Return of General Pervez Musharraf and History.

2013 : DUBAI: Former President General (retired) Pervez Musharraf announced he will return to Pakistan within a week of the interim government being formed, adding that he will land in either Karachi or Islamabad. While addressing a press conference in Dubai, the former president said the All Pakistan Muslim League will participate in the upcoming general elections. "Under the advice of all my party men, we have decided that as soon as the interim government is in place, which we hope will be on March 16, within a week of that I will go back to Pakistan," Addressing the issue of threats to his life and the cases against him in Pakistan, Musharraf said his life was in God’s hands, adding that if he was being tried for promoting development and prosperity in Pakistan, he was ready to face the courts. Musharraf termed his return to Pakistan as very important for Pakistani politics and said that a viable and honest third force was critically required, adding that he was not returning to settle any scores. Speaking about the Hazara’s of Quetta, Musharraf said they were patriotic, patient and educated Pakistani’s. Musharraf further added that by remaining divided and fighting amongst each other religious extremism was destroying Pakistan from within. The former president said he was hopeful that the people of Pakistan had realized who is right and who is wrong as the country will be facing more pressures after the 2014 NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. REFERENCE: Musharraf announces return to Pakistan March 01, 2013 - Updated 1755 PKT http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-90315-Musharraf-announces-return-to-Pakistan-

2007: Broadcast Media Muzzled by Musharraf’s Decree (New York) - The Dubai government should allow Geo Television and ARY Digital, which broadcast from Dubai and function as Pakistan’s most independent and respected television stations, to resume operations immediately, Human Rights Watch said today. On November 17, the Dubai authorities summarily gave Geo Television and ARY Digital two hours to halt broadcasting after persistent pressure from the Pakistani government. Both channels, which are registered in Dubai, have been off the air in Pakistan since November 3, when cable operators were instructed to end transmissions. But the channels had continued to broadcast on satellite and the internet until they were shut down on Saturday by the Dubai government. Human Rights Watch welcomed the show of support for media freedom by the US ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, when she visited the Geo offices in Karachi on Monday. The organization urged the Bush administration to also press the authorities in Dubai to reverse their decision to close Geo and ARY Digital. “Musharraf isn’t content with muzzling critical media coverage of his repression within Pakistan – now he is pressuring Dubai to abet his crackdown on independent reporting,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The US should publicly call on its close ally in Dubai to lift the bans. Dubai’s government should refuse to be an accomplice to Musharraf’s assault on free speech.” After Pakistan’s leader, General Pervez Musharraf, announced a state of emergency on November 3 and issued a draconian censorship decree on the media, private Pakistani television networks were instructed to sign a new 14-page code of conduct by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). While many channels have signed and agreed to discontinue specific programming deemed objectionable by the government, Geo TV and ARY Digital have refused to accept the new rules. Human Rights Watch urged the Dubai authorities to recognize the damage that the ban is causing to the emirate’s reputation as a neutral commercial and media center in the region. The authorities should unconditionally and immediately reverse the decision to ban transmission by Geo and ARY Digital, Human Rights Watch said. “By making itself a party to Musharraf’s repression of the Pakistani media, Dubai is damaging its own international reputation,” said Adams. “This move sets an appalling precedent and raises serious questions about Dubai’s viability as a regional hub for the international media.” Musharraf introduced curbs on the media through two decrees barring the media from printing or broadcasting “anything which defames or brings into ridicule the head of state, or members of the armed forces, or executive, legislative or judicial organ of the state.” The print and electronic media have also been restrained from publishing any material that is likely to “jeopardize or be prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan or the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or any material that is likely to incite violence or hatred or create inter-faith disorder or be prejudicial to maintenance of law and order.” Television discussions on anything which is deemed to be “false or baseless” by the regulatory authorities have also been banned. Journalists have been repeatedly threatened and prevented from covering events following suspension of the constitution, had their equipment confiscated, and been warned that if they record footage of arrests or police raids, they themselves will face arrest and incarceration. On November 15, Mir Shakilur Rehman, the owner of Geo TV, emailed his senior staff informing them that he had received a “threatening telephone call last night” from the Pakistani military’s feared Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), and adding that he had been “taken” to an ISI safe house in Islamabad where he was given a warning by an ISI operative who told him, “I would like to advise you to please follow the laws especially the newly promulgated law.” REFERENCE: Pakistan: Dubai Should End Shutdown of Pakistani Channels UAE Should Resist Pakistani Pressure; US Should Tell Ally It Opposes Closures NOVEMBER 21, 2007 http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/11/19/pakistan-dubai-should-end-shutdown-pakistani-channels Pakistan: Broadcast Media Muzzled by Musharraf’s Decree Withdraw Presidential Decree and End Threats to Journalists JUNE 7, 2007 http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/06/05/pakistan-broadcast-media-muzzled-musharraf-s-decree Letter to President Musharraf About Attacks on Journalists in Pakistan APRIL 28, 2007 http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/26/letter-president-musharraf-about-attacks-journalists-pakistan Pakistan: Musharraf’s ‘Restoration of Constitution’ a Sham Amendments Give Immunity to Army and President DECEMBER 16, 2007  http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/12/14/pakistan-musharraf-s-restoration-constitution-sham

General Hamid Gul supported Pervez Musharraf on 12 Oct 1999 - BBC



General Hamid Gul supported Pervez Musharraf on... by SalimJanMazari

1999  BBC: Wednesday, October 13, 1999 General Hamid Gul: "The army acted in the national interest": - Hamid Gul, a retired general, accuses Mr Sharif of having presided over an administration which had failed to deliver the goods. "Sharif turned out to be a great destroyer of national institutions," he told the BBC. "Look at what he did to the judiciary. "He stripped them of power, put a set of judges against the chief justice, did the same to the press. "He gagged the parliament and finally he wanted to do the same to the army." REFERENCE: World: South Asia Pakistan's coup: Why the army acted Wednesday, October 13, 1999 Published at 23:20 GMT 00:20 UK http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/473297.stm

General Pervez Musharraf on Press Freedom (BBC 2008)



General Pervez Musharraf on Press Freedom (BBC... by SalimJanMazari

2008 AS the army chief and the country`s self-styled chief executive, General Pervez Musharraf may have lacked legitimacy, but he rarely lacked charm and aplomb when appearing before the media. Over the years, particularly as the military ruler, he was seen as handling the toughest of questions with great panache, and on many occasions, with a smile. It was perhaps because of this that here and more so abroad the media often seemed to forget that he was a military ruler. But of late his personality seems to have undergone a transformation. He has taken to snapping at journalists at news conferences and is irritable and ready to explode at the slightest perceived provocation. But, as if this were not enough, the way he asked a gathering of his supporters to teach a lesson (do, teen tika do) to this newspaper`s London correspondent because he had asked him a tough question was a bit too much. The president, it appears, has journeyed from the sublime to the ridiculous. One runs into a dead-end in explaining how one question can trigger such anger, and can only speculate about the reasons. The first and foremost appears to be the widening gulf between how the president assesses his performance in office and how others see it, particularly in terms of his handling of militancy in the country. Although his advisers may tell him he may have weathered the storm over the judiciary, he may be unsure what the next parliament`s view on the issue will be. A greater issue could be how pressure is increasing on him to hold free and fair elections, even from allies who have stood solidly behind him through thick and thin over the past several years. For one who described his uniform as his second skin, retiring as the all-powerful army chief may have left him feeling vulnerable. But, regardless of the cause, one would advise the president to keep his cool, his composure. For such outbursts do not inspire confidence in his ability to steer the country out of the troubled waters it finds itself in today. REFERENCE: An unnecessary outburst  http://archives.dawn.com/archives/31755 Dawn - Musharraf asked to apologise for threatening journalist By Our Staff Reporter http://archives.dawn.com/archives/143218 UK media baffled by President's response to Pak newsman http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=196621 Why Pervez Musharraf Can't Tolerate Questions About Rashid Rauf Monday, January 28, 2008 http://winterpatriot.blogspot.com/2008/01/why-pervez-musharraf-cant-tolerate.html President Pervez Musharraf's many faces By David Blair January 26th, 2008 http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/davidblair/3630811/President_Pervez_Musharrafs_many_faces/

General Pervez Musharraf wanted Civil War in Sindh (BBC 2008)



General Pervez Musharraf wanted Civil War in... by SalimJanMazari

Devolution in Pakistan Reform or Regression (ICG Reoprt 2004) http://www.scribd.com/doc/113463978/Devolution-in-Pakistan-Reform-or-Regression-ICG-Reoprt-2004

Devolution in Pakistan Reform or Regression (ICG Reoprt 2004) by Aamir Mughal

2006 Outrage at Musharraf rape remarks : Pakistani activists have reacted with outrage to recent comments on rape victims by President Pervez Musharraf. He said that rape was a "money-making concern" and many argued it was a way to get money and a visa to emigrate. Pakistan's most-high profile rape victim, Mukhtar Mai, told the BBC no woman could subject herself to "such a horrendous experience" to make money. Women's groups and activists protested in Karachi on Friday, shouting: "Down with chauvinism". The president made his comments in an interview with the Washington Post on 13 September, incensing campaigners and others at home. "You must understand the environment in Pakistan. This has become a money-making concern," he said. "A lot of people say if you want to go abroad and get a visa for Canada or citizenship and be a millionaire, get yourself raped." Reference: Outrage at Musharraf rape remarks Friday, 16 September 2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4251536.stm US plays down Musharraf’s rape comment Wednesday, September 28, 2005  http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_28-9-2005_pg7_53

 Rape of Dr Shazia Khalid and General Pervez Musharraf - 1 (BBC 2005)

 

Rape of Dr Shazia Khalid & General Pervez... by SalimJanMazari

Rape of Dr Shazia Khalid and General Pervez Musharraf - 2 (BBC 2005)

 

Rape of Dr Shazia Khalid & General Pervez... by SalimJanMazari

Dr Shahid Masood Exposed in Dr Shazia Khalid Rape Case (Bolta Pakistan 13th July 2011)

Real Face of Dr Shahid Masood

Dr Shahid Masood is basically a Sanctimonious Prick and a first class intellectual Dishonest, he started his career from ARY when it's no good founder Haji Abdul Razzaq Yaqub aka Gold (a money launderer and Gold smuggler) was facing Accountability Cases and when Shahid was there he used to sermon everyone and used to say things for which he now attack others if they say the same things on Military, Fall of Dhaka etc.etc and he was very fond of Dr A Q Khan and attacked Musharraf for forcing A Q Khan to admit proliferation. He later became pragmatic and became the fast friend of not only Musharraf but also joined even worse Bordello "The Jang Group and GEO" and exploited the Lal Masjid issue and wrote False Columns in Daily Jang and The News and rascals like Mazhar Abbas, Hamid Mir, Ansar Abbasi, Ahmed Noorani, Shaheen Sehbai , Kamran Khan and Mir Shakil ran campaign in his favour , therefore don't just blame Dr Shahid but every Media House for running amok and for ruining sanity in Pakistan ! Watch and enjoy

