Tuesday, March 30, 2010

Judicial Dictatorship & Attorney-Client Privilege.

ISLAMABAD: Supreme Court has ordered arrest of former DG FIA Finance Ahmad Riaz Shaikh and sent him to jail. The court has also ordered NAB to seized assets of Riaz Shaikh and submission of report within three days. The apex court has also restored the punishment of five years imprisonment and Rs. 20 million. - EARLIER - ISLAMABAD: A seven-member of the SC headed by Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice Iftikhar Muhammed Chaudhry heard the corruption case against Riaz Sheikh, FIA’s additional DG Finance. Court voiced annoyance at Acting Chairman of NAB for not appearing before the court. When he came to the court, the SC ordered him to present by this afternoon the report on the implementation of the NRO verdict The CJ addressed the NAB acting chief, ‘If you fear, then go home. You are doing your job and want to get the SC slurred.’
[Justice (R) Rasheed A. Rizvi]The CJ Chaudhry expressed surprise saying how Riaz continued in a high office despite being accused of massive corruption. The court also called Home Secretary. The court also scolded the Rasheed A Rizvi for pleading the case for Ahmed Riaz Sheikh. The CJ said the court ordered to restore the accountability cases to October 5, 2007 position; however, the matter is being slighted with letters being addressed to the Attorney General and sometimes to the Law Secretary. - As per Daily Dawn - The court questioned Advocate Rasheed A. Razvi for pleading the case of Mr Sheikh while being the president of a bar association. The counsel replied that he strongly believed in the established principle that justice should not only be done but appear to have been done. REFERENCES: NAB chief to be jailed for defying court order: SC warns Updated at: 1245 PST, Monday, March 29, 2010 http://thenews.jang.com.pk/updates.asp?id=101739 SC irked by govt failure to implement NRO verdict By Nasir Iqbal Tuesday, 30 Mar, 2010 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/sc-irked-by-govt-failure-to-implement-nro-verdict-030 SC sends ex-FIA official to jail Updated at: 1358 PST, Tuesday, March 30, 2010 http://www.geo.tv/3-30-2010/61999.htm


DAILY JANG UPDATE: Monday, March 29, 2010, Rabi-us-Sani 12, 1431 A.H http://www.jang.com.pk/jang/mar2010-daily/29-03-2010/u25718.htm

The so-called Upholder of Law Openly Violate Constitution and Law themselves by asking questions from an Attorney of a Defendant "The court also scolded the Rasheed A Rizvi for pleading the case for Ahmed Riaz Sheikh"

Whereas 1973 Constitution of Pakistan says;


nor shall he be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Reference: 9. security of person. 10. Safeguards as to arrest and detention. PART II Fundamental Rights and Principles of Policy Chapter 1. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part2.ch1.html


Pakistani Judiciary since the decision against NRO often quote and cite International Cases [regarding bringing back the looted national wealth] to justify its decision against NRO but the same Judiciary often forget an old International practice i.e. Attorney-Client Privilege, a note is as under:


Attorney-Client Privilege


The ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE is an evidentiary rule that protects both attorneys and their clients from being compelled to disclose confidential communications between them made for the purpose of furnishing or obtaining legal advice or assistance. The privilege is designed to foster frank, open, and uninhibited discourse between attorney and client so that the client's legal needs are competently addressed by a fully prepared attorney who is cognizant of all the relevant information the client can provide. The attorney-client privilege may be raised during any type of legal proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative, and at any time during those proceedings, pre-trial, during trial, or post-trial.

The privilege dates back to ancient Rome, where governors were forbidden from calling their advocates as witnesses out of concern that the governors would lose confidence in their own defenders. In 1577 the first evidentiary privilege recognized by the English COMMON LAW was the attorney-client privilege. The English common law protected the confidential nature of attorney-client communications, regardless of whether those communications took place in public or in private. The American colonies adopted this approach to the attorney-client privilege, and Delaware codified the privilege in its first constitution in 1776.

