Pakistan's ISI was used as a "go-between". CIA covert support to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan operated indirectly through the Pakistani ISI, --i.e. the CIA did not channel its support directly to the Mujahideen. In other words, for these covert operations to be "successful", Washington was careful not to reveal the ultimate objective of the "jihad", which consisted in destroying the Soviet Union. In December 1984, the Sharia Law (Islamic jurisprudence) was established in Pakistan following a rigged referendum launched by President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Barely a few months later, in March 1985, President Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 166 (NSDD 166), which authorized "stepped-up covert military aid to the Mujahideen" as well a support to religious indoctrination. The imposition of The Sharia in Pakistan and the promotion of "radical Islam" was a deliberate US policy serving American geopolitical interests in South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Many present-day "Islamic fundamentalist organizations" in the Middle East and Central Asia, were directly or indirectly the product of US covert support and financing, often channeled through foundations from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Missions from the Wahhabi sect of conservative Islam in Saudi Arabia were put in charge of running the CIA sponsored madrassas in Northern Pakistan. Reference: 9/11 ANALYSIS: From Ronald Reagan and the Soviet-Afghan War to George W Bush and September 11, 2001 by Michel Chossudovsky October 1, 2011 http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=20958
Ronald Reagan Dedication for Afghan Mujahideen - 1
URL: http://youtu.be/eYLBoXQTBqY
Ronald Reagan Dedication for Afghan Mujahideen - 2
URL: http://youtu.be/YXb_BUSU91s
Under NSDD 166, a series of covert CIA-ISI operations was launched.
The US supplied weapons to the Islamic brigades through the ISI. CIA and ISI officials would meet at ISI headquarters in Rawalpindi to coordinate US support to the Mujahideen. Under NSDD 166, the procurement of US weapons to the Islamic insurgents increased from 10,000 tons of arms and ammunition in 1983 to 65,000 tons annually by 1987. "In addition to arms, training, extensive military equipment including military satellite maps and state-of-the-art communications equipment" (University Wire, 7 May 2002). Reference: 9/11 ANALYSIS: From Ronald Reagan and the Soviet-Afghan War to George W Bush and September 11, 2001 by Michel Chossudovsky October 1, 2011 http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=20958
Fast Forward to the present days
As the United States deepens its commitment to Afghanistan, FRONTLINE takes viewers inside the war-torn nation to reveal a disturbing practice that is once again flourishing in the country: the organized sexual abuse of adolescent boys. In The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan, Afghan journalist Najibullah Quraishi (Behind Taliban Lines) returns to his native land to expose an ancient practice that has been brought back by powerful warlords, former military commanders and wealthy businessmen. Known as "bacha bazi" (literal translation: "boy play"), this illegal practice exploits street orphans and poor boys, some as young as 11, whose parents are paid to give over their sons to their new "masters." The men dress the boys in women's clothes and train them to sing and dance for the entertainment of themselves and their friends. According to experts, the dancing boys are used sexually by these powerful men. REFERENCE: The Dancing Boys Of Afghanistan | FRONTLINE | PBS Introduction April 20, 2010 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/dancingboys/etc/synopsis.html
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/dancingboys/
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/dancingboys/
The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan (Bacha Bazi) 1 of 2
URL: http://youtu.be/ywWjjewqNDA
The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan (Bacha Bazi) 2 of 2
URL: http://youtu.be/sRhfthE_Ifg
WikiLeaks on US Contractors & "Bacha Bazi" (Paedophilia) in Afghanistan.
