Jaswant Singh, General (R) Pervez Musharraf & LIES.

The spark of tensions never dies on the frontiers of the countries involved in decade long disputes over territories and is always surrounded with animosity and suspicion. The feelings are almost reciprocated in all areas of activities the countries are involved into. What follow is inconclusive debates, skewed remarks, and fresh controversies. Indulged in such strain relationship for decades now are India – Pakistan, with the history of having fought four wars already. Their relationship has seen all shades of grey as well as pink over the years. The various attempts of restoring normalization have stumbled across many roadblocks. So when the representatives of these countries are given a platform to discuss and not debate their version of insight into issues, we are exposed to altogether different ideas. Speaking from the Indian version is the former Foreign Minister of India, Jaswant Singh, who held the position during the National Democratic Alliance rule from 1998 to 2004. Representing the Pakistan’s point of view is the Former President, General Pervez Musharaff, in power from 1999 to 2008. What makes the discussion more interesting is the fact that they both held the most controversial positions at a time when the countries were at tiff during the ongoing 1999 Kargil war. Then chief of Pakistan Army during the Kargil war, General Pervez Musharaff, affirms that for peace, both the countries needs to move from their stated position and solutions may differ but was certainly sought by the Pakistan Government. Involved in resolving the Indo- Pak Kargil War as a foreign minister then, Jaswant Singh believes that sensitivity of both the countries relationship is unmatched and despite the odds they have bright future ahead. Both the counterparts have strong arguments on the human right violation from their respective ends and blame the west for heir hypocrisies on these issues. Discussing these and many other issues straining their relationship in the most candid way are the speakers of the Outsider show, spilling in some exclusive thoughts. REFERENCE: Discussing the differences out – India & Pakistan Posted on November 7, 2012 by theoutsider http://www.theoutsider.tv/blog/discussing-the-differences-out-india-pakistan/

 ISLAMABAD Eleven years after the fateful night that put an end to his military career, General (retd) Ziauddin Butt disclosed that General (retd) Pervez Musharraf had plans to topple the elected government since his inception as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) in 1998. “I do know personally that he had some such plans since October 1998 when he assumed the office of the COAS,” said General (retired) Ziauddin in an exclusive but informal chat with Dawn at his residence in Lahore. General Ziauddin was “appointed” army chief by then prime minister Mian Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999, which triggered the series of events that led to the military coup later that night. The night proved to be no less tumultuous for Ziauddin; stripped of his military rank, he was kept in solitary confinement for two years at the headquarters of the 111 Brigade. In perhaps what is his first extensive interaction with the media, the military officer claimed that Musharraf was a “friend of mine”. At the same time, when pressed to talk further about the “plans” to carry out a coup, which dated back to 1998, the general refused to reveal anything else. He did, however, claim that the plan to topple the elected government was not a secret in the days leading up to October 12. “We were aware that General Musharraf and his cronies would take over.” Ziauddin told Dawn that armed with this knowledge the prime minister too had decided to remove General Musharraf though he (Ziauddin) was not aware of the details of what Nawaz Sharif had in mind. REFERENCE: Sharif removed Musharraf after a phone call: Gen Butt By Azaz Syed http://archives.dawn.com/archives/35099

Jaswant Singh Vs Pervez Musharraf India-Pakistan Relations - 1

The Outsider Special India-Pakistan Relations - 1 by SalimJanMazari

The government, he said, sprang into action when on October 12 Mr Sharif was about to proceed on a scheduled visit to Shujaabad, Multan. Shortly before he was about to leave the prime minister received a telephone call from a “reliable source”. This prompted the prime minister to remove General Musharraf. “To date Mian Nawaz Sharif has not disclosed who the caller on the other end was.” Ziauddin also said that despite heading the ISI, he was kept out of the loop by the rest of the military in the run-up to the coup. He explained that one of his junior officers, Major General Ghulam Ahmed, widely known as GA, was secretly reporting to Musharraf. He said that in the ISI, most of the postings were done by GHQ and hence if the DG ISI did not enjoy the confidence of the chief of army staff, he was not just ineffective but also helpless despite heading one of the strongest intelligence agencies in the country. He also disclosed that on the night of October 12, 1999, after the military had taken over, General Mahmud Ahmed visited him and suggested that he denounce the removal of Pervez Musharraf. Ziauddin refused and ended up in solitary confinement. “I refused to become party to the unconstitutional act carried out by the fellow Generals,” said Ziauddin. He held General Musharraf; then corps commander General Mahmud Ahmed; chief of general staff General Aziz Khan; vice chief of general staff Maj-Gen Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai; DG MO Maj-Gen Shahid Aziz and others responsible for the coup. Clad in a blue t-shirt with white trousers, General (retired) Ziauddin said that the differences between the PML-N and the military emerged after the Kargil war. Siding with Sharif, he too claimed that Musharraf started the Kargil conflict without the prior approval and knowledge of the elected government. “Even the corps commanders and principal staff officers were kept in the dark.” After the conflict, the relations deteriorated rapidly; according to Ziauddin, Musharraf began abusing Sharif in private gatherings. Sharif learnt this because he was given an audio tape in which the chief of army staff was using insulting language against the prime minister. The tape was given to Sharif by the Intelligence Bureau (IB). REFERENCE: Sharif removed Musharraf after a phone call: Gen Butt By Azaz Syed http://archives.dawn.com/archives/35099

