Tuesday, November 22, 2011

Jang Group Tilt Towards Anti-Pakistan "Mansoor Ijaz"

Pakistan is one of those unfortunate countries where the Sanctimonious Intellectuals discuss the blame on speculations and assumptions even if it is at the cost of the integrity and sovereignty of the country. Differring with PPP or any other government is one thing and putting country's fate at the stake for settling some political score is quite another and that is the usual story with the Jang Group of newspaper and their Journalists/TV Anchors particularly Shaheen Sehbai, Kamran Khan, Mohammad Malick and Ansar Abbasi despite knowing an established fact (with reference, history and footage) that Mansoor Ijaz and his Neocon Lobby had destroyed Iraq by raising False Alarm of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Mansoor Ijaz is exactly doing the same again and Jang Group of Newspapers is part and parrcel in this ugly game. During a TV Show of GEO TV "Aaj Kamran Khan Kay Sath dated 18 Nov 2011" and earlier on Bolta Pakistan of AAJ TV dated 16 Nov 2011 the resident editor of The News International, Mr. Mohammad Malick opined that raising objection on Mansoor Ijaz' credibility is of no use! Very well as Mr. Malick suggest we should apply Mansoor Ijaz "Rant" as a cardinal truth and Mr. Mohammad Malick should plead case against Pakistan in the world community particularly in UN by quoting from Mr. Mansoor Ijaz "Excellent Pieces" on Pakistan, and particularly Mansoor's Lie on WMD in Iraq, let us proceed but before proceeding to the detailed background of this Neocon War Monger i.e. Mansoor Ijaz, we must keep one thing in mind that Mohammad Malick (Resident Editor, The News International) also has several blot on his character e.g. Muhammad Malick (List of journalists given plots in Islamabad Published: November 1, 2010 http://tribune.com.pk/story/70940/list-of-journalists-given-plots-in-islamabad/ Journalist Corruption Scandal – Mohammad Malick JUNE 3, 2009 http://pkpolitics.com/2009/06/03/journalist-corruption-scandal-mohammad-malick/. Jang Group often invoke Quran and Sunnah and Fatwa to serve selfish motives therefore they must know about the “Burden of Proof” - “The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff and the taking of oath is upon the defendant.” (Al-Bayhaqi)” - Guilty by Suspicion is against the Spirit of Islamic Law because when you raise finger then it’s the responsibility of those who allege to produce witness. Benefit of doubt is always given to those who is under trial.

الْبَيِّنَةُ عَلَى الْمُدَّعِى وَالْيَمِينُ عَلَى الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ

The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and the oath is upon the one who is accused (Tirmidhi) - Therefore the ruler is forbidden from imposing a penalty on anyone, unless they perpetrate a crime which Shari’ah considers to be a crime, and the perpetration of the crime has been proven before a competent judge in a judiciary court, because the evidence could not be admissible unless it is established before a competent judge and in a judiciary court.

ISLAMABAD: The identity of the mystery government official whom American businessman Mansoor Ijaz claimed to have met in a European city and shared his trough of forensic communication data with, has remained a key missing link in the memo-authenticity-chain. Mansoor had also said that the gentleman was not a parliamentarian or a political personality. And he was right. According to highly classified information obtained by The News, the mystery caller was none other than the Director General ISI, Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha. It was revealed that owing to the sensitivity of the charges levelled by Mansoor, including the alleged authorisation of the controversial memo by President Zardari, it was decided at the highest level of the military leadership that the initial investigation must be carried out by the top spymaster himself. When asked by The News to confirm whether the official who met him on Oct 22 was the ISI chief Lt General Ahmed Shuja Pasha himself, Mansoor Ijaz simply said: ‘Yes.’ He has been saying in several statements in the last few days that the full data and evidence was given to the official including records of phone calls, SMS messages, BBM chat exchanges, emails etc. According to details, the meeting took place on the eve of October 22, in a Park Lane Intercontinental hotel room in London. The meeting is said to have started around 6:30pm and lasted for over four hours. The News has learnt that during the meeting, Mansoor Ijaz was exhaustively grilled over his claims and that Mansoor handed a fairly large quantity of records, both copies and originals. The records were subsequently put through a verification process and once the DG ISI was convinced about their authenticity, he then briefed the army chief who ultimately discussed the matter in his one-on-one meeting with President Zardari on November 15. The COAS, according to a highly informed insider, had impressed upon the president the inevitable necessity of Ambassador Haqqani’s presence in the country to explain his alleged role in the memo controversy. REFERENCE: DG ISI met Mansoor Ijaz in London Shaheen Sehbai & Mohammad Malick Sunday, November 20, 2011 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=10409&Cat=13

