ISLAMABAD: Former foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said the US employee Raymond Davis doesn't enjoy blanket immunity as sought by the US, Geo News reported. He was addressing the media after meeting with the US Senator John Kerry. Qureshi said the meeting was arranged on the senator's request. Senator Kerry was a friend of Pakistan, he opined. 'Pakistan and America need each other's help.' The issue of killing two Pakistani citizens in Lahore in broad daylight by a US embassy employee has become a matter of national respect, he added. Qureshi said that I was instructed to stay quit on the burning issue. Addressing the press conference, former minister said the foreign office had briefed him on January 31st that the blanket immunity that the US was demanding for Raymond Davis could not be provided. REFERENCE: Davis doesn't enjoy blanket immunity: Qureshi Updated at 1240 PST Wednesday, February 16, 2011 http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=11235
aaj kamran khan ke saath 16th feb 2011 p1
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJGIzJsGRlQ&feature=player_embedded
aaj kamran khan ke saath 16th feb 2011 p2
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evSx0iblPok&feature=player_embedded
aaj kamran khan ke saath 16th feb 2011 p3
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v6MokLjem2o&feature=player_embedded
aaj kamran khan ke saath 16th feb 2011 p4
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fPyFN_FsTsQ&feature=player_embedded
Mamla kuch aur hai by Nazir Naji
Wednesday, February 16, 2011, Rabi-ul-Awwal 12, 1432 A.H
http://www.jang.com.pk/jang/feb2011-daily/16-02-2011/col2.htm
"QUOTE"
YOU FIND Murtaza Bhutto nowadays through a Dubai-based business consultancy firm owned bya Pakistani woman, Husna Sheikh, and her daughter and chief executive, Shahmeen - a woman in her mid-thirties, who is happy for the world to believe that her father was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the late prime minister of Pakistan. The Sheikhs, mother and daughter, are just one more complication in the story of the Bhutto legacy. Husna Sheikh was, for more than 15 years, Zulfakir Ali Bhutto's mistress, according to an account of their relationship she gave the American historian Stanley Wolpert, whose biography of Bhutto was published this year. From the time Bhutto took power in December 1971 until the coup in 1977, when she fled to London, Husna Sheikh ran a virtual kitchen cabinet within the Pakistan government. Salman Taseer, a leading People's Party politician in Punjab province and supporter of Benazir, said Husna Sheikh was the Madame de Pompadour of Pakistan.Husna Sheikh and Mr Bhutto met in 1961 in Dhaka, capital of what was then East Pakistan, when Mr Bhutto was 34. Mr Wolpert's account of their relationship reads like Barbara Cartland out of Bertrand Russell. A ravishing beauty even now, according to Pakistanis who have shared her company, it was not simply her physical charms that hypnotised him then. She told Wolpert she was the first woman the philandering politician had ever loved who could think, talk and understand power politics as he did. Even as she sated Bhutto, Wolpert said, she stimulated his mind, body and spirit, 'rousing him to peaks of excitement he had never known'. We are told how she pandered to his large ego and discussed politics and world affairs after 'the flames of passion had died down'. 'For Zulfi's (Mr Bhutto's) proud, vain, arrogant, insecure, clever, scheming, easily bored, spoiled psyche nothing was as comforting as a beautiful woman who devoted herself fully to his needs, desires, and dreams, rousing his hopes and calming his darkest fears . . .'
Husna Sheikh then claimed she eventually married Bhutto to become his third wife. (His first marriage was an arranged marriage with a cousin when he was a teenager. His second was to Nusrat.) However, no evidence of a third has been forthcoming, either when the army raided Mr Bhutto's residences and took away his private papers at the time of the coup, or from Husna Sheikh herself. Not surprisingly, she is hated by Murtaza's mother and sisters. Husna remains in touch with Murtaza, and, like so many disenchanted with Benazir, sees an opportunity to regain some of her old control through her old lover's son. For Benazir the presence of Husna Sheikh is doubly offensive. Husna was close in business and politics to Jam Sadiq Ali, the chief minister of Sind province from 1990 until his death last year. Jam Sadiq was given the post by president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the man who sacked Benazir and her government 20 months after she was elected for the first time in 1988. His allotted task was to crush Benazir and the PPP in Sind. He brought extortion and kidnapping charges against her husband, Asif Zadari, which kept him in jail without trial for two years (but didn't stop him giving Benazir a daughter). REFERENCE: The Bhutto inheritance MICHAL FATHERS Sunday, 17 October 1993 http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/the-bhutto-inheritance-the-story-goes-that-hours-before-he-was-executed-in-1979-zulfikar-ali-bhutto-called-for-his-son-murtaza-and-daughter-benazir-to-succeed-him-jointly-in-last-weeks-elections-in-pakistan-murtaza-bhutto-challenged-his-sister-benazirs-power-from-exile-in-syria-while-his-mother-and-threeyearold-son-campaigned-on-his-behalf-1511302.html"UNQUOTE"
"QUOTE"
Q: It is said that Madame tried to drive a wedge between you and Yahya Khan?
A: I don’t want to say anything on this issue. If Rani catered to Agha Jani’s every whim, there is no question that she was royally compensated. During Yahya Khan’s time, General Rani prospered way beyond her wildest expectations. There are endless reports of how she would use her ’special relationship’ with Yahya to fill her coffers. She would ask for a plot of land or a house in return for a favour and those desperate for a job or promotion would readily fulfill her demands. During this time, politicians were also eager to win her approval and among the many who curried her favour were Mustafa Khar and Z. A. Bhutto.