Jaswant Singh Vs Pervez Musharraf India-Pakistan Relations - 2

The Outsider Special India-Pakistan Relations - 2 by SalimJanMazari

When asked about his reported close relations with the father of Sharif which is said to have led to his appointment as army chief in October 1999, Ziauddin could not help smiling before he answered that he had never met Sharif senior. Ziauddin also claimed that his name as the successor to Musharraf was suggested by secretary defence; Sharif had asked the secretary as to who was the senior most general after Musharraf and this is when Ziauddin`s name came up. “On October 12 when I went to PM house I was taken by surprise when I was given the letter appointing me as COAS.” He said that he was the senior most military officer on October 12, 1999. When asked about the reports which claimed that Ziauddin had no experience of commanding a corps, he said that he had commanded an infantry brigade and had been awarded the highest grade in the war course and that he had been personnel staff officer of COAS Aslam Baig for which the best brigadier of the army is selected. Besides this, he had also served as the Gujranwala corps commander. These reports about his previous military experience had surfaced after the coup, in a bid to highlight that Sharif`s choice for COAS had been inappropriate also because Ziauddin lacked the requisite experience. However, he claimed that this was not the first time his name had been considered for COAS. Even when General Jahangir Karamat`s replacement was to be finalised in October 1998, Ziauddin`s name was proposed along with those of Lt. General Ali Quli Khan and General Musharraf. “But at that time then secretary defence, Lt. General (retired) Iftikhar Ahmed Khan supported Musharraf for the post.” Ziauddin also claimed that Musharraf was all set to be removed by the former army chief General Jahangir Karamat because the latter had received some pictures and evidence implicating Musharraf in some immoral activities but for some reasons this did not happen. Talking about his arrest, General (retired) Ziauddin said he was kept in custody for two years. He said that he was told by a junior officer that he (Ziauddin) had been removed from service. Later, he added, he was given a hand-written order that he was removed under section 16 of the Pakistan Military Law and Manual of Pakistan Military Law but he was never court martialled. According to Ziauddin, the removal orders of any senior officer are to be signed by the prime minister or the president. But his dismissal orders, which were sent to the then president, Rafiq Tarar, were not signed by the latter. Evidently, the dismissal orders must have been backdated and signed by Pervez Musharraf once he took over as president, he conjectured. Ziauddin said that Musharraf confiscated his property and deprived him of his retirement benefits. The retired ISI chief today lives in a one-canal house owned by his wife. He claimed that for most of Musharraf`s tenure he lived under strict observation and surveillance and most of his former colleagues avoided meeting him. REFERENCE: Sharif removed Musharraf after a phone call: Gen Butt By Azaz Syed http://archives.dawn.com/archives/35099

Jaswant Singh Vs Pervez Musharraf India-Pakistan Relations - 3
The Outsider Special India-Pakistan Relations - 3 by SalimJanMazari

In 2008 Lieutenant General Jamshed Gulzar Kiani's forthright revelations on a TV channel about Kargil prove what this scribe stated more than 5 years ago.Lieut General Jamshed Gulzar Kiani called Kargil a debacle:-- The Kargil Conspiracy The Nation 29 May 2003 A.H Amin - There is general consensus on the fact that military juntas are convenient agents of change employed by larger powers to bring desired policy changes in smaller countries.This is more true for Pakistan where the USA has had a record of using the military juntas as agents of change . Ayub was cultivated in the 1950s and proved his worth as USA’s collaborator par excellence in destroying democracy in Pakistan . The Zia coup was US inspired and had complete US blessings since the USA viewed Mr Z.A Bhutto as a dangerously charismatic leader capable of uniting the Islamic/Third World ! Thus Operation Foul Play of 5th July 1977 ! When Liaquat Ali Khan the then prime minister of Pakistan warned the US Ambassador to Pakistan that the Graham Report on Kashmir must be presented in the UN by 15th October 1951 he was assassinated on 16th October 1951 ! Raja Ghazanfar Ali then Pakistan’s ambassador to Iran noted that Liaquat had planned an Islamic conference to discuss Kashmir , Anglo Iranian Oil Company and Palestine ! Keeping this background in mind the fact that a deliberate conspiracy with a design to control and manipulate Pakistan’s geopolitical future with Kargil as the key point cannot be ruled out.It is possible that Kargil may have been designed as the catalyst to create a civil-military political conflict in Pakistan and as a future launching pad of a military coup. In 1998 Nawaz Sharif often criticized as a man with limited IQ took one of Pakistan’s most decisive strategic command decisions defying USA , not appeasing it as Musharraf took in September 2001 ! It is on record that Nawaz Sharif did not surrender on one telephone call from US president like General Musharraf did and defied US threats not to go on with the nuclear tests despite four telephone call threats from US president Clinton and resolutely went on with Pakistan’s Nuclear blasts ! REFERENCES: Kargil-A Military Analysis 15 June 2003 A.H Amin - Debacle-As per Pakistani ex Corps Commander Posted: Jun 2, 2008 Mon 11:04 http://www.chowk.com/ilogs/67171/47736 Courtesy: Agha H. Amin http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/