Mansoor Ijaz Poisonous Propaganda Against Pakistan Army (FOX NEWS May 2011)


Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar not aware of meeting-21 Nov 2011


ISLAMABAD: Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar while speaking to Geo News said he was not aware of a meeting between ISI chief Shuja Pasha and US businessman Mansoor Ijaz. Mukhtar said that US Ambassador to Pakistan Husain Haqqani would be meeting with the country’s top leadership over the course of the next few days. Mukhtar also endorsed the notion that those involved in the memo scandal should stand trial. Earlier while talking to media here, Mukhtar said Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani was investigating the matter and the results would be made public. REFERENCE: Mukhtar not aware of Gen. Pasha, Mansoor Ijaz meeting Updated 4 hours ago (Dated 22 Nov 2011) http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=27023&title=%E2%80%98Not-aware-of-Pasha-Ijaz-meeting%E2%80%99-

 Bolta Pakistan with Nusrat Javed - Part 1 (16 NOV 2011)


Tuesday, November 22, 2011, Zil Hajj 25, 1432 A.H.

Mansoor Ijaz is Imran Khan's Friend.


Mansoor Ijaz is against Pakistan Nuclear Deterrence. (Fox News 2007)


A deeply disturbing picture of terrorist intent has emerged in recent weeks as blueprints for building nuclear weapons have been discovered in the wreckage of abandoned Al Qaeda safe houses. These blueprints and other documents, while largely available in the public domain, sharpen the need for a vigorous American policy to deal with unsecured nuclear, chemical and biological materials. Even if terrorist manufacture of nuclear bombs is unlikely, substantial dangers remain of terrorists using radioactive material in low-tech "dirty" bombs. The main nuclear security problem posed by Al Qaeda today is access to radioactive materials in Pakistan. However, for a decade we have focused on the former Soviet Union. Since the end of the cold war, approximately 175 incidents of smuggling or attempted theft of nuclear materials there have been thwarted. But the threat remains, as the Russian Defense Ministry reported on Nov. 6, when the last attempt at theft was made. For Russia, a sensible solution is available — the Nunn-Lugar "cooperative threat reduction" program to improve the security of Russia's nuclear materials, technology and expertise. This week, the House Republican leadership will decide whether to finance the next phase. The program is only 40 percent complete; finishing it will take another quarter of a century at the current rate of funding. It is past time to fully implement and finance this important legislation. The Nunn-Lugar initiative can serve as a valuable precedent in addressing security problems in Pakistan. Neither Pakistan nor India has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Nor has either country engaged in negotiations, under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, to protect against theft of fissile materials. This reluctance in India and Pakistan to recognize international norms, however, should not alter our resolve to improve the security of nuclear materials in South Asia. While Islamabad is widely believed to have the material for 25 to 40 medium-yield bombs, most of its nuclear devices are kept in component parts, not as assembled warheads. The storage procedures, quite elaborate prior to Sept. 11, were altered again on Oct. 7 when the American bombing of Afghanistan began. Separately stored uranium and plutonium cores and their detonation assemblies were moved to six new secret locations around the country.

The new storage patterns were designed to allow for rapid assembly and deployment, but attackers will nonetheless find it much more difficult to confiscate Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Even if Al Qaeda obtained radioactive materials from a sympathizer at one of Pakistan's plants for making weapons-grade nuclear materials, as some reports have suggested, the material would still have to be shaped into a fissionable core with detonation switches and delivery housings. Such a complex effort would be difficult to carry out in an Afghan cave. But we can hardly count on terrorists always being under bombardment in caves. Pakistan's nuclear command hierarchy, overhauled in 2000, was also revamped on Oct. 7 in the wake of a broad military-intelligence shake-up. Pakistan's president and army chief, Pervez Musharraf, created the strategic planning division and appointed a moderate general, Khalid Kidwai, to oversee Pakistani nuclear assets.

