Thursday, July 5, 2012

Vigilante Trial by Fire in Pakistan & Blasphemy Law.

ISLAMABAD: A Pakistani police official says thousands of people beat a man to death, and burned his corpse after he was accused of desecrating the holy Quran. A senior police officer Mohammed Azhar Gujar said that in the incident on Tuesday in the Ahmedpur East area of Punjab’s Bahawalpur district, attackers stormed a police station where the man was being interrogated. He said the victim seemed to be mentally unstable. He was arrested after residents said he threw pages of the Quran into the street. While the man was being questioned, some people started making announcements over mosque loudspeakers, urging residents to go to the police station and punish him. Within hours, thousands gathered outside and demanded the man be handed over to them. Gujar said police tried to protect him, but the mob turned violent. They burned several police vehicles and wounded seven officers before grabbing the man and dragging him into the street, where he was beaten to death and his body set on fire. Gujar said the mob also attacked the house of an area police chief and burned his furniture and possessions. It was unclear whether the man was Muslim, a member of Pakistan’s Christian minority or belonged to another religion. His name was not released. Pakistani Christians live in fear of being arrested under the blasphemy laws, which critics say are often misused to settle personal scores or family feuds. Efforts to change the laws have made little headway. Last year, two prominent Pakistani political figures who spoke out against the blasphemy laws were killed in attacks that raised concerns about the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan. On June 17, a crowd attempted to lynch a blasphemy suspect as they tried to storm into the police station where he was held. A group of lawyers attempted to attack the same suspect the next day following his production in court but policemen successfully foiled both attacks. In Quetta last month, a man was killed as a mob attacked a police station holding a “mentally retarded” man also suspected of desecrating the holy book. Former Punjab governor Salman Taseer was shot dead in January last year by one of his police bodyguards for opposing the blasphemy law. The incident highlighted the highly charged nature of the country’s blasphemy laws, under which anyone found guilty of insulting the prophet or the Quran can be sentenced to death. Sometimes, however, people take the matter into their own hands. During a visit to Pakistan in May, Gabriela Knaul, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, said lawyers are often reluctant to defend clients accused under the blasphemy laws because of intimidation, and judges are often pressured to convict. Mob kills man, burns corpse for desecrating Quran

Those who have set a Human being on Fire should read The Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) who has forbidden burning people with fire. He said, "Lord of fire is the only One Who can punish by fire.", narrated by Abu-Dawud and al-Dârimî.

Wednesday, July 04, 2012, Shaban 13, 1433 A.H.

Administering Justice and awarding punishment is the responsibility of the Ruler/State [even in the harshest Islamic State] not of the Masses or Mullahs. A detail view is as under for kind perusal. I guarantee you that those (Non-State Actors) commit murder in the name of Blasphemy Law are also the most ignorant about Islam, Quran and Shariah. "Killing" is the Right of "Judiciary" - Qazi, means Enforcement of Law and Administering "Punishment" is the Responsibility of State not the "Masses" and what Muslims in Pakistanis do is this "they violate very religion they claim to follow" - lets assume that Blasphemy Law is right and Guilty is to be punished through Death Sentence then that "sentence" would be implemented by the State not the "Public".It is not permissible for individuals to carry out this punishment themselves. Rather the matter must be referred to the ruler or his deputy to prove the crime and carry out the punishment, because if individuals carry out hadd punishments, that will lead to a great deal of corruption and evil. Ibn Muflih al-Hanbali (may Allaah have mercy on him) said in al-Furoo’ (6/53): It is haraam for anyone to carry out a hadd punishment except the ruler or his deputy. This is something on which the fuqaha’ of Islam are unanimously agreed, as was stated in al-Mawsoo’ah al-Fiqhiyyah (5/280): The fuqaha’ are unanimously agreed that the one who should carry out hadd punishments is the ruler or his deputy, whether the punishment is transgressing one of the limits of Allaah, may He be exalted, such as zina, or a transgression against another person, such as slander. {Further References: Durrul Al Behy by Shawkani, Baloogh Al Maram by Hajar Asqalani - both are in Arabic and available in English and Urdu as well]

The judgement of apostasy and expelling someone from the religion is only appropriate for the people of knowledge who are firmly grounded in knowledge, and they are the judges in the various Sharee’ah law courts, and those who are able of giving legal verdicts. And this is just like the other matters, and it is not the right of every person, or from the right of those who are learning, or those who ascribe themselves to knowledge, but who have deficiency in understanding. It is not appropriate for them to make judgements of apostasy (upon others). Since, mischief will arise from this, and sometimes a Muslim might be judged as an apostate but he is not actually so. And the takfir of a Muslim who has not committed one of the nullifications of Islaam contains great danger. Whoever says to his brother “O Kaafir” or “O Faasiq”, and he is not like that, then the words will fall back upon the one who said them. Hence, the ones who actually judge with apostasy are the legislative judges and those who are able and fit for giving legal verdicts. And as for those who enforce the judgements they are the leaders of the Muslims (wullaat al-amr). As for whatever is other than this, then it is mere confusion.” “Meting out the punishments is only appropriate for the leader of the Muslims and it is not for every person to establish the punishment, since confusion, and corruption necessarily follows from this, and also the cutting off of the society, tribulations and provocations occur. Establishing the punishments is appropriate (i.e. befits only) to the Muslim leader. The Prophet (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam) said, “Pardon each other for the punishments that are between you, but when the execution of the punishment reaches the [authority of the] Sultaan, then Allaah curses both the one who seeks intercession and the one who grants the intercession [i.e. to revoke the punishment]”. And from the responsibilities of the Sultaan in Islaam, and from those matters that befit him is the establishment of the punishments after they have been established legislatively, via the Sharee’ah law courts, upon the one who fell into the crime for which the legislator has designated a specific punishment, such as for stealing. So what has been said is that establishing the punishments (i.e. meting them out) is from the rights of the Sultaan, and when the Muslims do not have a Sultaan amongst them, then they should just suffice with commanding the good and forbidding the evil, and calling to Allaah, the Might and Majestic, with wisdom, good admonition and arguing with that which is best. And it is not permissible for individuals (in the society) to establish the hudood, since that, as we have mentioned, will bring about chaos, and also provocations, and tribulations will arise, and this contains greater corruption than it contains rectification. And from amongst the Sharee’ah principles that are submitted to is, “Repelling the harmful things takes precedence over bringing about the beneficial things”. FURTHER REFERENCES/READING: The Takfiris make unlicensed Takfeer of Governments and scholars and call the common-folk to bloody revolution as a way to remove such governments and establish Islaamic Law. 