Recently Dr Qadeer Khan speaking at a function in Karachi on 3rd April 2003 stated that Nawaz even refused an offer of bribe from Clinton wherein Clinton had offered to deposite 100 Million USD in Nawaz Sharif’s personal bank account ! All evidence proves that Nawaz Sharif’s decision to go on with the Nuclear blast was a political decision and the role of the armed forces was merely that of a technocrat consultant ! It appears that from May 1998 the US policy makers came to the conclusion that Nawaz was an irresponsible man and must be taken to task.. By September 1998 it appears that the Americans had succeeded in their manipulations . The then Army chief General Karamat at this stage started pressurizing the political leadership to include the army in the political decision making . Nawaz had done his homework well.With the ISI firmly under the prime ministers command under Lieutenant General Ziauddin one senior officer Zulfiqar presently chairman WAPDA had been sent to Ukraine to find details of kick backs given to General Jahangir Karamat in the Ukraianian tank deal with Pakistan.Full evidence was prepared of Jahangirs complicity in taking kick backs.Once Karamat asserted his political ambitions Nawaz threatened him with prosecution for taking kick backs ! Thus Jahangir Karamat’s unceremonial exit from power ! USA’s likely agent of change had been removed ! Now comes Kargil. With the appointment of Musharraf as army chief the more Machiavellian geopolitical moves were planned ! Major general Javed Hassan Khan previously military attaché to Washington where many military attaches are successfully cultivated by US intelligence was posted as Commander FCNA incharge of the forces in Gilgit ,Northern Areas including Kargil.The readers may note that this officer presently the commandant of the Pakistan Army’s National Defence College , back in early 1990s made Mughal Emperor Humayun fight in Second Battle of Panipat in his book “India- A Study in Profile�? ! The fact is that Humayun was dead while Panipat was fought and Humayun had no connection with Second Battle of Panipat ! REFERENCES: Kargil-A Military Analysis 15 June 2003 A.H Amin - Debacle-As per Pakistani ex Corps Commander Posted: Jun 2, 2008 Mon 11:04 http://www.chowk.com/ilogs/67171/47736 Courtesy: Agha H. Amin http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/

Jaswant Singh Vs Pervez Musharraf India-Pakistan Relations - 4
The Outsider Special India-Pakistan Relations - 4 by SalimJanMazari

The men who planned Kargil military operation using Pakistan’s 80 Brigade to infiltrate Indian positions in Kargil Sector were instruments of a grand conspiracy to destabilize Pakistans political government which had defied the USA and wanted to make peace with India without US involvement ! Ambition of General Musharraf and his team while planning Kargil had infected the entire military thought process ! The Kargil plan was adventurist,superpower manipulated and its intrinsic violence penetrated and cut open the very arteries of the Pakistani state, spurting out in civil military strife and finally a military coup ! The heroes of those rocky pinnacles are all dead ! Sacrificed in vain ! Diabolically launched into the valleys of death by men who now are dead earnest to make peace with India but propelled by promiscuous and unadulterated ambition wanted to sabotage Nawaz Sharif’s Lahore Peace move in 1999 ! Once Vajpayee came to Lahore on Nawaz’s initiatiave in 1999 he was a vampire but once Musharraf went to Agra later Vajpayee was an angel ! At the super power level Kargil was planned with a view to ridicule Pakistan’s political leadership , embarrass the Pakistani prime minister and to create a civil military divide aimed at a military coup in Pakistan ! Why ! Someone may ask naievely ! Because the USA views the military junta in Third World countries as a more reliable collaborator agent of change than a prime minister who repeatedly defies US threats of retaliation and a 100 Million USD bribery offer ! Thus Kargil operation was launched with an ulterior motive to divide Pakistan’s political and military leaderships ! It is an unfortunate fact of history that Nawaz Sharif was mot aided by a good defence analyst team ! Those who were with him and supposedly considered defence experts were either in secret league with Nawaz’s handpicked military man or too naieve to understand the military intricacies of Kargil ! Kargil in the final analysis stands out as the meticulously planned conspiracy catalyst employed to trigger a chain of events that led to the primacy of the military junta on 12 October 1999 ! So far the Americans have succeeded ! The Pakistani Nuclear programme is in safe hands ! Pakistan , the beautiful woman in words of General Habibullah has sold herself to , not the highest bidder , but the only bidder at a relatively low price ! The military junta has divided the society ! Bought the pillars of state ! Balkanised the political parties ! Marginalised the society introducing unjust ethnic domination in the army , reduced the Sindhis into a political minority , pitched Punjab against Sindh by Machaievellian agreement to Thal Canal and is all set to strike a deal with India which would ensure that Pakistan’s military junta is given a permanent share in the political hierarchy simply because it is USA’s best and most reliable agent of change ! Life goes on ! Kargil stands as perhaps the final military effort on Pakistans part to settle the Kashmir dispute by military means. Analysis has mostly centred around political aspects of the operation while the military aspects have been largely left to the imagination of the public.Lately it has been claimed that Kargil was launched to bail out Mujahideen as a last resort ! This is an insult to the memory of the Pakistani armed forces "Volunteers" who died in that Himalayan wasteland without a funeral and in circumstances of unimaginable misery ! Kargil operation cannot be understood unless the personalities and motives of the principal characters are examined ! Every action in history is the final culmination of a personality's self perception,ambition and subconscious as well as conscious urges.  REFERENCES: Kargil-A Military Analysis 15 June 2003 A.H Amin - Debacle-As per Pakistani ex Corps Commander Posted: Jun 2, 2008 Mon 11:04 http://www.chowk.com/ilogs/67171/47736 Courtesy: Agha H. Amin http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/