Dr Shahid Masood's Journey from ARY to GEO

News are sometimes wrong, says Shahid Masood after SBP refutes claim (Dunya News TV 26 Jan 2018)  Frauds, Intellectual Dishonest and Masquerades like Mazhar Abbas, Hamid Mir, Ahmad Noorani, Ansar Abbasi , Talat Hussain and their head-pope Mir Shakil ur Rehman and their 3rd rate News group Jang which has accommodated Touts like Kamran Khan and established Yellow Journalism in Pakistan and institutionalized Corruption in Journalism cannot just put all the blame of yellow journalism on a third rate Dr Shahid Masood (worse than a police informer) , Jang Group is equally responsible for ruining the journalism in Pakistan

Dr Shahid Masood's Lies from GEO TV and More Lies from News One

2005: Another Face of Terror: Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, is supposed to be our valued ally in the war on terrorism. But terror takes many forms, not all of them hijacked airplanes or bombed subways. For the vast majority of humans, terror comes in more mundane ways - like the violent hands that woke Dr. Shazia Khalid as she lay sleeping in her bed, and the abuse she's suffered at the hands of Mr. Musharraf's government ever since. I mentioned Dr. Shazia briefly in June when I wrote about General Musharraf's quasi-kidnapping and house arrest of Mukhtaran Bibi - the Pakistani rape victim who used compensation money to open schools and start a women's aid group. But at that time Dr. Shazia was still too terrified to speak out. Now, for the first time, Dr. Shazia has agreed to tell her full story, even though this will put herself and her loved ones at risk. Her tale is simultaneously an indictment of General Musharraf's duplicity, a window into the debasement that is the lot of women in much of the world - and a modern love story. Dr. Shazia, now 32, took a job by herself two years ago as a doctor at a Pakistan Petroleum plant in the wild Pakistani region of Baluchistan, after Pakistan Petroleum also promised a job for her husband there (that job never materialized). Dr. Shazia's family worried about her safety, but her residence was in a guarded compound and she felt strongly that the women in that region needed access to a female physician. Then on Jan. 2, Dr. Shazia woke up in the middle of the night, and at first she thought she was having a nightmare. "But this person was really pulling hard on my hair, and then he started pressing on my throat so I couldn't breathe. ... He tied the telephone cord around my throat. I resisted and struggled, and he beat me on the head with the telephone receiver. When I tried to scream, he said, 'Shut up - there's a man standing outside named Amjad, and he's got kerosene. If you scream, I'll take it and burn you alive.' ... Then he took my prayer scarf and he blindfolded me with it, and he took the telephone cord and tied my wrists, and he laid me down on the bed. I tried hard to fight but he raped me." The man spent the night in her room, beating her, casually watching television, raping her again and boasting about his powerful connections. A 35-page confidential report by a tribunal describes Dr. Shazia tumbling into the nurse's quarters that morning: "semiconscious ... with a swelling on her forehead and bleeding from nose and ear." Officials of Pakistan Petroleum rushed over and took decisive action. "They told me to be quiet and not to tell anybody because it would ruin my reputation," Dr. Shazia remembers. One official warned that if she reported the crime, she could be arrested. That was a genuine risk. Under Pakistan's hudood laws, a woman who reports that she has been raped is liable to be arrested for adultery or fornication - since she admits to sex outside of marriage - unless she can provide four male eyewitnesses to the rape. Dr. Shazia wasn't sure she dared to report the crime, but she begged for permission to contact her family. So, she says, officials drugged her into a stupor and then confined her in a psychiatric hospital in Karachi. "They wanted to declare me crazy," Dr. Shazia said bitterly. "That's why they shifted me to a hospital for crazy people." Dr. Shazia's husband, Khalid Aman, was working as an engineer in Libya, but he finally was notified and rushed back 11 days later. Dr. Shazia, by then freed, couldn't face him, but he comforted her, told her that she had done nothing wrong, and insisted that they report the rape to the police so that the criminal could be caught. That was, perhaps, naïve, particularly because there were rumors that the police had identified the rapist as a senior army officer and were covering up for him. "When I treat rape victims, I tell the girls not to go to the police," Dr. Shershah Syed, a prominent gynecologist in Karachi, told me. "Because if she goes to the police, the police will rape her." That's the way the world works for anyone unfortunate enough to be born female in much of the world. In my next column, on Tuesday, I'll tell how our ally, General Musharraf, then inflicted a new round of terrorism on Dr. Shazia. References:  Another Face of Terror By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF Published: July 31, 2005 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/opinion/31kristof.html?_r=0 ’انصاف ملنے تک لڑتی رہوں گی‘ وقتِ اشاعت: Saturday, 10 September, 2005, 07:46 GMT 12:46 PST  http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/miscellaneous/story/2005/09/050909_shazia_text_nisar.shtml ڈاکٹر شازیہ کا پہلا ویڈیو انٹرویو منیزے جہانگیر  http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/miscellaneous/story/2005/09/050909_dr_shazia_video_int.shtml ونی، ریپ اور جنرل مشرف کا بیان ندیم سعید بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام، ملتان وقتِ اشاعت: Friday, 16 December, 2005, 02:09 GMT 07:09 PST  http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2005/12/051216_women_yearender_as.shtml http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2005/09/050907_dr_shazia_army_ra.shtml تحقیقاتی ٹریبیونل نے اپنی رپورٹ میں اس بات کی تصدیق کی ہے کہ ڈاکٹر شازیہ کے ساتھ زیادتی کی گئی ہے۔ ڈاکٹر شازیہ بیرونِ ملک روانہ مبشر زیدی بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام اسلام آباد وقتِ اشاعت: Friday, 18 March, 2005, 17:05 GMT 22:05 PST  http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2005/03/050318_dr_shazia_abroad_ra.shtml یہاں انصاف سے قاتل بڑا ہے‘ حسن مجتبی' سان ڈیاگو، کیلیفورنیا وقتِ اشاعت: Tuesday, 01 March, 2005, 21:50 GMT 02:50 PST  http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/miscellaneous/story/2005/03/050301_hasan_column_zs.shtml لیڈی ڈاکٹر کے ساتھ ریپ کی تصدیق اعجاز مہر بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام، کراچی  http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2005/01/050128_lady_rape_confirmed_ra.shtml Rape victim under pressure to keep mum By Arman Sabir 04 February 2005 Friday 24 Zilhaj 1425 http://archives.dawn.com/2005/02/04/nat6.htm

2010 ISLAMABAD: While Musharraf continues to embarrass Pakistan and its authorities, including the Pakistan Army, an important source has revealed that the General Headquarters (GHQ) and its most vital arm, the Military Operations Directorate, was bypassed by the former dictator, both in the Lal Masjid operation and Bugti killing. The source said that none of these extremely controversial operations, which sowed the seeds of terrorism in Balochistan and the rest of the country, were the brainchild of the MO Directorate. The source said that in both these military operations, the GHQ and concerned field command were not directly involved. “In both the cases, General Musharraf bypassed the GHQ and its MO Directorate, and gave direct orders to the relevant field commanders,” said the well-placed and well- informed source. Ideally and as per the military’s established rules, no such operation could take place without being conceptualised and cleared by the MO Directorate. However, Musharraf, the all powerful dictator that he was, did not engage the MO Directorate. In the case of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s killing, the source said, General Musharraf involved the then Military Intelligence chief Major General Nadeem Ejaz and the top command of 12 Corps. In a briefing on Balochistan issue by the then DGMO and much before the killing of the Baloch Nawab, General Musharraf once talked about the idea of killing Bugti but the idea was not agreed to by the DGMO, who warned that it would lead to unrest. Later, Musharraf never engaged the GHQ and executed his plot to kill Bugti through the MI and the Commander of the 12 Corps. After the Bugti killing, some key generals in the GHQ in their in-house interactions expressed their dismay over the Kohlu military operation. The Lal Masjid operation, which killed over a hundred persons and led to the escalation of terrorism cases manifold, was no different from that of the military operation aimed at killing Bugti. The source said that the planning of the Lal Masjid operation was done by Commander 10 Corps Tariq Majid on the direct instructions of the ousted dictator. “The GHQ and its MO Directorate were not involved in any such planning,” the source said, adding that a day after Lieutenant Colonel Haroon became the first casualty of the pre-Lal Masjid operation, Musharraf convened a meeting of top political and military authorities and given his mind that a full-fledged operation had to be carried out. An important member of the GHQ spoke against this option and asked Musharraf to review his decision because it involved the lives of more than 100 persons. The dictator was told that when the military was taught to leave some exit point even in case of its enemy, then why should not the extremist elements holed up in Lal Masjid. Musharraf was also warned that if the Lal Masjid operation was executed, it would throw the country into a muddle for quarter of a century. Instead of listening to his key GHQ adviser, the source said Musharraf snubbed the officer and asked him to mind his own business. Later, the assignment to do the massacre in Lal Masjid was given to 10 Corps without getting the military operation cleared by the GHQ. It has also been revealed that Musharraf wanted to mislead the masses about the number of casualties by burying the dead unannounced and in unknown places. He was of the view that the CDA authorities would do the task of silent and hidden burial of those killed in the Lal Masjid operation. Musharraf, who has recently formally joined politics, has lately said that if given the chance, he would repeat the Lal Masjid and Bugti operations. These two operations brought enormous disrespect for the Army and caused retaliatory attacks against the military personnel and installations in all parts of the country. The first-ever suicide attack in a military unit in Dargai where dozens of soldiers were killed in 2006, was also the consequence of Musharraf’s announcement owning the American missile attack on a Madrassa in Bajaur where more than 80 children were killed. Under pressure from his American masters, whom he served against the interest of Pakistan, Musharraf said that they were not the American forces but the Pakistan Army, which attacked and killed such a large number of children, including the age of 10. Musharraf lied that they were terrorists but not even a single bullet was found from the rubble of the Madrassa. Many in the military today admit that the post 9/11 policies and Musharraf’s controversial decisions like the Lal Masjid operation, killing of Bugti and owning up of Bajaur massacre not only fuelled extremism and terrorism but made the military controversial. Reference: Ex-MI chief, commanders Quetta, Pindi involved Ansar Abbasi Wednesday, November 10, 2010 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=1977&Cat=13

LAHORE: Announcing to hold public gatherings across the country, Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) has said that US must be told to steer clear of Pakistan as it (Pak) were not an easy prey, Geo News reported. During Council’s media briefing here in Lahore, Ameer Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan, Maulana Samaiulhaq said that US must refrain from attacking our sovereignty and recognize Pakistan as an atomic power just like India. Terming it a clash of civilizations Maulana Samiulhaq said that it was an armageddon between good and evil. Talking on the occasion Ameer Jamat-ud-Dawah, Hafiz Saeed said Nato’s attack on a Pakistani outpost in Mohmand was a dangerous message conveyed to Pakistan. - Chairman Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) an alliance of various religious parties Maulana Samiul Haq has said that all religious parties will guide the nation on national issues and they will hold Difa-e-Pakistan Conference at Minar-e-Pakistan on December 18. He was talking to media after presiding over a meeting held here at Jammia-e-Manzoorul Islamia. Jammiat-e-Ulama Islam (S) Chief Mulana Sami ul Haq presided over the meeting. Leaders of some 24 religious groups including Jammat-ud-Dawa Chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Sipah-e-Sahaba Punjab President Maulana Shamsul Haq, Jammat-e-Islami Niab Amir Dr Muhammad Kamal, Maulana Abdul Jabbar, Mulana Rashid from JUP, Qari Hanif Jalandhari, Abdul Qadri Ropri and Pir Saif Ullah and large number of workers of the religious parties were present on the occasion. He said Nato air strike on Pakistani posts and killing of 24 soldiers was the grave violation of international laws and basic human rights. He termed the Nato attack on Pakistan sovereignty and said nation would not allow the US aggression in future, Mulana Samiul Haq added. JUI chief also endorsed the government decision to get vacate Shamsi airbase and block Nato supply route but stressed that government should withdraw all the logistic facilities provided to US forces. Maulana Samiul Haq also criticised government decision to make friendship with India and said that Pakistan was facing real threats from Eastern borders and we can not secure from Eastern borders. In response to a question he said Dafa-e-Pakistan Council would invite different political parties including PPP, PML-N, MQM, PTI leadership for Minar-e-Pakistan public gathering. REFERENCES: US told to stay away from Pakistan http://www.geo.tv/GeoDetail.aspx?ID=28824 Difa-e-Pakistan conference on December 18 DECEMBER 05, 2011 http://www.brecorder.com/general-news/single/599/172/1257956/ Sunday, December 18, 2011, Moharram-ul-Haram 22, 1433 A.H. Updated at: 1200 http://jang.com.pk/jang/dec2011-daily/18-12-2011/u90522.htm 