General Rani describes her relationship with these two men: “Both Mustafa Khar and Z. A. Bhutto would come and sit at my house for hours on end, begging me to introduce them to the General. Mustafa Khar was particularly fond of listening to the poems I used to write. In fact if you compare Yahya Khan to these two, I would say that I was closer to Bhutto and Khar and arranged more parties for them than I did for Agha Jani.” It was a closeness that was not to endure. As soon as Bhutto came to power, General Rani was put under house arrest and her telephone connection was cancelled. Her crime in the words of an eminent lawyer was that, “she knew too much.” Thus began General Rani’s downfall. Once the issue of house arrest was resolved (courtesy S. M. Zafar) and her subsequent jail terms ended (the most recent for drug-trafficking), General Rani never really reverted to her former glory. By now the money that had so freely flowed into her hands had also freely flowed out. Financially wrecked, socially ostracised, dependent only on the kindness of a few whose affections for her have endured, General Rani lives largely in the past – in the memory of days of wine and roses. REFERENCE: Night of the General By Ayesha Javed Akram 4 May 2002 http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2002/05/night-of-the-general/comment-page-1/"UNQUOTE"
SOUL SEARCHING
Ayub’s secularism as part of the military culture of British Indian Army was like an open book without any fine print. Even the prefix Islamic attaching to the Republic of Pakistan was dropped until restored under the writ of superior judiciary. That continued to be the case until the fateful day of 1965 when India attacked Pakistan along the international border, with Lahore as its principal target. Even in his first address to the nation within hours of the Indian invasion, Ayub went on to recite the ‘Kalama-i-Tayyaba’ in a stirring, emotion-choked voice. His subsequent meeting with religious parties – mainly the Jamaat-i-Islami under Maulana ‘Abul ‘Ala Maududi – marked the beginning of the military-mullah nexus. Yahya would not have much to do with things spiritual until the induction of retired Maj.-Gen. Sher Ali Khan into his cabinet as minister in-charge of information and national affairs. He initiated Yahya into ideological lore and saddled him with the mission of protecting the ‘ideology of Pakistan and the glory of Islam’. Yahya’s intelligence chief, Major-(later Lieut.) Gen. Muhammad Akbar Khan made no secret of his close liaison with the Jamaat-i-Islami especially in respect of its pro-active role in East Pakistan. The Jamaat was to go even to the extent of certifying Yahya’s draft constitution as Islamic. The draft was authored by Justice A.R. Cornelius, Yahya’s law minister. As for Zia, he embarked on his Islamization programme even as he assumed his army command. REFERENCE: MMA and the NSC By A.R. Siddiqi 30 June 2004 Wednesday 11 Jamadi-ul-Awwal 1425 http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/30/fea.htm#1
The War Inquiry Commission was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December 1971. In its secret report, never made public in Pakistan the commission, headed by then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Hamoodur Rahman, held widespread atrocities, other abuses of power by Pakistani generals and a complete failure in civilian and martial-law leadership responsible for the loss of East Pakistan. The report dwells on a range of sins: killing of thousands of Bangladeshis—both civilians and “Bengali” soldiers—rape, pan smuggling, looting of banks in East Pakistan, drunkenness by officers, even an instance of a Brigadier “entertaining” women while his troops were being shelled by Indian troops. It recommended a string of court-martials and trials against top officers . Nothing ever happened. The army’s role in splintering Pakistan after its greatest military debacle was largely ignored by successive Pakistani governments. The Commission examined nearly 300 witnesses and hundreds of classified army signals between East and West Pakistan. The final report was submitted on October 23, 1974, detailing political, administrative, military and moral failings of then Pakistan. REFERENCE: http://www.bangla2000.com/bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/default.shtm
In Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report, we have dealt at some length with the moral aspect of the causes of our defeat in the 1971 War. This became necessary in view of the vehement assertions made before the Commission by a large number of respectable witnesses drawn from various sections of society, including highly placed and responsible Service Officers, to the effect that due to corruption arising out of the performance of Martial Law duties, lust for wine and women and greed for lands and houses, a large number of senior Army Officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded of them for the successful prosecution of the war. It was asserted by these witnesses that men given to a disreputable way of life could hardly be expected to lead the Pakistan Army to victory.
2. After analysing the evidence brought before the Commission, we came to the conclusion that the process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the Armed Forces was set in motion by their involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958, that these tendencies reappeared and were, in fact, intensified when Martial Law was imposed in the country once again in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan, and that there was indeed substance in the allegations that a considerable number of senior Army Officers had not only indulged in large scale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted highly immoral and licentious ways of life which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership.
3. We then offered specific comments on the conduct of certain high officers including the Commander, Eastern Command, Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi. However, we observed, in Paragraph 35 of that Chapter, that "as we have not had the opportunity of putting these allegations to Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi any finding in this behalf must await his return from India where he is at present held as a prisoner of war". We have now examined not only Lt. Gen. Niazi but certain other witnesses as well in relation to his personal conduct, and the general allegations made against the Pakistan Army during its operations in the former East Pakistan, and are accordingly in a position to formulate our final conclusions in the matter.
Effect of Martial Law Duties
4. In the situation that developed after the military action of the 25th of March 1971, the civil administration in East Pakistan practically came to a standstill, and the burden of running the Province fell heavily upon the Army Officers. Their involvement in civil administration continued unabated even after the induction of a sizable number of senior civil servants from West Pakistan, including the Chief Secretary, the Inspector General of Police and at least two Division Commissioners.
5. According to the Inspector General of Police, Mr. M.A.K Chaudhry (Witness No. 219), "after the disturbances of March-April 1971, there was a Military Governor with a Major General as his adviser at the head of the civil administration. There was a parallel Martial Law administration at all levels. All wings of administration, relating to law and order were under the control of Martial Law Authorities. A West Pakistan Deputy Inspector General of Police in the field was not permitted by the local Martial Law Authorities to come to the Provincial Headquarters" for a conference with the Inspector General of Police. In the view of Syed Alamdar Raza (Witness No. 226), Commissioner of Dacca Division, "efforts were made to make civilian officers responsible or at least routine matters within the general supervision and control of the Army Officers, but no substantial results could be achieved. Those Bengali Officers who had been restored lacked confidence and were not sure if their loyalties were not suspected. Action was taken against them, even their arrests were ordered without any body knowing about it, including their superiors or the Government of East Pakistan."
6. The Army's involvement in civil administration did not come to an end even with the installation of a civilian governor (viz. Dr. A.M Malik), and the ministers appointed by him. The observations made in this behalf by Maj Gen. Rao Farman Ali (Witness No. 284), who held the appointment of Maj General (Civil Affairs) in the governor's Secretariat are worth quoting:
"A fully civil government could not be formed in East Pakistan as had been announced by the ex-President. Dr. Malik an old man and politician, had a weak personality. He could not annoy, the Martial Law Administrator (Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi) also because of the unsettled conditions obtaining in the Wing. Gen Niazi, on the other hand, cherished and liked power, but did not have the breadth of vision or ability to understand political implications. He did not display much respect for the civilian Governor,..... The Army virtually continued to control civil administration".
7. The impression created on the mind of the West Pakistani civilian officials, then serving in East Pakistan, has been stated thus by Mr. Mohammad Ashraf, (Witness No. 275), former Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dacca: "The installation of a civilian governor in September 1971 was merely to hoodwink public opinion at home and abroad. Poor Dr. Malik and his ministers were figureheads only. Real decisions in all important matters still lay with the Army. I remember the first picture of the new Cabinet. Maj. Gen Farman Ali was prominently visible sitting on the right side of the Governor, although he was not a member of the Cabinet."
8. This impression is fortified by the fact that at a later stage even the selection of candidates for the by-elections ordered by General Yahya Khan was made by Maj Gen Farman Ali. Lt. Gen Niazi and some of his subordinate Martial Law Administrators have no doubt claimed that they allowed full liberty of action to the civilian officials at various levels, but even they have conceded that in the peculiar situation prevailing in East Pakistan after the military action the Army necessarily continued to be deeply concerned with the maintenance of law and order, the restoration of communications and the revival of economic activity in the Province.
