ISLAMABAD: The killing of Habib Jalib Baloch on July 15 has sent a wave of concern across Balochistan and Islamabad that the insurgency in the province has entered a dangerous new phase. Mr Jalib was the secretary general of the Balochistan National Party led by Akhtar Mengal, a moderate party considered to be secular, middle class and at a remove from the oppressive sardari system that dominates politics in the province. While publicly Mr Jalib’s death has been blamed by Baloch leaders on the intelligence agencies, there is growing concern in the ranks of parties such as the BNP(M) and the National Party that hard-line Baloch separatists may be eliminating those willing to work inside the Pakistani federation. “We are in a very difficult position,” Senator Hasil Bizenjo of the NP said. “The message to us is that people talking about nationalist politics, about staying within the federation, will not be spared.” According to Mr Bizenjo, the BNP(M) and NP are viewed as collaborators by the separatist forces. “They (the hardliners) say, ‘We are being killed by the ISI and you people are working for them.’” The killings — Mr Jalib was the third former BSO chairman and one of a dozen Baloch leaders killed in the last three years — raise a more fundamental question: why is the cycle of violence still continuing in Balochistan? While the violence is down from the 2005-2008 peak period, the Pakistani state and parts of the Baloch population are undeniably still locked in conflict. In a series of conversations with Dawn, senior government and army officials and Baloch representatives attempted to explain why, in their view, a conflict that has claimed between 500 to 1,500 lives since 2001 continues today. Foremost is the issue of missing persons. Estimates vary wildly: the Baloch claim thousands of fellow citizens are missing; rights groups like the HRCP suggest a figure in the low hundreds; the army acknowledges no more than a few dozen missing. Yet, it isn’t necessarily the detentions per se but the lack of information about the detainees that makes the missing-persons issue so incendiary. “We asked them (the army) to do two things. One, produce all the missing person in court and file charges against them. Two, allow the families to meet them,” according to Hasil Bizenjo. A senior federal minister involved in discussions concerning Balochistan concurred: “We weren’t even asking to set them free. But they (the army) weren’t willing to listen because they considered them (the missing persons) to be treasonous. We said, they may have done things they need to be punished for, but they are still Pakistanis and we have to treat them as such.” Army officers deny the charge. A high-ranking officer claimed that comprehensive internal investigations have been conducted: “We’ve looked and we haven’t found anything. It’s a myth, one of those unfortunate consequences of this situation.” REFERENCE: Dawn: The Baloch insurgency, Part I July 23rd, 2010 by Cyril Almeida http://www.cyrilalmeida.com/2010/07/23/dawn-the-baloch-insurgency-part-i/
Brahamdagh Bugti Interview AAJ TV Part 1
Brahamdagh Bugti Interview AAJ TV Part 2
Brahamdagh Bugti Interview AAJ TV Part 3
Brahamdagh Bugti Interview AAJ TV Part 4
The army does admit nearly 30 suspects are in the custody of agencies such as the ISI, MI and Corps Intelligence and are being investigated by Joint Investigation Teams. In addition, senior offers admit some of the missing have been killed in encounters. Beyond that, high-ranking officers claim they are ready to investigate any and every case of alleged disappearances brought to their attention. That does not cut ice with rights groups. According to Ali Dayan Hasan of the Human Rights Watch “it’s the state’s responsibility to protect its people. If the families are claiming people are missing, then the MI should prove that they aren’t. Find these people and show us where they are.” Part of the problem, according to Hasil Bizenjo, is that the army does not understand the impact of missing persons. “Balochistan is a backward society. If you pick up a boy from a village, you make an enemy of the entire village.” The depth of anger over the missing persons can be gauged from the fact that it has dislodged as the central complaint the decades-old grievance of the Baloch: that the province’s gas and mineral riches have been exploited by the Pakistani state. No one, not even army officers, denies that reality. Referring to the disparity in the gas price offered to Balochistan and the other provinces, Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister Naveed Qamar explained: “There was definitely an anomaly in pricing. Sui was discovered in the mid ’50s and the subsequent increases in the price were made using the original price as a benchmark. Qadirpur (in Sindh) was priced using the benchmark of international oil prices. That doesn’t justify it, though. It was wrong.” However, Mr Qamar disputes the notion the centre is still exploiting Balochistan’s resources: “Over the last 18 months, significant change has come about. We’ve fixed the gas-price anomaly to a large extent. Rikodiq (where large reserves of gold and copper are reported to exist) has been handed over to the provincial government and Saindak will be soon.” REFERENCE: Dawn: The Baloch insurgency, Part I July 23rd, 2010 by Cyril Almeida http://www.cyrilalmeida.com/2010/07/23/dawn-the-baloch-insurgency-part-i/