 In this context the Kargil operation was born out of two key factors ! One was the personality of general Pervez Musharraf and the second was the unceremonial manner in which Nawaz Sharif ousted General Jahangir Karamat Musharraf's predecessor army chief of Pakistan Army. Musharraf as those who have served with him know which includes this scribe also has always been an intensely ambitious man ! One hallmark of his personality is that he wants to stand out as a great military commander ! Propelled by an enormous ego wherever he served he endeavoured to do something extraordinary ! However fate did not allow him the glory in battle which his other coursemates like shabbir sharif achieved ! In 1965 Musharraf was a subaltern in an artillery unit which saw little action apart from supporting operatiions by indirect fire ! The 16 SP unlike 3 SP which fired on Indian tanks with direct gunsights at Chawinda stayed in conventional artillery role ! In 1971 Musharrafs commando company was not involved in action ! Nevertheless Musharraf compensated for this lack of combat laurels by achieving laurels in army courses and in various command assignments ! His final opportunity came when he ascended to the post of army chief in a situation when the army was in a subservient position vis a vis the civilian head of state , something which was regarded by the military herarchy as worse than blasphemy ! The forced retirement of General Karamat by prime minister Nawaz Sharif was regarded as a personal defeat by the Pakistani military brass and by Musharraf who felt that he would be a far weaker army chief under a strong prime minister who had asserted civilian control over the military machine ! These two factors were the fathers of the Kargil operation ! Ambition accompanied by a perception that the Pakistani public must be convinced that the soldiers were better than politicians. Kargil at the military level was the brainchild of three men i.e General Musharraf the army chief ,Aziz the then army Chief of general Staff and Mahmud the then corps commander 10 Corps ! Musharraf and Mahmud were motivated by intense ambition to achieve military glory and Aziz was motivated by his Kashmiri ancestry plus military ambition.The person they selected to execute the operation was again one distinguished by out of proportion ambition i.e Major General Javed Hassan , author of a book in 1990s that claimed that India was on its way to disintegration and in which mughal king Humayun was resurrected from the grave to fight at Second Battle of Panipat ! In November December 1998 just one month after Musharraf's elevation to the post of army chief volunteers were asked for at the army level for an operation in Kashmir ! Many thousand volunteered including both officers and men from various units ! At no stage did any Mujahideen enter Kargil ! This is a piece of fiction and has no veracity ! These were attached to NLI units in the 80 Brigade sector for training.The principal idea of the plan was to infiltrate four battalions of NLI (Northern light Infantry) stationed in 80 Brigade Sector into Kargil Heights overlooking and dominating the Srinagar Ladakh road the lone Indian link with the Siachen and Leh Sectors ! The idea being to cut the lifeline of Indian supplies to Leh and Siachen Sectors ! Indian held heights in Kargil were to be occupied in February 1999 while Indian infantry had abandoned these heights at the approach of winter snow as an annual routine since 1948.In occupying the heights no fighting was involved ! The real issue was that of supplying Pakistani troops holding these heights which was far more difficult from the Pakistani side than from the Indian side ! REFERENCES: Kargil-A Military Analysis 15 June 2003 A.H Amin - Debacle-As per Pakistani ex Corps Commander Posted: Jun 2, 2008 Mon 11:04 http://www.chowk.com/ilogs/67171/47736 Courtesy: Agha H. Amin http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/

 Plans were kept secret and even the Commander 10 Corps Engineers of was not allowed to enter the Operations Room in 10 Corps Pindi. The distance involved in reaching the heights varied from 15 to 35 kilometres from Pakistan side over mountains as high as 13 to 19,000 feet .To do this each battalion was divided into two parts , one acting as porters taking supplies forward and one half occupying the heights . The heights were occupied as per the plan but the four units while doing so were severly exhausted ! In March-April the Indians discovered the Pakistani presence and reacted severely ! Severe fighting continued till July once the Indians finally re-captured the heights after Pakistani troops had been left to the mercy of Indian artillery and overwhelming troop concentrations as a result of the Blair House Accord ! A brief military examination of the plan reveals following weaknesses.(1) Failure to assess strategic repercussions of the operation at geopolitic and national strategic level .(2) Logistic failure in incorrect appreciation of supplying the troops . (3) Failure to understand that by occupying the heights the Indians were driven into a corner and had no choice but to retaliate , not for glory as was the Pakistani military's case but for pure military survival . (4) At a more subtle level the use of the Chora-Batalik Sector as a future spring board for Pakistani operations against India was sealed since Indians heavily fortified this sector for any future war. The Pakistani planners failed to assess that war as an instrument of policy is no longer in vogue at the international level and their temporary military success would only bring greater international censure and a negative war mongering image without any corresponding military gain at the strategic level. This scribe interviewed a former commander of FCNA and 10 Corps about logistics and General Imtiaz Warraich replied as following :-- " REFERENCES: Kargil-A Military Analysis 15 June 2003 A.H Amin - Debacle-As per Pakistani ex Corps Commander Posted: Jun 2, 2008 Mon 11:04 http://www.chowk.com/ilogs/67171/47736 Courtesy: Agha H. Amin http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/