Administering Justice and awarding punishment is the responsibility of the Ruler/State [even in the harshest Islamic State] not of the Masses or Mullahs. A detail view is as under for kind perusal. I guarantee you that those who have done the above deed would also have been the most ignorant about Islam, Quran and Shariah.

Thursday, January 06, 2011, Safar 01, 1432 A.H

Read the "Shahadat - Testimony of Late. Mr. Salman Taseer for proving that he was a Muslim" and do read News filed by the Ansar Abbasi of Jang Group, and Program Telecast against Mr. Salman Taseer on GEO TV to prove that he was not Muslim for inciting hate against him and read these Hadiths in the light of Salman Taseer's Testimony published by the very Jang Group after inciting masses for his murder.


Whoever offers prayers as we do and turns his face to our Qiblah and eats the animal slaughtered by us, he is a Muslim for whom is the covenant of Allah and the covenant of the Messenger of Allah; so do not violate Allah's covenant." [Sahih Bukhari]

``Ibn Umar related that the Holy Prophet said: If a Muslim calls another kafir, then if he is a kafir let it be so; otherwise, he [the caller] is himself a kafir.''(Sunnan Abu Dawood)

``Abu Zarr reported that the Holy Prophet said: No man accuses another man of being a sinner, or of being a kafir, but it reflects back on him if the other is not as he called him.''(Bukhari)

``Withhold [your tongues] from those who say `There is no god but Allah' --- do not call them kafir. Whoever calls a reciter of `There is no god but Allah' as a kafir, is nearer to being a kafir himself.'' (Tabarani, reported from Abdullah Ibn Omar)

If the above Hadiths do not satisfy then read this!

Usaamah bin Zaid reported,

“Allaah’s Messenger sent us towards Al-Huruqa, and in the morning we attacked them and defeated them. I and an Ansari man followed a man from among them and when we overwhelmed him, he said, “La ilaha illal-Lah.” On hearing that, the Ansari man stopped, but I killed him by stabbing him with my spear. When we returned, the Prophet (sal-Allaahu `alayhe wa sallam) came to know about that and he said:

"O Usaamah! Did you kill him after he had said “La ilaha ilal-Lah?” I said, “But he said so only to save himself.” He kept on repeating that so often that I wished I had not embraced Islaam before that day. [Agreed upon, and this is the wording of Bukhari]

and in another version in Sahih Muslim about the same incident:

``Did you tear open his heart to see what was in it?'' [Muslim]


How Mullah Hanif Qureshi instigated the murder of Salman Taseer


Determining whether someone is a kaafir or a faasiq (faasiq) is not up to us, rather it is up to Allaah, may He be exalted, and His Messenger (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him). This is one of the rulings of sharee’ah that is to be referred to the Qur’aan and Sunnah, so we should be very careful and base our judgement on clear proof. No one may be judged to be a kaafir or faasiq except the one whom the Qur’aan and Sunnah indicate is a kaafir or faasiq. The basic principle is that the one who appears outwardly to be a Muslim of good character is regarded as still being a Muslim of good character, until it is proven that this is no longer the case by means of evidence that is acceptable in sharee’ah. It is not permissible to take lightly the matter of judging someone to be a kaafir or faasiq, because that involves two very serious matters: Deatils: REFERENCES: Guidelines on takfeer (ruling someone to be a kaafir)