Even so, perceptions about the intentions of the army and ‘centrist’ bureaucrats in Islamabad linger. “It’s about greed. They want Balochistan’s resources to create prosperity in the other provinces,” claimed Syeda Abida Hussain, co-founder with her husband, Fakhar Imam, of the Friends of Baloch and Balochistan. “It’s no longer about the resource-sharing at present. It’s about the potential,” Naveed Qamar suggested. “Balochistan contributes 17 or 18 per cent of gas today to Pakistan’s needs, but the vast resources that are still untapped because of the security situation, that is the real prize.” The Baloch look no further for modern-day proof of the Pakistani state’s intention to ‘colonise’ Balochistan than the port at Gwadar. “There are these beautiful, paved boulevards in the port area. And right outside the poverty of the Baloch is shocking,” said Sanaullah Baloch, a former BNP(M) senator. “Gwadar has nothing to do with concern for the Baloch.” If the Baloch, army and government do agree on one thing, it is that a great deal of the blame for the violence continuing must be shouldered by the Balochistan government. The February 2008 provincial elections were boycotted by the moderate Baloch parties such as the BNP(M) and NP, an “unintended consequence that we didn’t understand at the time,” according to a senior army official, and which “the province is paying for.” The provincial government is widely perceived to be epically corrupt and monumentally inefficient. That has real consequences. For one, it allows the army to deflect attention from the heavy-handedness of the Frontier Corps, which is still tasked with law and order duties. Practically speaking, it becomes difficult to debate the withdrawal of the FC, a major demand of the Baloch, when the police are incapable of establishing even a modicum of law and order. The provincial government’s incompetence also impacts on the possibility of winning over disaffected Baloch. “They’ve got all this extra money,” Naveed Qamar said referring to the Rs12bn of new resources-related payments to the province, “but will it make its way to the people? That’s a big question mark.” Another commonality among the Baloch, government officials and army officers spoken to: none were optimistic the violence will abate soon. In fact, many suggested the two extremes appear to be digging in their heels. On the Baloch side, the armed radicals are bent on intimidating, perhaps even eliminating, moderate voices, making the possibility of a compromise with the state that much more distant. On the army’s side, while it fiercely denies it has a ‘colonial’ approach towards Balochistan, there is a steely resolve to prevent any ‘mischief’ by outside powers in the province — an approach which severely diminishes the possibility of concessions towards the Baloch extremists. “If the federation is to survive, the moderates need to be heard,” according to Raza Rabbani. The trouble is, no one seems to believe that is an imminent possibility. REFERENCE: Dawn: The Baloch insurgency, Part I July 23rd, 2010 by Cyril Almeida http://www.cyrilalmeida.com/2010/07/23/dawn-the-baloch-insurgency-part-i/
2006: Who’s who in BalochistanFrom the Newspaper (7 hours ago) Today
ID:764918/29/2006 10:5306ISLAMABAD16994Embassy IslamabadCONFIDENTIAL//NOFORNISLAMABAD 016994SIPDISE.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015TAGS: PK, PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINRSUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN (4): WHO’S WHO – THE BALOCH TRIBESREF: A. ISLAMABAD 14349B. ISLAMABAD 16269C. ISLAMABAD 16944D. ISLAMABAD 16962E. ISLAMABAD 16987ISLAMABAD 00016994 001.2 OF 003Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Peter W. Bodde,Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary and Introduction: The Baloch people give their name to Balochistan Province in Pakistan, where roughly two thirds of them live, as well as Sistan-va-Baluchestan Province in Iran. The Baloch are further spread across the southern reaches of Afghanistan. Baloch society is tribal, with power traditionally concentrated in the hands of autocratic princes, known as “”sardars,”" who have near totalitarian control over the lives of their tribes. Baloch nationalist and tribal leaders share a fundamental belief that the federal government has not given the province its fair share of the region’s mineral wealth, but many non-sardari nationalists disapprove of the violent tactics employed by some tribal leaders to wring concessions out of the federal government. There seems little support in the province, beyond the Bugti tribe, for the current insurgency. Nationalist leaders admit that calls for Baloch independence are nothing more than political rhetoric, and that they really want a voice in the province’s development and a greater percentage of the revenues generated by the province’s natural resources. This cable is the fourth in a series of cables on Balochistan. (Note: This cable was drafted prior to the reported death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti on August 26 (Ref C). End note.) End summary.
