In a television programme aired recently, former chief of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and an important leader of Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) General (retd) Hamid Gul cast doubts over the authenticity of a picture run by the website of The Express Tribune. The picture in question was that of Malik Ishaq, commander of the banned outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), who was shown to be in attendance at the DPC meeting in Multan – a meeting also attended and addressed by General Gul. During a talk show on Aaj TV, host Wajahat S Khan showed Gul the picture on The Express Tribune’s website as evidence of Ishaq’s attendance – in response to which the retired general alleged that the photo had been doctored. When he was further challenged by the show’s host, Gul resorted to questioning the reporter of the story. The Express Tribune takes strong exception to General Gul’s allegations and contends that the picture is authentic. It was taken by our photographer, who was assigned to cover the gathering. In fact, the picture was also run by other newspapers. If Gul has the slightest doubt regarding the authenticity of the photograph, we ask him to take the matter to court. Express Media Group Published in The Express Tribune, February 16th, 2012. REFERENCE: Notice: A note to Hamid Gul Published: February 16, 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/337252/notice-a-note-to-hamid-gul/ Difa-e-Pakistan: Malik Ishaq out to 'defend' Pakistan http://tribune.com.pk/multimedia/slideshows/329282/
Malik Ishaq attended Multan rally: Jamaatud Dawa
LAHORE: Chief of banned militant outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Malik Ishaq was in attendance at the Difa-e-Pakistan Council rally in Multan, a spokesperson for the council’s member organisation Jamaatud Dawa has said. “General (retd) Hamid Gul was wrong in denying Ishaq’s presence at the rally. He was present on stage,” said Yahya Mujahid, a spokesperson for Islamic chairty, which is blacklisted by the United Nations for its alleged ties to LeJ but not by the Pakistan government. Gul, in an interview with Express News television channel, had categorically denied that Ishaq was present at the rally. “It was DPC’s unanimous decision that Ishaq will not address the rally,” Mujahid told The Express Tribune on Friday. “It’s a simple rule that whoever addresses the people from stage at a DPC rally cannot be a member of a banned militant outfit.” Mujahid was attending an emergency protest, called by the JuD outside their main mosque Jamia Qudsia in Lahore under the DPC’s banner, against resumption of Nato supply routes and trade talks with India. The council has also called a meeting of heads of member parties on February 19 in Islamabad.
Apology to media
He also apologised for statements made against the media at the council’s Karachi rally. “The statements should be condemned in the strongest terms. I, as a representative of JuD, have written letters of apology to media organisations.”
Funding
The spokesperson said that the DPC is an organised platform. “Funding [for the organisation] is provided by member parties while host parties for different rallies fund events in their own cities,” he explained. For instance, he said, JuD hosted the Lahore rally, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat organised the one in Multan, Sheikh Rasheed hosted the Rawalpindi event and Jamat-e-Islami hosted the Karachi rally. “The nationwide networks of all member parties provide support in organisational procedures.”