The Elements, Scope, and Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege

Elements of the Attorney-Client Privilege

Because the attorney-client privilege often prevents disclosure of information that would be relevant to a legal proceeding, courts are cautious when examining objections grounded in the privilege. Most courts generally require that certain elements be demonstrated before finding that the privilege applies. Although the elements vary from JURISDICTION

to jurisdiction, one often cited recitation of the elements was articulated in U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357 (D.Mass. 1950), where the court enumerated the following five-part test: (1) the person asserting the privilege must be a client or someone attempting to establish a relationship as a client; (2) the person with whom the client communicated must be an attorney and acting in the capacity as an attorney at the time of the communication; (3) the communication must be between the attorney and client exclusively; (4) the communication must be for the purpose of securing a legal opinion, legal services, or assistance in some legal proceeding, and not for the purpose of committing a crime or FRAUD; and (5) the privilege may be claimed or waived by the client only.

Scope and Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege

The five-part test is typically the starting point in a court's analysis of a claim for privilege. Each element appears straight-forward on its face but can be tricky to apply, especially when the client is a corporation and not a natural person. CORPORATE clients raise questions as to who may speak for the corporation and assert the attorney-client privilege on behalf of the entity as a whole. Some courts have ruled that the attorney-client privilege may only be asserted by the upper management of a corporation. A vast majority of courts, however, have ruled that the privilege may be asserted not only by a corporation's officers, directors, and board members, but also by any employee who has communicated with an attorney at the request of a corporate superior for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584, (U.S. 1981).

Whether the client is a natural person or a corporation, the attorney-client privilege belongs only to the client and not to the attorney. As a result, clients can prevent attorneys from divulging their secrets, but attorneys have no power to prevent their clients from choosing to waive the privilege and testifying in court, talking to the police, or otherwise sharing confidential attorney-client information with third parties not privy to the confidential discussions. Clients may waive attorney-client privilege expressly by their words or implicitly by their conduct, but a court will only find that the privilege has been waived if there is a clear indication that the client did not take steps to keep the communications confidential. An attorney's or a client's inadvertent disclosure of confidential information to a third party will not normally suffice to constitute WAIVER. If a client decides against waiving the privilege, the attorney may then assert the privilege on behalf of the client to shield both the client and the attorney from having to divulge confidential information shared during their relationship.

In most situations, courts can easily determine whether the person with whom a given conversation took place was in fact an attorney. However, in a few cases courts are asked to decide whether the privilege should apply to a communication with an unlicensed or disbarred attorney. In such instances, courts will frequently find that the privilege applies if the client reasonably believes that he or she was communicating with a licensed attorney. State v. Berberich, 267 Kan. 215, 978 P.2d 902 (Kan. 1999). But courts in some jurisdictions have relaxed this standard, holding that the privilege applies to communications between clients and unlicensed lay persons who represent them in administrative proceedings. Woods on Behalf of T.W. v. New Jersey Dept. of Educ., 858 F.Supp. 51 (D.N.J. 1993).

Although many courts emphasize that the attorney-client privilege should be strictly applied to communications between attorney and client, the attorney-client privilege does extend beyond the immediate attorney-client relationship to include an attorney's partners, associates, and office staff members (e.g., secretaries, file clerks, telephone operators, messengers, law clerks) who work with the attorney in the ordinary course of their normal duties. However, the presence of a third party who is not a member of the attorney's firm will sometimes defeat a claim for privilege, even if that third person is a member of the client's family.

Thus, one court ruled that in the absence of any suggestion that a criminal defendant's father was a confidential agent of the DEFENDANT or that the father's presence was reasonably necessary to aid or protect the defendant's interests, the presence of the defendant's father at a PRETRIAL CONFERENCE between the defendant and his attorney invalidated the attorney-client privilege with respect to the conference. State v. Fingers, 564 S.W.2d 579 (Mo.App. 1978). In the corporate setting, the presence of a client's sister defeated a claim for attorney-client privilege that involved a conversation between a client-company's president and the company's attorney, since the sister was neither an officer nor director of the company and did not possess an ownership interest in the company. Cherryvale Grain Co. v. First State Bank of Edna, 25 Kan.App.2d 825, 971 P.2d 1204 (Kan.App. 1999).