2. (C) The concerns and demands of the people of the Makran Coast, where the seaport of Gwadar is located, differ from those of the tribes of eastern Balochistan, home of the province,s natural gas and coal fields. The coastal region is not dominated by tribal sardars as is the eastern quarter. It is less tribal, better educated, more middle class and politically aware than the rest of province.
3. (C/NF) The eastern portion of Balochistan has been dominated by three sardars (Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Nawab Khair Bux Marri, and Sardar Attaullah Mengal. These three sardars, out of more than 60 in the province, have each been alternately in and out of government and in and out of jail; the common denominator between them is their militant opposition to the federal government in Islamabad.….
The Big Three
5. (C/NF) Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who was 79 when killed in an August 26, 2006 GOP attack on his mountain hiding place (Ref C), had led his tribe since 1946. He has served as provincial governor, provincial chief minister and as a member of the National Assembly as late as 1999. He also led intermittent armed rebellions against the federal government since the 1970s. Favoring expansive provincial autonomy and open to independence, Bugti could also be motivated by cash and is rumored to have been bought off by the government at various points in his career. Nawab Bugti was widely believed to have pocketed the vast majority of royalties from the Sui gas fields on his tribe’s territory, rather than spreading the wealth amongst the tribe or investing in development projects in his tribal territory. … His militia had an estimated 5,000 fighters in 2004, but has been decimated by Pakistani security forces during recent months of fighting.
6. (C/NF) Nawab Khair Bux Marri, an octogenarian, lives in Karachi and has the reputation of being a leftist and an uncompromising hardliner. Although he publicly demands complete independence for Balochistan, he may also negotiate with the government to avoid being left out on development funds and royalties. … Like Bugti, he has fought the government intermittently over the decades. His tribal territory includes the mountainous stretches of Kohlu and Loralai districts, an area thought to have oil reserves, but in which Marri has blocked exploration. … His militia is also estimated at roughly 5,000 men, and is usually considered the have the best-trained and most hardcore fighters. Many believe that the elusive Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is actually an avatar of Marri’s militia.
7. (C/NF) Sardar Attaullah Mengal, age mid 70s, is the most politically active and astute of the three rebel sardars, leading the militarily weaker but more numerous Mengal tribe. He served as Balochistan’s Chief Minister in 1971-73. Unlike Nawabs Bugti and Marri, Mengal has sought to broaden his nationalist appeal beyond his tribe. He controls the areas of Khuzdar, Kharan, and parts of Bolan and Sibi. He has provided political support to the current uprising; some evidence indicates that his tribe has supplied guns and funds to Bugti and Marri. His roughly 4,000-strong militia has not joined in the 2005-06 insurgency. He leads the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M), which has two seats in the provincial assembly, one in the National Assembly, and one in the federal Senate. His son Akhtar Mengal was Balochistan’s chief minister in 1997.….Comment
10. (C/NF) Currently, there is little unity among the Baloch nationalists or among the sardars. In the provincial assembly the nationalist and sardar parties hold just ten of 65 seats; the Pakistan Muslim League, which President Musharraf relies on to run the country, has 23 seats in the assembly, and rules in tandem with the religious coalition Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal, which has 17 seats. In the national assembly the nationalist and sardari parties hold a handful of the 342 seats. Fractured by tribal affiliation, geography, political orientation, and personal rivalry, Baloch are unlikely to make common cause against the Government–which explains the Army’s emerging strategy of taking on the sardars one by one, while concurrently promising to address the overall grievances of the Baloch tribes.