URL: http://youtu.be/SIzeErqwph4
Wednesday, 24 June 2009, 11:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001651
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/A, INL, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR FLOURNOY
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICENT
KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A
EO 12958 DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, MASS, AF
SUBJECT: 06/23/09 MEETING, ASSISTANT AMB MUSSOMELI AND MOI
MINISTER ATMAR: KUNDUZ DYNCORP PROBLEM, TRANSPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND OTHER TOPICS
REF: KABUL 1480
Classified By: POLMIL COUNSELOR ROBERT CLARKE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Assistant Ambassador Mussomeli discussed a range of issues with Minister of Interior (MoI) Hanif Atmar on June 23. On the Kunduz Regional Training Center (RTC) DynCorp event of April 11 (reftel), Atmar reiterated his insistence that the U.S. try to quash any news article on the incident or circulation of a video connected with it. He continued to predict that publicity would "endanger lives." He disclosed that he has arrested two Afghan police and nine other Afghans as part of an MoI investigation into Afghans who facilitated this crime of "purchasing a service from a child." He pressed for CSTC-A to be given full control over the police training program, including contractors. Mussomeli counseled that an overreaction by the Afghan goverment (GIRoA) would only increase chances for the greater publicity the MoI is trying to forestall.
2. (C) On armored vehicles and air transport for presidential candidates, Atmar pitched strongly to have the GIRoA decide which candidates were under threat and to retain control of allocation of these assets. He agreed with the principle of a level playing field for candidates but argued that "direct support by foreigners" demonstrated a lack of confidence in GIRoA. If GIRoA failed to be fair, international assets and plans in reserve could be used. On another elections-related issue, Atmar claimed that two Helmand would-be provincial candidates (and key Karzai supporters) disqualified under DIAG rules had actually possessed weapons as part of a GIRoA contract to provide security for contractors.
3. (C) Atmar also was enthusiastic about working out arrangements with the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) in RC-South to partner with the Afghan Border Police (ABP) on training and joint operations to extend GIRoA governance south. He is considering giving BG">BG Melham, a highly regarded Afghan officer, responsibility for ABP in Nimruz and Helmand provinces. END SUMMARY.
KUNDUZ RTC DYNCORP UPDATE
4. (C) On June 23, Assistant Ambassador Mussomeli met with MOI Minister Hanif Atmar on a number of issues, beginning with the April 11 Kunduz RTC DynCorp investigation. Amb Mussomeli opened that the incident deeply upset us and we took strong steps in response. An investigation is on-going, disciplinary actions were taken against DynCorp leaders in Afghanistan, we are also aware of proposals for new procedures, such as stationing a military officer at RTCs, that have been introduced for consideration. (Note: Placing military officers to oversee contractor operations at RTCs is not legally possible under the currentDynCorp contract.) Beyond remedial actions taken, we still hope the matter will not be blown out of proportion, an outcome which would not be good for either the U.S. or Afghanistan. A widely-anticipated newspaper article on the Kunduz scandal has not appeared but, if there is too much noise that may prompt the journalist to publish.
5. (C) Atmar said he insisted the journalist be told that publication would endanger lives. His request was that the U.S. quash the article and release of the video. Amb Mussomeli responded that going to the journalist would give her the sense that there is a more terrible story to report. Atmar then disclosed the arrest of two Afghan National Police (ANP) and nine other Afghans (including RTC language assistants) as part of an MoI investigation into Afghan "facilitators" of the event. The crime he was pursuing was "purchasing a service from a child," which in Afghanistan is illegal under both Sharia law and the civil code, and against the ANP Code of Conduct for police officers who might be involved. He said he would use the civil code and that, in this case, the institution of the ANP will be protected, but he worried about the image of foreign mentors. Atmar said that President Karzai had told him that his (Atmar's) "prestige" was in play in management of the Kunduz DynCorp matter and another recent event in which Blackwater contractors mistakenly killed several Afghan citizens. The President had asked him "Where is the justice?"
6. (C) Atmar said there was a larger issue to consider. He
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understood that within DynCorp there were many "wonderful" people working hard, and he was keen to see proper action taken to protect them; but, these contractor companies do not have many friends. He was aware that many questions about them go to SRAP Holbrooke and, in Afghanistan, there is increasing public skepticism about contractors. On the other hand, the conduct of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is disciplined. Looking at these facts, he said, he wanted CSTC-A in charge. He wanted the ANP to become a model security institution just like the Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Directorate for Security (NDS), and the contractors were not producing what was desired. He suggested that the U.S. establish and independent commission to review the mentor situation, an idea he said Ambassador Eikenberry had first raised. Atmar added that he also wanted tighter control over Afghan employees. He was convinced that the Kunduz incident, and other events where mentors had obtained drugs, could not have happened without Afghan participation.