Who is Blasphemous Gustakh Kaun by Abul Qasim M Ismail

Mufti Hanif Qureshi's views about Zaid Hamid


2010: KARACHI: As thousands of people attended the funeral of Mufti Saeed Ahmed Jalalpuri here on Friday, police booked Zaid Hamid, who claims to be a security consultant and strategic defence analyst, for the murder of the prominent religious scholar, his son and two associates. Mufti Saeed Jalalpuri of Aalmi Majlis-i-Tahaffuz-i-Khatm-i-Nabuat, his son Huzaifa Jalalpuri and close associates Fakhruz Zaman and Abdul Rehman were returning from Jamia Masjid Khatman-un-Nabi in Gulshan-i-Iqbal on Thursday night when four to five gunmen sprayed their car with bullets, killing all of them. SSP Javed Mahar of Gulsha-i-Iqbal Town said the FIR had been registered under Sections 302 (premeditated murder), 324 (attempt to murder), 109 (punishment of abetment if the act abetted committed in consequence and where no express provision is made for its punishment) and 34 (common intention) against Zaid Hamid (Zaid Zaman Hamid) on the complaint of Mufti Jalapuri’s close aide Hafiz Shabbir. He said that although the text of the FIR did not mention the profession of the accused, the investigators were told by the complainant that they had nominated Zaid Hamid who appeared in TV shows and delivered lectures mainly on security and defence issues. Anwaar Ahmed, another aide of Mufti Jalalpuri, told Dawn that the scholar used to actively expose Zaid Hamid who, he alleged, was a close associate of ‘a person who had laid claim to prophethood’. Anwaar Ahmed said: “In late 1990s a man named Yusuf Kazzab emerged and claimed prophethood, who was aided and assisted by Zaid Hamid. At that time he was known as Zaid Zaman Hamid but currently he has cut his name short to Zaid Hamid”. He said he had insisted that both names be mentioned in the FIR, because his organisation suspected his role in the killing of Mufti Jalalpuri. REFERENCE: Daily DAWN – Zaid Hamid named in Jalalpuri murder FIR, March 13 2010

Hanif Qureshi and Zaid Hamid have Equal Think Both are Lover of Pakistan


2011: LAHORE: Pakistan Ulema Council Chairman Hafiz Muhammad Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi has challenged Zaid Hamid to hold a dialogue over allegations he made in a TV programme. In a letter to Zaid Hamid on Tuesday, Ashrafi said that he should talk sensibly and prove his allegations. He said that Zaid should tell the nation about himself and his thoughts about Khatm-e-Nubawwat first. Later, talking to Daily Times, Mahmood Ashrafi said that Zaid was a self-styled paragon of the ultra-right and was using Islam and patriotism as a tool for his ulterior motives. He said that he had no right to label charges against people. He said that he had labelled SAFMA as an extension of the Indian intelligence agency RAW, which was altogether baseless. Recalling the Yusuf Kazab case, Ashrafi said that Zaid had gone to Imtiaz Alam and had asked him to rescue Kazab but Alam had refused to help him. Zaid had also been nominated in Maulana Saeed Jalalpuri murder case, he added. He said that Zaid was now targeting those people who had refused to help him in Kazab case. He said that nobody knew what Zaid was, whether he was a right-winger, the army’s representative, a holy warrior, an intellectual or a saint. staff report REFERENCE: Tahir Ashrafi challenges Zaid Hamid to dialogue Wednesday, September 07, 2011

Blasphemy Law and Barelvis (as Per Deoband)

A caller exposes Zaid Hamid's Blasphemy on Live TV.


Dr. Aamir Liaquat - Ya Choot - Mujhay Chod Do (REMIX) (18+)


GEO TV & Aamir Liaquat Want Shia Sunni Clash

Blasphemy Law and Shias (as Per Sunnis)

Presenting... the Real Spirit of Aamir Liaquat (GEO TV/ARY NEWS/Daily Express) Real face of Amir Liaqat Hussain - WARNING strong use of Explicit Language