2006: Who’s who in BalochistanFrom the Newspaper (7 hours ago) Today
ISLAMABAD: A week ago, a war of words between the National Party and BNP-M on the one side and insurgent groups demanding independence for Balochistan on the other erupted out in the open. According to the Baloch Hal, an online newspaper, on Sunday, July 19 newspapers in Balochistan carried a statement by the National Party’s central spokesperson suggesting the Balochistan Liberation Front was to blame for the recent killing of an NP leader, Maula Baksh Dashti. The same day, newspapers in the province also carried a defiant statement by Akhtar Mengal, chief of the BNP-M, rebuffing a call by the Anjuman-i-Ittehad-i-Marri, a group linked to Khair Baksh Marri, leader of the Marri tribe, to reject parliamentary politics in the wake of Habib Jalib’s murder. The public outbursts were extraordinary: even mapping the groups involved in the violence in Balochistan is fraught with danger. “Please be very careful. These are merciless people,” a senior Quetta-based journalist who requested anonymity to talk about the radical groups urged. “It’s very difficult for us to work here.” Reliable information on the insurgent groups is difficult to come by and even harder to corroborate. Nevertheless, the contours of the groups involved in the violence can be established to some extent. A handful of groups dominate the insurgency, of which the Balochistan Liberation Army is perhaps the most well-known. The BLA appeared in its present incarnation soon after the arrest of Khair Baksh Marri in January 2000. The powerful Marri chief was accused of having a hand in the murder of a Balochistan High Court judge. Originally a rural phenomenon and limiting its operations to Dera Bugti and Kohlu, the BLA is believed to have expanded its attacks into the cities following the breakdown of a unilateral ceasefire declared in September 2008. An affiliate of the BLA is the Balochistan Liberation United Front, a smaller organisation thought to be ‘more sophisticated’ and considerably more hard-line. REFERENCE: Dawn: The Baloch insurgency, Part II By Cyril Almeida July 25th, 2010 http://www.cyrilalmeida.com/2010/07/25/dawn-the-baloch-insurgency-part-ii-by-cyril-almeida/
The other high-profile radical group is the Baloch Republican Army, the militant wing of the Balochistan Republican Party, a rechristened arm of Akbar Bugti’s Jamhoori Watan Party. The BRA came into existence after Bugti’s death in August 2006 and is believed to be controlled by his grandson, Brahmdagh. Its area of operations appears to be in relatively remote areas such as Dera Bugti, Jaffrabad and Naseerabad. A third major group is the Balochistan Liberation Front, another name resurrected from the last insurgency in the 1970s. The present-day version operates mostly in the Makran area and is also linked to Khair Baksh Marri. Beyond that, drilling down into the specifics invariably throws up a confusing set of claims and counter-claims. Take the killing of Habib Jalib, the BNP-M secretary general. Senior army officers point a finger at the BLUF, the affiliate of the BLA, for the killing. “BNP-M is in real trouble. Khair Baksh (Marri) has them in his sights,” a high-ranking officer claimed. However, some among the Baloch have focused on the alleged claim of responsibility made by the Baloch Armed Defence Organisation (Baloch Musalha Defai Tanzeem). It is a relatively new ‘anti-Baloch-nationalist’ group about which little is known, though the Baloch claim it is a front for the intelligence agencies. That is denied by the army and some moderate Baloch leaders wonder whether the Tanzeem is also sponsored by the radicals. Asma Jahangir, former chairperson of the HRCP, however, is not convinced: “The cleansing of the Baloch intelligentsia can only be the work of the agencies.” Other things are easier to speculate about, though. Why the alphabet soup of insurgent groups, when the majority are linked to Khair Baksh Marri? REFERENCE: Dawn: The Baloch insurgency, Part II By Cyril Almeida July 25th, 2010 http://www.cyrilalmeida.com/2010/07/25/dawn-the-baloch-insurgency-part-ii-by-cyril-almeida/
Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri Interview in Live with Talat Hussain AAJ TV - Part - 1
Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri Interview in Live with Talat Hussain AAJ TV - Part - 2
Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri Interview in Live with Talat Hussain AAJ TV - Part - 3
Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri Interview in Live with Talat Hussain AAJ TV - Part - 4
