As per Oxford dictionary "Brag": verb (brags, bragging, bragged) [reporting verb] say something in a boastful manner: [with clause] : he bragged that he was sure of victory [no object] : they were bragging about how easy it had been noun 1 [mass noun] a gambling card game which is a simplified form of poker. 2 a boastful statement.
Its an old principle (unwritten) of Murky Intelligence World that you never discuss or brag about your achievements and that too on a live TV and if that was not enough then discussing these issues during the most turbulent time of History when half of the world is asking for your blood. What we have here that Dr Strangelove is telling stories as if he is doing some service and even worse are those politicians who never leave any opportunity to capitalize even the Tragedies, which part of the Word Secret or Clandestine is beyond the comprehension of these Nincompoops.
Its an old principle (unwritten) of Murky Intelligence World that you never discuss or brag about your achievements and that too on a live TV and if that was not enough then discussing these issues during the most turbulent time of History when half of the world is asking for your blood. What we have here that Dr Strangelove is telling stories as if he is doing some service and even worse are those politicians who never leave any opportunity to capitalize even the Tragedies, which part of the Word Secret or Clandestine is beyond the comprehension of these Nincompoops.
Dr. Strangelove - Survival Plan - Watch the Clip from Stanley Kubrick Classic Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964) http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057012/
LAHORE: A Youm-e-Takbeer ceremony titled ‘Thank you Dr Qadeer Khan’ was held under the auspicious of Mohsin-e-Pakistan Lovers Foundation and Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) at Punjabi Complex here Saturday. The chief guest of the ceremony was the former army chief and DG ISI General (retd) Ziauddin. Gen Ziauddin (retd), while addressing the participants, claimed that former Gen Pervez Musharraf had given asylum to Osama bin Laden on mala fide nature. He said that Gen Musharraf kept extraditing other people but he himself hide bin Laden so that the series of coming of money would continue and kept minting money from America. Gen (retd) Ziauddin said that ex-DG Ejaz Shah had colluded with Musharraf in this job and General (retd) Mehmood could also be part of that job too. When asked had Musharraf handed Osama bin Laden over to anyone before departing, he said that absolutely. He said that you could see how Ejaz Shah had enjoyed perks still today and he was still travelling in a car with green number plate. REFERENCE: ‘Musharraf provided Osama shelter to mint money from US’ Ali Masood Monday, May 30, 2011 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=6348&Cat=13&dt=5/30/2011
http://ejang.jang.com.pk/5-30-2011/Karachi/page1.asp#;
http://ejang.jang.com.pk/5-30-2011/Karachi/pic.asp?picname=1042.gif
Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in Front Line (15 Jan 2010) - Part 1.
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAQFmJ9bBj4
Investigation: Nuclear scandal - Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan - The Pakistani scientist who passed nuclear secrets to the world’s rogue states has been muzzled by his government. In a smuggled letter, AQ Khan reveals his side of the story by Simon Henderson From The Sunday Times September 20, 2009 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6839044.ece
The former general said that how it was possible that Osama had been living near Abbottabad army academy for five years without any information. In such a period at least eleven of twelve time the houses were searched then why Osama was not found. He said that the whole band of General Musharraf was corrupt and Musharraf and his accomplices were minting money with both hands. He said that besides General (R) Tanvir Naqvi and another general all were plundering the country. He said that Musharraf had already made a plan to usurp power. He said, “When I was DG ISI Musharraf used to set spy on me.” While speaking on the dual policy of Musharraf, he said that he had sent a man to India for secret contact and when I as DG ISI summoned that person, at first that person refused but when I put proof before him then he admitted to visit India on Musharraf’s direction. REFERENCE: ‘Musharraf provided Osama shelter to mint money from US’ Ali Masood Monday, May 30, 2011 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=6348&Cat=13&dt=5/30/2011
Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in Front Line (15 Jan 2010) - Part 2.