Many courts have described attorney-client confidences as "inviolate." Wesp v. Everson, — P.3d ——, 2001 WL 1218767 (Colo. 2001). However, this description is misleading. The attorney-client privilege is subject to several exceptions. Federal Rule of EVIDENCE 501 states that "the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship... should be determined on a case-by-case basis." In examining claims for privilege against objections that an exception should be made in a particular case, courts will balance the benefits to be gained by protecting the sanctity of attorney-client confidences against the probable harms caused by denying the opposing party access to potentially valuable information.

The crime-fraud exception is one of the oldest exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications made in connection with a client seeking advice on how to commit a criminal or FRAUDULENT

act. Nor will a client's statement of intent to commit a crime be deemed privileged, even if the client was not seeking advice about how to commit it. The attorney-client privilege is ultimately designed to serve the interests of justice by insulating attorney-client communications made in furtherance of adversarial proceedings. But the interests of justice are not served by forcing attorneys to withhold information that might help prevent criminal or fraudulent acts. Consequently, in nearly all jurisdictions attorneys can be compelled to disclose such information to a court or other investigating authorities.

A party seeking DISCOVERY of privileged communications based upon the crime-fraud exception must make a threshold showing that the legal advice was obtained in furtherance of the fraudulent activity and was closely related to it. The party seeking disclosure does not satisfy this burden merely by alleging that a crime or fraud has occurred and then asserting that disclosure of privileged communications might help prove the crime or fraud. There must be a specific showing that a particular document or communication was made in furtherance of the client's alleged crime or fraud.

The fact that an attorney-client relationship exists between two persons is itself not typically privileged. U.S. v. Leventhal, 961 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1992). However, if disclosure of an attorney-client relationship could prove incriminating to the client, some courts will enforce the privilege. In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975). Names of clients and the amounts paid in fees to their attorneys are not normally privileged. Nor will clients usually be successful in asserting the privilege against attorneys who are seeking to introduce confidential information in a lawsuit brought by a client accusing the attorney of wrongdoing. In such instances courts will not allow clients to use the attorney-client privilege as a weapon to silence the attorneys who have represented them. Courts will allow both parties to have their say in MALPRACTICE suits brought by clients against their former attorneys.

State Rules Governing Attorney-Client Privilege

The body of law governing the attorney-client privilege is comprised of federal and state legislation, court rules, and CASE LAW. Below is a sampling of state court decisions decided at least in part based on their own state's court rules, case law, or legislation.

ARKANSAS: Attempts by both an attorney and his secretary to communicate with the client regarding his pending criminal case were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Rules of Evid., Rule 502(b). Byrd v. State, 326 Ark. 10, 929 S.W.2d 151 (Ark. 1996).

ALABAMA: Where a defendant asserted that his guilty pleas to robbery charges were the product of his defense counsel's COERCION, the absence of the defense counsel's TESTIMONY to rebut the defendant's testimony could not be excused by any assertion of the attorney-client privilege. Walker v. State, 2001 WL 729190 (Ala.Crim.App., 2001).

ARIZONA: By asserting that its personnel understood the law on stacking coverage for under insured and uninsured motorist claims, the insurer affirmatively injected legal knowledge of its claims managers into the insureds' BAD FAITH action and thus effectively waived the attorney-client privilege as to any communications between the insurer and its COUNSEL regarding the propriety of the insurer's policy of denying coverage. State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co. v. Lee, 199 Ariz. 52, 13 P.3d 1169 (Ariz. 2000).