9. The evidence of Officers repatriated from India leaves no doubt that this extensive and prolonged involvement of the Pakistan Army in Martial Law duties and civil administration had a disastrous effect on its professional and moral standards. According to Brig. M. Saleemullah, who was commanding 203 (A) Brigade in East Pakistan, "prolonged commitment on Martial Law duties and interment security roles had affected the professional standards of the Army." According to Rear Admiral M. Sharif (Witness No. 283) who was the Flag Officer Commanding the Pakistan Navy in East Pakistan, "the foundation of this defeat was laid way back in 1958 when the Armed Forces took over the country ..." While learning the art of politics in this newly assigned role to themselves, they gradually abandoned their primary function of the art of soldiering, they also started amassing wealth and usurping status for themselves. Similar views were expressed before us by Commodore I.H. Malik (Witness No. 272) who was the Chairman of the Chittagong Port Trust until the day of surrender, Brigadier S.S.A Qasim, former Commander Artillery, Eastern Command, Col. Mansoorul Haw Malik, former GS-I, 9 division, East Pakistan, and Col. Ijaz Ahmad (Witness No. 247) former Colonel Staff (GS) Eastern Command, to mention only a few.
10. The fresh evidence coming before the Commission has thus served only to reinforce the conclusions reached by us in the Main Report that the involvement of the Pakistan Army in Martial Law duties and civil administration had a highly corrupting influence, seriously detracting from the professional duties of the Army and affecting the quality of training which the Officers could impart to their units and formations, for the obvious reason that they did not have enough time available for this purpose, and many of them also lost the inclination to do so. REFERENCE: Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report The Moral Aspect Introductory http://www.bangla2000.com/bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/chapter1.shtm
کیا روشنی سے ڈرتے ہو؟
وجاہت مسعود
وقتِ اشاعت: Sunday, 17 December, 2006, 00:48 GMT 05:48 PST
دانشوروں کی مسخ شدہ لاشیں کچے بند کے قریب پایاب پانی سے برآمد ہوئیں
سنہ 71 کا سال تھا۔ نو اور دس دسمبر کی درمیانی شب تھی۔ ڈھاکہ چھاؤنی کے ایک بلند و بالا دفتر کی خوشگوار حرارت میں تین پُروقار چہرے چند کاغذ سامنے رکھے گہرے غوروفکر میں مصروف تھے۔
ان میں ایک لیفٹننٹ جنرل عبداللہ نیازی تھے جن کے کندھوں پر پورے مشرقی محاذ کی ذمہ داری تھی۔ دوسرے صاحب میجر جنرل راؤ فرمان تھے جو بظاہر گورنر مالک کے سیاسی مشیر تھے مگر عملی طور پر صوبے کے انتظامی سربراہ سمجھے جاتے تھے۔ تیسرے افسر میجر جنرل جمشید تھے جو ڈھاکہ سیکٹر کے دفاع کی ذمہ داری سنبھالے ہوئے تھے۔ کمرے میں دبے پاؤں چائے کے برتن لانے والے عملے کا خیال تھا کہ صاحب لوگ جنگ کی گمبھیر صورتِ حال پر مغز پاشی کر رہے ہیں۔ مگر ان اصحاب کے پیشِ نظر تو کہیں زیادہ اہم امور تھے۔ اس اجلاس میں بنگالی دانشوروں کی اس فہرست پر غور ہو رہا تھا جنہیں جنگ کا منطقی نتیجہ سامنے آنے سے پہلے ختم کرنا ضروری تھا۔ ہجرتی گھر چھوڑنے کے بھی کوئی آداب ہوتے ہیں۔
دسمبر کا مہینہ سرد ہوتا ہے۔ 1971 کے برس میں یہ مہینہ معمول سے کچھ زیادہ ہی سرد تھا۔ پاکستان کے مشرقی حصےمیں نو مہینے سے خانہ جنگی جاری تھی۔ لاکھوں شہری مارے جا چکے تھے۔ ایک کروڑ مہاجر سرحد پار کر کے بھارت جا بیٹھے تھے۔ عورتوں، بچوں، کسانوں اور تاجروں میں سے جس کے پاس لٹانے کو جو تھا، لٹ چکا تھا۔ گاؤں جل چکے تھے۔ شہر اور قصبے ملبے کا ڈھیر بن چکے تھے۔
واقعہ پاکستانی فوج کے ہتھیار ڈالنے سے صرف دو روز قبل 14 دسمبر کو پیش آیا۔واقعات کے مطابق البدر کے ارکان نے ایک باقاعدہ فہرست کے مطابق آدھی رات کو ڈھاکہ کے دو درجن سے زیادہ چیدہ چیدہ دانشوروں کو اغوا کیا۔ ان میں سے بیشتر اساتذہ یا تو اپنے شعبوں کے سربراہ تھے یا علمی اور ادبی حلقوں میں نہایت نمایاں مقام رکھتے تھے۔ انہیں مختلف مقامات پر رکھ کر شدید تشدد کا نشانہ بنایا اور پھر ریئر بازار اور میرپور نامی دو مقامات پر انہیں بہیمانہ طریقے سے موت کے گھاٹ اتار دیا گیا
3 دسمبر سے پاکستان اور بھارت میں شروع ہونے والی کھلی جنگ اختتامی مرحلے میں تھی۔ مشرقی حصے کے عوام میں متحدہ پاکستان سے بدظنی اپنے نقطہ عروج کو پہنچ چکی تھی۔ مغربی پاکستان دادو لوہار کے خطبات اور ملکہ ترنم کے جوشیلے ترانوں میں مگن تھا۔ اندرونی اور بیرونی محاذوں پر ناکافی ہتھیاروں، نیم دِلانہ قیادت، ناقص منصوبہ بندی اور غضب آلود عوام سے چومُکھی لڑائی لڑتے پاکستانی فوجی قدم بہ قدم پیچھے ہٹتے بالآخر ڈھاکہ تک محدود ہو چکے تھے۔ جنرل ناگرہ بوڑھی گنگا کے میر پور پُل پر آن بیٹھا تھا۔
یہ سوال دلچسپ ہے کہ ایسے میں جب جنرلوں کو ڈھاکہ کے دفاع کی فکر ہونا چاہیے تھی وہ اساتذہ، سائنسدانوں، صحافیوں، تاریخ دانوں، شاعروں، ادیبوں اور فنکاروں کے قتل کی فکر میں تھے۔ تاہم اس کا جواب کچھ ایسا مشکل بھی نہیں۔ ایوب خان نے بھی تو رائٹرز گلڈ بنائی تھی جس کے طفیل شاعروں، ادیبوں کو سلہٹ کا سبزہ اور چٹاگانگ کی پہاڑیاں دیکھنے کا موقع ملتا تھا۔ ضیاالحق بھی تو دانشوروں کو سیم اور تھور قرار دے کر ان پر پانی،ہوا اور چاندنی حرام کرنے کی وعید سنایا کرتے تھے۔ بھٹو صاحب سول مارشل لا ایڈمنسٹریٹر بنے تو انہوں نے روز نامہ’ ڈان‘ کے مدیر کو چہار چشمے کا خطاب دیا تھا۔
چودہ دسمبر کو ڈھاکہ کے چیدہ چیدہ دانشوروں کو اغوا کر کے ہلاک کر دیا گیا
فوج جب کسی ملک پر قبضہ کرتی ہے تو اس کا مقصد عوام کے امکان کو بیدار کر کے ترقی کی راہیں کھولنا نہیں ہوتا۔ ہر فوجی حکمران کا خواب ایک ایسی چراگاہ ہے جہاں عوام کے نام پر بہت سی بھیڑ بکریاں اس کے دماغِ عالی پر اترنے والی ہر پھلجھڑی کو حکمِ خداوندی سمجھیں۔ دانشور وہ آوازہِ انکار ہے جو آمر کا خواب کِرکِرا کر دیتا ہے۔