Candles were lit by members of a civil society for victims of the attack on the Ahmadiyya sect in Lahore. Photograph: KM Chaudary/AP - I often find myself defending Pakistan against the unbidden prejudices of the outside world. No, Islam is not the cause of terrorism. Yes, the Taliban is a complex phenomenon. No, Imran Khan is not a major political figure. This past week, though, I am silent. The massacre of 94 members of the minority Ahmadiyya community on May 28 has exposed something ugly at the heart of Pakistan – its laws, its rulers, its society. It's not the violence that disturbs most, gut-churning as it was. During Friday prayers two teams of attackers stormed Ahmadiyya mosques in the eastern city of Lahore. They fired Kalashnikovs from minarets, chucked grenades into the crowds, exploded their suicide vests. As the massacre unfolded, a friend called – his father-in-law, a devout Ahmadi, was inside one of the besieged mosques. The family, glued to live television coverage, were sick with worry. Two hours later, my friend's relative emerged alive. But many of his friends – old men, including a retired general and former judge – were dead. The killers were quickly identified as "Punjabi Taliban" – a loose collective of local extremists with ties to the tribal belt. This was unsurprising. More dispiriting, however, was the wider reaction. Human rights groups reacted with pre-programmed outrage; otherwise there was a virtual conspiracy of silence. A dribble of protesters attended street protests against the attack in Lahore and Karachi; eleven people showed up in Islamabad. The normally vociferous media were unusually reticent. Commentators expressed dismay at the violence, but few dared voice support for the Ahmadiyya community itself. Politicians turned yellow. Few visited the bereaved; still today, the chief minister of Punjab, Shahbaz Sharif, has not visited the bullet-pocked mosques or offered compensation to the injured. In the national parliament, three brave female MPs crossed party lines to propose a resolution condemning the attacks, in the face of massive indifference. The motion passed, just. The reticence is rooted in law and history. Ahmadis believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, a 19th century Punjabi cleric, was the messiah sent by God – a notion that deeply offends orthodox Muslims for whom Muhammad, who lived in 7th-century Arabia, is the final prophet. The problem is that the state has taken sides in this religious argument. Since the 1970s, civilian and military governments have passed laws enshrining the discrimination against Ahmadis, today thought to number about 4 million in Pakistan. And so they live in the shadows of society. Under the law, Ahmadis may not call themselves Muslims and may not refer to their places of worship as "mosques". Orthodox Muslims applying for a passport must sign a statement deriding Ahmad as an "imposter". Any Ahmadi who defies these edicts can be sentenced to death; in 2009, 37 were charged under the blasphemy laws and 57 under Ahmadi-specific laws. This state-directed discrimination has caused prejudice to soak into the bones of even well-educated Pakistanis. It is acceptable to denigrate Ahmadis as "agents of foreign powers" such as the CIA and Raw, India's intelligence service. In 2008 a prominent preacher on Geo, the country's largest channel, suggested that right-minded Muslims should kill Ahmadis. Within 48 hours two Ahmadis had been lynched. The television presenter has prospered. REFERENCE OF AHRC: A report from Asian Human Rights Commission on GEO TV: PAKISTAN: Two persons murdered after an anchor person proposed the widespread lynching of Ahmadi sect followers ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION – URGENT APPEALS PROGRAMME Urgent Appeal Case: AHRC-UAC-203-2008 PAKISTAN: No action taken against Geo TV presenter who incited Muslims to murder members of Pakistan minority on air FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AHRC-STM-244-2008 September 18, 2008 A Statement by the Asian Human Rights Commission – PAKISTAN: No action taken against Geo TV presenter who incited Muslims to murder members of Pakistan minority on air Last year a banner appeared outside the high court in Lahore, declaring "Jews, Christians and Ahmadis are enemies of Islam". Few complained. The silence that followed the Ahmadi killings was broken last week by a tsunami of outrage at the Israeli commando raids on boats headed for Gaza. Commentators and politicians fulminated at the treatment of the Palestinians – a minority that suffers state-sanctioned, religiously driven discrimination. Nobody got the irony. It makes one realise how small the constituency of true liberals is in Pakistan – not Pervez Musharraf-style liberals, who drink whisky and attend fashion shows, but people who believe the state should cherish all citizens equally. That, after all, was the publicly expressed desire of Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 63 years ago. Today it lies in tatters. REFERENCE: Ahmadi massacre silence is dispiriting – The virtual conspiracy of silence after the murder of 94 Ahmadis in Pakistan exposes the oppression suffered by the sect Declan Walsh, Monday 7 June 2010 14.59 BST

Ahl-e-Hadith Scholar ISSUES Fatwa of Kufr on Imam Abu Haneefah, Deobandis & Barelvis


Blasphemy Law and Deobandis (as Per Deobandi Books)





Marriage with Mother and Sister in Hanafi Fiq - Maulana Amin Safdar Orkarvi


Punjabi Taliban: Here they came in contact with Taliban militants; both influenced each other and a new sectarian breed came into being in the form of the Punjabi Taliban, now led by Asmatullah Muavia and loyal to Hakimullah Mehsud. Initially based in South Waziristan, the Punjabi Taliban were ousted after the military operation in 2009. In reprisal, they carried out high-profile attacks such as the one on GHQ in Rawalpindi. Sources say that that particular incident was the turning point and led to a re-think by the establishment. Security officials — who wish to remain anonymous — say this was because the GHQ standoff was resolved not just by army commandos but mainly through negotiations by Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, chief of the SSP, who convinced those inside to surrender. Army officials dismiss these claims. They say military action broke the siege and that the so-called Punjabi Taliban remains their number one enemy. It may well be that both stories are true, as one security official points out. Ludhianvi’s intervention — while crucial — was definitely only limited to the GHQ attack. He appears to have little control over the Punjabi Taliban leadership, which continues to wreak all sorts of havoc across Pakistan. However, it’s also clear that Ahmed Ludhianvi now enjoys official protocol. The SSP and Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, Sipah-i-Sahaba’s current title, are both supposedly proscribed, yet these organisations hold rallies in major cities with ease where arms are openly displayed. Today it’s clear that the SSP and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, an even more extreme sectarian outfit, are inter-linked. Maulana Ludhianvi admitted as much to the BBC when he said in an interview that Malik Ishaq, the LJ chief, was released on his guarantees and that the notorious militant now answers to him. Since Malik Ishaq’s release it’s become easier for the LJ leaders to move around, and they have since started expanding and setting up cells in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. These cells are made of locals and have been greatly strengthened, especially in Balochistan — where they operate independently of the LJ central command. There the traditionally secular Baloch — and particularly Brahui — are increasingly turning to the radical Islamist militancy espoused by SSP/LJ. Security officials — and Shia leaders — say this turn of events is complemented by the growth of sectarian madressahs there. Perhaps the largest Sipah-i-Sahaba seminary outside southern Punjab is in Mastung, in the heart of territory controlled by the Raisani tribe. Another major reason, according to Shia leaders, is the alleged support by intelligence agencies to groups of pro-government Baloch tribesmen. Most of these have dual identities — the second being outright sectarian and extremist. It is no surprise, then, that the largest of the groups is considered to be the de facto Lashkar-i-Jhangvi in Balochistan. All that is perhaps irrelevant for the intelligence agencies, whose main aim is the tried tactic of using religion to suppress nationalism. Led by a close relative of a senior politician from the province, some of LJ Balochistan’s more high-profile attacks include the killing of Baloch nationalist leader Habib Jalib Baloch and the attacks on the Hazara Shias pilgrims in Mastung. A senior member of the group accepts it has been involved in attacks to protect the Baloch community – it denies it’s carried out attacks on Shias. “We are only carrying out defensive actions against people who are supported by foreign intelligence services. The Baloch people are with Pakistan – it’s just that they are scared of the militants.” He adds that while their group isn’t anti-Shia — the community has elements that act as agents of Iran in Pakistan and they should refrain from this. REFERENCE: Sectarian militancy thriving in Balochistan By Syed Shoaib Hasan