Self-policing, however, is not enough. Since 1990, American sanctions have blocked sale or transfer of any technology that might have a military use — including technologies that would improve nuclear security. American export license controls — and, where necessary, Non-Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty compliance rules preventing United States exports — should be waived to transfer the technology needed to protect Pakistan's nuclear arsenals and materials from unauthorized use. The Bush administration should make available American vaults, sensors, alarms, tamper-proof seals, closed-circuit cameras and labels to identify, track and secure Islamabad's nuclear materials. Such precautions would dramatically reduce the probability that even the most devoted bin Laden supporter inside a Pakistani nuclear enrichment facility would get very far in trying to deliver stolen uranium or plutonium to terrorists. There is a real risk that Pakistan's fanatics might collaborate with Al Qaeda; the plans, recently discovered in Kabul, for a helium balloon armed with anthrax have been attributed to a Pakistani nuclear scientist turned Taliban philanthropist. But the risk is manageable if we can help the Musharraf government focus on this threat, as Russia has done in the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. Unless we follow such a course, we face the very real possibility of terrorist militias obtaining not just blueprints but the materials to fashion and detonate weapons of mass destruction. We also risk sharpening the debate in Pakistani military and political circles about whether its nuclear expertise should be shared with other Muslim countries. It is hard to think of two developments that are less in our interest. Mansoor Ijaz, a nuclear scientist, is chairman of Crescent Investment Management in New York; his father was an early pioneer in Pakistan's nuclear program. R. James Woolsey, an attorney, was director of central intelligence from 1993 to 1995. REFERENCE: How Secure Is Pakistan's Plutonium? By MANSOOR IJAZ and R. JAMES WOOLSEY Published: November 28, 2001 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/28/opinion/28WOOL.html

CHAT PARTICIPANT: How does Pakistan ensure safe transition of nuclear weapons when power is seized (as in 1998) in their country? How can we be assured that these weapons won't fall into the hands of a fanatic like bin Laden? IJAZ: That's a very good question. The answer to that is the following. Until 1998, the control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal always rested in the army, it never rested with the politicians. In many cases, the politicians didn't even know how far developed the nuclear program was. Now, when we look at the post-1998 scenario, after the nuclear test took place, the command and control structure not only was held inside the army, but concentrated in the hands of the army chief. It's vitally important to know that Pakistan's army is one of the most professionally trained in the world. All objective analysts agree. The largest peace-keeping contingency has historically always been Pakistani troops. So, the concern that is raised (a very valid concern) only becomes a problem if the United States does not remain firmly engaged with General Musharraf, who is a secular, moderate, rational mind. The people under him are by and large are secular, moderate, rational minds. The people below them are the problem. That is why the U.S. must re-engage on every front, economically, militarily, and diplomatically, to prevent the radicalization of Pakistan's military infrastructure.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: Pakistan has lot of Taliban supporters in it's army. Aren't they going to be threat to Musharraf?

IJAZ: Again, a very intelligent question. The answer is that they really could be a threat. If the U.S. bombing campaign results in much larger losses of civilian life in Afghanistan without a tangible result in favor of the war on terrorism -- that is, either bin Laden is killed, or Zawahiri is killed, or Mullah Omar is killed -- without a tangible result of that type, the agitation in Pakistan's streets would rise to unmanageable levels. Today it's manageable. Tomorrow it may not be.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: Is it possible that bin Laden has taken refuge in Pakistan?

IJAZ: I think it's unlikely, because Pakistani intelligence is now under the control of one of General Musharraf's most trusted aides. If this had been a month ago, one might believe he would be given refuge somewhere in Pakistan, but now the change in the ISI's leadership (Pakistani equivalent of the CIA), there's virtually no chance that bin Laden could take refuge in Pakistan, nor the Pakistan side of Kashmire, which is where some think he might go.

CHAT PARTICIPANT: What is the government of Pakistan's policy towards terrorism in Kashmir? Do they consider them terrorists or freedom fighters?

IJAZ: The official version is that they're freedom fighters. But I can tell you there are serious people both in the Pakistani army and the government that believe strongly that the entire freedom movement in Kashmir was hijacked, and I use that word clearly and strongly, hijacked by external Arabic influences. So, the answer to your question is simple. Officially, they don't believe it's terrorism, but unofficially, they believe there are elements of that movement that are uncontrollable. REFERENCE: Mansoor Ijaz: The Pakistan perspective October 17, 2001 http://articles.cnn.com/2001-10-17/us/ijaz_1_pakistan-american-afghanistan-nuclear-bombs?_s=PM:COMMUNITY October 18, 2001 Posted: 1:37 PM EDT (1737 GMT) http://edition.cnn.com/2001/COMMUNITY/10/17/ijaz/index.html

Thanks for being with us today. - MANSOOR IJAZ, SOUTH ASIA ANALYST: Good to with you, Catherine.- CALLAWAY: Let's focus a little bit now on Pakistan, and their role in the search -- of the search for bin Laden. What are the possibilities of bin Laden being in Pakistan now? And is the Pakistani government actively looking for him? IJAZ: Well, certainly they're ensuring that he's -- if he's there anywhere that he's turned over. And my own assessment is that bin Laden himself, if he is still alive, would have made it pretty clear that -- in his own mind -- that if there was a way to blame Pakistan for his whereabouts and cause headaches for the Pakistani government, that he would like to do that. Because he is essentially -- as soon as Pakistan decided to ally with the United States he became anti-Pakistan. And it certainly wouldn't bother him in the least if Pakistan were to be scoured for potentially harboring him, even though he's not there.