Karamat's categorical tone left some US officials a little embarrassed, for they are not used to ambassadors laying down the line in Washington. "Even Tony Blair's ambassador won't use that tone in public," said one observer. Some others said that Pakistan prescribing the agenda was a case of the tail wagging the dog. Meanwhile, what surprised some was Karamat's dismissive tone about the A Q Khan affair, which he labeled a "proliferation episode" while denying any government complicity in it. "There was no government sanction, approval, or any kind of government connection with what went on," he said flatly. But Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, in his 11-page confession reported in the US press in February, named Karamat, former chief of army staff General (retired) Mirza Aslam Beg and President General Pervez Musharraf as the men on top who were aware of what was going on. As the chief of army staff from 1996-98, Karamat was directly responsible for the safety and security of the nuclear program. REFERENCE: Pakistan lays down the agenda for the US By Seema Sirohi South Asia http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FL25Df01.html
Barlow went about his business without incident, so he thought, until July of 1989. Then he learned that the United States government was once again distorting intelligence on Pakistan’s nuclear capability. He had prepared a comprehensive analysis on Pakistan’s nuclear capability for Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and other senior officials. The paper cited what Barlow and many others in the intelligence community understood to be persuasive data showing that the F-16 aircraft previously delivered to Pakistan had been modified to deliver nuclear weapons. Barlow’s paper was complemented by a separate Defense Intelligence Agency study, which reached the same conclusion. REFERENCE: A REPORTER AT LARGE On the Nuclear Edge by Seymour M. Hersh MARCH 29, 1993 http://www.newyorker.com/archive/1993/03/29/1993_03_29_056_TNY_CARDS_000363214
Dick Cheney & Cover-Up! http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2009/05/dick-cheney-cover-up.html
Former Gen Ziauddin said that he had been associated with Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan for three years and all allegations on him are false and he is hero of the nation and most intelligent person. He said that if given chance Dr Qadeer would solve the issue of energy within six months. While addressing telephonically, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan said that the youths should come forward to save the country and we would stand by with them. He said that revolution is the only solution to the problems. He said that country’s situation is extremely bad and people are fed up with price hike, anarchy and unemployment. He said a campaign should be launched with full force and there is a need to liberate the country. Arif Nizami, Qayyum Nizami, Irshad Arif, Dr Mujahid Mansoori, Amna Ulfat, Saadullah Shah, Maj (R) Muhammad Arif and Syed Rajab Ali were among those who spoke on the occasion. REFERENCE: ‘Musharraf provided Osama shelter to mint money from US’ Ali Masood Monday, May 30, 2011 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=6348&Cat=13&dt=5/30/2011
Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in Front Line (15 Jan 2010) - Part 4.
• Chief of Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani wanted to remove Zardari into exile and replace him with Asfandyar Wali as president. Kayani felt that Faryal Talpur, Zardari’s sister, would make a better president than Zardari, who he preferred over PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif. • United States was concerned for the security of nuclear facilities and the access to the facilities in Pakistan. • Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani had approved US drone strikes inside Pakistan. • Former President Musharraf wanted to remove Kayani for being unhelpful; ISI chief felt that Zardari was too corrupt to lead the country as president. • Nawaz Sharif wanted to bring nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan into politics and convinced the US he remained on their side in the war on terror. REFERENCE: Key Leaks By Sadef A. Kully | DAWN.COM December 2, 2010 http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/02/key-leaks.html
Capital Talk - 6th Decembe 2010 - P1 - Who is real American agent?
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rfl3YpShdJo
"QUOTE"
2008: Zardari, Nawaz agreed not to restore Chief Justice Iftikhar ChaudhryDAWN.COM May 24, 2011 (1 week ago) http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/24/2008-zardari-nawaz-agreed-not-to-restore-chief-justice-iftikhar-chaudhry.html
145093 3/10/2008 15:21 08ISLAMABAD1072 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL 08ISLAMABAD1070|08ISLAMABAD924|08ISLAMABAD970 “VZCZCXRO0486
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1072/01 0701521
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INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8301
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7468
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2970
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9249
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5064
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3767
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY” “C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001072
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PK
SUBJECT: ZARDARI’S VIEWS ON AGREEMENT WITH NAWAZ
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1070
B. ISLAMABAD 970
C. ISLAMABAD 924
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader Asif Zardari told Ambassador March 10 that yesterday’s agreement with Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif was less than it seemed regarding the restoration of the judges (Ref A). Zardari reiterated his desire to work with Musharraf as President. He and Nawaz have agreed, privately, that former Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry will not be restored and that the current Chief Justice will remain. Zardari said his choice for Prime Minister was Yousef Gillani (Ref B). Zardari has selected Sherry Rehman as Minister of Information and Syed Naveed Qamar as Minister of Finance (Ref C). Embassy cautions there is more ground to travel before these issues are resolved. Zardari seems sincere and has shown some political courage, particularly on the Kashmir issue. He has good ideas, especially on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and on economic issues. But it remains to be seen how he will handle the parliament )- and his coalition partners — once the sessions get underway. End Summary.