Hanafi/Shia Fatwa of Apostasy against Dr. Zakir Naik (Ahle Hadith)


1. (S/NF) Summary: During recent trips to southern Punjab, Principal Officer was repeatedly told that a sophisticated jihadi recruitment network had been developed in the Multan, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan Divisions. The network reportedly exploited worsening poverty in these areas of the province to recruit children into the divisions’ growing Deobandi and Ahl-eHadith madrassa network from which they were indoctrinated into jihadi philosophy, deployed to regional training/indoctrination centers, and ultimately sent to terrorist training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Locals believed that charitable activities being carried out by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith organizations, including Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Al-Khidmat Foundation, and Jaish-e-Mohammad were further strengthening reliance on extremist groups and minimizing the importance of traditionally moderate Sufi religious leaders in these communities. Government and non-governmental sources claimed that financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from “”missionary”" and “”Islamic charitable”" organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments. Locals repeatedly requested USG support for socio-economic development and the promotion of moderate religious leaders in the region as a direct counter to the growing extremist threat. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) During a recent visit to the southern Punjabi cities of Multan and Bahawalpur, Principal Officer’s discussions with religious, political, and civil society leaders were dominated by discussions of the perceived growing extremist threat in Seraiki and Baloch areas in southern and western Punjab. Interlocutors repeatedly stressed that recruitment activities by extremist religious organizations, particularly among young men between the ages of 8 and 15, had increased dramatically over the last year. Locals blamed the trend on a strengthening network of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith mosques and madrassas, which they claimed had grown exponentially since late 2005. Such growth was repeatedly attributed to an influx of “”Islamic charity”" that originally reached Pakistani pseudo-religious organizations, such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Al-Khidmat foundation, as relief for earthquake victims in Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province. Locals believe that a portion of these funds was siphoned to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in southern and western Punjab in order to expand these sects’ presence in a traditionally hostile, but potentially fruitful, recruiting ground. The initial success of establishing madrassas and mosques in these areas led to subsequent annual “”donations”" to these same clerics, originating in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The value of such donations was uncertain, although most interlocutors believed that it was in the region of $100 million annually.

3. (S/NF) According to local interlocutors, current recruitment activities generally exploit families with multiple children, particularly those facing severe financial difficulties in light of inflation, poor crop yields, and growing unemployment in both urban and rural areas in the southern and western Punjab. Oftentimes, these families are identified and initially approached/assisted by ostensibly “”charitable”" organizations including Jamaat-ud-Dawa (a front for designated foreign terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyaba), the Al-Khidmat Foundation (linked to religious political party Jamaat-e-Islami), or Jaish-e-Mohammad (a charitable front for the designated foreign terrorist organization of the same name).

4. (S/NF) The local Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith maulana will generally be introduced to the family through these organizations. He will work to convince the parents that their poverty is a direct result of their family’s deviation from “”the true path of Islam”" through “”idolatrous”" worship at local Sufi shrines and/or with local Sufi Peers. The maulana suggests that the quickest way to return to “”favor”" would be to devote the lives of one or two of their sons to Islam. The maulana will offer to educate these children at his madrassa and to find them employment in the service of Islam. The concept of “”martyrdom”" is often discussed and the family is promised that if their sons are “”martyred”" both the sons and the family will attain “”salvation”" and the family will obtain God’s favor in this life, as well. An immediate cash payment is finally made to the parents to compensate the family for its “”sacrifice”" to Islam. Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rps. 500,000 (approximately USD 6500) per son. A small number of Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in Dera Ghazi Khan district are reportedly recruiting daughters as well.

5. (S/NF) The path following recruitment depends upon the age of the child involved. Younger children (between 8 and 12) seem to be favored. These children are sent to a comparatively small, extremist Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa in southern or western Punjab generally several hours from their family home. Locals were uncertain as to the exact number of madrassas used for this initial indoctrination purpose, although they believed that with the recent expansion, they could number up to 200. These madrassas are generally in isolated areas and are kept small enough (under 100 students) so as not to draw significant attention. At these madrassas, children are denied contact with the outside world and taught sectarian extremism, hatred for non-Muslims, and anti-Western/anti-Pakistan government philosophy. Contact between students and families is forbidden, although the recruiting maulana periodically visits the families with reports full of praise for their sons’ progress. “”Graduates”" from these madrassas are either (1) employed as Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics or madrassa teachers or (2) sent on to local indoctrination camps for jihad. Teachers at the madrassa appear to make the decision based on their read of the child’s willingness to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture versus his utility as an effective proponent of Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith ideology/recruiter.