We initiated this operation but failed to support it with comprehensive operational planning and above all buildup for essential logistic support without which no operation can succeed"......'" the principal reason for our heavy casualties and lack of progress was unimaginative and callous logistic operations to support the units". At one point the sepoys who had volunteered to fight and had come from many other infantry units to the NLI units refused to act as porters carrying supplies over 15 kilometres and were so exasperated that they defied Javed Hassan's personal orders in unit durbars to carry supplies and when Javed Hassn threw his cap on the ground threatened to march over it unless they were not employed as porters ! One such volunteer told this scribe that we had volunteered to fight ,not to act as porters ! The same fact was also mentioned in ISI chief Ziauddin Butt's secret report to Nawaz Sharif prepared by an Engineer officer on Zia's staff in ISI ! The failure to assess the "Enemy" factor was another strategic planning failure at the highest level .I asked General Warraich this question and he stated " Capture of Kargil Heights would totally stop all Indian movement to Leh and Ladakh Sectors unlike Pakistan in Siachen and Indians had no option but to do and die " ! Lust for glory and honour in battle are perfectly reasonable aspirations as long as they are accompanied by commensurate military talent in the generals who are at the helm of affairs ! This was sadly lacking in the Musharraf team who planned the operation. Their egos were many times larger than their real military talent ! By promoting an intensely ambitious man to the rank of army chief Nawaz did a favour which could only be repaid by betrayal ! The plan was based not on sound military reasoning but on burning ambition and an unrealistic desire for glory by men far away from the heat of battle ! No one above major level died , yet in a report to the military secretarys branch Javed Hassan recommended retiring 75 % of officers involved in the operation below colonel level ! The prime minister was not fully briefed because of ulterior motives ! Had the operation succeeded it would have been projected as a proof of Musharraf's Napoleonic brilliance and if it failed as it did Nawaz Sharif would have been made the scapegoat ! The operations planners were distinguished neither by loftiness of thought,nor audacity in the conduct of battle athe operational or strategic level.Thus boldness at tactiacl level was sacrificed because of operational and tactical timidity at the highest level. No one appreciated that the army men who were employed , and it is a fiction that there was a single Mujahid in Kargil , had flesha nd blood ! These men mourned by a few hundred families were sons husbands fathers and brothers ! The Kargil operation at the military level is a watershed ! Idealism that propelled many hundred to die in those Himalayan wastes is buried for good ! Now there is a new breed which dominates the army ! The ones who aim at going on lush UN secondments or to KESC,WAPDA or as well paid consulatants ! What can one conclude ! It was the human heart that failed in Kargil and this heart which failed was housed in the ribcage of men sitting in the GHQ and not on the rocky pinnacles of Kargil ! Once the supply lines were closed under Indian threat of a counter attack , these brave men all Pakistan Army regulars were abandoned to die , pounded by artillery fire , bayoneted by overwhelming numbers , weakened by starvation ! Who can hear their cries ! Our ears are covered with heaps of lies ! Truth died at Kargil ! What remains is a body guard of lies! REFERENCES: Kargil-A Military Analysis 15 June 2003 A.H Amin - Debacle-As per Pakistani ex Corps Commander Posted: Jun 2, 2008 Mon 11:04 http://www.chowk.com/ilogs/67171/47736 Courtesy: Agha H. Amin http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/

Playing with basic law: Devolution Plan of Musharraf - 1

BBC's Tim Sebastian had ruined Tanveer Naqvi Lt. General [General Musharraf's National Reconstruction Bureau's Chief Planner] and his so-called Devolution Plan in one of his program Hard Talk. One must have joined issue with Lt.-Gen (Rtd) Tanvir Naqvi when he says that the army has ``the right`` to amend the Constitution. Speaking on the BBC, the chief of the National Reconstruction Bureau, however, tried to soften the impact of his remarks by saying that the government was not going to amend ``the whole Constitution.`` This evades the real issue, which is: does the army have a right at all to amend the nation`s basic law?

As per Daily Dawn Columnist Mr Ayaz Amir [dated 21 April 2000 i.e. One year after Illegal Martial Law Regime of General Musharraf and Co] had written on the cronies in General Musharraf's Cabinet http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/20000421.htm

"QUOTE"


But to return to the wizards of this dispensation, the strangest case is that of Lt-Gen Tanvir Naqvi and his district devolution plan. No kidding, Gen Naqvi is a bright officer. Whoever heard him speaking during the Zarb-I-Momin military exercises when General Aslam Beg was army chief came away greatly impressed. But the profession of arms is one thing, politics quite another. Has he ever cast his vote in an election? Has he ever been near a village polling station in his life? I doubt it. If a delegation of NATO commanders were visiting Pakistan the best person to address them from the present crop of serving or retired generals would be Gen Naqvi. But if an election plan were being put together I would keep Gen Naqvi at a distance of a hundred miles.


SDPI Research and News Bulletin


“Greater Provincial Autonomy”


http://www.sdpi.org/help/research_and_news_bulletin/nbjanfeb04/articles/In%20Retrospect.htm

During 2004 ANP Senator Asfandyar Wali said when Gen Pervez Musharraf assumed power and presented his seven- point agenda, there was a little hope as it contained the issue of provincial disharmony. However, he said, the devolution plan presented by Lt-Gen (retired) Tanveer Naqvi even snatched a little bit autonomy which the provinces had been enjoying. He said the devolution should be from federal to provinces and then from provinces to districts. By putting the districts directly under the federal system for six years, the provincial governments have been made post offices and the chief ministers should be called postmasters general, he added.

