Saturday, November 19, 2011

Nawaz Sharif, Kargil & General Anthony Zinni.

MANDRA: Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) chief Nawaz Sharif threatened to contact the Supreme Court in case a transparent investigation was not carried out into the memo controversy, DawnNews reported. Speaking to media representatives here on Saturday, Sharif said an inquiry commission should be established with the consent of the opposition so that the issue could reach a logical conclusion. He suggested that retired judges could be among the members of the commission or the national assembly could also hold an investigation. Answering a question on the Senate elections, Sharif said he was not afraid of the elections and said they should be held on time. Moreover, he said there was a need to curb the role of intelligence agencies in politics. The PML-N leader expressed his concern over the progress of the Abbottabad commission and said the inquiry appeared to be approaching a dead end. REFERENCE: Nawaz calls for transparent inquiry in memo scandal http://www.dawn.com/2011/11/19/nawaz-calls-for-transparent-inquiry-in-memo-scandal.html

Nawaz Sharif Kargil Was A Mistake
video
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4OiDARlI4E

Saturday, November 19, 2011, Zil Hajj 22, 1432 A.H. (Updated: 1510)
http://jang.com.pk/jang/nov2011-daily/19-11-2011/u87969.htm






















Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan and some other party members were in favour of Pervaiz Musharaf because Musharaf has an ugly face and so he would not want to come on TV. And if a person do not want to come on TV then he will not impose Martial Law. And Nawaz Sharif went with the 2nd choice. Jang Oct 2010 Hamid Mir – http://www.siasat.pk/forum/showthread.php?45643-Ch.-Nisar-Ali-Khan-and-some-other-party-members-supported-Musharraf-because-he-looks-ugly/




















































ISLAMABAD: General Anthony Zinni, former Commander in Chief of the US Central Command, has disclosed that former prime minister Nawaz Sharif ordered the withdrawal of troops from Kargil following a US offer of a meeting with President Clinton as a face saving to the Pakistani leader. Initially reluctant to order the withdrawal before his meeting with President Clinton, General Zinni writes that after I insisted, he (Nawaz Sharif) finally came round and he ordered the withdrawal. The meeting with President Clinton was subsequently set up for July 4, Zinni discloses, writing in his book "Battle Ready", says a press release. Gen Zinni’s account belies the claim by PML-N that Nawaz Sharif did not order the withdrawal of troops from Kargil. Recounting his meetings with Pakistani leaders in the last days of June 1999, Gen Zinni says that the problem for the Pakistani leader was the apparent national loss of face. "Backing down and pulling back to the Line of Control looked like political suicide. We needed to come up with a face saving way out of this mess. What we were able to offer was a meeting with President Clinton which would end the isolation that had long been the state of affairs between our two countries, but we would announce the meeting only after a withdrawal of force," says Gen Zinni. He writes that General Pervez Musharraf, the then Chief of Army Staff who learnt of this situation, encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear out General Zinni. Referring to the Sharif govt as freely elected but outrageously corrupt, Gen Zinni says that "the military found itself between a rock and a hard place. But there was no way to change the situation according to the normal democratic rules." Gen Zinni writes that "Sharif set in motion his own downfall by trying to fire Gen Musharraf, while Musharraf was out of the country and to put the Chief of Intelligence in his place. He had originally given Musharraf the job under the misperception that Musharraf would be easy to control. He had not reckoned on the General’s integrity. Writing of his experiences in dealing with General Musharraf, Gen Zinni says that the two of them connected quickly and easily. He describes President Musharraf as bright, sincere and personable, a fervent nationalist who nevertheless leaned towards the West. He was as appalled as Gen Karamat, the previous Army Chief, over the ever worsening corruption within the civilian govt. Referring to his meetings with Gen Musharraf, Gen Zinni calls it a great meeting despite the chill cast by our sanctions. As I was leaving, we both agreed to stay in close touch (we exchanged our home-telephone numbers). Our friendship would later prove to be enormously valuable to both our countries. REFERENCE: Nawaz ordered withdrawal from Kargil: Gen Zinni (The News International Link is Dead)