“Perhaps they don’t want to put all their eggs in one basket,” according to Malik Siraj Akbar, editor of the Baloch Hal. “If one group is dismantled, at least the others will still exist.” Akbar also suggested unfamiliarity with the terrain in sprawling Balochistan leads to the recruitment of locals. Saleem Shahid, Dawn’s Quetta editor, ventured that the reason could be rooted in the tribal system: “Tribal society does not accept outside leadership, so they create their own groups.” More than the proliferation of radical groups, however, what worries observers is the widening scope of targets. Attacks on security forces, state installations and government offices are all standard fare in Baloch insurgencies. In addition, killings of ‘settlers’ (groups considered non-Baloch because they trace their ancestry to outside the province, even though in many instances they have been residing in Balochistan for generations) have occurred in the past. This time, however, it is the breadth and intensity of such killings that is alarming. The senior journalist in Quetta claimed: “The target killings started in 2003, but they were sectarian in nature. The radical groups started their killing post-Bugti, initially in Quetta. Now, though, it has spread. Noshki, Khuzdar, Mastung, Gwadar, Turbat, Kech, the target killings are happening everywhere.” According to the Balochistan government’s most recent figures, more than 125 people have been killed and nearly 200 injured in the last 18 months alone in ‘settler’-related violence. One particular murder in Quetta last April sent shockwaves through conservative Balochistan: the killing of Nazima Talib, a female assistant professor at the University of Balochistan. The targeting of women was previously considered a taboo, but the BLA, which claimed responsibility for the killing, was defiant and claimed the murder was revenge for the alleged killing and harassment of Baloch women by the security forces. REFERENCE: Dawn: The Baloch insurgency, Part II By Cyril Almeida July 25th, 2010 http://www.cyrilalmeida.com/2010/07/25/dawn-the-baloch-insurgency-part-ii-by-cyril-almeida/
Another worrying trend this year: the killing of fellow Baloch by the insurgent groups. The victims have been accused of spying and working as agents of the Pakistani state. A senior journalist said, “Even Pathans have been killed, and businessmen too. The impact is enormous. There is an exodus of teachers, doctors, businessmen.” The killings by Baloch radicals are of course not occurring in a vacuum. Entrenched attitudes in the army towards Balochistan and the Baloch may be sustaining the cycle of violence. “The army thinks of the Baloch as lazy, that they don’t want to work,” according to Zahid Husain, a respected analyst. “They believe all Baloch are suspect, that they are against Pakistan,” said Senator Hasil Bizenjo. The senator recalled an incident where an entire area was sealed off by security forces in order to pull down a BSO flag hoisted atop a school. A senior army officer admitted that sometimes the security forces need to show restraint. “They see this (the Baloch flags) as an affront to Pakistan, but I tell them not to react to small provocations.” In present times, however, what may be impacting most directly on the army’s tough line against the insurgent groups is the foreign connection — the insistently whispered claims that Balochistan has become a stamping ground for foreign intelligence agencies. India features heavily in such claims. From Brahmdagh Bugti’s ‘Indian passport’ to Baloch insurgents being handed suitcases of cash in Dubai to RAW agents in the Indian consulate in Kandahar, senior army officers are adamant Indian ‘mischief’ is at work. Strikingly, even senior government officials agree that the Indian connection exists. It goes beyond India, though. “Every agency in the world, from the Americans to the Iranians to the Afghans to the Europeans to the Arabs, has some kind of footprint in the area. For some reason the British have an extraordinary interest in the area,” according to a senior army officer. Some, though, suggest common sense needs to prevail. “There are 100,000 security men in the province if you count the army, the FC, the police, everything. At most there will be a few thousand among the Baloch population capable of causing trouble. They will never be able to create big mischief. We need to recognise that,” according a high-ranking officer. Unfortunately, long-time observers of the Pakistan Army believe the officer’s opinion is squarely among the minority in the army. REFERENCE: Dawn: The Baloch insurgency, Part II By Cyril Almeida July 25th, 2010 http://www.cyrilalmeida.com/2010/07/25/dawn-the-baloch-insurgency-part-ii-by-cyril-almeida/
Saturday, May 28, 2011, Jamadi-us-Sani 24, 1432 A.H
2009: Friction between Taliban and Baloch
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: TALIBAN INFLUENCE IN BALOCHISTAN
REF: A. A: 08 KARACHI 472
B. B: 08 KARACHI 339
C. C: 08 ISLAMABAD 3533
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CONSUL GENERAL STEVE FAKAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) An often overlooked element about the presence of the Taliban shura in Quetta, Balochistan, is the ongoing friction between an expanding of Afghan refugees presumed to be Taliban and the fiercely nationalistic Balochis. The current Pakistan People’s Party government is trying to mend fences with the Balochis after years of Musharraf-era military operations against a long-simmering separatist movement (ref C ). However, many Baloch leaders claim the GOP continues military operations in tandem with support for a growing Taliban presence in Balochistan. Baloch leaders have a clear political agenda in making these claims, and, so far, provincial leaders insist the Taliban do not possess sufficient influence to threaten provincial authority. However, Balochistan’s poverty, illiteracy, and poor health care make it ripe for exploitation by extremists. As the U.S. examines ways to increase economic and development assistance in Pakistan, Post firmly believes we must expand development programs in Balochistan.
Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri in Dunya TV - Najam Sethi Special - 04-07-2009 - 1.
Taliban in Balochistan
2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Post on January 7 that Balochistan’s northern districts and the provincial capital Quetta are safe havens for pro-Taliban elements. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed with a January 4 public warning by former Senator Sana Baloch about growing Taliban influence in Quetta, adding his theory that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) provides key support to the religious extremists. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that Quetta is the reputed hiding place of Taliban Leader Mullah Omar. (Note: A number of leading Taliban have been found in Balochistan, including former Taliban Defense Minister Obaidullah Akhund, and Taliban commander Abdullah Mehsud. End comment.)
Baloch Nationalists Accuse GOP of Supporting Taliban
4. (C) Nationalist leaders in the province tend to see an underlying GOP hand supporting the growth of religious fundamentalism in Balochistan. Senator Abdul Malik Baloch (National Party) claimed that a large Taliban presence in the province is beginning to infiltrate Baloch dominated areas and affecting the city of Quetta. The Senator believed the GOP supports the religious fundamentalists as a counterbalance to the more secular Baloch nationalists, some of whom have called for independence from Pakistan.
Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri in Dunya TV - Najam Sethi Special - 04-07-2009 - 2.
Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri in Dunya TV - Najam Sethi Special - 04-07-2009 - 3.
Some Officials Confident About Maintaining Control
6. (C) Provincial Minister of Public Health Maulana Abdul Bari (JUI-F) opined that although there are Taliban in Quetta, mainstream religious leaders would keep them in check. This sentiment was echoed by Balochistan Minister for Public Affairs Maulana Abdul Bari Aga, who believed that there might be support for the Taliban in Balochistan, but insisted the group would not be able to undermine law and order in the province.
Religious Parties Reject Notion of Taliban Infiltration
7. (C) However, conservative religious leaders downplayed claims of a Taliban presence in Quetta. Maulana Noor Mohammed, a former National Assembly member and leader of the religious party Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-F (JUI-F), rejected claims of a Taliban presence in the city. Maulana Noor Mohammed, a cleric reputedly sympathetic to the Taliban position, denied Taliban presence in Quetta, claiming that the accusation was promulgated by nationalist groups to alarm the public.
Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri in Dunya TV - Najam Sethi Special - 04-07-2009 - 3.
8. (C) Comment: Given its proximity to the Afghan border and the long history of conflict and religious fundamentalism in the area, there is almost certainly a Taliban presence in both northern Balochistan and in its capital city, Quetta. Nonetheless, ethnic bias could exaggerate some accusations and raise the potential for more violent conflict (ref A). The native Baloch have felt increasingly threatened by the growing Pashtun population, many of whom are refugees from Afghanistan or northern Pakistan. Tribal leaders in the tightly knit Baloch society have vigorously resisted any usurpation of their authority by outsiders, especially Pashtuns. This could make it particularly difficult for relatively new groups, like the Taliban, to consolidate any control in the province.
9. (C) Secular Baloch-nationalists have repeatedly accused the GOP of supporting Pashtun religious extremists to counter their often violent struggle for autonomy and control over natural resources (ref B). Ultimately, countering their influence among Balochistan’s impoverished and largely illiterate population will require significant improvements in health care, education and economic opportunities.
2009: Friction between Taliban and Baloch
Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri in Dunya TV - Najam Sethi Special - 04-07-2009 - 4.