2. (C) Ambassador called on Asif Zardari March 10 to get his version of the “”deal”" with PML-N head Nawaz Sharif. Zardari said he and Nawaz had agreed (very privately) that the former Chief Justice would not be restored, nor would current Chief Justice Dogar be removed. Zardari said he had to do something about the judges: a new civilian government could not keep the former Chief Justice and his family, including two disabled children, in confinement two blocks from the parliament, and Zardari had conveyed this view to ISI head Nadeem Taj and NSA Tariq Aziz. He had asked the government to move the former Chief Justice to his family home in Quetta, but the government had refused, arguing that the CJ “”had a gun”" and would forcibly resist being moved. (Comment: No one wants the black eye of moving the former Chief Justice
and his family under the glare of international publicity. End Comment.) When Ambassador asked about the 30 day deadline for the parliamentary resolution which would supposedly reinstate the judges, Zardari laughed and said in politics thirty days could become eighty or ninety. He reiterated his commitment to working with Musharraf and especially Tariq Aziz, with whom he felt particularly comfortable. He wanted Musharraf to “”relax”" and not be so concerned about the former Chief Justice.
3. (C) Zardari revealed he had been in touch with Chief Justice Dogar to assure him he would not be removed. Zardari was less clear about the legalities of the restoration of the other judges, although he implied some phased-in system might be employed. He noted Aitzaz Ahsan was campaigning for President now, a job that Nawaz Sharif would also like to have. Zardari said he would not welcome Aitzaz back into the PPP fold.
4. (C) Ambassador asked about the choices for Prime Minister. Zardari reiterated that he was angry Amin Faheem had spent virtually the entire campaign in Dubai ) engaging his “”weak libido (sic)”" and ignoring his party responsibilities in the middle of the campaign. Zardari argued that Faheem was simply not up to the demands of the office of the Prime Minister. Ambassador asked about the possibility of a split in the party and the general perception that Faheem was a popular party stalwart with IOUs in the party structure. Zardari said Faheem would only take two deputies with him if he split from the party. In the meantime, he was being courted by the PML-Q. Zardari confirmed he would have been willing to work with the PML-Q if they had dumped the Chaudharys — which Musharraf had been reluctant to do. Now, Zardari said, he did not trust Faheem. Zardari said he was going to wait until the very last minute, after the assembly was convened, to announce the choice for PM.
5. (C) Zardari said he had made a deal with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) leader Fazlur Rehman to enter the coalition. While he only has six seats in the national assembly, Rehman still has fourteen senators. Ambassador asked if ANP leader Walid Khan had agreed to this: Zardari ISLAMABAD 00001072 002 OF 002 said he had.
6. (C) Zardari said he planned to run in a by-election if he were permitted to do so. Ambassador said we would like to work with the PPP and other parties on the reform of the electoral commission, to make it truly independent. Zardari concurred with this idea.
7. (C) Zardari said he had floated Ahmed Mukhtar,s name as a possible candidate for Prime Minister, but Mukhtar had not done well in the subsequent glare of international publicity. Zardari said his current choice was Yousef Raza Gillani (Ref B) who is also a vice chairman of the party. Zardari argued he needed someone from the Punjab as PM, since that populous province was the backbone of the party’s future. He said Sherry Rehman would be Information Minister and that Syed Naveed Qamar would become the Minister of Finance, although he would be advised by a strong group of businessmen. Zardari said he was at pains to rebrand the PPP as friendly to business and to encourage American investment.
8. (C) Comment: Party infighting seems to continue unabated. Tariq Aziz told us a few days ago that while the government would have preferred Amin Faheem, any of the four major candidates would be acceptable to them. Embassy will get an update from him March 11. At this point we do not believe it realistic to try and put together any coalition with the PML-Q. One of the main outstanding questions is whether Zardari plans to run for Prime Minister himself if allowed to run in a by-election. End comment.
PATTERSON
”
2008: Zardari, Nawaz agreed not to restore Chief Justice Iftikhar ChaudhryDAWN.COM May 24, 2011 (1 week ago) http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/24/2008-zardari-nawaz-agreed-not-to-restore-chief-justice-iftikhar-chaudhry.html
"UNQUOTE"
Capital Talk - 6th Decembe 2010 - P2 - Who is real American agent?