آمر بڑی عرق ریزی سے اور اپنے چنیدہ حواریوں کی شبانہ روز محنت سے ایک آئین گھڑتا ہے ادھر کوئی بے ننگ و نام حبیب جالب پکار اٹھتا ہے ’ایسے دستور کو میں نہیں مانتا‘۔ حکمران صدارتی نظام کے حق میں قائد اعظم کی ڈائریاں ایجاد کرتا ہے تو ڈاکٹر مبارک علی نامی کوئی مورخ قلم گھسیٹ گھسیٹ کر قوم کو بتانے لگتا ہے کہ قائد اعظم نے تو کبھی ڈائری لکھی ہی نہیں تھی۔
حکمران اخبار والوں کے گھٹنوں کو ہاتھ لگا کر وسیع تر قومی مفاد میں نظریہ پاکستان گھڑتا ہے تو ڈاکٹر مہدی حسن نامی کوئی استاد اپنی پاٹ دار آواز میں قائداعظم کی کوئی گمنام تقریر دہرانے لگتا ہے جو انہوں نے کہیں 11 اگست 1947 کو کی تھی۔
منعم خان اور امیر محمد خان جیسے شہریاروں کا نسخہ یہ ہوتا ہے کہ حالات درست کرنے کی بجائے حالات کی خرابی کی نشاندہی کرنے والوں کا منہ بند کر دیا جائے
دانشور کو اس کے علم کا کیڑا، تحقیق کی عادت اور بصیرت کا تقاضا کاٹتا رہتا ہے۔ اس کی دلیل بازی کی عادت سے فوجی حکمران کی جان ضیق میں آ جاتی ہے۔ ہر عہد میں الطاف گوہر، ابن الحسن، نوابزادہ شیر علی خاں، راجہ ظفرالحق، جام صادق اور شیرا فگن جیسے محبِ وطن جابر سلطان کو یہ کلمہ حق سناتے رہتے ہیں کہ اگر مٹھی بھر دانشوروں کا ٹینٹوا دبا دیا جائے۔ صحافیوں کو گرمی میں میانوالی اور سردی میں مظفرآباد کی سیر کرائی جائے، شاعروں کی شراب بند کر دی جائے، یونیورسٹیوں کو حوالداروں کے حوالے کر دیا جائے تو عوام بہتر طور پر برکاتِ حکومتِ خود آرا سے آگاہ ہو سکتے ہیں۔ منعم خان اور امیر محمد خان جیسے شہریاروں کا نسخہ یہ ہوتا ہے کہ حالات درست کرنے کی بجائے حالات کی خرابی کی نشاندہی کرنے والوں کا منہ بند کر دیا جائے۔ ان خیر اندیشوں کی تقریِر پُر تاثیر میں ایسی لذت ہوتی ہے کہ رفتہ رفتہ خود حکمران کو بھی یقین ہونے لگتا ہے کہ دانشور ملک دشمن، بد اندیش نیز خونی پیچش میں مبتلا کسی گروہ کا نام ہے جس کی بیخ کنی ہی میں قوم کی فلاح ہے۔
’یہ خونِ خاک نشیناں تھا رزقِ خاک ہوا‘
متحدہ پاکستان میں اردو، اسلام اور بھارت دشمنی کی تین پہیوں والی سائیکل چلانے والے ہمیشہ یہی کہتے اور سمجھتے رہے کہ مشرقی پاکستان کی بے گانگی کا اصل سبب معاشی ناہمواری اور سیاسی استحصال نہیں بلکہ وہاں کا دانشور طبقہ بالخصوص ہندو اساتذہ ہیں جو عوام میں الٹی سیدھی باتیں پھیلاتے ہیں۔ حقیقت بھی یہی ہے کہ بنگالی عوام کے سیاسی شعور کی بیداری میں وہاں کے روشن خیال اور جمہوریت پسند دانشوروں نے بنیادی کردار ادا کیا تھا اور یہ امر راؤ فرمان جیسے فوجی افسروں سے مخفی نہیں تھا جو قریب ایک عشرے سے مشرقی پاکستان کے جملہ امور چلا رہے تھے۔
ربع صدی کی سیاسی کشمکش کے بعد جب مشرقی پاکستان کی علیحدگی نوشتہ دیوار نظر آنے لگی تو مغربی پاکستان سے تعلق رکھنے والے فوجی افسران نے خالص جاگیردارانہ انداز میں ’دشمنی‘ کو آخری دم تک نبھانے کا فیصلہ کیا۔ منتخب یونیورسٹی اساتذہ کے قتل کا سلسلہ تو 1969 ہی سے شروع ہو چکا تھا۔ جب راجشاہی یونیورسٹی میں کیمسٹری کے استاد شمس الضحٰی کو دِن دھاڑے قتل کیا گیا تھا۔ 25 مارچ 1971 کی قیامت خیز رات کے مقتولوں میں ڈھاکہ یونیورسٹی کے متعدد اساتذہ بھی شامل تھے۔
عوامی لیگ کی منتخب قیادت کے بھارت جانے کے بعد منعقد ہونے والے ضمنی انتخابات میں جماعت اسلامی فوجی قیادت کے بہت قریب آ گئی۔ یوں بھی جماعت اسلامی کے لیے عوامی لیگ کی غیر مذہبی سیاست بدیہی طور پر ناقابلِ برداشت تھی۔ مکتی باہنی کا مقابلہ کرنے کے لیے فوجی انتظامیہ نے جماعت اسلامی کو اپنا مسلح بازو تشکیل دینے کی ترغیب دی۔ ابتدائی طور پر تو اسے البدر ہی کا نام دیا گیا (30 برس بعد کشمیر جہاد میں بھی جماعت اسلامی نے اپنی پروردہ جہادی تنظیم کے لیے البدر ہی کا نام چنا) تاہم صدیق سالک لکھتے ہیں کہ بعد ازاں اسی تنظیم کو الشمس بھی کہا جانے لگا تا کہ مشرقی پاکستان میں عوامی لیگ کی وسیع مخالفت کا تاثر پیدا کیا جا سکے ۔ جماعت اسلامی کے رضاکار مکتی باہنی جیسی مسلح تنظیم کا کیا مقابلہ کرتے جس کے ارکان بھارت سے باقاعدہ فوجی تربیت پا چکے تھے۔ البتہ البدر اور الشمس کے ارکان کو غیر مسلح مگر روشن خیال دانشوروں پر دل کے ارمان نکالنے کا اچھا موقع ہاتھ آیا۔
البدر کے رہنماؤں میں مولوی غلام اعظم، مولوی عبدالمنان اور طالبعلم اشرف الزماں کے نام نمایاں ہیں۔ البدر کو فوجی تربیت کے لیے باقاعدہ سرکاری تعلیمی ادارے مہیا کیے گئے۔ سیکولر دانشوروں کو جسمانی طور پر ختم کرنے کے اس سلسلے کا ہولناک ترین واقعہ پاکستانی فوج کے ہتھیار ڈالنے سے صرف دو روز قبل 14 دسمبر کو پیش آیا۔واقعات کے مطابق البدر کے ارکان نے ایک باقاعدہ فہرست کے مطابق آدھی رات کو ڈھاکہ کے دو درجن سے زیادہ چیدہ چیدہ دانشوروں کو اغوا کیا۔ ان میں سے بیشتر اساتذہ یا تو اپنے شعبوں کے سربراہ تھے یا علمی اور ادبی حلقوں میں نہایت نمایاں مقام رکھتے تھے۔ انہیں مختلف مقامات پر رکھ کر شدید تشدد کا نشانہ بنایا اور پھر ریئر بازار اور میرپور نامی دو مقامات پر انہیں بہیمانہ طریقے سے موت کے گھاٹ اتار دیا گیا ۔ 17 دسمبر کو ان کی مسخ شدہ لاشیں کچے بند کے قریب پایاب پانی سے برآمد ہوئیں۔ ان میں سے ہر ایک کے ہاتھ پشت پر بندھے تھے اور سر میں گولی کا نشان تھا۔ ممتاز ماہرِ امراض چشم ڈاکٹر فضل ربی کی آنکھیں نکالی جا چکی تھیں۔
راؤ فرمان کی ڈائری کا عکس
اس موقع پر جب جنگ کا حتمی نتیجہ سامنے آ چکا تھا، متحدہ پاکستان کی حمایت یا مخالفت بے معنی ہو چکی تھیں۔ اس مرحلے پر کسی سیاسی مخالف کو قتل کرنے سے کوئی سیاسی یا جنگی فائدہ حاصل نہیں ہو سکتا تھا۔ حمود الرحمٰن کمیشن کے سامنے لیفٹننٹ جنرل عبداللہ نیازی، میجر جنرل راؤ فرمان اور میجر جنرل جمشید تینوں نے اس نوعیت کی فہرست سازی کا اقرار ضرور کیا مگر فوج کے اس کارروائی میں ملوث ہونے سے انکار کیا۔ شواہد سے بڑی حد تک اس مؤقف کی تصدیق ہوتی مگر جنگ کے بعد بھارتی فوج کو جنرل فرمان کے میز سے ایک ڈائری ملی جس میں خود جنرل فرمان کے ہاتھ سے ناموں کی ایک فہرست تحریر تھی۔ ان ناموں میں سے چودہ افراد 14 دسمبر کی رات مارے گئے۔ الطاف گوہر راوی تھے کہ انہوں نے ایک مشترکہ دوست کے توسط سے راؤ فرمان کو اپنے عزیز دوست ثناالحق کی جان بخشی کی سفارش کی تھی۔ راؤ فرمان کی فہرست میں ثناالحق واحد خوش نصیب تھے جو 14 دسمبر کے بعد بھی زندہ رہِے۔