6. (S/NF) Children recruited at an older age and “”graduates”" chosen for jihad proceed to more sophisticated indoctrination camps focused on the need for violence and terrorism against the Pakistan government and the West. Locals identified three centers reportedly used for this purpose. The most prominent of these is a large complex that ostensibly has been built at Khitarjee (sp?). Locals placed this site in Bahawalpur District on the Sutlej River north of the village of Ahmedpur East at the border of the districts of Multan, Bahawalpur, and Lodhran. The second complex is a newly built “”madrassa”" on the outskirts of Bahawalpur city headed by a devotee of Jaish-e-Mohammad leader Maulana Masood Azhar identified only as Maulana Al-Hajii (NFI). The third complex is an Ahl-e-Hadith site on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city about which very limited information was available. Locals asserted that these sites were primarily used for indoctrination and very limited military/terrorist tactic training. They claimed that following several months of indoctrination at these centers youth were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas. Many worried that these youth would eventually return to try and impose their extremist version of Islam in the southern and western Punjab and/or to carry out operations in these areas.

7. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly chastised the government for its failure to act decisively against indoctrination centers, extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar. One leading Sufi scholar and a Member of the Provincial Assembly informed Principal Officer that he had personally provided large amounts of information on the location of these centers, madrassas, and personalities to provincial and national leaders, as well as the local police. He was repeatedly told that “”plans”" to deal with the threat were being “”evolved”" but that direct confrontation was considered “”too dangerous.”" The Bahawalpur District Nazim told Principal Officer that he had repeatedly highlighted the growing threat to the provincial and federal governments but had received no support in dealing with it. He blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties — he is currently with the Pakistan Muslim League — neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan Peoples Party federal governments would take his requests seriously. The brother of the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, and a noted Brailvi/Sufi scholar in his own right, Allama Qasmi blamed government intransigence on a culture that rewarded political deals with religious extremists. He stressed that even if political will could be found, the bureaucracy in the Religious Affairs, Education, and Defense Ministries remained dominated by Zia-ul-Haq appointees who favored the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious philosophies. This bureaucracy, Qasmi claimed, had repeatedly blocked his brother’s efforts to push policy in a different direction.

8. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly requested USG assistance for the southern and western Punjab, believing that an influx of western funds could counter the influence of Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics. Principal Officer was repeatedly reminded that these religious philosophies were alien to the southern and western Punjab — which is the spiritual heartland of South Asia’s Sufi communities. Their increasing prominence was directly attributed to poverty and external funding. Locals believed that socio-economic development programs, particularly in education, agriculture, and employment generation, would have a direct, long-term impact in minimizing receptivity to extremist movements. Similarly, they pressed for immediate relief efforts — particularly food distribution and income support — to address communities’ immediate needs. Several interlocutors also encouraged direct USG support to Brailvi/Sufi religious institutions, arguing that these represented the logical antithesis to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith philosophy and that if adequately funded, they could stem the tide of converts away from their moderate beliefs.


9. (S/NF) A jihadi recruiting network relying on Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious, charitable, and educational institutions is increasing its work in impoverished districts of southern and western Punjab. Local economic conditions coupled with foreign financing appear to be transforming a traditionally moderate area of the country into a fertile recruiting ground for terrorist organizations. The provincial and federal governments, while fully aware of the problem, appear to fear direct confrontation with these extremist groups. Local governments lack the resources and federal/provincial support to deal with these organizations on their own. The moderate Brailvi/Sufi community is internally divided into followers of competing spiritual leaders and lacks the financial resources to act as an effective counterweight to well-funded and well-organized extremists.

10. (S/NF) Post believes that this growing recruitment network poses a direct threat to USG counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts in Pakistan. Intervention at this stage in the southern and western Punjab could still be useful to counter the prevailing trends favoring extremist organizations. USAID development resources in agriculture, economic growth, education, and infrastructure development are useful and necessary and will address some of the immediate needs. In post’s view short-term, quick impact programs are required which focus on: (1) immediate relief in the form of food aid and microcredit, (2) cash for work and community-based, quick-impact infrastructure development programs focusing on irrigation systems, schools, and other critical infrastructure, and (3) strategic communication programs designed to educate on the dangers of the terrorist recruiting networks and to support counter-terrorist, counter-extremist messages. HUNT REFERENCE: 2008: Extremist recruitment on the rise in south Punjab madrassahs DAWN.COM | 22nd May, 2011

Deobandi Fatwa against Dr Zakir Naik Jamia Binoria Pakistan of Mufti Naeem

Dr. Zakir Naik K Mutalik Dar ul Ulloom Deoband Ka Fatwa


1. (S) Summary: A well-placed Deobandi religious leader told Principal Officer in a meeting on March 18 that extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) was increasing its activities in the central Punjab city of Faisalabad, the province’s second largest, in collaboration with elements of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a splinter group from the banned terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). The cleric reported that SSP had recently launched a pamphlet campaign across the city in which it called for people to take steps to enforce Islamic law including: (1) cease business and social activities at the five daily calls to prayer, (2) remove all sources of “”vulgarity”" such as televisions, cd players, and radios from their homes, (3) seek dispute resolution through local imams rather than the courts, (4) take Friday rather than Sunday as the weekly holiday, and (4) strictly enforce purdah for female family members. The pamphlet states that it comes from SSP with support from the TTP and specifically praises “”the enforcement of Sharia in Swat”" and recommends it as a model for Faisalabad. According the religious scholar, a number of girls’ educational institutions in Faisalabad have received letters stating that if they fail to observe purdah, they could be attacked by suicide bombers. The cleric surmised that SSP activities would increase in Faisalabad on the return of its leader Maulana Ludhianvi from a Libyan-government sponsored trip to that country. End Summary.