"QUOTE"
Shahbaz speculated Kayani may be pressured to intervene in political system DAWN.COM May 20, 2011 (2 weeks ago) http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/20/shahbaz-speculated-kayani-may-be-pressured-to-intervene-in-political-system.html
195758 3/6/2009 19:08 09LAHORE41 Consulate Lahore SECRET “O 061908Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3945
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
CIA WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL LAHORE “S E C R E T LAHORE 000041
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/6/2034
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, KDEM, PK
SUBJECT: (S) SHAHBAZ SHARIF OPEN TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRESIDENT
ZARDARI
Derived from: DSCG 05-1, D
1. (S) Summary: In a March 6 meeting with Principal Officer, Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) President Shahbaz Sharif laid out a number of preconditions for a quick negotiated settlement to the current political impasse with President Asif Zardari including that (1) the agreement included concrete progress to resolve the judges’ issue and (2) their was a guarantor to ensure President Zardari lived up to his commitments. Shahbaz suggested that either a dismissal of all judges who had taken an extra-constitutional oath — including former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry — or creation of a constitutional court superior to the Supreme Court might offer ways to resolve the issue but noted that Nawaz Sharif had not yet been consulted on these ideas. Shahbaz worried that if the current political impasse was not resolved prior to March 12, the long march could be exploited both by terrorists and by elements of the establishment who still wished to derail the democratic process. While Shahbaz reposed continued confidence in Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Kayani and suggested that Kayani could be used to pressure Zardari towards a reasonable agreement, Shahbaz cautioned that Kayani was only one general and that others were undoubtedly pushing Kayani to use the current political impasse as a pretext for intervention in the system. End Summary.
2. (S) Principal Officer met March 6 with PML-N President Shahbaz Sharif to deliver talking points provided by Ambassador Holbrooke. Shahbaz immediately accepted that a quick negotiated settlement of all of the Sharifs’ outstanding issues with President Zardari was in the national interest and stated that he and his brother were fully prepared to be constructive participants in a dialogue process that yielded concrete results. However, Shahbaz cautioned that it was President Zardari who had initiated this latest political crisis through his pressure on the Supreme Court to disqualify the Sharifs and that it was President Zardari who would need to show himself open to a final negotiated settlement. Shahbaz opined that any trust in President Zardari’s intentions was gone, owing to his habit of negotiating and then breaking deals with the Sharifs. Shahbaz stated that he was only interested in dialogue if it led to concrete commitments from Zardari that would finally resolve the outstanding issues dividing the parties, particularly the judges’ issue. He also stressed that given Zardari’s past track record on agreements, any settlement would need to include a guarantor, who could exercise pressure on both sides to fulfill commitments. Shahbaz did not offer comment on to which party he would like to serve as guarantor, deferring instead to his elder brother.
3. (S) Shahbaz stated that for any reconciliation between the PML-N and President Zardari to proceed, the President would at a minimum have to resolve a formula that restored Shahbaz’s government, restored Nawaz’s eligibility, and restored — if only for a few moments — former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Shahbaz stated that the first two issues could easily be resolved through presidential decree and/or parliamentary action, if both the PML-N and PPP leadership agreed to do so. On the Iftikhar Chaudhry issue, Shahbaz suggested two possible compromises (although he noted that his brother might have separate complimentary or conflicting ideas). First, he proposed that President Zardari announce Chaudhry’s restoration concomitant with a parliamentary decision, removing all judges who have taken oath under a provisional constitutional order (PCO) from office. Under this formula, Chaudhry, who took a PCO oath following Musharraf’s 1999 coup, along with most other senior judges would be removed from office. The parties could then implement the provisions of the Charter of Democracy, which lays out a system for multiparty consultation and agreement on judicial appointments. Second, he suggested that the Constitutional Court, envisaged in the Charter of Democracy, be established and that it be made superior to the Supreme Court. Iftikhar Chaudhry’s restoration as Chief Justice would then have little measurable impact, as the Constitutional Court, staffed by appointees from both parties, could nullify his decisions.
4. (S) Shahbaz agreed with USG concerns that the current political impasse was distracting attention from issues of national importance. He also expressed his concern that terrorists could exploit the current demonstrations and the planned long march to carry out attacks on the public and political leaders. He also expressed concern that while he and his brother could confidently control PML-N elements in the long march and keep them peaceful, people from numerous other organizations outside their influence would also be participating. Shahbaz expressed serious reservations that in the current emotionally charged climate, these elements could resort to vandalism and/or violence. If such occurred, Shahbaz worried that the army might be tempted to intervene in the political system.