CALIFORNIA: The attorney-client privilege is not limited to litigation-related communications, since the applicable provisions of the state Evidence Code do not use the terms "litigation" or "legal communications" in their description of privileged disclosures but instead specifically refer to "the accomplishment of the purpose" for which the lawyer was consulted. West's Ann.Cal.Evid.Code §§ 912, 952. STI Outdoor v. Superior Court, 91 Cal.App.4th 334, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2001).

ILLINOIS: To prevail on an attorney-client privilege claim in a corporate context, a claimant must first show that a statement was made by someone in the corporate control group, meaning that group of employees whose advisory role to top management in a particular area is such that a decision would not normally be made without their advice or opinion and whose opinion, in fact, forms the basis of any final decision by those with actual authority. Hayes v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 323 Ill.App.3d 474, 752 N.E.2d 470, 256 Ill.Dec. 590 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2001).

MAINE: Counsel's inadvertent disclosure of a memorandum to opposing counsel, which summarized a telephone conference between counsel and his client, did not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, where the document was mistakenly placed in boxes of unprivileged documents that were available to opposing counsel to photocopy and the memorandum in question was labeled "confidential and legally privileged." Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 742 A.2d 933, 1999 ME 196 (Me. 1999).

MASSACHUSETTS: Hospital personnel were neither the defendant's nor his attorney's agents when they conducted a blood-alcohol test on the defendant at the attorney's request for sole purpose of gathering potentially exculpatory evidence, and thus the state's GRAND JURY SUBPOENA of the test results did not violate the attorney-client privilege. Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 744 N.E.2d 614 (Mass. 2001).

MICHIGAN: A Court of Appeals reviews de novo a decision regarding whether the attorney-client privilege may be asserted. Koster v. June's Trucking, Inc., 244 Mich.App. 162, 625 N.W.2d 82 (Mich.App. 2000).

MINNESOTA: The presence of the defendant's wife at a joint meeting in which the defendant, his attorney, and his wife discussed financial aspects of a possible DIVORCE prevented the attorney-client privilege from attaching. State v. Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 2001).

NEW JERSEY: The person asserting the attorney-client privilege bears the burden to prove it applies to any given communication. Horon Holding Corp. v. McKenzie, 341 N.J.Super. 117, 775 A.2d 111 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2001)

NEW YORK: A client's intent to commit a crime is not a protected confidence or secret for the purposes of the attorney-client privilege. N.Y.Ct.Rules, § 1200.19. People v. DePallo, 96 N.Y.2d 437, 754 N.E.2d 751, 729 N.Y.S.2d 649 (N.Y. 2001).

NORTH DAKOTA: A communication is confidential, for the purposes of determining the applicability of attorney-client privilege, if it is not intended to be disclosed to persons other than those to whom the disclosure is made during the course of rendering professional legal services or to those reasonably necessary for transmission of the communication during the course of rendering professional legal services. Rules of Evid., Rule 502(a)(5). Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Huether, 454 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1990).

OHIO: The attorney-client privilege is not absolute, and thus the mere fact that an attorney-client relationship exists does not raise a presumption of confidentiality of all communications made between the attorney and client. Radovanic v. Cossler, 140 Ohio App.3d 208, 746 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 2000).

TEXAS: Physicians who were defending against a malpractice action were not entitled to discover, under fraud exception to attorney-client privilege, material relating to a SETTLEMENT between the plaintiffs and another defendant, although the physicians alleged that disparate distribution of the settlement proceeds was a sham intended to deprive the physicians of settlement credit, since there was no evidence that the plaintiffs made or intended to make hidden distributions. Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 192.5(a); Rules of Evid., Rule 503(d)(1). IN RE Lux, 52 S.W.3d 369 (Tex.App. 2001).

WASHINGTON: The federal constitutional foundation for the attorney-client privilege is found in the Fifth Amendment PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as these rights can be protected only if there is candor and free and open discussion between client and counsel. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 6, 14. In re Recall of Lakewood City Council Members, 144 Wash.2d 583, 30 P.3d 474 (Wash. 2001).