Why the Pakistani Military used to Support Taliban, Several Sectarian Outfits and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba before 911? And while the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi stand officially disbanded, their most militant son and leader, Maulana Azam Tariq, an accused in several cases of sectarian killing, contested elections from jail - albeit as an independent candidate - won his seat, and was released on bail shortly thereafter. Musharraf rewrote election rules to disqualify former Prime Ministers Mohammed Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, and threatened to toss them in jail if they returned from abroad, which badly undermined both Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League and Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Musharraf has plainly given the religious groups more free rein in the campaign than he has allowed the two big parties that were his main rivals. In Jhang city, in Punjab province, Maulana Azam Tariq, leader of an outlawed extremist group called Sipah-e-Sahaba, which has been linked to numerous sectarian killings, is being allowed to run as an independent despite election laws that disqualify any candidate who has criminal charges pending, or even those who did not earn a college degree. "It makes no sense that Benazir can't run in the election," says one Islamabad-based diplomat, "and this nasty guy can."

References: And this takes me back to Pervez Musharraf’s first visit to the US after his coup. At a meeting with a group of journalists among whom I was present, my dear and much lamented friend Tahir Mirza, then the Dawn correspondent, asked Musharraf why he was not acting against Lashkar-e Tayba and Jaish-e Muhammad. Musharraf went red in the face and shot back, “They are not doing anything in Pakistan. They are doing jihad outside.” Pakistani neocons and UN sanctions Khalid Hasan This entry was posted on Sunday, December 28th, 2008 at 6:00 pm. http://www.khalidhasan.net/2008/12/28/pakistani-neocons-and-un-sanctions/ 2 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C12%5C28%5Cstory_28-12-2008_pg3_3 For The 'General' Good By Sairah Irshad Khan Monthly Newsline January 2003 http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2003/01/for-the-general-good/ - General's Election By TIM MCGIRK / KHANA-KHEL Monday, Oct. 07, 2002 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,361788,00.html - MORE DETAILS: General Musharraf, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Brigadier [R] Usman Khalid & Deobandi Taliban. http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2009/02/general-musharraf-colonel-muammar.html 

Pakistan’s chief spy Lt. General Mahmoud Ahmad “was in the US when the attacks occurred.” He arrived in the US on the 4th of September, a full week before the attacks. He had meetings at the State Department “after” the attacks on the WTC. But he also had “a regular visit of consultations” with his US counterparts at the CIA and the Pentagon during the week prior to September 11. REFERENCE: Cover-up or Complicity of the Bush Administration? The Role of Pakistan’s Military Intelligence (ISI) in the September 11 Attacks by Michel Chossudovsky Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), Montréal Posted at globalresearch.ca 2 November 2001 http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO111A.html


Michel Chossudovsky is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa. TFF Associates http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/tff/people/m_chossudovsky.html

AFTER 9/11.

In the afternoon, Mahmood was invited to CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, where he told George Tenet, the CIA director, that in his view Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief, was a religious man with humanitarian instincts and not a man of violence! This was a bit difficult for the CIA officials to digest and rightly so as the Taliban’s track record, especially in the realm of human rights, was no secret. General Mahmood was told politely but firmly that Mullah Omar and the Taliban would have to face US Military might if Osama Bin Laden along with other Al-Qaeda leaders were not handed over without delay. To send the message across clearly, Richard Armitage held a second meeting with Mahmood the same day, informing him that he would soon be handed specific American demands, to which Mahmood reiterated that Pakistan would cooperate. {Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York}, p 32. {Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Owen Bennett Jones, published by New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002}, p. 2.

General Mahmood on September 13, 2001, was handed a formal list of the US demands by Mr. Armitage and was asked to convey these to Musharraf and was also duly informed, for the sake of emphasis, that these were “not negotiable.” Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and the assisstant secretary of state, Christina Rocca, had drafted the list in the shape of a “non-paper”. It categorically asked Pakistan:

Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end ALL logistical support for Osama Bin Laden.

Give blanket overflight and landing rights to US aircraft.

Give the US access to Pakistani Naval and Air Bases and to the border areas betweeen Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Turn over all the intelligence and immigration information.

Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism.

Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Talibans, and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban. Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda Network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbour him and his accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, end support for the Taliban, and assist the US in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama and his network.

Having gone through the list, Mahmood declared that he was quite clear on the subject and that “he knew how the President thought, and the President would accept these points.” {Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York}, p 58-59. Interview: Richard Armitage, “Campaign Against Terror,” PBS (Frontline), April 19, 2002}

Mahmood then faxed the document to Musharraf. While the latter was going through it and in the process of weighing the pros and cons of each demand, his aide de camp that Colin Powell was on the line. Musharraf liked and respected Powell, and the conversation was not going to be a problem. He told him that he understood and appreciated the US position, but he would respond to the US demands after having discussed these with his associates. Powell was far too polite to remind him that he in fact was the government, but did inform him that his General in Washington had already assured them that these demands would be acceptable to the government of Pakistan. {Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism : Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror by Hassan Abbas, published by An East Gate Book , M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York. London, England.}. NOTES/REFERENCES - Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Owen Bennett Jones, published by New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. Interview: Richard Armitage, “Campaign Against Terror,” PBS (Frontline), April 19, 2002; last accessed June 2, 2003, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/armitage.htm Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism : Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror by Hassan Abbas, published by An East Gate Book , M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York. London, England

2013 Musharraf landed at Karachi's airport as scheduled on Sunday, aboard a commercial flight from Dubai [AFP] 2005 Musharraf: Get Yourself Raped And Go To Canada: (Audio) - EXCERPT: Interview with Pakistan president Musharraf September 23, 2005 - During a tape-recorded, 50-minute interview with the Washington Post, Pakistan president Gen. Pervez Musharraf said that claiming rape has become a "moneymaking concern" in Pakistan. Musharraf later denied saying this to the Post. Here is a recording of the quote in the 12th paragraph of the Sept. 12 story. The remark was made in regards to the case of Mukhtar Mai, an illiterate woman who spoke publicly about having been gang-raped on the orders of a village council in 2002. REFERENCE: EXCERPT: Interview with Pakistan president Musharraf September 23, 2005 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/audio/2005/09/23/AU2005092301278.html

Balochistan Conflict & Solution.

QUETTA: The chief of the paramilitary troops in Balochistan has claimed that billions of rupees were being spent to spread a state of unrest in the insurgency-hit province, DawnNews reported. Speaking to media representatives at the FC headquarters here on Saturday, Inspector General Frontier Corps Balochistan Major General Obaidullah Khan Khattak said on Saturday that over 30 militant training camps had been set up across the border in Afghanistan to launch terrorist and anti-state activities in Balochistan. Maj Gen Khattak also claimed that around 121 insurgent training facilities were operating in different parts of the province. Teachers, doctors and many civilians have fallen prey to target killings, said Khattak adding that over 100,000 people had migrated from the province due to its law and order situation. About 550 incidents of terrorism have taken place in the province so far this year, out of which several groups have claimed responsibilities of 258 such incidents, he informed the media. The future of the country is in Balochistan, said Khattak, alleging that foreign powers had their eyes set on the province for the same reason. Moreover, a well-planned conspiracy had been hatched for a propaganda campaign against the FC and intelligence agencies, he added. The Frontier Corps had recently come under much criticism over its alleged role in forced disappearances and human rights violations in Balochistan. The Supreme Court is also hearing a case on the province’s law and order situation. The IG FC’s comments come after a hearing on Friday in which a bench of apex court judges, headed by the chief justice, assailed the FC and described the recent killing of three people whose whereabouts were being sought by the court as a chilling reminder to it. “We are aware that lives of law enforcement personnel were also being lost, however that does not empower anyone to take the law into their own hands,” one of the judges had remarked during the hearing. Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province by area, has been the centre of a violent insurgency by nationalist activists and militant groups. The Pakistani prime minister on Saturday called for new legislation for the recovery of ‘missing persons’ in the province. PM Gilani is also expected to start a tour of Quetta, the provincial capital, from Sunday. Earlier on Tuesday, another high-level meeting attended by the prime minister, army chief Kayani, ISI head DG-ISI Lt Gen Zaheerul Islam, and Balochistan Chief Minister Raisani had decided to initiate dialogue with the Baloch leadership and discontented nationalist parties in the province. REFERENCE: Over 30 training camps in Afghanistan fuelling Balochistan unrest: IG FC DawnNews | DAWN.COM | 2nd June, 2012 http://dawn.com/2012/06/02/over-30-training-camps-in-afghanistan-fuelling-balochistan-unrest-ig-fc/ 

ISLAMABAD, June 11: Taking exception to a media conference addressed by Frontier Corps (FC) Inspector General Obaidullah Khattak on the Balochistan situation, Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry wondered on Monday whether the court should summon Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. “It is not the job of the people in uniform to address press conferences. We have taken strong exception to the press conference of IG-FC. Is he overtaking the Supreme Court!” asked the chief justice while hearing a petition filed by Hadi Shakeel, former president of the Balochistan High Court Bar Association, about breakdown of law and order in the province. He said time had come to pass a coercive order against him and send it to Gen Kayani and the interior secretary to look into the conduct of the general. The court also asked Attorney General Irfan Qadir to look into the transcript of the press conference. Advocate Raja Muhammad Irshad, representing the FC chief, was asked to provide the transcript to the court. The court asked why it should not be feel aggrieved over the recovery of the bodies of missing persons when it was the guardian of the Constitution. “Nobody has a right to kill even a criminal,” the chief justice said. He said Balochistan should not be ignored as it was the most important part of the country. The bodies of Muhammad Khan Marri, Muhammad Nabi and others were found dumped a few days after the apex court’s directives issued during proceedings in Quetta for the recovery of three missing persons. Over the past few days 15 to 20 people had been killed, the court noted. Sadiq Umrani, a member of parliament, had said that he was a witness to an incident in which two persons had been butchered. “Why not put responsibility on the IG of the FC as every second accusation was against the FC,” the chief justice said, adding that the court could go to any extent, citing as example passing an order under Article 190 of the Constitution. “Tomorrow, we can call Gen Kayani and ask him to look into it,” the court said and recalled that Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani had also visited Balochistan last week. When Raja Irshad asked the court to order withdrawal of the FC from Balochistan, the chief justice observed that it was not the court’s job. Meanwhile, Advocate Raza Kazim, counsel for cellular phone companies, contended that a negative impression was being created against them as they were accused of promoting terrorism. They had spent Rs30 million to acquire equipment through which they could trace a caller within 30 seconds and the required information was being shared with intelligence agencies, he said. His request to implead cellular companies in the case was accepted before adjournment of further hearing to June 19. REFERENCE: FC chief’s press briefing irks SC From the Newspaper | Our Staff Reporter | 9 hours ago http://dawn.com/2012/06/12/fc-chiefs-press-briefing-irks-sc/