"UNQUOTE"

Lets have a look at the so-called Refroms thrusted down the throats of 170 Million Pakistanis by A MARTIAL LAW REGIME during 1999-2007. International Crisis Group had published a detailed and an impartial report in 2004. For kind perusal

Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression? 22 March 2004

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2549&l=1

DEVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 22 March 2004


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Pakistan's military government launched a campaign for political devolution in 2000 that it said was aimed at transferring administrative and financial power to local governments. The scheme was to strengthen local control and accountability and, according to President Pervez Musharraf, "empower the impoverished" . In practice, however, it has undercut established political parties and drained power away from the provinces while doing little to minimise corruption or establish clear accountability at a local level. The reforms, far from enhancing democracy, have strengthened military rule and may actually raise the risks of internal conflict. Under the Devolution of Power Plan announced in August 2000, local governments were to be elected on a non-party basis in phased voting between December 2000 and July 2001. District and sub-district governments have since been installed in 101 districts, including four cities. Operating under its respective provincial Local Government Ordinance 2001, each has its Nazim and Naib Nazim (mayor and deputy mayor), elected council and administration. Like previous local government plans, Musharraf's called for re-establishing elected local councils at district and sub-district levels.

It promised substantial autonomy for elected local officials and, most notably, placed an elected official as overall head of district administration, management and development, reversing a century-old system that subordinated elected politicians to bureaucrats. Musharraf's scheme ostensibly aimed at establishing the foundations of genuine local democracy. However, the main rationale for devolution was and remains regime legitimacy and survival. Aside from the widespread allegations of rigging and manipulation that have shadowed them, the non-partisan
nature of the local elections has exacerbated ethnic, caste and tribal divisions and undermined the organisational coherence of political parties. Devolution, in fact, has proved little more than a
cover for further centralised control over the lower levels of government. Despite the rhetoric from Islamabad of empowerment, local governments have only nominal powers. Devolution from the centre directly to the local levels, moreover, negates the normal concept of decentralisation since Pakistan's principal federal units, its four provinces, have been bypassed. The misuse of local government officials during the April 2002 presidential referendum and the October 2002 general elections has left little doubt that these governments were primarily instituted to create a pliant political elite that could help root the military's power in local politics and displace its traditional civilian adversaries. Friction is growing between various levels of government, especially since the military transferred power, at least formally, to the central and provincial governments that were formed after the 2002 elections. These tensions are partly the result of the manner in which the devolution plan was devised and implemented in the absence of elected officials and against the strong opposition of the major political parties, civil society and media. Despite its lack of domestic legitimacy, the devolution plan has considerable support from donors, who mistakenly believe it is advancing democracy and building down military rule.

For now, the military's backing as well as this external support works in its favour. But low domestic acceptance undermines its long-term prospects, and the military's political engineering that accompanies it is widening divisions at the local and provincial levels. Some of these could well lead to greater domestic violence and instability.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Pakistan:

1. Demonstrate a commitment to real political devolution by:

(a) placing the Local Government Ordinance (LGO) before each provincial government for review to create the necessary political acceptance of the scheme;

(b) holding local government elections on a party basis, with direct polls for district officials; and

(c) refraining from imposing political discipline on local officials and misusing them for political ends such as partisan electioneering.

2. Take steps toward decentralisation from federal to provincial levels by:

(d) reducing the number of federal ministries involved in and hence capable of exercising control over local government; and

(e) allowing the representation and participation of provincial and national assembly legislators in key local government bodies such as the district development advisory committees.

3. Devolve administrative and fiscal powers to local units, in particular by:

(f) giving district governments greater control over budgetary resources and increasing allocations for development, especially in poorer districts; and

(g) linking provincial population-based fiscal transfers to each district's level of poverty, fiscal
and development needs.

4. Improve the delivery of justice in local government through security sector reform, notably by:

(h) expediting the formation and operationalisation of district, provincial and national safety commissions and police complaints authorities; and

(i) allocating more resources and staff to the district police.

To UNDP, the international financial institutions and key donor governments, including the U.S.:

5. Encourage the Pakistan government strongly to devolve political, administrative and financial
responsibilities to the provinces.

6. Re-evaluate and reorder devolution program assistance in order to emphasise sustained help for wider institutional reforms that address the longstanding problems of poverty, economic growth, public sector corruption and inefficiency.

7. Link support for devolution to progress on police reforms and provide budgetary support and other assistance to improve service incentives and conditions and build capacity for investigation and prosecution functions.

DEVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN: REFORM OR REGRESSION?

I. INTRODUCTION:

On 14 August 2000, President Musharraf unveiled his government's Local Government Plan, intended to build genuine democratic institutions and empower the people at the grassroots. The main stated objectives are political devolution, administrative decentralisation, and the redistribution of resources to local governments. In his words:

The basic issue is to empower the impoverished and make the people the master of their own destiny. We want to introduce essence of democracy and not sham democracy, which promotes the privileged. Devolution will bring far-reaching consequences and will change [the] fate of the country. In reviving local governments, Musharraf was following in the footsteps of his predecessors. Successive military rulers have typically instituted lower tiers of government as a
substitute for democratisation at the provincial and national levels. Local governments have mainly been used to:

(1) depoliticise governance;

(2) create a new political elite to challenge and undermine the political opposition;

(3) demonstrate the democratic credentials of a regime to domestic and external audiences;

and

(4) undermine federalism by circumventing constitutional provisions for provincial political, administrative, and fiscal autonomy.