WASHINGTON, June 3: It was President Pervez Musharraf who advised former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to listen to the US proposal for withdrawing troops from Kargil, says a former US general. Gen. Anthony Zinni, who headed the US Central Command from 1997 to 2000, was sent to Pakistan as a special presidential envoy during the Kargil crisis. In his book "Battle Ready", which was published in the United States this week, Gen. Zinni dispels the general impression that it was the civilian leadership in Pakistan that sought Washington's help for arranging a respectable withdrawal from Kargil. Instead, the former general says, Pakistan's civilian leadership was worried about a loss of face that the withdrawal could have caused and to allay their fears President Bill Clinton offered a plan that could have arranged a respectable withdrawal. But even at this stage, according to General Zinni, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his civilian colleagues appeared reluctant to endorse a withdrawal. That got Musharraf's attention, and he encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out," writes Gen. Zinni. Sharif was reluctant to withdraw before the meeting with Clinton was announced (again, his problem was maintaining face); but after I insisted, he finally came around and he ordered the withdrawal," he adds. "He set up a meeting with Clinton in July," says Gen. Zinni while explaining how Mr Sharif arrived in Washington for the 1999 meeting with President Clinton that took place on the American Independence Day, July 4. Explaining the background of the Kargil adventure, Gen. Zinni writes: "In May, Pakistani forces made a deep incursion into an area called Kargil, on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Though there was normally fighting near the Line of Control, the area for a long time has been quite stable. There would be probes and shooting during the good months of the year, but nothing ever changed much; and in wintertime, everybody would pull back down into the valleys, and the two sides would create 'no-man's-land'. As spring came, they would go back up into their positions. Every so often, somebody on one side would be a little late getting up to their spring positions, and the other side could grab an advantage of a kilometre or so. It was "Aha, I've gotcha!" on a tactical level. But it did not really change things." "This time, however, the Pakistanis waylaid the Indians and penetrated all the way to Kargil. This was such a deep, significant penetration that it wasn't tactical; it threatened Indian lines of communication and support up to Siachen glacier." "The Indians came back with a vengeance. There were exchanges of fire, there was a mobilization of forces, there were bombing attacks, and planes were shot down." "Then the two sides started to mobilize all their forces all along the line; and it was beginning to look like the opening moves of the larger war. It got alarming." "I was therefore directed by the (Clinton) administration to head a presidential mission to Pakistan to convince Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Gen. Musharraf to withdraw their forces from Kargil." "I met with the Pakistani leaders in Islamabad on June 24 and 25 and put forth a simple rationale for withdrawing; 'If you don't pullback, you're going to bring war and nuclear annihilation down on your country. That's going to be very bad news for everybody.' Nobody actually quarrelled with this rationale." "The problem for Pakistani leadership was the apparent national loss of face. Backing down and pulling back to the Line of Control looked like political suicide. We needed to come up with a face-saving way out of this mess. What we were able to offer was a meeting with President Clinton, which would end the isolation that had long been the state of affairs between our two countries, but we would announce the meeting only after the withdrawal of forces." "That got Musharraf's attention; and he encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out." "Sharif was reluctant to withdraw before the meeting with Clinton was announced (again, his problem was maintaining face); but after I insisted, he finally came around and he ordered the withdrawal.""We setup a meeting with Clinton in July." REFERENCE: Zinni's book throws light on Kargil withdrawal By Anwar Iqbal 04 June 2004 Friday 15 Rabi-us-Saani 1425 http://archives.dawn.com/2004/06/04/nat26.htm



BILL CLINTON AND THE KARGIL CONFLICT: FROM CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO COERCIVE DIPLOMACY Submitted by Ajay Bisaria WWS 547: The Conduct of International Diplomacy May 12, 2009 http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/Bisaria2-09.pdf
































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