امریکی ہفت روزے ٹائم نے 19 دسمبر 1971 کی اشاعت میں پہلی بار اس واقعے سے پردہ اٹھایا۔ لیکن نرمل کمیشن سے لے کر حکومتی تحقیق تک اس واقعے پر کوئی قانونی پیش رفت نہیں ہو سکی۔ مولوی غلام اعظم 1978 میں پاکستان سے بنگلہ دیش واپس چلے گئے تھے اور1991 سے وہاں جماعت اسلامی کے امیر ہیں ۔مولوی عبدالمنان دانش کے اس قتل میں ذاتی طور پر شریک تھے، وہ ایک سے زیادہ مرتبہ وزیر کے عہدے پر فائز رہ چکے ہیں۔ اشرف الزماں کی ڈائری میں 14 دسمبر کے آٹھ مقتول دانشوروں کے نام پتے درج تھے۔ اشرف اب امریکہ میں ایک اسلامی مرکز چلاتے ہیں۔ دلچسپ بات یہ ہے کہ البدر کے بیشتر سابق ارکان آجکل برطانیہ میں مسجدوں کے پیش امام ہیں۔
بنگلہ دیش کی آزادی کے بعد متعدد مواقع پر اپنی مخصوص گھن گرج کے ساتھ انصاف کے بلند بانگ دعوے کرنے والے مجیب الرحمٰن نے 1973 میں تمام بنگالی نژاد جنگی مجرموں کے لیے عام معافی کا اعلان کر دیا۔ بنگلہ بندھو کی اس قلابازی کے متعدد پہلو ہیں۔ بنگلہ دیش کی جنگِ آزادی میں مرنے والے قریب قریب تمام دانشور روشن خیال ہونے کے علاوہ بائیں بازو کے رجحانات بھی رکھتے تھے۔ عوامی لیگ کے آئندہ طرزِ حکومت میں بلند آہنگ اور عوام دوست دانشوروں کے لیے کہاں جگہ تھی؟ دوسرے بھارت کو یہ کب پسند تھا کہ بنگلہ دیش کے حریت پسندوں سے نکسل باڑی تحریک تقویت پائے۔ اور تیسرے یہ کہ امریکی حکام کو پیکنگ نواز دانشور کیسے ہضم ہوتے۔ سو یہ خونِ خاک نشیناں تھا رزقِ خاک ہوا۔
(وجاہت مسعود انسانی حقوق، صحافت اور تعلیم کے شعبوں میں وسیع تجربہ رکھتے ہیں۔ وہ ادبی اور سیاسی موضوعات پر متعدد کتابوں کے مصنف ہیں۔)
With brainwashing on the one hand and erosion of academic freedom on the other, the campuses (once temples of learning and enlightenment) have been turned into centres of rowdyism and repositories of deadly weapon. Students belonging to various schools of religious thought, regional and ethnic groups, particularly the Islami Jamiat-e-Tulba (the student wing of Jamat-e-Islami) , have played havoc with educational institutions. Professors were another target of the victimization carried out in this period. Members of the IJT launched a concerted campaign against professors known for their liberal views. In Punjab University, particularly, many professors were forced to resign, others were sacked. [Reference: The Web of Censorship by late. Zamir Niazi published by Oxford University Press] December 28 Poet Josh Malihabadi has been blacklisted from radio and television because of a controversial interview on religion and Pakistan published in the rightist monthly, Zindagi. The interview is said to have been given to Radio Pakistan in 1974, with permission for posthumous broadcasting only. Mahmood Azam Farooqui, Jamaat-e-Islami affiliated information minister, is suspected to have instigated its publication ahead of time. [Courtesy: 1978 The Chronicle of Pakistan Compiled by Khurram Ali Shafique] Note: Mahmood Azam Farooqui was in General Zia's Earliest Cabinet. Following the ban on all political parties, members of the Jamaat-e- Islami have assembled under the banner, Khidmat-e- Islami (Service of Islam). Detractors call them the 'Martial Law's B-team.' The Chronicle of Pakistan Compiled by Khurram Ali Shafique http://therepublicofrumi.com/chronicle/1979.htm Zia Cabinet is as under [watch out the names of Prof. Ghafoor, Senator Khursheed, Mehmood Azam Farooqui of Jamat-e-Islami, Khwaja Safdar f/o Kh Asif - PML- N, A K BROHI, A G N KAZI, MOHAMMAD KHAN JUNEJO AND MEHMOOD HAROON, JAVED HASHMI - PML-N : High Treason Cases against Pakistani Military Dictators & Collaborators/Abettors http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2009/08/high-treason-cases-against-pakistani.html Junejo Cabinet [under Martial Law]: Watch out for Gilani and Ch Nisar Ali Collaborators of General Zia's Quasi Martial Law Regime 1985 - 1988 http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2009/08/collaborators-of-general-zias-quasi.html 
The series of assassinations in Former East Pakistan [now Bangladesh] was started from 1969 when a Shams Duaa-Haa, professor of Chemistry in Rajshahi University, was assassinated in daylight. Let me explain what the Al-Badar and Al-Shams were and are? Al-Badar was and is militant wing of Jamait Islami and a paramilitary force formed in Bangladesh in 1971 by General Yahya INC. Al-Badar forget that what the real Jihad is? And fight against the Muslims in Bangladesh, Bengalis use to call Al-Badar as “Butcher of Bangladesh.” The Al Badar was assigned a variety of combat and non-combat tasks including taking part in the operations, spying against Bengali Intellectuals, interrogation, working as the guides for Tikka Khan and Niazi, assassination, detecting and killing Bengali intellectuals. The force was composed of madrassah students-teachers, supporters of Muslim League and Jamait Islami. History tell us that killings which began on 25 March 1971 and sparked the Bangladesh Liberation War and also led to the deaths of at least 26,000 people as admitted by Pakistan on one hand (by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission) and 3,000,000 by Bangladesh on the other hand, (From 1972 to 1975 the first post-war prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, mentioned on several occasions that at least three million died). Doctor Fazl Rabbi was an eye specialist; he was kidnapped by Al-Badar. Next day his body was found from a drainage line. His both eyes were vanished and there were marks of switchblade. “What should we think about such peccadilloes?” Ex-militants of Al-Badar are settled in UK and other European countries and they are appointed as cleric of mosques there. And I want to remind the readers that too, “Jamait Islami’s former leader Maulana Modudi had rejected the theory of Pakistan but since 1947, when Pakistan came into being, it is claimed by the leaders of Jamait Islami that they are playing leading role of toady.