5. (S) Shahbaz expressed great faith in Chief of Army Staff Kayani’s commitment to civilian rule and democracy. He stated without prompting that Kayani was the least likely army officer to intervene in the democratic process. However, he cautioned that Kayani, unlike Musharraf, was surrounded by corps commanders who were effectively his equals in terms of seniority. If these officers pressed for a direct or Bangladesh-style indirect intervention in the system, Kayani would have no choice but to comply with their wishes. Shahbaz stated that he hoped Kayani would play a constructive role at this time in pressing all political leaders to resolve their outstanding issues quickly and through negotiation.
6. (S) Shahbaz remained optimistic that if a provincial election for Chief Minister were declared, the PML-N could muster the necessary votes to elect its candidate (currently Sardar Zulfiqar Khan Khosa — an 80 plus year old former Punjab Governor from Dera Ghazi Khan currently serving as PML-N’s Punjab President) as Chief Minister. Shahbaz was confident that under no circumstances would PML-N or PML forward block members vote for the PPP, as, he argued, they are mindful that the next elections will go to the PML-N and these members wish to win a second term. Shahbaz claimed that he was open to an alliance with the PML, provided that the PML dropped its initial demand that the Chief Minister slot go to the PML, as there was no way he could sell that to Nawaz. Shahbaz reported that he was in regular contact with Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi (through intermediaries) regarding a possible deal, but noted that at least initially, the PML would need to agree to a partnership without preconditions — in order to win over Nawaz. Ministries would, of course, be provided appropriate to the PML’s status as a “”junior coalition partner.”"
7. (S) Comment: Shahbaz Sharif seemed slightly more open than during his meeting a week earlier to reconciliation with President Zardari. However, he seemed extremely cautious about any direct dialogue with President Zardari absent an outside guarantor and pre-agreement from Zardari to resolve all issues including the restoration — even if only symbolic — of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Post believes that Shahbaz has not discussed his various “”solutions”" in detail with his elder brother Nawaz Sharif, who will ultimately have to acquiesce to any final deal. Shahbaz offered no assurances that the PML-N was prepared to end its street protests / public meetings unilaterally, placing the blame for any disruptive consequences on President Zardari, who Shahbaz regards as provocateur. Shahbaz remained pessimistic about President Zardari’s desire to pursue reconciliation.
End Comment
HUNT
Shahbaz speculated Kayani may be pressured to intervene in political system DAWN.COM May 20, 2011 (2 weeks ago) http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/20/shahbaz-speculated-kayani-may-be-pressured-to-intervene-in-political-system.html
"UNQUOTE"
Capital Talk - 6th Decembe 2010 - P3 - Who is real American agent?
"QUOTE"
Shahbaz was willing to negotiate CJ’s future DAWN.COM May 20, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
196903 3/14/2009 11:25 09LAHORE49 Consulate Lahore SECRET “O 141125Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3957
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL LAHORE “S E C R E T LAHORE 000049
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/14/2034
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: SHARIFS REMAIN OPEN TO NEGOTIATION
CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan D. Hunt, Principal Officer, American
Consulate Lahore, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (S) Summary: In a March 14 meeting, Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) President Shahbaz Sharif told Principal Officer that he and his brother — former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif — welcomed efforts by the United States, United Kingdom, and the Pakistan Army to negotiate a political settlement between his party and the government. Shahbaz stated that the Sharifs’ key demands in these negotiations were: (1) restoration of the electoral eligibility of both Sharif brothers; (2) restoration of Shahbaz Sharif’s government in the Punjab; (3) some sort of face-saving restoration of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry; and (4) agreement on transfers of powers between the President and the Prime Minister in accordance with the Charter of Democracy. Shahbaz noted that the lawyers would need to be brought into the discussion on Iftikhar Chaudhry’s restoration and that, in his assessment, both current Chief Justice Dogar and Punjab Governor Salman Taseer would be unable to play a role in the new system. Shahbaz rejected the proposal for a provincial unity government headed by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), as contrary to the clear will of the electorate. Shahbaz accepted Interior Minister Rehman Malik’s proposal to negotiate an appropriate venue for the lawyers’ planned sit-in in the Islamabad/Rawalpindi area, but stated that Advisor Malik would need to negotiate such a deal with the lawyers, not simply the PML-N. As demonstrated in the meeting, the PML-N has hardened its demands and displayed little flexibility. End Summary.