Additional Resources

American Jurisprudence. West Group, 1998.

CyberSpace Law Center: Privacy: Attorney-Client Privilege.

West's Encyclopedia of American Law. West Group, 1998.


American Bar Association
740 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-1019 USA
Phone: (202) 662-1000
Fax: (816) 471-2995
URL: http://www.abanet.org/
Primary Contact: Robert J. Saltzman, President

National Lawyers Association
P.O. Box 26005 City Center Square
Kansas City, MO 64196 USA
Phone: (800) 471-2994
Fax: (202) 662-1777
URL: http://www.nla.org/
Primary Contact: Mario Mandina, Chief Executive Officer

National Organization of Bar Counsel
515 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 64196 USA
Phone: (202) 638-1501
Fax: (202) 662-1777
URL: http://www.nobc.org/
Primary Contact: Robert J. Saltzman, President


Lawyers shout slogans in support of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry in Lahore on December 17, 2009, as they celebrate the Supreme Court's decision on the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). — AFP

The NRO case, Dr Mubashar Hasan and others versus the federation, has once again stirred a hornet’s nest. There is thunderous applause for bringing the accused plunderers and criminals to justice and widespread speculation on the resignation of the president. Very little analysis is being done on the overall effect of the judgment itself. While, the NRO can never be defended even on the plea of keeping the system intact, the Supreme Court judgment has wider political implications. It may not, in the long run, uproot corruption from Pakistan but will make the apex court highly controversial.

Witch-hunts, rather than the impartial administration of justice, will keep the public amused. The norms of justice will be judged by the level of humiliation meted out to the wrongdoers, rather than strengthening institutions capable of protecting the rights of the people. There is no doubt that impunity for corruption and violence under the cover of politics and religion has demoralised the people, fragmented society and taken several lives. It needs to be addressed but through consistency, without applying different standards, and by scrupulously respecting the dichotomy of powers within statecraft. In this respect the fine lines of the judgment do not bode well.

The lawyers’ movement and indeed the judiciary itself has often lamented that the theory of separation of powers between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive has not been respected. The NRO judgment has disturbed the equilibrium by creating an imbalance in favour of the judiciary. The judgment has also sanctified the constitutional provisions of a dictator that placed a sword over the heads of the parliamentarians. Moreover, it has used the principle of 'closed and past transactions' selectively. It is not easy to comprehend the logic of the Supreme Court that in a previous judgment it went beyond its jurisdiction to grant life to ordinances — including the NRO — protected by Musharraf’s emergency to give an opportunity to parliament to enact them into law. If the NRO was violative of fundamental rights and illegal ab initio, then whether the parliament enacted it or not it would have eventually been struck down. By affording parliament an opportunity to own up to the NRO appears to be a jeering gesture unbecoming of judicial propriety.

The NRO judgment has struck down the law also for being violative of Article 62(f), which requires a member of parliament to be, 'Sagacious, righteous and non-profligate and honest and ameen'. Hence, the bench will now judge the moral standing of parliamentarians on these stringent standards set by the notorious Zia regime. This article of the constitution has always been considered undemocratic and a tool to keep members of parliament insecure. If parliamentarians, who also go through the rigorous test of contesting elections in the public domain, are to be subjected to such exacting moral standards then the scrutiny of judges should be higher still.
After all, judges are selected purely on the value of their integrity and skills. Judges who erred in the past seek understanding on the plea that they subsequently suffered and have made amends. Should others also not be given the same opportunity to turn over a new leaf? How will sagacity and non-profligate behaviour be judged?