2. (S) Leading Faisalabad-based Deobandi scholar and IVLP alumnus Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX called on the Principal Officer on March 18 to discuss his concerns regarding what he termed as “”growing extremist activity”" in Punjab’s second-largest city Faisalabad. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that in the last month he has observed a dramatic increase in propaganda activities from Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). He believed that this increase coincided with a number of visits to Faisalabad from activists both of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a splinter group from the southern Punjab-based Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). XXXXXXXXXXXX believed that the activists were involved in recruiting for TTP militant operations in the FATA and NWFP through madrassas in southern Punjab and hoped to replicate that success in Faisalabad. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that SSP leaders had long-standing ties with JeM, as both were Deobandi organizations that had collaborated in the past in anti-Shia and anti-India activities.

3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with Principal Officer an Urdu-language sticker that he claimed he had confiscated from several of his madrassa students in Faisalabad. The sticker, which he stated was also being printed and distributed as a pamphlet, praised the implementation of Sharia law in Swat and exhorted Muslims to pursue the same sort of Sharia law in Faisalabad. It then recounted five steps that every Faisalabad based Muslim should take to begin the process of implementation in the district. The steps were: : (1) cease business and social activities at the five daily calls to prayer, (2) remove all sources of “”vulgarity”" such as televisions, cd players, and radios from their homes, (3) seek dispute resolution through local imams rather than the courts, (4) take Friday rather than Sunday as the weekly holiday, and (4) strictly enforce purdah for female family members.

4. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX told Principal Officer that he had initially dismissed the pamphlet campaign, but became increasingly concerned after learning of specific threats received by several girls’ schools (NFI) in Faisalabad. He claimed that these schools had received letters sent from SSP, referencing the situation in Swat, and warning that if these schools did not begin having their students observe complete purdah, the schools could be the target of violence, including suicide bombing. Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX did not produce a copy of the threat letter. Principal Officer inquired whether any violence had yet occurred in Faisalabad in connection with the SSP campaign. Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX responded that to his knowledge it had not, but he believed that it could occur in short order if police did not check SSP activities.

5. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that in addition to its pamphlet campaign, SSP had organized a number of traditional religious conferences in Faisalabad during the Islamic month of Rabwa (currently ongoing). Traditionally such conferences are organized in this month of the Prophet’s birth to discuss the model life that the Prophet lead and to exhort Muslims to follow his example. According to Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX, this year during the SSP conferences, the organizers have exhorted attendees to follow the Prophet’s example and press for the adoption of complete shariah law in Faisalabad, using Swat as a model. These exhortations specifically call for action against vulgarity and women not observing purdah. In one case, Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that he learned that leaders of the recently banned al-Rashid Trust were coming to address a March 8 SSP conference. He stated that he had informed the District Police Officer, who cancelled the event.

6. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX shared that he had received reliable information that SSP leader Maulana Ludhianvi was on a fundraising trip to Tripoli sponsored by the Libyan government. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that Ludhianvi had made contact with Libyan officials in the guise of working against Iran and Shia agents in Pakistan. (Note: SSP was originally founded as a violent anti-Shia organization and has, in the past, received extensive foreign funding from a variety of Sunni states, including Saudi Arabia. End Note). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ludhianvi was scheduled to return to Pakistan in “”a few days”" and was bringing with him a “”donation”" from the Libyan government valued at nearly 25 million Pakistani rupees (approximately $312,000) that XXXXXXXXXXXX was certain would be used to increase further SSP activities.

7. (S) Comment: Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX is a long-standing contact of Consulate Lahore, who visited the United States in XXXXXXXXXXXX as part of our International Visitor Leadership Program. XXXXXXXXXXXX repeatedly credits his trip to the United States and particularly his discussions with Muslim leaders there for changing his previously anti-Western views. XXXXXXXXXXXX has numerous ties within the broader Deobandi community and is well-positioned to obtain information on activities of Deobandi-linked terrorist/extremist groups such as SSP and JeM. He has not/not previously shared such extensive information with post about these groups’ activities in Faisalabad. Post believes he has done so on this occasion largely out of concern for his and other moderate Deobandi leaders’ safety if these groups expand activities in Faislabad. The significant decline in the Pakistani textile industry and accompanying large-scale lay-offs in Faisalabad –the center of that industry in Punjab — provides groups like SSP with a ready pool of unemployed recruits, who are susceptible to these groups’ rhetoric about an Islamic utopia based on Sharia and prepared to engage in violence to bring it about. End Comment. HUNT “ REFERENCE: 2009: Was Qaddafi funding Sipahe Sahaba? 26th May, 2011

Blasphemous Jamat-E-Islami and Mawdudi

Jamat e Islami Sindh president-Asad ullah Bhutto Speech on Imam Khomeini (Part - 1)


KARACHI: A US official in a cable sent to the State Department stated that “financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith clerics in south Punjab from organisations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments.” The cable sent in November 2008 by Bryan Hunt, the then Principal Officer at the US Consulate in Lahore, was based on information from discussions with local government and non-governmental sources during his trips to the cities of Multan and Bahawalpur. Quoting local interlocutors, Hunt attempts to explain how the “sophisticated jihadi recruitment network” operated in a region dominated by the Barelvi sect, which, according to the cable, made south Punjab “traditionally hostile” to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith schools of thought. Hunt refers to a “network of Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith mosques and madrassahs” being strengthened through an influx of “charity” which originally reached organisations “such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Al-Khidmat foundation”. Portions of these funds would then be given away to clerics “in order to expand these sects’ presence” in a relatively inhospitable yet “potentially fruitful recruiting ground”.