ARMORED VEHICLES (AND AIR TRANSPORT) FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
7. (C) Atmar expressed strong opinions about the use of armored vehicles for travel by presidential candidates that he has requested be provided to MoI by the U.S. and UK. He said it was up to MoI to decide whether a candidate was under threat or not. Atmar opined that it should be an MoD responsibility to provide air transport for presidential candidates. Amb Mussomeli explained that we want a level playing field, which Atmar agreed was necessary. However, Atmar said there were two important considerations: 1) some of the electorate will view that the candidates are controlled by foreigners if provided non-GIRoA transport; and 2) bypassing the MoI or MoD with "direct support by foreigners" demonstrated a lack of confidence in the Afghanistan government. When Amb Mussomeli said MOD lacked adequate aircraft to cover all candidates, Atmar responded that MoD could ask ISAF for help but should retain control of the travel. Amb Mussomeli pointed out that some reasonably worried that such a plan will falter or will not be fairly implemented. Atmar answered "Just give us a chance. If we fail, then you have your own planes and plans in reserve."
DIAG-DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATES IN HELMAND
8. (C) In a discussion on two would-be provincial election candidates in Helmand who were disqualified by the Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) program, Atmar said he had looked into requests to stand firm against their reinstatement, but it was a "big, contentious issue that is not explainable to President Karzai." Atmar said that the only reason these two candidates were barred was for having weapons, apparently against DIAG rules. In fact, he said, they were "contracted by the state" to have those weapons in order to provide security for contractors. He acknowledged that the "contract" had not been properly registered, and suggested that the GIRoA would take care of the registration.
AFGHAN BORDER POLICE (ABP) AND PARTNERING WITH THE MARINES IN RC-SOUTH
9. (C) Atmar enthusiastically proposed an MOI meeting with the leadership of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and CSTC-A to work out arrangements for good partnering, training, and joint operations with Afghan security forces in RC-South. The MEB would like two ABP companies (approximately 250 police) currently located near Lashkar Gah to move south, and to be mobile enough to move further south when opportunities arise. The MEB would like a customs officer to be attached to these ABP companies so that the reach of GIRoA governance can be extended when insurgent-controlled or dominated territory is opened. Atmar stopped short of making a final promise to give a highly-regarded Afghan officer, BG">BG Melham (whom he personally respects), responsibility for the ABP in Nimruz and Helmand provinces, but he was aware of concerns about the current responsible officer (BG">BG Noorzai).
KABUL INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL (ISK)
10. (U) Amb Mussomeli expressed concern over a plan by a District Police Chief to remove security barriers at ISK (an primary and secondary school partially dependent on USAID and other Mission funding support) that keep the road closed to
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normal traffic. Removing the barriers could endanger the kids and teachers who walk between two compounds. Atmar said that he was very familiar with ISK and "no barriers would be touched," although he added that perhaps an arrangement could be made to unblock the road and have the ISK security personnel search vehicles.
EIKENBERRY
REFERENCE: US embassy cables: Afghan government asks US to quash 'dancing boys' scandal Thursday 2 December 2010 21.30 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/213720 Courtesy: Tell the UN to Stop Child Trafficking via Bacha Bazi in Afghanistan http://www.change.org/petitions/tell-the-un-to-stop-child-trafficking-via-bacha-bazi-in-afghanistan Are Afghan Security Forces Complicit in Child Sex Trafficking? by Amanda Kloer · October 29, 2010 http://news.change.org/stories/are-afghan-security-forces-complicit-in-child-sex-trafficking WikiLeaks: Texas Company Helped Pimp Little Boys To Stoned Afghan Cops By John Nova Lomax Tue., Dec. 7 2010 at 7:01 AM http://blogs.houstonpress.com/hairballs/2010/12/wikileaks_texas_company_helped.php Wikileaks Reveals U.S. Tax Dollars Fund Child Sex Slavery in Afghanistan by Amanda Kloer · December 08, 2010 http://news.change.org/stories/wikileaks-reveals-us-tax-dollars-fund-child-sex-slavery-in-afghanistan
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