Negotiation
2. (S) PML-N President Shahbaz Sharif welcomed efforts by the United States, United Kingdom, and the Pakistan Chief of Army Staff to negotiate a political settlement between the leadership of the PML-N and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Shahbaz stated that the three parties working in concert should eventually be able to place sufficient pressure on both sides to find a durable solution to the crisis and that the Sharifs were satisfied that any deal guaranteed by the three would be implemented. Shahbaz stressed that he and his brother — former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif — were sincere in desiring a negotiated settlement to the outstanding issues and promised that they would show “”maximum flexibility”" in trying to find a workable approach in concert with international donors and the Pakistan army. Shahbaz, however, assessed that it was President Zardari’s intransigence on restoration of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and his misreading of Punjabi politics that had created the current crisis and that would likely be the greatest stumbling block to quick progress in the discussions.
3. (S) Shahbaz Sharif highlighted that the PML-N currently had four core goals in the negotiation process. First, the restoration of the eligibility of both Sharif brothers to contest in national elections was a prerequisite to progress on any other issues. Shahbaz bluntly stated that his party had no room for maneuver on this demand. Second, Shahbaz insisted that his government in the Punjab province would have to be restored. Principal Officer raised the possibility of a provincial unity government headed by the minority PML, which Shahbaz rejected. The former Chief Minister argued that his party had a clear plurality in the provincial assembly, which had been established through an election that had been judged by the international community to be free, fair, and credible. Shahbaz stated that this gave his party the mandate to form the government and that the public would never accept a deal that did not restore his government to power. Shahbaz stressed that his party was not open to negotiation on this point. Shahbaz underscored that Punjab Governor Salman Taseer would need to be replaced.
4. (S) On the issue of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, Shahbaz claimed that the PML-N was open to negotiation, provided that Chaudhry was symbolically restored as Chief Justice of Pakistan. Shahbaz stressed that his party could not afford the political humiliation of abandoning what had become a long-standing principle in favor of Chaudhry’s restoration. At the same time, Shahbaz claimed to understand that Chaudhry was a problematic jurist, whose powers would need to be carefully curtailed. Shahbaz underscored that the Sharifs were prepared to adopt any safeguards that President Zardari desired prior to Chaudhry’s restoration, including curtailment of his powers to create judicial benches, removal of his suo moto jurisdiction, and/or establishment of a constitutional court as a check on the Supreme Court. Shahbaz also stated that following the restoration, the PML-N was prepared to end the issue and remove Chaudhry once and for all by adopting legislation proposed in the Charter of Democracy that would ban all judges who had taken an oath under a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) from serving. Asked about the PML-N’s openness to a new role for current Chief Justice Hameed Dogar, Shahbaz stated that Dogar was a completely discredited jurist and that his party did not believe that he should play any role in a future set-up after his mandatory retirement on March 20. Shahbaz left the clear impression that the PML-N was unwilling to show any flexibility on Dogar.
5. (S) Shahbaz raised that his party also believed any negotiated settlement should include movement towards full adoption of the Charter of Democracy, particularly its provisions related to the repeal of Musharraf’s controversial 17th amendment and the transfer of powers from the President to the Prime Minister. Shahbaz stated that this had been a long-standing demand of the PML-N (although it had not previously been raised with the international community in the context of the current political crisis) and that given the problems Zardari had caused, it was prudent to move forward. Shahbaz indicated that the actual implementation of this part of the agreement could be prolonged, but felt that his party would require, at a minimum, a guarantee from Zardari that it would eventually move forward on an agreed-upon timeframe.
Long March
6. (S) Shahbaz noted that both he and Nawaz Sharif were very concerned about the potential for criminal and/or terrorist elements to exploit the chaos created by the long march and induce violence. He thanked the Principal Officer for USG efforts to encourage former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to take greater precautions with his personal security, noting that Nawaz had understood the message and had promised to modify his behavior. Shahbaz stated that he was disappointed that Interior Minister Rehman Malik had only belatedly advised the Sharifs formally of threats to their security in a March 13 letter. He noted that even this had only come following the Sharifs’ independent gathering and sharing of information with the federal government on criminal elements’ intentions to make trouble during the long march. Nonetheless, Shahbaz conceded that Malik’s fears were well-founded and promised that the senior leadership would take “”full-proof”" security precautions during the rallies and minimize their exposure to the public.