ISLAMABAD: The British government has refused to process warrants against former president Pervez Musharraf in the Benazir Bhutto assassination case, issued by an anti-terrorism court of Pakistan, DawnNews reported. The British Foreign Office informed the Pakistani government that the arrest warrants cannot be processed because there is no official agreement signed between the two countries on prisoner exchange. However, the British Prime Minister David Cameron during his visit to Pakistan had assured Pakistan’s request would be processed. REFERENCES: UK refuses to handover Pervez Musharraf DAWN.COM April 19, 2011 http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/19/uk-refuses-to-handover-pervez-musharraf.html  Warrants issued for Musharraf By Mudassir Raja | From the Newspaper February 13, 2011 http://www.dawn.com/2011/02/13/warrants-issued-for-musharraf.html 

NEW YORK: President All Pakistan Muslim League (APML) and former president Pervez Musharraf, criticizing PML-N’s Nawaz Shaif said, he made a blunder as he messed with four ex-army chiefs, two presidents and the chief justice during his government, Geo News reported Sunday. Musharraf was addressing APML’s mass gathering here on Sunday. Former President, responding to threats of filing a lawsuit incessantly posed to him by Nawaz Sharif, said, “As Nawaz knows that neither will he regain power nor will he be able to try me in a court of law therefore he takes resort to blow this trumpet time and again.” He said he doesn’t regret killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti and attack on Lal Mosque and neither will he seek apology over those actions, adding that he was ready to replicate all what he did during his tenure in the face of similar situation. Musharraf said, on one hand Nawaz Sharif chant slogan of ‘Jaag Punjabi Jaag’ to accumulate votes in Punjab and on the other hand, he has worn criminal silence over killings of Punjabis in Balochistan. Also, Musharraf alleged Nawaz Sharif of handing refuge to Talal Bugti in Lahore whom (Bugti) he termed ‘lawbreaker’. The supporters of PML-N and APML were also present on the occasion and were chanting slogans against chiefs of both parties. REFERENCE: Don’t regret Bugti’s murder: Musharraf Updated at: 1150 PST, Sunday, November 07, 2010 http://www.thenews.com.pk/latest-news/4448.htm  Don’t regret Bugti’s murder: Musharraf Updated at: 1217 PST, Sunday, November 07, 2010 http://www.geo.tv/11-7-2010/74006.htm 

Former Chief of the Army Staff General (R) Pervez Musharraf Justifies the "Murder" of Sardar Akbar Bugti


COURTESY: AYANTVUS URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQK3N4dLz8w

The 132-page report documents dozens of enforced disappearances, in which the authorities take people into custody and then deny all responsibility or knowledge of their fate or whereabouts. The report details 45 alleged cases of enforced disappearances, the majority in 2009 and 2010. While hundreds of people have been forcibly disappeared in Balochistan since 2005, dozens of new enforced disappearances have occurred since Pakistan returned to civilian rule in 2008. REFERENCE: “We Can Torture, Kill, or Keep You for Years” Enforced Disappearances by Pakistan Security Forces in Balochistan July 28, 2011 http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0711WebInside.pdf
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/07/28/we-can-torture-kill-or-keep-you-years 

Reporter - The problems of Balochistan--Ep 166-Part 1 (DAWN NEWS 2011)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gp2YMuyozL8

Tribal Politics in Balochistan by Lt. Col Mohammad Usman Khan

Reporter - The problems of Balochistan--Ep 166-Part 2 (DAWN NEWS 2011)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q9A8wIW2NbM

Balochistan Economic Report Haris Gazdar

Reporter - The problems of Balochistan--Ep 166-Part 3 (DAWN NEWS 2011)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l8kgxgkzRtw

Usa Aid Food Security Poverty Alleviation in Arid Agriculture Balochistan

Reporter - The problems of Balochistan--Ep 166-Part 4 (DAWN NEWS 2011)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JvJv0zTZUAI

Socio Economic Survey of Rural Households

Reporter-Rule of Law, Intelligence Agencies and Baluchistan Situation-EP 156-Part-1 (DAWN NEWS 2011)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oxu9eqh57Ps

Pakistan the Worsening Conflict in Balochistan

Reporter-Rule of Law, Intelligence Agencies and Baluchistan Situation-EP 156-Part-2 (DAWN NEWS 2011)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYRGWQOLyoM


Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan 2007

Reporter-Rule of Law, Intelligence Agencies and Baluchistan Situation-EP 156-Part-3 (DAWN NEWS 2011)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3hWOuonoKc

Settlers — caught in crossfire By Nasir Jamal 29th June, 2011 QUETTA: “They keep changing the menu,” a hotel attendant in Quetta sums up the scale and scope of the target killing of settlers in Balochistan. “Almost all non-Baloch are on their hit-list.” Nearly 1,200 settlers are estimated to have been killed across Balochistan, mostly in what are referred to as hit-and-run incidents and grenade attacks on their businesses and homes. According to Balochistan Punjabi Ittehad, some 200,000 people have fled Balochistan since early 2008 when the violence against various ethnic groups excluding Pashtuns peaked. Other estimates put the number at 100,000. In any case the migration has been significant. Muhammad Khalid of Balochistan Punjabi Ittehad says “the militants began to target the Punjabi settlers after Nawab Bugti was taken out by the military (in August, 2006). Before that there were occasional incidents in which Punjabis were targeted”.

The settler killings increased soon after the Feb 2008 elections. It was the time when the Baloch militant organisations such as Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) began to paint such slogans as ‘down with Punjabis’, ‘Long Live Azad Balochistan’, etc. “My own election billboards were sprayed by the BLA activists with these slogans,” says Anwaarul Haq Kakar, a young PML-N leader whose National Assembly constituency in Quetta mostly comprises Punjabi settlers. “A vast majority of settlers killed in the beginning were service providers from Punjab running barber shops, laundries and tailoring shops. Later the militants also began to target teachers, doctors, lawyers and other professionals,” says Mohammad Amir, who is also associated with the Balochistan Punjabi Ittehad. The first ‘high-profile’ killing in Quetta was of the provincial education minister, Shafique Ahmed, in 2009, he says. It was followed by the killings of school and college teachers, university professors and others. Mostly Punjabis were the target but other ethnic groups were also hit — Urdu-speaking people from Karachi and Hindko-speaking settlers from Haripur in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In many cases, people tell this reporter, those hit by the insurgents had earlier received pamphlets warning them to leave immediately.

The target killing has created an atmosphere of fear and terror among the settlers in the entire Balochistan. While Quetta still hosts a substantially large population of Punjabi and other settlers, few remain in the Baloch areas of the province. Even in Quetta the settlers are afraid of going to areas such as Sariab Road, a Baloch-dominated neighbourhood. Many old Sariab Road dwellers, including Pashtuns, have sold their property and moved to non-Baloch quarters of the city for safety. “The property prices in Baloch areas are at their lowest because of the exodus from there,” a Pashtun dealing in rice business in Quetta says. Only those Punjabi settlers who had been assured of protection by Baloch tribes or those working on government projects under the watch of the security forces still remain in the Baloch areas. Chacha Raheem came to Quetta from Rawalpindi in search of livelihood more than 22 years ago. He says “only people who don’t have anyone to fall back on or those who lack the financial means to relocate or have (provincial) government jobs are staying back”. Others say there are many who have actually given up their government jobs to return to Punjab. Around 10 incidents of target killings have taken place in Quetta during 2011. This is a reduction in violence which is often linked by the officials and others to the ‘discovery’ of 170-odd bodies of Balochs believed to be ‘separatists’ involved in ‘murders’ and ‘terrorism’. Amir of Punjabi Ittehad says, consequently, “almost 50 per cent of the settlers who had left Quetta since the start of violence have come back.”

But many, such as Chacha Raheem, do not agree with Amir’s assessment. “Why would anyone come back?” Chacha asks. “To get killed or relocate in another six months or a year?” he wonders. “Who knows what is afoot? No one can guarantee that the Baloch rebels who have gone underground will not resurface and start killing the settlers again.” It is difficult to put a number on them, but some, at least some of those who had left close relatives behind in the city, are returning to Quetta. PML-N’s Kakar recalls how the Punjabi settlers “forced out by the government of Sardar Attaullah Mengal in the early 1970s” returned “because the Baloch or the Pashtuns did not have the skills or education to replace them”. Are we going to see a repeat of that now? The Baloch associated with the ‘resistance’ do not think so. “We want all settlers, particularly the Punjabis and the Urdu-speaking, to leave our land. They are colonialists and our enemies. We don’t want collaborators of the Pakistan military on our soil,” says a former activist of the Balochistan Students Organisation (Azad) who is currently affiliated with the movement for an independent Balochistan. “We are being treated as Red Indian and our existence is in danger.”

He defends target killing of Punjabi and other settlers, saying it will soon lead to ‘freedom from Pakistan’. “How can you expect us to let your people live in peace when our own land has been turned into a hell for us,” he contends, adding that the killing and ‘mutilation’ of a couple of hundred ‘freedom fighters’ cannot quash their movement for liberation. “It won’t be very long before we come back for those who haven’t left our soil yet.” For many moderate Baloch intellectuals and writers target killings of Punjabis and other settlers — though a ‘human problem’ — are a way for the insurgent groups of communicating to the world that ‘we want to be independent’. “Punjabis came here to live and work under the British Raj as food suppliers, camp followers and providers of skilled labour and services. Now they have become chief justice, IG police and occupy senior positions in the government at our expense,” says a leading ‘moderate’ Baloch writer in Quetta.