In defence of Hafiz Saeed
Amir Hamza, a senior leader of the JuD, said that the reason the US is against JuD chief Hafiz Saeed is because he speaks out about human rights violations by US allied forces in the region. He also blamed former president Pervez Musharraf for joining hands with the US in the ‘war on terror’ and the Balochistan crisis. CORRECTION: Former president Pervez Musharraf’s name was erroneously written as Pervez Sharif. The error is regretted. REFERENCE: Malik Ishaq attended Multan rally: Jamaatud Dawa By Rabia Mehmood Published: February 17, 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/337998/malik-ishaq-attended-multan-rally-jamaatud-dawa/
Gen (R) Hamid Gul & Death Threats to Wajahat S. Khan - 1 (Bolta Pakistan 14-2-12)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aU2kQjGnwEE
Gen (R) Hamid Gul & Death Threats to Wajahat S. Khan - 2 (Bolta Pakistan 14-2-12)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YzVM22SnKKE
Daily Express Dated 18 Feb 2012 http://www.express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1101452646&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=20120218
Now, we come to the second generation of officers who were in key decision-making positions during 80s. Former Director General (DG) of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant General (Retd) Hameed Gul’s anti-American rhetoric in post-retirement phase makes headlines off and on in national news media. It is interesting that when he was DGISI, US ambassador attended the meetings of Afghan Cell of Benazir government. In fact the major decision of Jalalabad offensive in 1989 was made in one of those fateful meetings. To date there has been no evidence (no statement by any other participants of those meetings or by General Hameed Gul himself) that Mr. Gul made any objection to the presence of US ambassador in these meetings, which had wide ranging impact on national security. It is probable that Mr. Gul was at that time a top contender for the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) race, therefore he didn’t wanted to be on the wrong side of the civil government. When he was sacked, then he found the gospel truth that US was not sincere. Another example is of former Chief of Afghan Cell of ISI, Brigadier (Retd) Muhammad Yusuf. For five long years, he was a major participant in a joint CIA-ISI venture of unprecedented scale in Afghanistan. During this time period, he worked with several different level US officials and visited CIA headquarters in Langley. In his post-retirement memoirs, he tried his best to distance himself from the Americans. His statements like, ‘Relations between the CIA and ourselves were always strained’, ‘I resorted to trying to avoid contact with the local CIA staff’, ‘I never visited the US embassy’ and vehement denial of any direct contact between CIA and Mujahideen shows his uncomfortability of being seen as close with the Americans.5 Pakistan’s former foreign minister Agha Shahi in a conversation with Robert Wirsing said that in 1981 during negotiations with US, he gave a talk to a group of Pakistani generals on the objectives of Pakistan’s policy toward US. He stressed the importance of non-alignment and avoidance of over dependence on superpowers. Few days later one of the generals who attended Shahi’s briefing met him and told him that Americans should be given bases in return for the aid.6 The officer would not dare to make that statement public in view of the prevailing sentiments of the public. The hawkish generals of Zia reassured US about the full Pakistani support. John Reagan, the CIA station chief in Islamabad stated, “Their attitude was that Agha Shahi was doing his own thing, that we needn’t be concerned about it”.7 General Zia and DGISI Akhtar Abdur Rahman had very cordial relations with CIA director William Casey. To offset that uncomfortable closeness with Americans, Zia and Akhtar were portrayed as holy warriors of Islam and modern day Saladins. According to one close associate of Akhtar, ‘They (Casey and Akhtar) worked together in harmony, and in an atmosphere of mutual trust’.8 The most interesting remarks about the death of CIA Director, William Casey were made by Brigadier Yusuf. He states that, “It was a great blow to the Jehad when Casey died”.9 He did not elaborate whether by this definition one should count Casey as Shaheed (warrior who dies in battle in the cause of Islam). It will quite be amusing for Americans to know that one of their former CIA director is actually a martyr of Islam. In fifty-five years, we have come full circle, and in 2002, a retired Major General laments about the US and gives a long list of grievances. He states, “Discarding General Ziaul Haq when no more needed must never be forgotten. The treatment meted out to Pakistan after the victory in Afghanistan in late eighties cannot be forgiven ... It can be safely presumed that before mobilizing its armed forces on the borders of Pakistan, the US has (take it for sure) given a nod to India... Remember the visit of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the USA and getting a silent approval from there before attacking East Pakistan in 1971. And the Pakistanis kept waiting for the seventh fleet to come to our rescue... They have already done a great damage to Pakistan by imposing an anti-Pakistan government in Afghanistan”.10 Very limited knowledge, paranoia, disregard of the facts, total lack of perception and extreme simplicity is quite evident from the statement and not a very good sign of the intellectual level of senior officers at highest decision making process. REFERENCE: Tale of a love affair that never was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations Columnist Hamid Hussain analyses an ON and OFF affair. http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/june/loveaffair.htm
General Hamid Gul supported Pervez Musharraf on 12 Oct 1999
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRXOjCGcoRI
Hamid Gul, a retired general, accuses Mr Sharif of having presided over an administration which had failed to deliver the goods. "Sharif turned out to be a great destroyer of national institutions," he told the BBC. "Look at what he did to the judiciary. "He stripped them of power, put a set of judges against the chief justice, did the same to the press. "He gagged the parliament and finally he wanted to do the same to the army." REFERENCE: World: South Asia Pakistan's coup: Why the army acted Wednesday, October 13, 1999 Published at 23:20 GMT 00:20 UK http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/473297.stm
Difa-e-Pakistan/JUD Death Threat to Pakistani Media (Capital Talk - 13th Feb 2012)
ISLAMABAD: Saturday afternoons in Islamabad are clinically boring. The industrial/agricultural elite of Parliament has packed off for the weekend and anybody who wears stars is off golfing or playing polo. As even the Twitter feed is slow, the news day is thus a stretch. Meanwhile, news TV viewing, even the rerun of one’s own show, is a painful but relevant exercise, especially when it is compounded by threats that promise beheading, bestiality, torture and other such comforts of wrath. According to the records, I got the first call at 1312 hours on Saturday, a few minutes into the repeat broadcast of my new show. It needs to be stated for the record that the show was a passionate debate between that old warhorse, Lt. Gen. Hameed Gul, and myself. Though ‘Saddam Gul’, as Robert Oakley once called him, and I have faced off several times on television, this encounter was less about him and more about his new gig with the good folks of the Difa-e-Pakistan Council. I started off fairly quickly, teasing Gul why he and his DPC buddies were so angry all the time. Gul just laughed it off. Then we got cracking about the DPC’s ‘pressure group’ tactics, and how they had nothing constructive to contribute to the critical governance issues the country is being held hostage by. Still, that toughened spy chief brushed it aside. Then came the issue of the ‘outlaw groups’, and how the Malik Ishaqs and the Hafiz Saeeds of the world are displayed and paraded around at the DPC’s rallies, and how such displays cause jitters everywhere, and how those jitters end up giving this poor, broken country a bad name. For the first time in the interview, around 10 minutes in, Gul struggled, outright rejecting the claim that Malik Ishaq was at the Multan rally. As we tend to do in our show, evidence was promptly presented. A screen shot of The Express Tribune, with Ishaq in living colour at the Multan stage, was displayed on our monitor, and Gul struggled some more. Doing what he does best, Gul upped the ante, claiming that the Tribune’s pics were doctored. I challenged him, defending the Tribune’s reporting standards. He counter-challenged, and said it was not the paper, rather the reporter who was lying. I rebutted, and hence we moved on. Around this part of the show’s broadcast, the call came. He didn’t say hello. He knew my name and my address. He kept it short, and told me exactly what he would do to my body parts when he was done detaching them. He then hung up. That was caller one. But that was just the bad cop routine. The good cops, several of them, came knocking with a flurry of text messages. One of them started off by asking why I was siding with India. My reply was that I was not siding with any collective, and in fact had brought up the disturbing statistic of India’s arms expenditures with Gul, asking the former ISI chief what he and the DPC were doing besides screaming murder about matching the $100 billion dollars that the Indians plan on weapons procurement spending over the next decade. He pinged back after a few minutes, concentrating his grammar on the imaginings between my mother and some animals. The other good cops started in similar vein, one of them asking me whether I had learnt my English in America. Seeing where this could lead to, I didn’t