Apart from Dr Mubashar Hasan, not even the petitioners of the NRO case are likely to pass the strenuous test laid down in Article 62 of the constitution. This could well beg the question whether it is wise for those in glass houses to be pelting stones.The judgment goes much further. It has assumed a monitoring rather than a supervisory role over NAB cases. In India, the supreme court directly interfered in the Gujarat massacre but it did not make monitoring cells within the superior courts. Is it the function of the superior courts to sanctify the infamous NAB ordinance, the mechanism itself and to restructure it with people of their liking? It is true that the public has greater trust in the judiciary than in any other institution of the state, but that neither justifies encroachment on the powers of the executive or legislature nor does it assist in keeping an impartial image of the judiciary. The long-term effects of the judgment could also be counter-productive; perpetrators are often viewed as victims if justice is not applied in an even-handed manner and if administered in undue haste with overwhelming zeal. It is therefore best to let the various intuitions of state take up their respective responsibilities because eventually it is the people who are the final arbiters of everyone’s performance. REFERENCE: Another aspect of the judgment By Asma Jahangir Saturday, 19 Dec, 2009 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/another-aspect-of-the-judgment-929

’عدلیہ غیر جانب دار نہیں رہی‘

آخری وقت اشاعت: جمعـء, 19 فروری, 2010, 05:58 GMT 10:58 PST

’عدلیہ دائرہ کار سے تجاوز کر گئی ہے‘

علی سلمان
بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام، لاہور

عدلیہ کا کام ارکانِ پارلیمان کی اخلاقیات کی جانچ پڑتال نہیں
آخری وقت اشاعت: ہفتہ, 19 دسمبر, 2009, 05:25 GMT 10:25 PST

پاکستان انسانی حقوق کمشن کی چیئرپرسن عاصمہ جہانگیر نے این آر او کے بارے میں سپریم کورٹ کے فیصلے پر تبصرہ کرتے ہوئے کہا ہے ’عدلیہ اپنے دائرہ کار سے تجاوز کرگئی ہے اوریہ بہت ہی خطرناک بات ہوگی کہ سپریم کورٹ اراکین پارلیمان کی اخلاقیات پر فیصلے دے۔‘

عاصمہ جہانگیر نے بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام سے گفتگو کرتے ہوئے کہا کہ جس طریقے سے فیصلہ آیا اور مانیٹرنگ سیل بنائے گئے اور سارے اراکین پارلیمان کو ایک طرح سے وارننگ دی گئی کہ ان کے کردار کی چھان بین ہوسکے گی ’وہ سمجھتی ہیں کہ عدلیہ اپنے دائرے سے باہر نکلی ہے۔‘

انہوں نے کہا وہ اس بات کی توقع نہیں رکھتی تھیں کہ عدلیہ اب اس بات کی جانچ پڑتال شروع کردے گی کہ ممبران کے اخلاقیات کیا ہیں۔

عاصمہ جہانگیر نے کہا کہ اراکین اسمبلی تو الیکشن لڑ کر آتے ہیں لیکن جج تو اپنی ساکھ کی وجہ سے آتے ہیں اگر ممبران پارلیمان کے لیے معیار اتنا بلند کردیا جائے کہ کوئی اس پر پورا نہ اتر سکے تو پھر عدلیہ کا معیار تو اس سے بھی بہت بلند ہونا چاہیے۔

انسانی حقوق کمشن پاکستان کی سربراہ نے کہا کہ ’یہ جوڈیشل ایکٹوازم نہیں ہے بلکہ عدلیہ اپنی اتھارٹی کو بہت زیادہ آگے لے گئی ہے۔اب اس نے مانیٹرنگ سیل قائم کرنے کی بات کر دی ہے۔یہ بھی دیکھا جائے گا کہ کس میکنزم کے مطابق کام ہوگا۔‘

’عدلیہ کی سپرویژن تو ہوتی ہے لیکن مانیٹرنگ سیل ہم نے آج تک نہیں دیکھا کہ اس طریقے بنائے گئے ہوں۔‘