“This is like speaking to a press conference for them,” he says and adds it becomes difficult to take a position against insurgency and killings of settlers when people speaking for the rights of the Baloch people are being abducted and their bodies dropped from the air by the security forces, in the presence of a media that is largely silent. A pamphlet by the Balochistan Liberation Front delivered to several Quetta-based journalists some time ago warned the journalists against becoming a part of the ‘dirty game’ being played by Pakistan’s security forces against the Baloch freedom movement. “Do not try to cover up the Pakistani security forces’ black deeds against the Baloch. Do not also try to play down the forces’ losses at the hands of the BLF,” it said. It is not Baloch insurgents alone who are speaking through target killings. The security forces are also using bullets and violence to send a ‘tough’ message across to them. Caught in the crossfire are the common people. REFERENCE: Settlers — caught in crossfire By Nasir Jamal | From the Newspaper | 29th June, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/06/29/settlers-caught-in-crossfire-2/

Reporter-Rule of Law, Intelligence Agencies and Baluchistan Situation-EP 156-Part-4 (DAWN NEWS 2011)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TlKW-Xjw2QY

Balochistan will stay if people stop leaving Amir Mateen Tuesday, May 29, 2012 QUETTA: To say that Balochistan was deteriorating towards becoming a dysfunctional governance mechanism would be an understatement. In the peoples perspective it has already become absolutely dysfunctional. The government existing only as a mere nomenclature. Insurgency is mostly used as a ruse to cover up inefficiency, mismanagement and corruption by those in government. Politicians who are outside the power circle apparently are not bothered about the plight of the people and their concern is limited only to spewing venom on TV chat shows. Bureaucrats are having a field day in an environ where there are no concerned politicians looking over their shoulders and the only ones remaining are in cahoots with them. The army, like always, lives in the lavish gated community of cantonment and is absolutely insulated from the troubling ‘civilian riff-raff’. The luckier ones among the ‘bloody civilians’ of course have been allowed sanctuary in the khaki oasis. The rest of the elite have moved to the safer environs of Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad if not Dubai, London or Washington. Forget about the everyday killing by a lethal mix of Baloch insurgents, Taliban warlords, sectarian lunatics or common criminals, the locals die a thousand deaths from a monstrous civic collapse in every Balochistan city and town. Living in the provincial capital has become a nightmare. Streets routinely remain inundated by sewage water; roads reduced to dusty pathways with gaping manholes. Streetlights do not work and if when they do, many people get killed from electrocution because of water around lampposts. Major road arteries are actually mosaics of potholes. And this is Quetta, a city whose nine MPAs have been given Rs2.25 billion in the name of development funds (Rs250 million each), not to mention Rs 1 billion given by the federal government for Quetta’s ‘beautification.’ Pashtunkhwa Party’s former Senator Raza Khan alleged that Ministers take ten to twenty per cent upfront from contractors as their cut from development funds and issue them completion certificates. This is all that the contractors need to collect money — without even an iota of actual work on ground.

Availability of drinking water is a big issue. Experts believe Quetta might be reduced to a salt city without water if drastic steps are not taken to manage its fast depleting water table. The city looks like one big dumpster of filth. In the absence of local bodies, the cleaning system has collapsed. A municipality official said the availability of sweepers has become an issue. As all sweepers are either Christians or Hindus, in keeping with our national racist policy, many of them have left to save themselves from sectarian strife. Of course, unlike Dubai and London, Muslims will never work as sweepers. Ah, forgive my blasphemous thought. Violence has disrupted the very social fabric of the society. An acute shortage of barbers exists. Most of them were Punjabis and have either been killed or have left to avoid being the next fatal statistic. Now this may look like a small problem but it is not — not in cultures where people are accustomed to barbers shaving even their armpits. Carpenters, mechanics and cobblers are also in short supply.

Health issue is equally severe. Over 100 doctors, including 20 specialists, have reportedly left the province because of security issues. Many of them had made their name as top specialist working for decades in Quetta. Renowned entomologist Dr. Sarwar, Orthopaedic surgeon Dr Chiragh and gynaecologist Dr Nyla Ehsan have all left because they were given threats. Dr Nadir Khan, who faced three murder attempts from Sunni militants, has finally opted for the US. Cardiologists are particularly short in supply. Women health suffers more because of the severe shortage of gynaecologists, lady health visitors and traditional midwives all over Balochistan. There have been cases in public hospitals where women have died while delivering in waiting area because of the non-availability of doctors. Mismanagement makes it worse. Out of the total 350 Bolan Medical College doctors, only 40 come to duty on any given day. Doctors have developed a mutual understanding of alternating each other on selected days and work in private hospitals instead. But not without taking non-practicing allowance. This is also a common practice in other government offices. Politician Rauf Khan Sasoli says only half of the staff turns up on duty. Most come twice and thrice every week on alternate days. “There is nobody to check,” he said. “It’s a free-for-all.”

Dera Bugti has the highest per capita teachers in Pakistan on paper but nothing exists on ground. The name of ghost teachers is also highest in Balochistan. It’s a common practice for Sardars to register their servants as teachers and take a cut in their salaries. Education in Balochistan has suffered the most. Balochistan Chief Secretary Yaqoob Babar said in the 1980s there were no schools — “now we don’t have teachers.” Hundreds of teachers have moved out of the province. The number of settler teachers reportedly killed is close to 50 including Vice-chancellors, principals and senior professors. Some of them had lived in Quetta for centuries. This has led to a mass exodus of not just settler teachers but also many locals. In Balochistan University alone 80 teachers have left, 40 of them PhDs. According to one report 70 per cent schools are deficient in teachers whereas half of them have already closed down. As families move out the number of students has also declined. A famous school in Quetta was recently closed after its owner was killed. This may have been the single largest loss to Balochistan, particularly the Baloch. Even Baloch nationalists concede the damage that militants have done to the community. “We shall continue to suffer the consequences of this loss for many decades as an entire generation of Baloch youth is growing up either with little or no education,” says BNP leader Munir Baloch. Even if they get a degree by cheating in examination, a common practice all over Balochistan, these kids will have a hard time competing in job market. “This will lead to further alienation and deprivation,” he adds. Baloch are already suffering the consequences of this as the vacuum of settler teachers is being filled by better educated Pashtuns and Hazaras, thus changing the ethnic balance. This is sure to trigger a new war between a quota policy backed by the Baloch and merit policy supported by the Pashtun. Despite all the problems, Balochistan can still be saved and made the jewel in Pakistan’s crown. But we need to move in earnest. The first step is to make it a place worth belonging to. Balochistan will stay only if its people stop leaving it. REFERENCE: Balochistan will stay if people stop leaving Amir Mateen Tuesday, May 29, 2012 http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-14972-Balochistan-will-stay-if-people-stop-leaving

Saudi Arabian/Iranian Role in Sectarian Killings in Pakistan.

ISLAMABAD: Saudi Arabia looks askance at Pakistan’s commitment to pursue energy cooperation with Iran and is nudging the government to reconsider its decision. This was the essence of a message from the Saudi King conveyed by Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Prince Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz in his meetings with Pakistani leaders on Tuesday, Arab diplomatic sources based in Islamabad said. Riyadh is said to have offered an ‘alternative package’ to meet Islamabad’s growing energy needs in an effort to persuade it to abandon the Iran gas pipeline and electricity/oil import deals. The deputy foreign minister’s visit closely follows a trip by Saudi Culture and Information Minister Dr Abdul Aziz bin Mohiuddin Al-Khoja last week, which coincided with Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s visit to Saudi Arabia. The exchanges took place against the backdrop of an intensifying cold war between Tehran and Riyadh over Syria with smaller versions of the proxy being played out in Bahrain, Yemen and other parts of the region. The meetings are also taking place at a time when diplomatic efforts for dealing with the Syrian crisis have picked momentum. Riyadh sees the situation in Syria as key to the future of the Middle East and has been spearheading efforts to isolate Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The statements issued by the Presidency, Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Office all spoke about the cordial ties between the two countries and noted the discussions on “regional and international challenges”. Mr Aziz also had a one-to-one interaction with Prime Minister Gilani, besides the delegation meeting, during which, a prime ministerial aide said, a “special message” from the Saudi monarch was delivered. A senior Foreign Ministry official confirmed that Iran and the situation in Syria were on the agenda of the talks. “They have a position. We reiterated our desire for the issues relating to Muslim Ummah to be peacefully resolved through dialogue,” he added. President Zardari, in his meeting with Mr Aziz, also stressed the need for regional countries to find regional solutions to their problems.The Saudi delegation was informed that maintaining neighbourly relations with Iran did not mean endorsing its position or actions on other issues. Mr Aziz was quoted in a Foreign Office statement as having said: “Pakistan and Saudi Arabia enjoyed commonality of views on regional and international challenges and the visit afforded him an opportunity to discuss these, and how to address them.” Saudi Arabia is said to have offered a loan and oil facility to bail Pakistan out of its financial and energy crises. A Pakistani official said the offer would be discussed at the Pak-Saudi joint ministerial meeting, which is being planned. Referring to the ministerial meeting, Prime Minister Gilani told the Saudi minister that it was important for “working out mechanism to give impetus to trade compatible with the exemplary relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. REFERENCE: S. Arabia offers help to tide over energy crisis Baqir Sajjad Syed http://dawn.com/2012/04/11/move-to-keep-pakistan-off-iran-pipeline-s-arabia-offers-help-to-tide-over-energy-crisis/

PML Nawaz & Sectarian Outfit


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Q3J4jWc-mc

Punjabi Taliban: Here they came in contact with Taliban militants; both influenced each other and a new sectarian breed came into being in the form of the Punjabi Taliban, now led by Asmatullah Muavia and loyal to Hakimullah Mehsud. Initially based in South Waziristan, the Punjabi Taliban were ousted after the military operation in 2009. In reprisal, they carried out high-profile attacks such as the one on GHQ in Rawalpindi. Sources say that that particular incident was the turning point and led to a re-think by the establishment. Security officials — who wish to remain anonymous — say this was because the GHQ standoff was resolved not just by army commandos but mainly through negotiations by Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, chief of the SSP, who convinced those inside to surrender. Army officials dismiss these claims. They say military action broke the siege and that the so-called Punjabi Taliban remains their number one enemy. It may well be that both stories are true, as one security official points out. Ludhianvi’s intervention — while crucial — was definitely only limited to the GHQ attack. He appears to have little control over the Punjabi Taliban leadership, which continues to wreak all sorts of havoc across Pakistan. However, it’s also clear that Ahmed Ludhianvi now enjoys official protocol. The SSP and Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, Sipah-i-Sahaba’s current title, are both supposedly proscribed, yet these organisations hold rallies in major cities with ease where arms are openly displayed. Today it’s clear that the SSP and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, an even more extreme sectarian outfit, are inter-linked. Maulana Ludhianvi admitted as much to the BBC when he said in an interview that Malik Ishaq, the LJ chief, was released on his guarantees and that the notorious militant now answers to him. Since Malik Ishaq’s release it’s become easier for the LJ leaders to move around, and they have since started expanding and setting up cells in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. These cells are made of locals and have been greatly strengthened, especially in Balochistan — where they operate independently of the LJ central command. There the traditionally secular Baloch — and particularly Brahui — are increasingly turning to the radical Islamist militancy espoused by SSP/LJ. Security officials — and Shia leaders — say this turn of events is complemented by the growth of sectarian madressahs there. Perhaps the largest Sipah-i-Sahaba seminary outside southern Punjab is in Mastung, in the heart of territory controlled by the Raisani tribe. Another major reason, according to Shia leaders, is the alleged support by intelligence agencies to groups of pro-government Baloch tribesmen. Most of these have dual identities — the second being outright sectarian and extremist. It is no surprise, then, that the largest of the groups is considered to be the de facto Lashkar-i-Jhangvi in Balochistan. All that is perhaps irrelevant for the intelligence agencies, whose main aim is the tried tactic of using religion to suppress nationalism. Led by a close relative of a senior politician from the province, some of LJ Balochistan’s more high-profile attacks include the killing of Baloch nationalist leader Habib Jalib Baloch and the attacks on the Hazara Shias pilgrims in Mastung. A senior member of the group accepts it has been involved in attacks to protect the Baloch community – it denies it’s carried out attacks on Shias. “We are only carrying out defensive actions against people who are supported by foreign intelligence services. The Baloch people are with Pakistan – it’s just that they are scared of the militants.” He adds that while their group isn’t anti-Shia — the community has elements that act as agents of Iran in Pakistan and they should refrain from this. REFERENCE: Sectarian militancy thriving in Balochistan By Syed Shoaib Hasan http://dawn.com/2012/04/11/sectarian-militancy-thriving-in-balochistan-fm/