US Declassified Document before the Fall of Dhaka: Handwritten note from President Richard M. Nixon on an April 28, 1971, National Security Council decision paper: "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at this time - RMN" The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 REFERENCE: The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79 Edited by Sajit Gandhi
December 16, 2002 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/
"An statement of an Honest General who was absent minded too" President Yahya Khan On East Pakistan [KEEP IN MIND THE RECENT RANT OF REVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN WITH THE HELP OF HONEST GENERAL]
NEW DELHI, Dec 18: Newly-declassified papers of the US government reveal that the then President Richard Nixon had ordered his aides not to hamper Gen Yahya Khan’s war effort in East Pakistan, despite warnings from his Dhaka envoy that American weapons were being used to carry out a massacre there, Star News reported on Wednesday. In what was billed as an exclusive report, the New Delhi- datelined report quotes American documents as saying that the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Nixon were poised to cut off diplomatic ties with New Delhi in the middle of the 1971 conflict but they were stopped by Pakistan’s surrender and the ceasefire declared by India. Two days ago, India celebrated Vijay Diwas or Victory Day — the day in 1971 that Pakistan forces agreed to surrender in Dhaka. “Now 31 years later, the US has declassified 46 documents on its role during the crisis,” Star News added.
It quoted the documents as saying showing “how America blatantly violated its own arms embargo in arming Pakistan, despite ground reports of a systematic genocide by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan,” the report said. “To all hands, don’t squeeze Yahya at this time,” said a handwritten note by President Richard Nixon in April 1971 — perhaps the clearest indicator of US interests in backing Pakistan’s military dictator. Only a month earlier in March 1971, the American consul-general in Dhaka wrote to his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saying: “Am deeply shocked at massacre by Pakistani military in East Pakistan, appalled at possibility these atrocities are being committed with American equipment, and greatly concerned at United States vulnerability to damaging allegations of association with reign of military terror.” With the American administration choosing to ignore such warnings it was up to the Indian government to internationalise the killings in East Pakistan, the report added. “The genocide in East Pakistan caught the world media’s attention because world media happened to be in West Bengal for the elections and we who were in eastern command would send them to places where they could shoot for themselves,” said Star News quoting India’s Gen Sethna, former Vice Chief of Army Staff, as saying.
Despite the media pressure Richard Nixon continued to support Yahya Khan sometimes for reasons, which seem implausible. “In all honesty, Dr Kissinger pointed out, the President has a special feeling for President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life,” says an extract from the Memorandum of Conversation: Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President to Kenneth Keating and US ambassador to India. It was perhaps this “fact of life” which saw the US completely disregarding its own arms embargo by transferring F-5 fighters then considered state of the art to Pakistan, less than 10 days after the ceasefire. According to the American embassy in Tehran: “Three F-5A fighter aircraft with Pakistani markings and piloted by Pak pilots transited Tehran en-route from Turkey to Pakistan on December 26. Aircraft were noted by several employees including a Pakistani who spoke with one Pak pilot and the reported pilot indicated, that the aircraft had come from US.” As Indian armed forces gained upper hand in the war, the mood in the White House grew increasingly desperate. The documents show both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had decided on breaking diplomatic ties with the India but the Pakistani surrender and the Indian ceasefire brought a quick end to the Indo-US diplomatic standoff, the agency said. REFERENCE: Don’t squeeze Yahya Khan, Nixon told aides in 1971 By Jawed Naqvi December 19, 2002 Thursday Shawwal 14, 1423 http://www.dawn.com/2002/12/19/top11.htm
Bhutto Supporting Military Action in Former East Pakistan now Bangladesh
Problem with Pakistani Intelligentsia that they Forget and suffer from Severe Selective Memory Loss. There is no hope until and unless we didn't analyse our own mistakes honestly e.g. I just sometime wonder as to how Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would justify to appoint “General Tikka Khan” as his COAS of New Pakistan after Fall of Dhaka [Pakistan of Jinnah died with Jinnah in 1948] , Liaquat Ali Khan’s Pakistan died in 1971. Tikka Khan was Brigadier during late 50s Operation in Baluchistan and he earned name “Butcher of Baluchistan” alter he earned the Nick “Butcher of Bengal” after purifying the Bengali’s blood by intermingling West Pakistani Blood in the veins of Bengalis, if that was not enough Benazir Bhutto appointed Tikka a PPP Gen Secy????