respond. That action further lit up my afternoon, as references to pre-Islamic debauchery, disasters and disease continued to flash on my phone. No names were offered, but when my address and location was confirmed, again and again, I pressed the panic button. The cavalry that came to help was the Aaj TV administration as well as contacts in Pakistan’s premier intelligence agencies. Within an hour, we had located the origin of the calls: All of them were from Lahore. And yes, we even had the addresses down. By now, panic had given way to anger. Evidently, this was a planned and coordinated assault, ranging between Badian, Rajababad and Model Town. I reached out to Gen Gul, and after several hours, he finally reverted, admitting that he too had heard from “some people” who were “angry” at him about granting me this interview. He said all was well between us, and that he was sorry about what had happened. He said he didn’t know who was threatening me, but nor could he help call them off. Meanwhile, contacts in the intelligence community had another explanation: they said that people belonging to “such organizations” are “excessively emotional”, and that the real operators “never warn” before they strike. Still, the fact that my address and numbers were so quickly available to my would-be executioners wasn’t taken as a “credible threat”. You’re a famous man, I was told. Everybody knows your information. Don’t worry. All will be well. And that’s when it all made sense. Pakistan is Chaos Country. Nobody is in charge any more. In the battles for our soul – for freedom, for journalism, for jihad, for governance and law – all the combatants are right, and everybody else wrong. The intel officials and my television bosses thought it would be better to know more and do less, for giving the relevant groups’ actions public coverage would only serve their purpose. But when I was advised to “move for the night” and asked if I could “handle a weapon” by some very important, powerful people, I realised that in spirit, maybe the DPC’s message, if not the DPC’s (or its supporters’) tactics is right: We should do what it takes to survive. At a primal, human level, I secretly wished that I hadn’t “made enemies” by taking on Gen Gul. At a professional level, I was pleased and even proud. Personally, I was scared and then angry. But as a Pakistani, I broke down a little this weekend. And all the king’s horses, and all the king’s men, despite their power and potential, couldn’t put my family and me together again. Truth led to lies. Lies led to video-tape. Video-tape led to jihad. And then nobody, even the jihadis themselves, could do anything more to help. The writer is host of the show Ikhtilaf, on Aaj TV. Published in The Express Tribune, February 14th, 2012. REFERENCE: Journalism under threat: Jihad, lies and video tape By Wajahat S Khan Published: February 14, 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/336144/journalism-under-threat-jihad-lies-and-video-tape/
Ring Piston of Flirting Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed (JUD/LT/Difa-e-Pakistan)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-rg5qFJ4zk
KARACHI - Just as the mention of a book by Osama bin Laden can send it hurtling up the best-seller list, so the name of the al-Qaeda leader can be manipulated by jihadis to serve their cause. Sales of Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower by former US State Department employee William Blum rocketed from obscurity to the top 20 on Amazon's top-seller list after bin Laden praised it in a video aired on Al-Jazeera television network this month. Similarly, the banned Pakistan-based jihadi group Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT), or Jamaatut Dawa as it is now known, unashamedly exploits bin Laden's name to gain popularity among the masses, even though the group has very strained ties with al-Qaeda, while denouncing him to win support from mentors. "Osama is a hero" is the motto the LeT spreads in Punjabi to draw in fresh recruits for its jihad in Indian-administered Kashmir, where it concentrates its activities. "Osama is a deviant" is the Arabic phrase the LeT uses to solicit patronage and funds from Saudi Arabia, where Saudi-born bin Laden rejects the current leadership. The LeT, whose name means Soldiers of the Pure, is uniquely focused. On the one hand it operates against Indian rule in Kashmir, on the other it bans its members from joining the jihad in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal area (against the Pakistani army) and from taking part in the Taliban-led Afghan resistance. The LeT has been blamed for a number of attacks beyond Kashmir, the most recent being in the technology hub, Bangalore. In 2000, it carried out audacious armed attacks inside the Red Fort in Delhi. The LeT apparently does not want to dilute its goal, described in a pamphlet titled "Why Are We Waging Jihad?" as the restoration of Islamic rule in India, by waging jihad anywhere else.