CALLAWAY: What about those inside Pakistan domestically? How do they feel about the search for bin Laden? Do they think he'll be found? And, you know, what kind of support would he receive from Pakistanis?

IJAZ: Well, I think there's a certainly a clear indication that the Pashtun tribal leaders that live very close to the Afghan border could be a problem area. In other words, they could harbor him, and they may keep him for a while. But I think we have to understand that long-term, these same, very (sic), Pashtun leaders are going to need to be able to do business with the Afghans on the other side of the border. And that's their primary source of economic livelihood; they don't have any other way to make money. So maybe bin Laden can sustain them -- let's assume for the sake of argument that he was coming in and staying with them, he could sustain them for a short period of time. But long-term -- and I think that's what the Pakistani intelligence chief has explained to these people -- long-term it's not in their interest to harbor anybody of that type.

CALLAWAY: Well, you're an analyst in this region, so let me ask you: What about Musharraf's statement today that he believes bin Laden may, indeed, be dead somewhere in one of the bombed caves. Do you think that is what has happened, or do you think he's still in hiding?

IJAZ: I don't think that was a false trial balloon. General Musharraf is a very careful and very logical man. And he does not float trial balloons for the heck of it. And so I think there's a good chance that Pakistani intelligence knows something that the rest of the world does not yet know. And if he is making that statement, he's probably making it with some very clear understanding of what the facts are.

CALLAWAY: Let's look ahead a little bit on the interim government that we're seeing now taking the reigns there in Afghanistan, and the role of General Musharraf cooperating with this new government. How do you see that future playing out? And will we eventually see, at some point, the Northern Alliance, or whoever is involved in the new government, basically saying enough is enough, we don't need your help anymore?

IJAZ: Well it's very, very good question. Essentially what this comes down to is the following: On one side of Pakistan you have a hostile India, and on the other side you have an Afghanistan today that is no longer friendly to Pakistan interests. So the generals in Pakistan that are below General Musharraf could very easily come to the conclusion, if things got more heated along the Pakistani-India border, as they right now, and if the Northern Alliance that controls the defense ministry, the interior ministry and the foreign ministry, even though they don't control the prime ministership -- if they came to the conclusion that there was a squeeze play going on here, I think we could see a very big problem in Pakistan. And that is a very serious concern at the Pentagon, and at the White House right now.

CALLAWAY: And quickly: Are they going to be able forget the past and move forward here?

IJAZ: I think General Musharraf can persuade his people that a stable Afghanistan is in everyone's interest, even though they may not be the best friends. The problem will be whether the Afghans decide that India is a greater ally of theirs than having a better relationship with Pakistan next door. If that happens, then I can tell you the Pakistanis will not be happy.

CALLAWAY: Mansoor Ijaz, thank you for your insights today. Thanks for being with us.

IJAZ: Thank you.

CNN SATURDAY: Interview With Mansoor Ijaz Aired December 22, 2001 - 15:05 ET TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0112/22/cst.02.html

World Knows the truth behind WMD in Iraq but Jang Group of Newspapers/GEO TV's New Love Mansoor Ijaz support Bombing on Iraq  - Commentary Saddam Hussein is building banned weapons and is in league with Al Qaeda. January 28, 2003  http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/28/opinion/oe-ijaz28  Islamic truths February 18, 2006|Mansoor Ijaz | MANSOOR IJAZ is an American Muslim of Pakistani ancestry. http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/18/opinion/oe-ijaz18 How Secure Is Pakistan's Plutonium? By MANSOOR IJAZ and R. JAMES WOOLSEY Published: November 28, 2001 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/28/opinion/28WOOL.html but The United Nations' former chief weapons inspector in Iraq told the official inquiry into the war that he had cautioned Tony Blair the month before the 2003 invasion about the possibility that no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be found. (The Telegraph)

Mansoor Ijaz's Partner Ex CIA Chief James Woolsey on War on Iraq


The United Nations' former chief weapons inspector in Iraq told the official inquiry into the war that he had cautioned Tony Blair the month before the 2003 invasion about the possibility that no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be found. (The Telegraph) Former head of UN weapons inspectors tells Chilcot inquiry 'alarm bells' should have rung when his staff failed to find evidence of WMD (The Guardian)