انہوں نے کہا کہ وہ سمجھتی ہیں کہ تقسیم اختیارات کا نظریہ متاثر ہوا ہے۔’عدلیہ کو اپنے رویے پر غور کرنا چاہیے اس کا اپنا ایک مقام ہے اور اسے اپنے اس مقام پر واپس چلے جانا چاہیے۔وہ کسی خاص معاملے یا کیس میں اپنی دلچسپی نہ دکھائے۔‘

’وہ انصاف ضرور کریں لیکن یہ مخصوص نہ ہو بلکہ مساویانہ انداز سے ہونا چاہیے کیونکہ یہ نہ صرف ملک کے لیےبلکہ خود ان کے لیے بھی اچھا نہیں ہوگا۔‘

ایک سوال کے جواب میں انہوں نے کہا کہ وہ اس فیصلے کے خلاف اسی صورت میں اپیل کرسکتی تھیں جب اس عدالت سے بڑی بھی کوئی عدالت ہوتی۔انہوں نے کہا کہ سپریم کورٹ کے سترہ رکنی بنچ نے ایسا فیصلہ سنا دیا ہے جس کی کہیں اپیل بھی نہیں ہوسکتی۔

’انسان آخر انسان ہوتا ہے اس سے غلطی ہوسکتی ہے اسی لیے اپیل کا حق رکھا جاتا ہے۔ یہ بھی سوچنے کی بات ہے کہ اتنے بڑے فیصلے کردیئے جائیں اور اس کی کہیں اپیل بھی نہ ہوسکے۔‘

انہوں کہا کہ وہ یہ نہیں کہتیں کہ عدلیہ فیصلے نہ دے لیکن جو بھی کرے بہت سوچ سمجھ کر کرے۔

عاصمہ جہانگیر نے کہا کہ اس سے کوئی انکار نہیں کرسکتا کہ جن لوگوں نے لوٹ مار کی ہے ان کے مقدمات عدالتوں میں چلنے چاہیے اور یوں اجتماعی معافی نہیں ہونی چاہیے لیکن عدلیہ نے جس انداز میں فیصلے کیے ہیں اس پر انہیں تحفظات ہیں۔

دریں اثناء انسانی حقوق کمشن آف پاکستان نے ایک بیان جاری کیا ہے جس میں بعض افراد کے بیرون ملک نقل وحرکت پر پابندی کو بنیادی حق کی خلاف ورزی قرار دیا ہے اور کہا ہے کہ کمشن کو اس بات پر پریشانی ہے کہ حکام نے ایگزٹ کنٹرول لسٹ آرڈیننس کا اطلاق کردیا ہے جسے کبھی بھی منصفانہ نہیں سمجھا گیا۔کمشن کی سربراہ عاصمہ جہانگیر نے کہاکہ پیشگی نوٹس اور مناسب وجوہات بیان کیے بغیر پابندی عائد کرنا اس بنیادی حق کی خلاف ورزی ہے جس کی ضمانت ملک کا آئین دیتا ہے۔انہوں نے کہا کہ جن لوگوں کے خلاف عدلیہ میں مقدمات چل رہے ہوں ان کے بیرون ملک سفر پر پابندی عائد کرنا ضروری نہیں ہے ان کے فرار کو روکنے کے لیے عدالت میں قانونی سطح پر یقین دہانی حاصل کی جاسکتی ہے۔انہوں نے کہا کہ ایگزٹ کنٹرول لسٹ کو ماضی میں سیاسی طور پر حراساں کرنے کے لیےاستعمال کیا جاتا رہا ہے اور اب ایگزٹ کنٹرول لسٹ کا عدالتی فیصلے کی آڑ میں من مانے طریقے سے استعمال کسی آفت سے کم نہیں سمجھا جائے گا۔انہوں نے کہا کہ قومی دولت لوٹنے والوں کے خلاف جو قانونی کارروائی کی جارہی ہے وہ کافی ہے، حکام کو بے جا غصے اور جوش میں آکر ایسے ناجائز اقدام نہیں کرنے چاہیے جنہیں وہ انصاف سمجھتے ہوں۔

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