ISLAMABAD: Most Baloch believe that had the Bugti-Musharraf meeting come about in 2005, Balochistan could have been different in 2010, according to a report released by the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS). The report, titled Pakistan’s Security Challenges, quotes officials saying that a meeting had been arranged between then president General (retd) Pervez Musharraf and revered Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who was eventually assassinated in August 2006 in an army operation. Officials said a private aircraft had been sent to fetch Bugti from Sui. Bugti, who lived in Dera Bugti, travelled to Sui to leave for Islamabad but some hawkish elements within the military establishment apparently scuttled the entire scheme by delaying the aircraft on the pretext of a technical failure, according to the report. Bugti waited for two hours at the Sui airport and then returned to Dera Bugti, after he understood the scheme. “Interestingly, the plane took off minutes after Bugti left, suggesting that some elements within the army opposed Musharraf’s rapproachement,” says the report, in its chapter titled Balochistan — Pakistan’s Festering Wound. REFERENCE: CRSS report: Hawks prevented a planned Bugti-Musharraf rendezvous By Umer Nangiana Published: May 28, 2011 http://tribune.com.pk/story/177515/crss-report-hawks-prevented-a-planned-bugti-musharraf-rendezvous/
Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri Innterview with Samaa TV part 1URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SzChutNSNH0
Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri Innterview with Samaa TV part 2
Later in 2005, Musharraf declared in a press conference at the President House that “only three sardars – Akbar Bugti, Khair Bux Marri and Ataullah Mengal – were the problem in Balochistan” boasting, “it is a different age, they wouldn’t know what hit them”, the report says. Bugti’s killing coupled with existing “highhanded approach by security forces, economic backwardness, extremely poor governance and political patronage of criminal gangs” accentuated a situation which Baloch nationalist forces fully exploited and continue to do so. They tend to project almost every action by security forces (police, levies, Frontier Corps (FC)) as an “act of oppression against Baloch nationalists”. Narrating an incident of a terrorist attack on December 1 last year, the report says, “an unidentified armed group attacked a FC checkpost in Turbat around 7:30am resulting in the death of one person. Chased by FC personnel, the group took refuge in the house of Ayub Gichki, an uncle of former chief minister Akhtar Mengal, in the Overseas Residential Colony. When asked to surrender, those holed up inside responded with at least 15 grenade attacks. The episode ended with FC raiding the house and killing five people, including two sons of Gichki”. The incident sparked protests and strikes in several parts of Balochistan with almost all political parties blaming the government for killing “innocent Baloch” youth, the report adds. REFERENCE: CRSS report: Hawks prevented a planned Bugti-Musharraf rendezvous By Umer Nangiana Published: May 28, 2011 http://tribune.com.pk/story/177515/crss-report-hawks-prevented-a-planned-bugti-musharraf-rendezvous/
Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri Innterview with Samaa TV part 3
Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri Innterview with Samaa TV part 4
Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri Innterview with Samaa TV part 5
Political patronage of criminal gangs involved in abductions for ransom, extortion and car theft is a major factor in the breakdown of law and order in the province, claims the report quoting informal consultations of CRSS researchers with Baloch and Pashtun individuals. Citing the Balochistan Home Department, the report claims that 300 people were killed and 800 injured in 658 cases of sabotage and terrorism in Balochistan from January 1 to November 26, 2010, while between 2008 and 2009, 652 people died in such incidents. “Official statistics reveal that as many as 316 people lost their lives in over 400 incidents of target and sectarian killing during 2010. Target killings were basically directed against Punjabi and Urdu-speaking settlers, including about 30 academics,” the report says. More than 200 teachers have been transferred out of Balochistan for fear of being killed and another 200 were currently in the process. In the spiralling violence, as many as eight prominent Baloch political leaders were killed in incidents of target killing and kidnappings. Hundreds of people including student leaders have gone missing, the report said. Quoting a Brussels-based Baloch activist Mehran Baloch, the report said in the last four months of 2010, around 50 bullet-riddled bodies of Baloch missing persons were found in different areas of Balochistan. Published in The Express Tribune, May 28th, 2011. REFERENCE: CRSS report: Hawks prevented a planned Bugti-Musharraf rendezvous By Umer Nangiana Published: May 28, 2011 http://tribune.com.pk/story/177515/crss-report-hawks-prevented-a-planned-bugti-musharraf-rendezvous/