Hans Blix, who has not been called to give evidence to Sir John Chilcot's inquiry, said his team had grown suspicious of the quality of intelligence pointing to Saddam Hussein having WMDs. The inspectors visited many sites said by intelligence services in the UK, the US and elsewhere to contain WMDs, but had only ever found conventional weapons, documents or nothing at all, he said. ''I think this was one of the most significant things of the whole story,'' he told BBC Radio 4's Today programme. ''We got tips not only from the UK but from other intelligence, the US as well, so perhaps some 100 all in all. ''We had time to go to about three dozen of these sites and in no case did we find any weapons of mass destruction.''He added: ''We said if this is the best (intelligence), then what is the rest? Doubts arose from that.'' Dr Blix said he spoke to Mr Blair in February 2003, ahead of the March invasion, about his team's findings. ''I said to Mr Blair 'Yes, I also thought there could be weapons of mass destruction', but I said 'Are you so sure? Would it not be paradoxical if you were to invade Iraq with 200,000 men and found there were no weapons of mass destruction?'. ''His response was 'No, no', he was quite convinced, the intelligence services were convinced, and even the Egyptians were convinced, so I had no reason to doubt his good faith at the time. But I was doubtful.'' Dr Blix rejected suggestions by Jack Straw, who was foreign secretary in 2003, that he had since ''applied gloss'' to what he was saying in the months leading up to the invasion. And he said the Iraqis were finally making progress in opening up to inspections and should have been allowed more time. ''We warned the Iraqis that they needed to be more active and they became more active and we reported that to the (UN) Security Council, that we were actually making a great deal of progress,'' he said. Dr Blix added: ''We could not exclude that there was still something hidden, because you cannot prove the negative, but I think they should have taken to heart that there was a change in the Iraqi attitude, that there was more cooperation and that things that were unresolved were becoming resolved.'' REFERENCE: Hans Blix warned Tony Blair Iraq might not have WMD 9:19AM GMT 22 Jan 2010 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/7051059/Hans-Blix-warned-Tony-Blair-Iraq-might-not-have-WMD.html

Former head of UN weapons inspectors tells Chilcot inquiry 'alarm bells' should have rung when his staff failed to find evidence of WMD (The Guardian)

Mass Destruction: Truth and Consequences with Hans Blix


Britain and the US relied on dubious intelligence sources ahead of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the former head of the United Nations weapons inspectors said today. Giving evidence to the Iraq inquiry, Hans Blix said it should have set alarm bells ringing in London and Washington when the inspectors repeatedly failed to turn up any evidence that Saddam Hussein still had active weapons of mass destruction programmes. Blix said he warned the then prime minister Tony Blair in a February 2003 meeting that Saddam Hussein might not have any weapons of mass destruction. He told the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, the same thing. He said: "When we reported that we did not find any weapons of mass destruction they should have realised, I think, both in London and in Washington, that their sources were poor. They should have been more critical about that." Blix said that he had privately confided to Blair in autumn 2002 – before the inspectors returned to Iraq – that he thought it "plausible" that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. However in the weeks leading up to the invasion in March 2003 – after the inspectors had failed to uncover anything significant – he said that he had cautioned Blair that there might not be anything. He said that he told Blair: "Wouldn't it be paradoxical if you were to invade Iraq with 250,000 men and find very little?" He added: "I gave a warning that things had changed and there might not be so much." Blix has claimed in the past that inspectors had too little time to assess whether Saddam was concealing weapons of mass destruction, as the US and Britain believed. He said that, immediately before the 2003 US-led invasion, his inspectors checked around 30 sites said by British and US intelligence to contain weapons of mass destruction, but discovered little more than some old missile engines and a sheaf of nuclear documents. He also said told the inquiry that he never felt "weapons of mass destruction" was a useful term because it conflated nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and the British more or less accepted there was no nuclear threat. Blix acknowledged the pressure of the US military buildup in the region had led Saddam to agree to the return of the UN inspectors in September 2002. However he said that he did not believe that Britain and the US had been entitled to invade Iraq without a further UN security council resolution specifically authorising military action. He accused the administration of US president George Bush of being "high on military" in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001. "They felt that they could get away with it and therefore it was desirable," he said. He also condemned claims by Britain and the US that Iraq had tried to acquire raw uranium for its supposed nuclear programme from Niger, based on a forged document. Blix said: "That was perhaps the first occasion I became suspicious about the evidence. I think that was the most scandalous part." REFERENCE: Hans Blix: Allies used 'poor' intelligence ahead of Iraq invasion - Staff and agencies Tuesday 27 July 2010 17.39 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/27/hans-blix-iraq-war-inquiry

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