Imran Khan and Sectarianism in Pakistan.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-9I2P3pphm8

GILGIT: Thirty-four people kidnapped from Hunza on April 3 in the wake of violence and bloodshed in Gilgit and Chilas were released on Tuesday as a result of successful talks between kidnappers and cleric Aga Rahat ul Hussain, police said. Member of the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly Deedar Ali Shah said the 34 hostages had been released unconditionally. The kidnapped men — the district health officer, a civil judge, truck drivers, cleaners and labourers working in flour mills — had been taken to Nagar valley. On Tuesday, they were brought to Gilgit where they were received by the deputy speaker of the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly, home secretary, finance secretary and the DIG. Police said Aga Rahat, accompanied by Sheikh Mirza Ali and a number of other religious scholars, went to Nagar valley after the kidnappers had said that they would hand over the hostages only to him. A team earlier constituted by the Gilgit-Baltistan chief minister had failed to persuade the kidnappers to free the hostages. The hostages were first taken to the Chief Minister’s House where they met the CM and later transferred to a hotel. They are expected to go to their homes on Wednesday. Meanwhile, a curfew imposed eight days ago remained in force on Tuesday, without any relaxation. Since the outbreak of violence, Gilgit has remained cut off from the rest of the country with no vehicle plying on the Karakoram Highway and PIA not operating its flights. When contacted, SP Diamer district Bashir Ahmed said road traffic would not resume without improvement in the security situation. He said about 27 trucks loaded with foodstuff had left for Gilgit, but they were not allowed to enter the city because all entry points were closed. People in Skardu, Ghizer, Astore, Ghanche and Hunza Nagar are facing a shortage of food and medicines. Tens of thousands people held a sit-in in Skardu and called for arrest of the killers of bus passengers in Bonar Das near Chilas. REFERENCE: Curfew continues in Gilgit, Kidnappers free 34 hostages Farooq Ahmed Khan http://dawn.com/2012/04/11/curfew-continues-in-gilgit-kidnappers-free-34-hostages/

Former ISI Chiefs Exposing Sectarian Terrorists (ARY Dr. Shahid Masood)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbMF1YeB-Kg

The Shi’a Awakening: General Ziaul Haq, who ruled Pakistan with an iron hand from 5 July 1977 to 17 August 1988, believed that “a state that is construed as a legitimate Islamic actor can both ride the tiger of Islamism and harness its energies in the service of the state.” [10] Islamization under General Ziaul Haq affected four areas—judicial reform, the penal code, economic activity and educational policy. Two decisions that had a particularly significant, long-term impact on the rise of sectarianism were the imposition of zakah or zakat (a 2.5 percent annual contribution Muslims must make toward charity based on their net asset value) and the expansion and radicalization of traditional religious schools called madrasa. The state funded the madrasas through zakat. In 1984, 9.4 percent of zakat funds went to madrasas, and in 1996, long after Ziaul Haq was gone, the government was giving various madrasas 3.5 million dollars a year. [11] In 1982 the government had announced that madrasa diplomas would be considered equivalent to formal school certificates as long as the madrasas reformed their curricula according to state demands. As the state and the Islamists collaborated during the Ziaul Haq years, many madrasas changed their focus from traditional religious education to training an Islamic bureaucracy that could assume positions in the lower and middle echelons of the government, thus creating a social base for a future Islamic state. Islamist groups set up numerous madrasas with government zakat funding. The Jamaat-e-Islami, which had set up its first madrasa—the Ulema Academy at Lahore—in 1976, ran seventy-.five madrasas by 1990. The Barelvis set up a new network of madrasas called Ziaul-Quran (the Light of the Quran) in response to the government initiative, which was primarily benefiting politicized groups such as the Deobandi, Ahl-e Hadith and Jamaat-e-Islami. The Shi’a were not too keen on Ziaul Haq’s Islamization from the top, particularly when it strengthened Sunni Islamist groups. The Shi’a and Sunnis differ in their understanding of zakat. Unlike the Hanafi school of Sunnis, which accepts the government’s right to collect and distribute zakat, the Shi’a consider zakat to be an individual obligation. They may voluntarily entrust the collection and spending of zakat to the Shi’a clergy, but Shi’a jurisprudence gives the state no role in the matter. This communitarian and voluntary approach to zakat among the Shi’a is probably a reaction to centuries of domination by Sunni rulers over most of the Muslim world. When Ziaul Haq decreed that 2.5 percent of all bank savings would be forcibly deducted every year and deposited in the government’s zakat account, therefore, the Shi’a protested. An important Shi’a cleric, Mufti Jaafar Husain (1916-1983), had argued for a long time that if Pakistan was to have Islamic law, the Shi’a should be allowed to follow their own jurisprudence—known as Jaafari fiqh after the sixth Shi’a imam, Jaafar al-Sadiq. Husain formed the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Fiqh-e-Jaafariya (TNFJ), the Movement for the Enforcement of Jaafariya Law, which was later shortened to Tehrik-e-Jaafariya. Soon after Ziaul Haq’s decree authorizing the forcible deduction of zakat, the TNFJ started agitating against the decision. From Ziaul Haq’s point of view, and that of other Sunni Islamists, the Shi’a demand was unjustified. Iran had just had an Islamic revolution the year before (in 1979) and had implemented the Shi’a interpretation of Islamic law. If the majority’s jurisprudence prevailed in Iran, Pakistan’s Sunni Islamists believed the majority should prevail in Pakistan as well, and they saw no reason to make special provisions for the Shi’a minority. The state had become not only more Islamized, but it was also now adopting a sectarian preference within the Islamic context. Ziaul Haq’s preference for an across-the-board enforcement of Sunni law in relation to zakat was challenged by large Shi’a demonstrations. On 5 July1980 the TNFK brought tens of thousands of Shi’a from all over the country and laid siege to the government headquarters in Islamabad. The government backed down and exempted the Shi’a from the compulsory deduction of zakat. Although this measure appeased the Shi’a, it did not please the Sunni Islamists. They saw it as a dilution of Ziaul Haq’s commitment to Islamizing the Pakistani state with their support. For his part, in an effort to limit any damage to his reputation among the Sunni Islamists, Ziaul Haq made a point of venerating Prophet Mohammed’s earliest successors, the first three caliphs whom the Shi’a consider usurpers of political power from their first imam, Ali. In articulating its ideology and position, the TNFJ avoided expressly sectarian arguments. It insisted that, like every other Muslim group in Pakistan, it considered the Quran and the Sunnah to be the fundamental sources of law. It sought only for the right of “all recognized schools of Islamic thought” to be governed by their own interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah. The TNFJ also talked about the creation of a popular Islamic army. Both these ideas—the concept of a popular army, as opposed to the professional one that dominated Pakistan, and the support for multiple interpretations of Islamic law—were viewed as dangerous by the army-run Pakistani state and its Sunni Islamist allies. REFERENCE: "Weeding Out the Heretics": Sectarianism in Pakistan by Husain Haqqani Published on Wednesday, November 01, 2006 Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol. 4 http://currenttrends.org/research/detail/weeding-out-the-heretics-sectarianism-in-pakistan

Sethi: Sectarianism & Taliban in Punjab


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Yh8bLvLIf4

The General and Jihad: Pakistan Under Musharraf

http://books.google.com.pk/books/about/The_General_and_Jihad.html?id=352TrRDopikC&redir_esc=y

The Emergence of Sunni Militancy: Ziaul Haq’s policies of Islamization had strengthened Sunni Islamist institutions, especially the madrasas, and given influence to Islamist political parties disproportionate to their electoral strength. Even before their Iranian-inspired political awakening, Pakistan’s Shi’a had been wary of the Islamist political formations and had tended to support secular political parties, notably the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ziaul Haq had deposed Bhutto and executed him. The PPP and the pro-democracy movement it led were seen by Ziaul Haq as major challenges to his authority. It suited Ziaul Haq, therefore, to advertise himself as the defender of Sunni Islam and to identify the pro-democracy movement with Shiism for the purpose of mobilizing Sunni Islamists on his behalf. And it was not difficult to spread fear among Sunni Islamists about the Shi’a minority’s possible rise to power. The Shi’a were an influential minority, prominent in the arts and literature. Several leading Pakistani politicians were Shi’a, and Shi’a support for the pro-democracy movement meant that Sunni Islamists would never have as much influence under a democratic government as they wielded under Ziaul Haq’s Islamizing regime. More significantly, the number of Shi’a in Pakistan was rising. In addition to making gains through effective proselytizing and natural growth, Shi’a ranks were swelling through conversions of convenience. Well-to-do secular Sunnis did not think much of declaring themselves Shi’a to enable their daughters to benefit from a larger share of their inheritance. While Islam’s laws of inheritance are defined in the Quran, the Shi’a interpret them more favorably for women. The compulsory deduction of zakat from bank accounts, so essential to generating funds for Sunni Islamist madrasas, also became a reason for defections from Sunni ranks. Many non-practicing Muslims decided to become Shi’a, not necessarily to observe the sect’s faith or practices, but to avoid having zakat deducted from their savings each year. These circumstances, which appeared to threaten Sunni dominance and identity, provided an environment conducive to Islamist political activism and militancy. A Deobandi cleric, Maulana Saleemullah Khan, founded Sawad-e Azam Ahl-e Sunnat (Greater Unity of the Sunnis) in 1980, demanding that Pakistan be declared a Sunni state and that the Shi’a be declared non-Muslims. [12] Soon after, sectarian riots erupted in the port city of Karachi, and Sawad-e Azam followers attacked Shi’a neighborhoods and religious gatherings. The Sawad-e-Azam was later instrumental in creating the strongest Sunni sectarian militia—the Anjuman-e Sipah-e Sahaba (ASS), or Society of the Army of the Prophet’s Companions. Both organizations were run by Deobandi clerics who had little or no knowledge of English, and once the militant leaders learned the connotation of their English language abbreviation, they changed the name of their organization to Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Pakistan Army of the Prophet’s Companions.