7. (S) Principal Officer asked Shahbaz whether his party was prepared to negotiate the venue for the planned Islamabad sit-in with the federal government in order to minimize the security threat and disruption to governance in the capital. Shahbaz stated that “”unofficially”" the PML-N was fully prepared to discuss the issue with Malik and to compromise on a venue acceptable to both parties, even if it meant holding the sit-in in Rawalpindi or on the outskirts of Islamabad. However, Shahbaz stated that the PML-N was not the primary organizer of the event and that if Malik wished to discuss such matters, he should include the other sit-in participants, principally the lawyers’ movement leadership in the negotiations. Shahbaz was adamant that while the PML-N was prepared to be helpful, the party would have to follow the lawyers lead on this question, as the lawyers were the primary event organizers. (Note: Ambassador conveyed Shahbaz’s message to Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who requested that the PML-N take the lead in organizing a trilateral discussion including himself and the lawyers. Post has conveyed Malik’s request to Shahbaz Sharif. Shahbaz, after consulting with senior leadership of the PML-N, refused to assist. End Note.)
Comment
8. (S) As was expected, the Sharifs are expanding the issues on which they want progress as part of negotiations with President Zardari. The removal of Governor Taseer, the final retirement of Chief Justice Dogar, and progress on the Charter of Democracy provisions related to the 17th amendment are all new PML-N demands that will likely be highly controversial with President Zardari. Post believes that the Sharifs are likely flexible on the 17th amendment but will hold firm to both the Dogar and Taseer removals — for largely personal reasons. The offer to negotiate on the sit-in venue is an important concession that has the possibility to help improve security and minimize direct confrontation during the long-march and that could serve as a confidence building measure for future negotiations. However, Shahbaz’s insistence on the lawyers’ involvement in this process could easily complicate the discussions significantly, and we will need to continue to lean on the Sharifs to show leadership and bring the lawyers to a reasonable compromise.
End Comment
Shahbaz was willing to negotiate CJ’s future DAWN.COM May 20, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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Capital Talk - 6th Decembe 2010 - P4 - Who is real American agent?
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Kayani, politicians asked US to intervene in Zardari-Sharifs rowDAWN.COM May 20, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
195795 3/7/2009 16:44 09ISLAMABAD495 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL 09ISLAMABAD488|09LAHORE41 “VZCZCXRO3255
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY “C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000495
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: ZARDARI-NAWAZ RECONCILIATION: PLEAS FOR U.S.
INTERVENTION
REF: A. LAHORE 41
B. ISLAMABAD 488 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. Amid flurries of political horse trading and so-far unsuccessful efforts to mediate a resolution to the Sharif brothers’ disqualification from public office and the imposition of governor’s rule in Punjab, Chief of Army Staff General Kayani and several political parties appealed to the U.S. to intervene. Pakistan Muslim League (PML) leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain indicated to Ambassador he would align with Zardari if we would guarantee he became leader of the Senate (next in line to the President); Shahbaz Sharif told PO Lahore (Ref A) the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) would need a guarantor for any reconciliation with Zardari; the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) wanted U.S. reassurance we still supported Zardari but also was concerned that MQM would be damaged by its association with him.
2. (C) There are several common themes here: distrust of Zardari; agreement on the need to find a way out of the current political impasse to prevent disruptive street violence; and abandonment of all pretense that the U.S. should not intervene in Pakistani internal affairs. Ambassador has been careful to keep the U.S. out of the political souk; however, it is in our interests to ease Zardari off the ledge he has walked onto and avoid the kind of violence that will force the Army to restore law and order. Even if a reconciliation package can be found, it is unlikely Nawaz can back out of support for the lawyers’ march, scheduled to begin on March 12 and culminate in Islamabad on March 16. We have no leverage over Nawaz but continue weigh in with Zardari. We will urge him to resolve quickly the political leadership issue in Punjab and avoid further exacerbating the judiciary issue with a decision to extend the current Chief Justice. End Summary.
