the “holy war” against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. From humble beginnings in Lufkin, Texas, Congressman Charlie Wilson became an Israeli lobbyist and beneficiary of largesse bestowed upon him by the Jewish lobby in the United States and went on to become Ziaul Haq’s personal friend and confidant as they plotted to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan at times using Israeli supplied arms. Charlie Wilson still works as a lobbyist for Pakistan on Capitol Hill and he was spotted at every reception that former Pakistani ambassador Maleeha Lodhi hosted. Wilson, an avowed anti-Communist and anti-Indian, sat on the powerful US House Appropriations Committee. He managed to procure millions of dollars for America’s largest covert operation ever. He has been investigated several times by the FBI for using covert money to support his lifestyle. Reference: Charlie Wilson’s war by Masood Haider DAWN - Features; July 23, 2003 https://www.dawn.com/news/1064817
This is a triangular story of platonic, sensual and long distance love between a woman and two men as different as day and night. One man being a boozer, a womaniser, the other a paragon of piety (so he led us to believe). And in the middle was a woman — attractive and steamy. At first, there was a visible tilt in the direction of the Army House in Rawalpindi, which the woman frequented. How the occupant reciprocated is a classified state secret buried with his bones at Faisal Mosque. Curse Zia as much as you want, but unlike Musharraf, he at least left Pakistan with a legacy. The legacy was Charlie Wilson. “He won the war,” Zia said of the Texas congressman who single-handedly convinced US Congress to funnel truckloads of money to finance the CIA-sponsored war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. And how did Zia get around Wilson? The route to Wilson's heart, Zia knew, was through a woman. That woman was Joanne Herring. Our dictator general appointed the attractive socialite Pakistan's honorary consul in Texas. He flirted with her; he honoured and excited her. She fell hook, line and sinker for the president. While Wilson fell hook, line and sinker for Herring. He became a friend of Zias because Joanne so told him to. Reference: An affair to remember by
Anjum Niaz February 21, 2010 https://www.dawn.com/news/833627
Margaret Thatcher with General Ziaul Haq, General Fazle Haq and Afghan Jihad
Within three weeks of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the cabinet secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, was negotiating how to channel covert military aid towards the "Islamic resistance" that was fighting the Russians. Details of how swiftly clandestine weapons routes were opened up to aid the mujahideen emerge from secret cabinet documents released to the National Archives today under the 30-year rule. The files show how extensive military and diplomatic efforts – co-ordinated with western allies – were made to defeat the USSR and the lengths to which Thatcher went to discourage participation in the 1980 Olympics. Shortly after KGB special forces seized control of Kabul on 27 December 1979, the foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, expressed the view: "The Russians are resorting to the big lie by saying that they intervened at the invitation of Afghan authorities … we should take every opportunity to make them uncomfortable and bring home to them the consequences of their actions." Reference: UK discussed plans to help mujahideen weeks after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Cabinet documents released after 30 years also reveal Thatcher's support for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics Thu 30 Dec ‘10 by Owen Bowcott https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/dec/30/uk-mujahideen-afghanistan-soviet-invasion
The corridors of power have been abuzz with speculation since reports emerged that Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani had a secret meeting with Punjab Chief Minister Mian Shahbaz Sharif last Wednesday midnight. Sources privy to the development told Dawn here on Friday that the meeting took place on the night between Sept 30 and Oct 1 when Mr Sharif visited Rawalpindi and went to meet the army chief without security and protocol. The sources said that only two vehicles were present at the airport and no prominent official was present to receive the chief minister when he arrived late on Wednesday night. The sources said Mr Sharif reached the Punjab House in Rawalpindi straight from the airport, had a shower and changed. In the meantime, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan came to the Punjab House in his own vehicle and then drove away with Mian Shahbaz Sharif. The sources said that initially no one was aware of the destination of the vehicle carrying the two leaders, but later it became known that they had gone to the Army House to see Gen Kayani.Before the general election last year, General Kayani had barred military officers from meeting politicians, but he himself crossed the red line when he met Chaudhry Aitzaz Ahsan in July. There was no word about the agenda of the meeting between Gen Kayani and Shahbaz Sharif. REFERENCES: Shahbaz and Nisar secretly meet Kayani October 03, 2009 https://www.dawn.com/news/848903 WikiLeaks: Chaudhry Nisar did not want to be seen at the US embassy in Islamabad By Saba Imtiaz Published: September 11, 2011 https://tribune.com.pk/story/249802/wikileaks-chaudhry-nisar-did-not-want-to-be-seen-at-the-us-embassy-in-islamabad/ Chaudhry Nisar admits his wife, children are US citizens September 13, 2011 https://www.dawn.com/news/658727
Moral of the Blog
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""The Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, speaking in New Delhi on February 12, 1980 had warned that, "If Pakistan continues to serve as a puppet of imperialism in the future; it will jeopardize its existence and its integrity as an independent state." The United States, too, could in certain circumstances accept the dismemberment of Pakistan as it did in 1971. Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State during President Nixon's administration, had said: "In my conversation with Ambassador Jha I reiterated my constant theme that we considered Indian and American long term interests as congruent .... I emphasized that the United States did not insist that East Bengal remain part of Pakistan. On the contrary, we accepted autonomy as inevitable and independence as possible. A war was senseless; Bangladesh would come into being by the spring of 1972 if present procedures were given a chance. We differed over method, not aim."On October 7, I told WSAG meeting that if India would accept an evolutionary process, it would achieve most of its objectives with our assistance. If they would co-operate with us we could work out 90 per cent of their problems, like releasing Mujib or attaining some degree of autonomy for Bangladesh, and these steps would lead eventually to their getting it all." With the return of a Republican administration and keeping United States global interests in mind, it would be prudent to assume that should the US interests in the future be better served by sacrificing Pakistan or a part of it, Henry Kissinger's successors would not hesitate to do so. Pakistan must, therefore, strive to keep itself together by weakening those forces that are pulling it apart and this cannot be done by force of arms. The use of strong arm methods has shown that the situation did not, to say the least, improve." Reference: Middle East Journal Vol. 36, No. 4, Autumn, 1982 http://www.jstor.org/pss/4326473 Middle East Journal http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=middeastj
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