The Sipah-e Sahaba was formally established by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (1952-90) in 1985 in Pakistan’s central Punjab province. According to the organization’s literature, it is part of the global struggle between Western materialism and the true faith:

The greatest evil of our age is atheism, irreligion and the revolt against the true faith. Although those (in the west) who revolted against religion at the beginning of the twentieth century are now returning to religion themselves, the poison of their ideologies has seeped into our society’s thinking. We need to generate the antidote… Just as the Muslim Ummah got rid of the yoke of British and French colonialism, we need a major effort to protect ourselves from the demon of irreligion and secularity and immerse ourselves into the beauty of Islam and Quranic injunctions. [13]

Sipah-e Sahaba opposed the notion of freedom of religious observance if it meant that the Shi’a would be free to criticize the early caliphs and companions of the Prophet. “True faith is only that following the way of the Prophet’s companions; anything else is heresy,” declared Ziaur Rehman Faruqui, who took over as SSP chief after Jhangvi’s assassination in 1990. The emphasis on following the Prophet’s early companions is simply a subtle way of condemning the Shi’a as heretics. The SSP’s goals are to combat the Shi’a at every level of society, to have them declared a non-Muslim minority like the Ahmadis, and to proscribe their processions of self-flagellation during the month of Muharram. Sipah-e Sahaba also wants to impose its own version of Sunni Islam on the state and society. Its ideal polity is the Khilafat-i-Rashida, the rightly guided Caliphate that succeeded Prophet Mohammed and lasted for only thirty-one years. SSP justifies its virulent anti-Shiism as crucial to protecting Islam from Persian influence and saving the Muslim world from Khomeini’s pernicious, heretical ideology. The SSP gained influence in the rural parts of Pakistan’s central Punjab province, partly by criticizing the influence of Shi’a landowners. They accused the Shi’a of having maintained their large land holdings through close ties with the British, which made them representative of secular culture. It did not occur to SSP’s militant Sunni followers that focusing on the large Shi’a estates might inadvertently endorse Shi’a inheritance laws, which prevented the kind of fragmentation of property that inevitably resulted from Sunni laws of inheritance. SSP also attacked traditional, custom-based, mystical Sufi Islam that often allowed Sunnis and Shi’a in rural Pakistan to merge in their common reverence for particular saints and shrines. Seeking to impose a standardized, ritual-free, text-based Islam, SSP took pride in articulating the anti-Shi’a puritanism that other Islamist organizations shared but were unable to voice for the sake of political correctness. SSP maintained close ties with the leading Deobandi organization, Jamiat-e Ulema-e Islam (JUI), and all its leaders were graduates of Deobandi madrasas. Almost all Sunni Islamist organizations quietly supported SSP’s anti-Shi’a rhetoric and campaigns. The Ziaul Haq regime saw the SSP as a check on the rise of Shi’a influence and gave it a free hand. Soon covert links had been established between SSP and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which managed official Pakistani support of jihadi operations in Afghanistan and Indian-controlled Kashmir. SSP cadres attended Afghan mujahidin training camps and returned to kill Shi’a leaders within Pakistan. The rise of the Taliban in the 1990s further deepened the ties among Pakistan’s various jihadi groups (see Current Trends, vol. 1), Deobandi madrasas and Sunni sectarian organizations like Sipah-e Sahaba. SSP’s lethal attacks on Shi’a ulema and professionals generated a violent Shi’a backlash, however. The Shi’a Sipah-e Mohammed Pakistan (SMP)—Army of Mohammed in Pakistan—surfaced in 1991, almost a year after the assassination of SSP founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. Sipah-e Mohammed claimed to have more global aims than just protecting Pakistan’s Shi’a. Its founder, Ghulam Raza Naqvi, declared that he wanted to set up a Quds-force of both Sunnis and Shi’a to liberate Palestine. [14] But in practice SMP did little more than retaliate for SSP’s assaults on Shi’a by killing SSP leaders and cadres, and occasionally by mounting attacks on Deobandi mosques in reprisal for attacks on Shi’a mosques. The violence between Shi’a and Sunni extremist groups escalated further once Ziaul Haq’s military regime came to an end and civilian rule was restored in Pakistan. Worried about the sectarian violence, the civilian political leaders attempted to co-opt the SSP into the political system. The group’s candidates won some seats in the Punjab Assembly, and they were offered positions in the government in exchange for renouncing violence. One segment of the SSP found this bargain unacceptable, however, and responded by creating the secretive and uncompromisingly violent Lashkar-e Jhangvi (JI)—Jhangvi’s Army. This group, founded by Riaz Basra in 1994, consisted mainly of Afghan jihad veterans and worked closely with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It is important to note that since the collapse of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Baluchistan province has become a major center of anti-Shi’a militants. Their main targets have been the anti-Taliban Shi’a Hazara community. [15] Sectarian conflict in Pakistan has not remained confined to the sphere of Sunni-Shi’a rivalry. Violence has erupted among competing Sunni organizations as well. Once the floodgates of discussion over who is or is not a Muslim are opened, any number of claims for excluding heretics from the mainstream can emerge. Although sectarian violence in Pakistan began with demands to declare Ahmadis and Shi’a non-Muslims, the rising tide of Sunni extremism has led the various Sunni organizations to vie with one another for the right to decide who can legitimately be considered a true Sunni Muslim. As Deobandi and Wahhabi groups expanded through state patronage and organized militias, the traditionalist Barelvis found themselves marginalized. By the middle of the 1990s, a militant organization called the Sunni Tehreek (Sunni Movement) was founded in Karachi by Saleem Qadri. This movement sought to roll back the rising tide of Wahhabi and Deobandi influences and to restore the South Asian tradition of devotional and festive observance of Islam. This effort did not sit well with the Deobandi and Wahhabi groups, of course, who saw the revival of traditionalism as a setback to their successful imposition of fundamentalism in the preceding two and a half decades. On 11 April 2006 a massive bomb blast in Karachi on the occasion of Eid Milad-un Nabi (celebration of Prophet Muhammad’s birthday), which the Deobandis and Wahhabis view as sinful, killed about fifty people and injured many more. Most of the casualties belonged to the Barelvi sub-sect of Sunni Islam, and many were affiliated with the Sunni Tehreek. REFERENCE: "Weeding Out the Heretics": Sectarianism in Pakistan by Husain Haqqani Published on Wednesday, November 01, 2006 Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol. 4 http://currenttrends.org/research/detail/weeding-out-the-heretics-sectarianism-in-pakistan

Punjab Govt & Rana Sanaullah Lie Exposed on Malik Ishaq received monthly stipend (GEO TV)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HWQjcKA7niU

KARACHI: A US official in a cable sent to the State Department stated that “financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith clerics in south Punjab from organisations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments.” The cable sent in November 2008 by Bryan Hunt, the then Principal Officer at the US Consulate in Lahore, was based on information from discussions with local government and non-governmental sources during his trips to the cities of Multan and Bahawalpur. Quoting local interlocutors, Hunt attempts to explain how the “sophisticated jihadi recruitment network” operated in a region dominated by the Barelvi sect, which, according to the cable, made south Punjab “traditionally hostile” to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith schools of thought. Hunt refers to a “network of Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith mosques and madrassahs” being strengthened through an influx of “charity” which originally reached organisations “such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Al-Khidmat foundation”. Portions of these funds would then be given away to clerics “in order to expand these sects’ presence” in a relatively inhospitable yet “potentially fruitful recruiting ground”.

Outlining the process of recruitment for militancy, the cable describes how “families with multiple children” and “severe financial difficulties” were generally being exploited for recruitment purposes. Families first approached by “ostensibly ‘charitable’” organisations would later be introduced to a “local Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith maulana” who would offer to educate the children at his madrassah and “find them employment in the service of Islam”. “Martyrdom” was also “often discussed”, with a final cash payment to the parents. “Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rs 500,000 (approximately USD 6,500) per son,” the cable states. Children recruited would be given age-specific indoctrination and would eventually be trained according to the madrassah teachers’ assessment of their inclination “to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture” versus their value as promoters of Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith sects or recruiters, the cable states. Recruits “chosen for jihad” would then be taken to “more sophisticated indoctrination camps”. “Locals identified three centres reportedly used for this purpose”. Two of the centres were stated to be in the Bahawalpur district, whereas one was reported as situated “on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city”. These centres “were primarily used for indoctrination”, after which “youths were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas”.

The cable goes on to quote local officials criticising the PML-N-led provincial and the PPP-led federal governments for their “failure to act” against “extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-i-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar”. The Bahawalpur district nazim at the time told Hunt that despite repeatedly highlighting the threat posed by extremist groups and indoctrination centres to the provincial and federal governments, he had received “no support” in dealing with the issue unless he was ready to change his political loyalties. The nazim, who at the time was with the PML-Q, “blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties…neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan People’s Party federal governments would take his requests seriously”. REFERENCE: Saudi Arabia, UAE financing extremism in south Punjab By Qurat ul ain Siddiqui 22nd May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/22/saudi-arabia-uae-financing-extremism-in-south-punjab/

PML (Nawaz) & Sectarian Killings - 3 (News One/TV One)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIGoO0clwGU

1. (S/NF) Summary: During recent trips to southern Punjab, Principal Officer was repeatedly told that a sophisticated jihadi recruitment network had been developed in the Multan, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan Divisions. The network reportedly exploited worsening poverty in these areas of the province to recruit children into the divisions’ growing Deobandi and Ahl-eHadith madrassa network from which they were indoctrinated into jihadi philosophy, deployed to regional training/indoctrination centers, and ultimately sent to terrorist training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Locals believed that charitable activities being carried out by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith organizations, including Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Al-Khidmat Foundation, and Jaish-e-Mohammad were further strengthening reliance on extremist groups and minimizing the importance of traditionally moderate Sufi religious leaders in these communities. Government and non-governmental sources claimed that financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from “”missionary”" and “”Islamic charitable”" organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments. Locals repeatedly requested USG support for socio-economic development and the promotion of moderate religious leaders in the region as a direct counter to the growing extremist threat. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) During a recent visit to the southern Punjabi cities of Multan and Bahawalpur, Principal Officer’s discussions with religious, political, and civil society leaders were dominated by discussions of the perceived growing extremist threat in Seraiki and Baloch areas in southern and western Punjab. Interlocutors repeatedly stressed that recruitment activities by extremist religious organizations, particularly among young men between the ages of 8 and 15, had increased dramatically over the last year. Locals blamed the trend on a strengthening network of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith mosques and madrassas, which they claimed had grown exponentially since late 2005. Such growth was repeatedly attributed to an influx of “”Islamic charity”" that originally reached Pakistani pseudo-religious organizations, such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Al-Khidmat foundation, as relief for earthquake victims in Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province. Locals believe that a portion of these funds was siphoned to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in southern and western Punjab in order to expand these sects’ presence in a traditionally hostile, but potentially fruitful, recruiting ground. The initial success of establishing madrassas and mosques in these areas led to subsequent annual “”donations”" to these same clerics, originating in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The value of such donations was uncertain, although most interlocutors believed that it was in the region of $100 million annually.

3. (S/NF) According to local interlocutors, current recruitment activities generally exploit families with multiple children, particularly those facing severe financial difficulties in light of inflation, poor crop yields, and growing unemployment in both urban and rural areas in the southern and western Punjab. Oftentimes, these families are identified and initially approached/assisted by ostensibly “”charitable”" organizations including Jamaat-ud-Dawa (a front for designated foreign terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyaba), the Al-Khidmat Foundation (linked to religious political party Jamaat-e-Islami), or Jaish-e-Mohammad (a charitable front for the designated foreign terrorist organization of the same name).

4. (S/NF) The local Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith maulana will generally be introduced to the family through these organizations. He will work to convince the parents that their poverty is a direct result of their family’s deviation from “”the true path of Islam”" through “”idolatrous”" worship at local Sufi shrines and/or with local Sufi Peers. The maulana suggests that the quickest way to return to “”favor”" would be to devote the lives of one or two of their sons to Islam. The maulana will offer to educate these children at his madrassa and to find them employment in the service of Islam. The concept of “”martyrdom”" is often discussed and the family is promised that if their sons are “”martyred”" both the sons and the family will attain “”salvation”" and the family will obtain God’s favor in this life, as well. An immediate cash payment is finally made to the parents to compensate the family for its “”sacrifice”" to Islam. Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rps. 500,000 (approximately USD 6500) per son. A small number of Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in Dera Ghazi Khan district are reportedly recruiting daughters as well.