MEDIATORS SHUTTLE
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3. (C) On March 6-7, multiple political mediators, including Balochistan Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani, Awami National Party leader Asfundyar Wali Khan and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam chief Fazlur Rehman, conducted visits aimed at reconciling President Zardari and Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leaders Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif in the wake of mounting political pressure following the Sharifs’ disqualification from public office and Zardari’s imposition of governor’s rule in Punjab. There was a mixed response to PML-N’s call for nationwide strikes on March 6; as expected, the biggest support for strikes and PML-N rallies continued to be in the Sharifs’ home base of Punjab. Zardari and PM Gilani met to review the situation, and Zardari saw Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in-country leader Farouq Sattar. Representatives of rival center-right parties PML-N and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) also met, while PML also offered to mediate between Zardari and Nawaz. PML also reportedly met with PM Gilani to discuss a possible alliance with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).
4. (C) Despite assertions by Fazlur that Nawaz and Zardari were seasoned politicians who would come to an agreement, Nawaz continued to address large crowds and Zardari has shown no sign of budging on the judges’ issue or the Sharifs’ disqualification. In impassioned speeches in Lahore and Faisalabad this weekend, Nawaz asserted that the dispute could only be settled on the street and predicted that the lawyers’ march would mark the beginning of “”revolution”" in the country. Both Zardari and Nawaz have boxed themselves into hardline positions.
MQM WORRIED
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5. (C) On March 6, MQM leader Farouq Sattar asked urgently to see Ambassador to convey the concerns of MQM leader Altaf Hussain regarding the political upheaval. Sattar emphasized that MQM continued to support Zardari 100 percent, but said:
(1) it was clear Zardari had not done his homework by accurately counting votes before declaring governor’s rule;
ISLAMABAD 00000495 002 OF 002
(2) the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) support for both the disqualification and governor’s rule was weak at best; and
(3) the coalition was not governing well and this latest distraction would not help matters. His conclusion was that Zardari’s friends had to get together and find a way to help him out of this mess, so that the coalition could concentrate on the economy and growing militancy. Altaf Hussain wanted to know if the U.S. still supported Zardari.
6. (C) Ambassador agreed with Sattar’s analysis, said emphatically that we continued to support the elected government and asked Sattar for suggestions on how to reconcile Nawaz and Zardari. Sattar described a formula he had proposed to Zardari several days ago–enact a constitutional amendment that would concurrently fire all/all judges who had taken oaths to dictators (this would include both the former and current Chief Justices Chaudhry and Dogar) and, through a new judicial review board, hire new judges with impeccable credentials (this could include judges backed by Nawaz and Zardari). Sattar, whose MQM party strongly dislikes the PML-N, did not suggest that the disqualification of Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif be overturned. MQM remains a key player the PPP cannot afford to lose; Zardari did not move against Nawaz until MQM (with its 25 seats in the National Assembly) agreed to join the governing coalition and return the PPP government to a slim majority in the National Assembly.
PML IN THE SOUK
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7. (C) On March 7, Ambassador met with Pakistan Muslim League (PML) leaders Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Pervaiz Elahi. PML holds the votes to enable either the PPP or the PML-N to form a coalition government in Punjab but has been sitting on the fence courting offers from both Zardari and Nawaz. A significant (30 plus) forward block within PML has made it clear it supports joining Nawaz, and many in the party agree it would make more sense to bring these two center-right parties together again. However, uniting PML and PML-N would precipitate a leadership struggle between the Sharifs and the Chaudhrys. Others within the party believe an alliance with the PPP makes more sense because Zardari now controls a larger share of the spoils.
8. (C) Shujaat made it clear to Ambassador he would like U.S. support for his bid to become leader of the Senate (second in line to the President); Elahi would like to return to his former post as Chief Minister of Punjab. Shujaat told Ambassador, however, that he does not trust Zardari to follow through on his promises without a guarantor. (Note: Shahbaz Sharif told PO Lahore (Ref A) that PML-N would also like a guarantor to any reconciliation deal because of questions about Zardari’s trustworthiness.) 9. (C) Comment: With the lawyers’ march scheduled to begin on March 12, and election of a new Senate leader expected the same day, time is running short for a resolution of these disputes. The media, which overwhelmingly has criticized Zardari for both the Sharifs’ disqualification and governor’s rule, will have a field day covering the long march. Meanwhile, the situation in Swat and even the Sri Lankan cricket team attack have receded from the front pages to make way for the current political drama. As Awami National Party leader Khattak told Polcouns March 5, “”Zardari will not be able to concentrate on anything else but the Punjab crisis from now on.”" This has all become reminiscent of Musharraf’s obsession with the former Chief Justice, to the detriment of his own rule and government control over the tribal areas.
PATTERSON
Kayani, politicians asked US to intervene in Zardari-Sharifs rowDAWN.COM May 20, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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