Like his predecessors, Musharraf quickly seized upon local government. Within a month of his coup, he set up a National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) under a retired general to develop a scheme for devolution. Drafted with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the "Local Government Plan 2000" (LG Plan 2000) called for reestablishment of elected councils at the sub-district and district levels just like President and Field Marshal Ayub's Basic Democracy and President and General Zia-ul-Haq's local bodies. But unlike previous systems, Musharraf's plan promised to vest extensive political and administrative authority in district and sub-district governments by providing for matching federal and provincial grants to help them fulfil their new responsibilities. Each level was to have an elected nazim and naib nazim (mayor and deputy mayor), elected councils and administration. For the first time in Pakistan's history, elected officials were to be placed at the apex of district government, with executive powers and responsibilities for law and order to "ensure the supremacy of the political leadership over the administration" . While the ostensible aim of Musharraf's devolution scheme may be the transfer of administrative, political and financial authority to the lower tiers of government, the reality is starkly different. Local governments in fact exercise only nominal autonomy with respect to administrative and financial matters in their respective jurisdictions. Sweeping as it looks, the new system's telltale mandate is in the requirement that all local elections must be partyless. Local governments have proved to be key instruments in the military's manipulation of the Pakistani polity to ensure regime survival. District nazims (mayors) used public funds and other state resources to stage pro-Musharraf rallies during the April 2002 presidential referendum and to support the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) (PML-Q)'s parliamentary candidates in the 2002 national polls. Local governments have also had significant utility for the military's divide-and rule tactics. By juxtaposing more than 100 new local governments between it and the provinces, the centre, where the military continues to maintain its grip on the levers of state power, has been strengthened at the cost of Pakistan's four federating units. If Pakistan's chequered political history is any barometer, the question of devolution cannot be addressed in isolation from the larger issue of provincial autonomy. Devolution of power, authority and resources is central to the viability of any multi-ethnic, multi-regional state. Although the federal principle is enshrined in the 1973 constitution, Pakistan's civil-military ruling elite has been averse to devolving powers to the provincial level. Instead, it has often used the administrative and coercive powers at its disposal to extend the centre's control over the provinces.

Since military-inspired devolution is directed to local levels, it enhances tensions between the centre and the provinces. Such schemes undermine the very concept of federalism and increase ethno-regional rifts. This centralisation of power and authority led to Pakistan's break-up in 1971, when the East wing rebelled against the centre's political control and fiscal exploitation. In present-day Pakistan, ethnic tensions, fuelled by bitter resentment against a Punjabi-dominated military, are rising in the smaller federal units of Sindh, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). In the Punjab itself, Pakistan's largest province, the military has bargained opportunistically along biradari (caste, tribal, sub-regional) lines and unleashed equally divisive forces by deliberately suppressing party politics. This report examines President Musharraf's devolution scheme in relation to its stated political, administrative, financial, and law enforcement objectives and assesses the impact on political stability, federal-provincial relations, and ethno-regional relations.

II. BACKGROUND

A. GENERAL AYUB KHAN'S BASIC DEMOCRACY

While rudimentary forms had existed in parts of British India, the colonial state's need for centralised, authoritarian rule mitigated against the development of any real elected system of local government. Pakistan inherited the British system in which the deputy commissioner (DC) (administrative head of the district) virtually controlled all facets of district government: administration, development, revenue and criminal justice. Upon assuming power in 1958, Pakistan's first military ruler, General Ayub Khan, opted for an elaborate, though nominally empowered, local bodies scheme. Having suspended the constitution, the regime needed for its survival to create at least a semblance of democratic representation at some level. In 1959, Ayub formally introduced his "Basic Democracy" (BD) plan, declaring that the nation was not yet ready for full democracy. "The scheme of Basic Democracies" , he said, "has been evolved after a careful study of the experience of other countries and of the special conditions prevailing in our land". Under Basic Democracy, the country was divided into 80,000 wards (single member constituencies of 1,000 to 1,200 people each) to elect a "Basic Democrat" on a non-party basis. Local councils were created at the district and sub-district levels of union, tehsil (West Pakistan) and thana (East Pakistan). Roughly half the members of local councils were officially nominated, not directly elected. While these councils received state funds to perform municipal and civic functions, the district administrative bureaucracy retained virtually total authority over them, including the powers to overrule council decisions and suspend the execution of their orders. Besides serving on the local councils, Basic Democrats constituted the Electoral College that selected the president. In 1960, Ayub used this new institution to have himself confirmed as president for five years through a referendum that gave him a 95.6 per cent vote. Having abrogated the 1956 constitution, Ayub promulgated a new one in March 1962. Federal in principle, it established a unitary, presidential government. As president, Ayub arrogated to himself unchallenged executive powers and the authority to dismiss the national and provincial legislatures.