Outlining the process of recruitment for militancy, the cable describes how “families with multiple children” and “severe financial difficulties” were generally being exploited for recruitment purposes. Families first approached by “ostensibly ‘charitable’” organisations would later be introduced to a “local Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith maulana” who would offer to educate the children at his madrassah and “find them employment in the service of Islam”. “Martyrdom” was also “often discussed”, with a final cash payment to the parents. “Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rs 500,000 (approximately USD 6,500) per son,” the cable states. Children recruited would be given age-specific indoctrination and would eventually be trained according to the madrassah teachers’ assessment of their inclination “to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture” versus their value as promoters of Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith sects or recruiters, the cable states. Recruits “chosen for jihad” would then be taken to “more sophisticated indoctrination camps”. “Locals identified three centres reportedly used for this purpose”. Two of the centres were stated to be in the Bahawalpur district, whereas one was reported as situated “on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city”. These centres “were primarily used for indoctrination”, after which “youths were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas”.

The cable goes on to quote local officials criticising the PML-N-led provincial and the PPP-led federal governments for their “failure to act” against “extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-i-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar”. The Bahawalpur district nazim at the time told Hunt that despite repeatedly highlighting the threat posed by extremist groups and indoctrination centres to the provincial and federal governments, he had received “no support” in dealing with the issue unless he was ready to change his political loyalties. The nazim, who at the time was with the PML-Q, “blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties…neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan People’s Party federal governments would take his requests seriously”. REFERENCE: Saudi Arabia, UAE financing extremism in south Punjab By Qurat ul ain Siddiqui 22nd May, 2011 

Jamat e Islami Sindh president-Asad ullah Bhutto Speech on Imam Khomeini (Part - 2)


Real Face of Mawdudi and Jamat e Islami by Maulana Manzoor Naimani

In a television programme aired recently, former chief of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and an important leader of Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) General (retd) Hamid Gul cast doubts over the authenticity of a picture run by the website of The Express Tribune. The picture in question was that of Malik Ishaq, commander of the banned outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), who was shown to be in attendance at the DPC meeting in Multan – a meeting also attended and addressed by General Gul. During a talk show on Aaj TV, host Wajahat S Khan showed Gul the picture on The Express Tribune’s website as evidence of Ishaq’s attendance – in response to which the retired general alleged that the photo had been doctored. When he was further challenged by the show’s host, Gul resorted to questioning the reporter of the story. The Express Tribune takes strong exception to General Gul’s allegations and contends that the picture is authentic. It was taken by our photographer, who was assigned to cover the gathering. In fact, the picture was also run by other newspapers. If Gul has the slightest doubt regarding the authenticity of the photograph, we ask him to take the matter to court. Express Media Group Published in The Express Tribune, February 16th, 2012. REFERENCE: Notice: A note to Hamid Gul Published: February 16, 2012 Difa-e-Pakistan: Malik Ishaq out to 'defend' Pakistan

Malik Ishaq attended Multan rally: Jamaatud Dawa


LAHORE: Chief of banned militant outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Malik Ishaq was in attendance at the Difa-e-Pakistan Council rally in Multan, a spokesperson for the council’s member organisation Jamaatud Dawa has said. “General (retd) Hamid Gul was wrong in denying Ishaq’s presence at the rally. He was present on stage,” said Yahya Mujahid, a spokesperson for Islamic chairty, which is blacklisted by the United Nations  for its alleged ties to LeJ but not by the Pakistan government. Gul, in an interview with Express News television channel, had categorically denied that Ishaq was present at the rally. “It was DPC’s unanimous decision that Ishaq will not address the rally,” Mujahid told The Express Tribune on Friday. “It’s a simple rule that whoever addresses the people from stage at a DPC rally cannot be a member of a banned militant outfit.” Mujahid was attending an emergency protest, called by the JuD outside their main mosque Jamia Qudsia in Lahore under the DPC’s banner, against resumption of Nato supply routes and trade talks with India. The council has also called a meeting of heads of member parties on February 19 in Islamabad.

Apology to media

He also apologised for statements made against the media at the council’s Karachi rally. “The statements should be condemned in the strongest terms. I, as a representative of JuD, have written letters of apology to media organisations.”


The spokesperson said that the DPC is an organised platform. “Funding [for the organisation] is provided by member parties while host parties for different rallies fund events in their own cities,” he explained. For instance, he said, JuD hosted the Lahore rally, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat organised the one in Multan, Sheikh Rasheed hosted the Rawalpindi event and Jamat-e-Islami hosted the Karachi rally. “The nationwide networks of all member parties provide support in organisational procedures.”

In defence of Hafiz Saeed

Amir Hamza, a senior leader of the JuD, said that the reason the US is against JuD chief Hafiz Saeed is because he speaks out about human rights violations by US allied forces in the region. He also blamed former president Pervez Musharraf for joining hands with the US in the ‘war on terror’ and the Balochistan crisis. CORRECTION: Former president Pervez Musharraf’s name was erroneously written as Pervez Sharif. The error is regretted. REFERENCE: Malik Ishaq attended Multan rally: Jamaatud Dawa By Rabia Mehmood Published: February 17, 2012

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