Here is a glimpse: 1960 Sardar Nauroz Khan’s sons and other relatives were hanged despite the fact that it was sworn on the Quran by the no other than Tikka Khan. The people of Balochistan cannot forget that General Tikka Khan commanded the troops against Mir Nauroz Khan in 1958 and he also had been Bhutto’s Commander in Chief during the initial years of Balochistaninsurgency ( 1973 – 77). REF: FINAL PHASE OF MIR BEZANJO’S POLITICAL STRUGGLE(FEDERALISM V/s REGIONALISM) http://prr.hec.gov.pk/Chapters/60-7.pdf
The next violent outbreak of Baloch sentiments came in 1958. This was the direct result of the centralising policies pursued by the Pakistani leaders. Fears of Bengali domination in the 1950s had propelled the Punjabi leaders, who controlled the levers of power, to consolidate the Western Wing of Pakistan into a unified province to counter Bengali numerical strength. This One Unit plan was resisted by the Baloch, both by Abdul Karim who had completed his prison term in 1955 and the Khan who mobilised wide spread demonstrations through tribal chieftains. Balochi nationalists within the Khanate took serious exception to the One Unit scheme and in a meeting with Pakistani president Iskander Mirza in October 1957 they urged Iskander Mirza to exempt Kalat from the One Unit scheme, and to allot more government spending on developmental activities in Kalat. But Ayub Khans ambitions changed the political matrix in Pakistan and when some Baloch sardars started non-cooperating with the Pakistani commissioner, under a flimsy pretext that the Khan had raised a parallel army to attack Pakistani military, Ayub ordered Pakistani army to march into Kalat on 6 October 1958, a day before he imposed martial rule in Pakistan. The army arrested the Khan and his followers and accused them of secretly negotiating with Afghanistan for a full-scale Baloch rebellion. The arrest touched off a chain reaction of violence and counter-violence with the government bombing villages suspected of harbouring guerrillas. Pakistan military’s campaigns in Danshera and Wad were resisted by the Jhalawan Sardars loyal to the Khan. The octogenarian Chief of the Zehri tribe in Jhalawan, Nauroz Khan put up a stiff resistance in the Mir Ghat mountains, but the Pakistani military swore an oath by the Quran and urged Nauroz to give up arms and prepare for negotiations. Nauroz surrendered in anticipation of safe conduct and amnesty but the army put Nauroz and his sons behind the bars as soon as they laid down their arms. Naurozs sons were hanged soon afterwards, in Hyderabad and Sukur, in July 1960. A shocked and surprised Nauroz died soon afterwards in Kohlu prison in 1962. Ayubs message to the Balochis of Kalat who were the first to challenge the might of the Pakistani state, was clear. He reportedly threatened the total extinction of Balochis if they did not mend their ways. REFERENCE: BALOCH INSURGENCIES 1948-1977 http://balochistaninhistory.blogspot.com/2008/10/baloch-insurgencies-1948-1977_09.html
RAWALPINDI, March 28: Gen Tikka Khan (Rtd), former chief of the army staff, died here on Thursday, at CMH Rawalpindi, after a protracted illness. He was 87. He was laid to rest with full military honour, in the army graveyard. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen Muhammad Aziz Khan, Vice Chief of Army Staff Gen Muhammad Yousaf Khan and other senior military and civil officials attended the funeral. Tikka Khan, also PPP former secretary-general, is survived by three sons and two daughters. Mr Khan, a graduate from the Indian Military Academy Dera Doon, was born in 1915 in village Jochha Mamdot of tehsil Kahuta, and was commissioned in 1939. During his military career, he served on various staff, command and instructional positions. Gen Khan was promoted to the rank of Major-General in 1962, made the Lieutenant-General in 1969, and elevated to the rank of General and appointed as the army chief in 1972. Following the retirement from the army in 1974, he joined the PPP in 1976, after going through two-year constitutional silence. In her first tenure, Benazir Bhutto made him Punjab governor in 1988. BENAZIR CONDOLES: The former prime minister and chairperson of the Pakistan Peoples Party, Benazir Bhutto, has condoled the death of Tikka Khan. In a message addressed to his son Col Khalid Masud, the former prime minister paid glowing tributes to late Tikka Khan, and described him as a person who “rose to the highest offices of this country due to his hard work and respect for the rule of law”. REFERENCE: Tikka Khan passes away By Our Reporter March 29, 2002 Friday Muharram 14, 1423 http://www.dawn.com/2002/03/29/top12.htm
Two points must be noted. The terms of reference covered the west also, on which the Supplementary Report is totally silent. It was, presumably, dealt with in the Main Report. Secondly, the entire political and military background preceding the surrender in the east and ceasefire in the west is excluded. A lot had happened, diplomatically and militarily since the Pakistan Army's brutal crackdown in Dhaka on March 25, 1971, to go no further. Involved principally were Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, Commander, Eastern Command, as well as the Zonal Martial Law Administrator. Major-General Rao Farman Ali was military adviser to the Governor. Niazi took over the job on April 4, 1971 from Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan who was responsible for the crackdown on March 25. He had repla ced Lt. Gen. Yaqub Khan, who, being this honourable man that he is, had resigned on March 7. Bhutto made Tikka Khan Army Chief shortly after he became President. Farman Ali was reputed to be the brains behind the killing of Bengali intellectuals. He was exonerated by the Commission. So was Tikka Khan. At the apex stood Gen. M. Yahya Khan, the Martial Law Administrator who had staged a coup against Ayub Khan in 1969. Niazi was the last of the POWs to be repatriated to Pakistan on April 30, 1974. The Inqu iry was reopened on May 25. Tikka Khan, "the butcher", was not only exonerated of all charges but was praised: "always willing to redress grievances." Figures of the killings provided by the Army HQs (that is, Tikka Khan) were readily accepted. "Indian infiltrators and members of M ukti Bahini sponsored by the Awami League continue (even after March 25, 1971) to indulge in killings, rape and arson". Read this: "We consider, therefore, that unless the Bangladesh authorities can produce some convincing evidence, it is not possible to record a finding that any intellectuals or professionals were indeed arrested and killed by the Pakistan Army during December 1971." In an article free of any trace of the national chauvinism that besets most in our region, Ahmed Salim exposed this falsehood in the Karachi monthly Newsline (September 2000). The Sunday Times (London) of December 19, 1971 had reported the killing in Dhaka of more than 50 of surviving intellectuals, scientists and businessmen. On January 19, 1992, 101 well-known Bangladeshi personalities including retired Supreme Court Judges, university teachers, veterans of the independence war, artists and journalists formed a committee known as the Ekatarer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee, to track down the killers and collaborators of the 1971 war of independence. REFERENCE: Lies and war histories A post-script on the Hamoodur Rahman Report. A.G. NOORANI Volume 17 - Issue 21, Oct. 14 - 27, 2000 India's National Magazine from the publishers of THE HINDU http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1721/17210580.htm NOTE: A. G. Noorani, a secular Indian Muslim, is a lawyer and political analyst. He is is an Advocate in the Supreme Court of India and a leading Constitutional expert. His columns appear in The Hindustan Times, Frontline, Economic and Political Weekly and Dainik Bhaskar. He is the author of a number of books including: 'The Kashmir Question', 'Badruddin Tyabji Ministers' Misconduct', 'Brezhnev's Plan for Asian Security', 'The Presidential System', 'The Trial of Bhagat Singh' and 'Constitutional Questions in India'. His most recent book, as of 2003, is 'The RSS and the BJP: A Division of Labour' (LeftWord 2000). http://cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/php/authors.php?auid=5513