Provincial autonomy was circumscribed further through the appointment of governors, answerable to the centre. Basic Democrats were retained as the Electoral College for both the President and members of the National Assembly and provincial legislatures. In creating these local bodies, Ayub's intent was not to decentralise or democratise authority but to extend centralised control over the federal units through a new grass roots political base. The scheme was remarkably well orchestrated for extending direct patronage to, and manipulation of local power structures. Controlling access to the state's resources, the district bureaucracy was able to
penetrate and manipulate local politics by dealing directly with the new elite, bypassing politicians and political parties and thus isolating them from the general electorate. In this way, governance was depoliticised and localised under the control of centrally appointed bureaucrats. At the end of his presidential tenure in 1965, Ayub sought re-election in a contested poll. While he defeated his principal civilian opponent, Fatima Jinnah, allegations of electoral rigging and manipulation from the opposition further weakened the declining credibility of his local government system. The denial of provincial autonomy and systematic suppression of political views fuelled domestic dissent and, combined with skewed economic policies that mostly benefited a small industrial elite, exacerbated polarisation along regional, class and ethnic lines. In East Pakistan, resentment over denial of economic and political autonomy by a Punjabi-dominated civil-military establishment galvanised a popular movement for provincial autonomy under Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's Awami League. In the western wing, lack of opportunity for political participation and coercive authoritarian rule bred alienation and frustration among ethno-regional groups, urban intelligentsia, students and labour unions. By 1969, violent protests and countrywide strikes crippled Ayub's authority. As it declined, the military high command withdrew its support and handed power to his army chief, General Yahya Khan. One of Yahya's first steps was to scrap "Basic Democracy". Lacking legitimacy and public sanction, Ayub's discredited system did not survive its creator. But Ayub's political engineering, aimed at legitimising the military's control over politics at every level, undermined federalism, exacerbated regional frictions and culminated in civil war and dismemberment of the Pakistani state.

B. GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM

In July 1977, the army under General Zia-ul-Haq deposed the elected Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ironically, local government had remained defunct during the brief democratic interlude from 1972 to 1977. Although the PPP government promulgated a People's Local Government Ordinance in 1975, the elections were never held. Like Ayub, Zia saw merit in instituting local bodies in order to cloak a highly centralised, authoritarian system of government under the garb of decentralisation. In September 1979, he revived local governments through provincial ordinances. Unlike with Ayub's BDs, some functions of provincial governments were delegated to local bodies but they were to operate under provincial control. Zia established three tiers of local government in rural
areas: union councils (consisting of villages), tehsil (sub-district) committees and zila (district) councils. In urban areas, town committees were established for towns with populations between 5,000 and 30,000; municipal committees for towns with a population up to 250,000, and municipal/metropoli tan corporations for major cities (Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi) with populations in excess of 250,000. Elections to union councils/town committees were held in 1979, 1983, and 1987 on a non-party basis, with 80 per cent of members elected by universal adult suffrage and 20 per cent reserved for peasants, workers, tenants, and women. Councillors served as the electoral college for choosing the heads (chairmen and vice chairmen) of zila and tehsil councils.

The main responsibility of the local councils was to manage small-scale public welfare and development activities (water supply, sanitation, maintenance and management of hospitals and schools) in their jurisdictions. The list of council functions was extensive but the revenue base was limited despite the delegation of some taxation powers by provincial governments. The bulk of their funds came as federal transfers and to a lesser extent allocations from provincial Annual
Development Programs (ADP). Similar to the BD scheme, Zia's local councils were not entrusted with general administration, law and order or policing, which were retained by civil bureaucrats (commissioners and deputy commissioners) who also served as ex officio, non-voting, members of these councils. Unlike the BD system, Zia's local government officials did not form an electoral college for provincial or national assemblies or the presidency. In the first local bodies elections, in September 1979, the Awam Dost (Friends of the People) group, a cover name for the Pakistan People's Party, secured significant representation. Their success was a rude shock to the military government. To forestall their victory, Zia postponed indefinitely national elections scheduled for 17 and 20 November 1979. The primary motivations for Zia to create local bodies was to legitimise the military government, broaden its support base beyond the military, and use the newly created and pliable local elite to undermine its political opponents. In essence, the local bodies provided the "civilian base of his military government, supporting it in return for economic and political benefits". Gradually, these local governments became a vast mechanism for extending state patronage to pro-military politicians, providing the military government with ample scope for staging favourable, non-partisan elections. In due course, the new local elites formed the core of Zia's rubber stamp parliament, elected in non-party national elections in 1985. But these local bodies could not assuage popular demands for participation or bestow any lasting legitimacy on the military government.

Eventually, a revolt within the parliament triggered by the military's refusal to share any meaningful authority with elected politicians led to dissolution of the democratic façade it had so assiduously manufactured. Tainted by its association with a military dictator, Zia's local government scheme was allowed to decay under elected governments in the 1990s. Local bodies were dissolved in the NWFP in 1991, in Sindh in 1992 and a year later in the Punjab province. While corruption and mismanagement were often cited, the primary reason for scrapping these local bodies was almost always political. Wary of the electoral influence of local officials, elected governments preferred to run local councils through appointed administrators, regular federal and/or provincially appointed civil servants. "Unfortunately, elected governments were at loggerheads with local bodies", says a senior PPP politician, "because they wanted to keep local politics under control for fear of losing out to their rivals".

Cont/P-2