5. (S/NF) The path following recruitment depends upon the age of the child involved. Younger children (between 8 and 12) seem to be favored. These children are sent to a comparatively small, extremist Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa in southern or western Punjab generally several hours from their family home. Locals were uncertain as to the exact number of madrassas used for this initial indoctrination purpose, although they believed that with the recent expansion, they could number up to 200. These madrassas are generally in isolated areas and are kept small enough (under 100 students) so as not to draw significant attention. At these madrassas, children are denied contact with the outside world and taught sectarian extremism, hatred for non-Muslims, and anti-Western/anti-Pakistan government philosophy. Contact between students and families is forbidden, although the recruiting maulana periodically visits the families with reports full of praise for their sons’ progress. “”Graduates”" from these madrassas are either (1) employed as Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics or madrassa teachers or (2) sent on to local indoctrination camps for jihad. Teachers at the madrassa appear to make the decision based on their read of the child’s willingness to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture versus his utility as an effective proponent of Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith ideology/recruiter.

6. (S/NF) Children recruited at an older age and “”graduates”" chosen for jihad proceed to more sophisticated indoctrination camps focused on the need for violence and terrorism against the Pakistan government and the West. Locals identified three centers reportedly used for this purpose. The most prominent of these is a large complex that ostensibly has been built at Khitarjee (sp?). Locals placed this site in Bahawalpur District on the Sutlej River north of the village of Ahmedpur East at the border of the districts of Multan, Bahawalpur, and Lodhran. The second complex is a newly built “”madrassa”" on the outskirts of Bahawalpur city headed by a devotee of Jaish-e-Mohammad leader Maulana Masood Azhar identified only as Maulana Al-Hajii (NFI). The third complex is an Ahl-e-Hadith site on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city about which very limited information was available. Locals asserted that these sites were primarily used for indoctrination and very limited military/terrorist tactic training. They claimed that following several months of indoctrination at these centers youth were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas. Many worried that these youth would eventually return to try and impose their extremist version of Islam in the southern and western Punjab and/or to carry out operations in these areas.

7. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly chastised the government for its failure to act decisively against indoctrination centers, extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar. One leading Sufi scholar and a Member of the Provincial Assembly informed Principal Officer that he had personally provided large amounts of information on the location of these centers, madrassas, and personalities to provincial and national leaders, as well as the local police. He was repeatedly told that “”plans”" to deal with the threat were being “”evolved”" but that direct confrontation was considered “”too dangerous.”" The Bahawalpur District Nazim told Principal Officer that he had repeatedly highlighted the growing threat to the provincial and federal governments but had received no support in dealing with it. He blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties — he is currently with the Pakistan Muslim League — neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan Peoples Party federal governments would take his requests seriously. The brother of the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, and a noted Brailvi/Sufi scholar in his own right, Allama Qasmi blamed government intransigence on a culture that rewarded political deals with religious extremists. He stressed that even if political will could be found, the bureaucracy in the Religious Affairs, Education, and Defense Ministries remained dominated by Zia-ul-Haq appointees who favored the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious philosophies. This bureaucracy, Qasmi claimed, had repeatedly blocked his brother’s efforts to push policy in a different direction.

8. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly requested USG assistance for the southern and western Punjab, believing that an influx of western funds could counter the influence of Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics. Principal Officer was repeatedly reminded that these religious philosophies were alien to the southern and western Punjab — which is the spiritual heartland of South Asia’s Sufi communities. Their increasing prominence was directly attributed to poverty and external funding. Locals believed that socio-economic development programs, particularly in education, agriculture, and employment generation, would have a direct, long-term impact in minimizing receptivity to extremist movements. Similarly, they pressed for immediate relief efforts — particularly food distribution and income support — to address communities’ immediate needs. Several interlocutors also encouraged direct USG support to Brailvi/Sufi religious institutions, arguing that these represented the logical antithesis to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith philosophy and that if adequately funded, they could stem the tide of converts away from their moderate beliefs.

Comment

9. (S/NF) A jihadi recruiting network relying on Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious, charitable, and educational institutions is increasing its work in impoverished districts of southern and western Punjab. Local economic conditions coupled with foreign financing appear to be transforming a traditionally moderate area of the country into a fertile recruiting ground for terrorist organizations. The provincial and federal governments, while fully aware of the problem, appear to fear direct confrontation with these extremist groups. Local governments lack the resources and federal/provincial support to deal with these organizations on their own. The moderate Brailvi/Sufi community is internally divided into followers of competing spiritual leaders and lacks the financial resources to act as an effective counterweight to well-funded and well-organized extremists.

10. (S/NF) Post believes that this growing recruitment network poses a direct threat to USG counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts in Pakistan. Intervention at this stage in the southern and western Punjab could still be useful to counter the prevailing trends favoring extremist organizations. USAID development resources in agriculture, economic growth, education, and infrastructure development are useful and necessary and will address some of the immediate needs. In post’s view short-term, quick impact programs are required which focus on: (1) immediate relief in the form of food aid and microcredit, (2) cash for work and community-based, quick-impact infrastructure development programs focusing on irrigation systems, schools, and other critical infrastructure, and (3) strategic communication programs designed to educate on the dangers of the terrorist recruiting networks and to support counter-terrorist, counter-extremist messages. HUNT REFERENCE: 2008: Extremist recruitment on the rise in south Punjab madrassahs DAWN.COM | 22nd May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/22/2008-extremist-recruitment-on-the-rise-in-south-punjab-madrassahs/

Wiki Leaks on Saudi Arabian & UAE funding to Sectarian Groups in Pakistan


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n3Y_asJNnR8

1. (S) Summary: A well-placed Deobandi religious leader told Principal Officer in a meeting on March 18 that extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) was increasing its activities in the central Punjab city of Faisalabad, the province’s second largest, in collaboration with elements of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a splinter group from the banned terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). The cleric reported that SSP had recently launched a pamphlet campaign across the city in which it called for people to take steps to enforce Islamic law including: (1) cease business and social activities at the five daily calls to prayer, (2) remove all sources of “”vulgarity”" such as televisions, cd players, and radios from their homes, (3) seek dispute resolution through local imams rather than the courts, (4) take Friday rather than Sunday as the weekly holiday, and (4) strictly enforce purdah for female family members. The pamphlet states that it comes from SSP with support from the TTP and specifically praises “”the enforcement of Sharia in Swat”" and recommends it as a model for Faisalabad. According the religious scholar, a number of girls’ educational institutions in Faisalabad have received letters stating that if they fail to observe purdah, they could be attacked by suicide bombers. The cleric surmised that SSP activities would increase in Faisalabad on the return of its leader Maulana Ludhianvi from a Libyan-government sponsored trip to that country. End Summary.

2. (S) Leading Faisalabad-based Deobandi scholar and IVLP alumnus Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX called on the Principal Officer on March 18 to discuss his concerns regarding what he termed as “”growing extremist activity”" in Punjab’s second-largest city Faisalabad. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that in the last month he has observed a dramatic increase in propaganda activities from Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). He believed that this increase coincided with a number of visits to Faisalabad from activists both of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a splinter group from the southern Punjab-based Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). XXXXXXXXXXXX believed that the activists were involved in recruiting for TTP militant operations in the FATA and NWFP through madrassas in southern Punjab and hoped to replicate that success in Faisalabad. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that SSP leaders had long-standing ties with JeM, as both were Deobandi organizations that had collaborated in the past in anti-Shia and anti-India activities.

3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with Principal Officer an Urdu-language sticker that he claimed he had confiscated from several of his madrassa students in Faisalabad. The sticker, which he stated was also being printed and distributed as a pamphlet, praised the implementation of Sharia law in Swat and exhorted Muslims to pursue the same sort of Sharia law in Faisalabad. It then recounted five steps that every Faisalabad based Muslim should take to begin the process of implementation in the district. The steps were: : (1) cease business and social activities at the five daily calls to prayer, (2) remove all sources of “”vulgarity”" such as televisions, cd players, and radios from their homes, (3) seek dispute resolution through local imams rather than the courts, (4) take Friday rather than Sunday as the weekly holiday, and (4) strictly enforce purdah for female family members.

4. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX told Principal Officer that he had initially dismissed the pamphlet campaign, but became increasingly concerned after learning of specific threats received by several girls’ schools (NFI) in Faisalabad. He claimed that these schools had received letters sent from SSP, referencing the situation in Swat, and warning that if these schools did not begin having their students observe complete purdah, the schools could be the target of violence, including suicide bombing. Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX did not produce a copy of the threat letter. Principal Officer inquired whether any violence had yet occurred in Faisalabad in connection with the SSP campaign. Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX responded that to his knowledge it had not, but he believed that it could occur in short order if police did not check SSP activities.

5. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that in addition to its pamphlet campaign, SSP had organized a number of traditional religious conferences in Faisalabad during the Islamic month of Rabwa (currently ongoing). Traditionally such conferences are organized in this month of the Prophet’s birth to discuss the model life that the Prophet lead and to exhort Muslims to follow his example. According to Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX, this year during the SSP conferences, the organizers have exhorted attendees to follow the Prophet’s example and press for the adoption of complete shariah law in Faisalabad, using Swat as a model. These exhortations specifically call for action against vulgarity and women not observing purdah. In one case, Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that he learned that leaders of the recently banned al-Rashid Trust were coming to address a March 8 SSP conference. He stated that he had informed the District Police Officer, who cancelled the event.

6. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX shared that he had received reliable information that SSP leader Maulana Ludhianvi was on a fundraising trip to Tripoli sponsored by the Libyan government. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that Ludhianvi had made contact with Libyan officials in the guise of working against Iran and Shia agents in Pakistan. (Note: SSP was originally founded as a violent anti-Shia organization and has, in the past, received extensive foreign funding from a variety of Sunni states, including Saudi Arabia. End Note). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ludhianvi was scheduled to return to Pakistan in “”a few days”" and was bringing with him a “”donation”" from the Libyan government valued at nearly 25 million Pakistani rupees (approximately $312,000) that XXXXXXXXXXXX was certain would be used to increase further SSP activities.

7. (S) Comment: Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX is a long-standing contact of Consulate Lahore, who visited the United States in XXXXXXXXXXXX as part of our International Visitor Leadership Program. XXXXXXXXXXXX repeatedly credits his trip to the United States and particularly his discussions with Muslim leaders there for changing his previously anti-Western views. XXXXXXXXXXXX has numerous ties within the broader Deobandi community and is well-positioned to obtain information on activities of Deobandi-linked terrorist/extremist groups such as SSP and JeM. He has not/not previously shared such extensive information with post about these groups’ activities in Faisalabad. Post believes he has done so on this occasion largely out of concern for his and other moderate Deobandi leaders’ safety if these groups expand activities in Faislabad. The significant decline in the Pakistani textile industry and accompanying large-scale lay-offs in Faisalabad –the center of that industry in Punjab — provides groups like SSP with a ready pool of unemployed recruits, who are susceptible to these groups’ rhetoric about an Islamic utopia based on Sharia and prepared to engage in violence to bring it about. End Comment. HUNT “ REFERENCE: 2009: Was Qaddafi funding Sipahe Sahaba? 26th May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/26/2009-was-qaddafi-funding-sipahe-sahaba/