The civilians of West Pakistan in general had the same thinking. Bhutto had claimed that the bastions of power of Pakistan were Punjab and Sindh. The civil service held the general idea that, “a taste of the ‘danda’ the big stick would cow down the Bengali babu”. (37) The civilian bureaucrats serving the regime, like Information Secretary Roedad Khan were advising the generals about ‘putting some fear of God in Bengalis and how to purify Bengali race and culture by Arabising the Bengali script. (38) The ruling elite was totally lost and the events were moving too fast for any of them to fully comprehend, let alone respond in any meaningful way. The rulers were now really suffering from delusions, unable to see beyond their boots. When Bengali soldiers, police officials, diplomats and airline pilots were defecting en masse, the members of the regime were re-assuring the Pakistani envoys (Secretary of National Security Council Major General Ghulam Omar, Information Secretary Roedad Khan and Foreign Secretary Sultan Muhammad met with Pakistani envoys in Tehran and Geneva) that everything was under control and that majority of Bengalis were with Pakistan. (39) This was being told when they could not get a single Bengali to work at Dacca radio station and in an ironic twist, Pakistani representative (Abu Saeed Chowdhry) attending a human right conference at Geneva had defected. They really thought that the world was blind. This general thought process was not limited to only senior level but was prevalent among junior officers and rank and file. Yahya’s intelligence Chief, Major General Akbar Khan stated that, ‘we will not hand over power to these bastards’. This is the historical context of the events up to independence in 1947, which is very important in understanding of the events, which plagued the country later.Second Class Citizens of the New Nation’Your music is so sweet. I wish to God, you Bengalis were half as sweet yourself’. Pakistani President Field Marshal Ayub Khan to his Bengali friend.After independence, several factors contributed to the gradual widening of gulf between the two wings. The fundamental factor was the difficulty of West Pakistani elite to accept Bengalis as equal partners. REFERENCE: WHY BANGLADESH WAS CREATED Dec 18, 2008 Thu 12:16 am Demons of December Road from East Pakistan to Bangladesh Hamid Hussain http://www.chowk.com/ilogs/70192/47736
WASHINGTON, July 6: The US State Department’s newly declassified documents about the 1971 debacle show that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman wanted to have a “form of confederation” with Pakistan rather than a separate country. The documents include two telegrams dating Feb 28, 1971 and Dec 23, 1971 “based on the sentiments of Sheikh Mujib and the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,” showing that Sheikh Mujib was not secessionist, as many in the then West Pakistan believed. The telegrams, sent to the State Department by the US embassies in Pakistan and India, document key foreign policy decisions and actions of the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. The telegram, entitled “Conversation with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,” shows the path followed by the Awami League leader as he “talks of excesses by West Pakistan, states he (Mujib) is not willing to share power and does not want separation but rather a form of confederation.” In November 1969, a year before the war began, a US diplomat sent this report to Washington: “… East Pakistan, one also senses a growing undercurrent that beyond some intangible point the West Pakistan landlord-civil service-military elite might prefer to see the country split rather than submit to Bengali ascendancy.” One telegram quotes Indira Gandhi as saying that President Nixon has “misunderstanding about India’s case” and that “there is fantastic nonsense being talked about in the US about our having received promises from the Soviet Union about the Soviet intervention against the seventh fleet and against China.”
The documents released on June 28 provide full coverage of the US policy towards India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the newly created state of Bangladesh from January 1969 to December 1972. Documents from March to December 1971 include intelligence assessments, key messages from the US embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi and the Consulate General in Dhaka, responses to National Security Study memoranda and full transcripts of the presidential tape recordings that are summarized and excerpted in editorial notes in volume XI. The historian branch of the State Department held a two-day conference on June 28 and 29 on US policy in South Asia between 1961 and 1972, inviting scholars from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to express their views on the declassified documents. During the seminar, Bangladeshi scholars acknowledged that their official figure of more than 3 million killed during and after the military action was not authentic. They said that the original figure was close to 300,000, which was wrongly translated from Bengali into English as three million. Shamsher M. Chowdhury, the Bangladesh ambassador in Washington who was commissioned in the Pakistan Army in 1969 but had joined his country’s war of liberation in 1971, acknowledged that Bangladesh alone cannot correct this mistake. Instead, he suggested that Pakistan and Bangladesh form a joint commission to investigate the 1971 disaster and prepare a report.
Almost all scholars agreed that the real figure was somewhere between 26,000, as reported by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, and not three million, the official figure put forward by Bangladesh and India. Prof Sarmila Bose, an Indian academic, told the seminar that allegations of Pakistani army personnel raping Bengali women were grossly exaggerated. Based on her extensive interviews with eyewitnesses, the study also determines the pattern of conflict as three-layered: West Pakistan versus East Pakistan, East Pakistanis (pro-Independence) versus East Pakistanis (pro-Union) and the fateful war between India and Pakistan. Prof Bose noted that no neutral study of the conflict has been done and reports that are passed on as part of history are narratives that strengthen one point of view by rubbishing the other. The Bangladeshi narratives, for instance, focus on the rape issue and use that not only to demonize the Pakistan army but also exploit it as a symbol of why it was important to break away from (West) Pakistan.
Prof Bose, a Bengali herself and belonging to the family of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, emphasized the need for conducting independent studies of the 1971 conflict to bring out the facts. She also spoke about the violence generated by all sides. “The civil war of 1971 was fought between those who believed they were fighting for a united Pakistan and those who believed their chance for justice and progress lay in an independent Bangladesh. Both were legitimate political positions. All parties in this conflict embraced violence as a means to the end, all committed acts of brutality outside accepted norms of warfare, and all had their share of humanity. These attributes make the 1971 conflict particularly suitable for efforts towards reconciliation, rather than recrimination,” says Prof Bose. REFERENCE: Sheikh Mujib wanted a confederation: US papers By Anwar Iqbal July 7, 2005 Thursday Jumadi-ul-Awwal 29, 1426 http://www.dawn.com/2005/07/07/nat3.htm
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