Ratting on al-Qaeda
Soon after September 11, 2001, a top al-Qaeda operator, Abu Zubaida, came to Pakistan and handed over a sum of money to Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, then chief of the LeT and now head of the Jamaatut Dawam, into which the LeT evolved after being banned, along with other Islamic groups, in January 2002 under US pressure. According to sources in the LeT, the amount of money was US$100,000, which was to be used to take care of Arab jihadis and their families displaced from Afghanistan by the US-led invasion of 2001. The LeT was the only organization in Pakistan the Arabs from Afghanistan would deal with. There were a number of reasons for this, apart from both having Salafi backgrounds, the most important being ties established during the Afghan resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s. So the LeT organized temporary housing for many Arab families after the fall of Kabul and Kandahar. The next step was to arrange forged travel documents and air tickets. But Hafiz, and the money, were not forthcoming. Abu Zubaida, who was living in a safe house of the LeT in Faisalabad, traveled to Lahore to speak to Hafiz, who complained he did not have enough money to help the Arabs. Abu Zubaida was incensed, and returned to his safe house. A few days later the house was raided and he was arrested. These events are part of jihadi folklore. However, what is new is added by a source who left the Pakistani army to join the LeT, with which he soon became disillusioned and left for Africa to become a businessman. "Abu Jabran was the chief bodyguard of Abu Zubaida. He was also arrested along with Abu Zubaida. The logical conclusion is that he should be in Camp X-Ray," the US military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the source said. "But he is serving as the personal adviser to the No 1 man in the Laskar-e-Toiba, Zakiur Rehman," the commander-in-chief of the LeT in Indian-administered Kashmir. Asia Times Online inquiries indicate that Abu Jabran was freed by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation eight days after being arrested with Abu Zubaida. As soon as he was released, he was elevated as adviser to Zakiur Rehman. Abu Jabran is known in the internal circles of the LeT as Janab Jabran Chaca.
Damage to al-Qaeda
Since al-Qaeda was structured on vertical lines at the time of the arrest of Abu Zubaida (it is now set up horizontally), his apprehension was followed by the capture of a number of al-Qaeda operatives, including Yasir al-Jazeri, who was chief of financial matters. And they all blamed it on Hafiz for his initial betrayal. According to a Guantanamo returnee, many inmates include loud qanoots (in essence bad prayers) against Hafiz, calling for his death.
Double-faced
After September 11, the LeT was in a bind. It wanted to recruit fresh blood, but this was impossible without invoking bin Laden's name. And it wanted to retain its pro-establishment ties without upsetting its mentors in Islamabad and Riyadh. On the death of King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz last year, the Jamaatut Dawa published an article on its website in praise of the Saudi king. And since Saudi rulers were demanding that their friends denounce bin Laden, Hafiz did so. Last year, for instance, he wrote an article in an Arabic magazine in which he described bin Laden and al-Qaeda as khwarij (away from mainstream Islam, or those extremists who do not make a distinction between a minor and a major sin and deal with sinners as infidels). Hafiz chose Arabic so as not to upset his members still enamored with al-Qaeda and the concept of worldwide jihad. At the same time, the LeT - or Jamaatut Dawa to be precise - is teaching a distorted version of Islam. Many Koranic verses concerning jihad have been deleted from the books its members use, with emphasis placed on following the ameer (chief). The aim is to prevent members joining the fighters in South and North Waziristan and Afghanistan, where the pull grows stronger by the day. Asia Times Online contacts claim that in the past few months hundreds of people have broken their ties with the LeT and headed for Waziristan, which is once again a powerful hub of the Afghan resistance movement. The battle for the hearts and minds of potential jihadis is truly on, with twisted ideologies and contradictory, tortuous positions a part of the process, with a little help from the Osama bin Laden brand name. REFERENCE: Taking Osama's name in vain By Syed Saleem Shahzad South Asia Jan 27, 2006 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HA27Df02.html
"LIE" with General (R) Hamid Gul on AAJ TV - 1 (Ikhtilaf 10th February 2012)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AVgk34xTX8w
WASHINGTON: A United States federal judge said on Thursday that the admission by a Pakistani imam that he had lied repeatedly to obtain a green card could lead to his deportation. Under a tentative deal disclosed at a hearing in which Imam Muhammad Masood changed his plea to guilty, the former prayer leader of the Islamic Centre of New England, would be spared imprisonment, but he would have to serve three years on probation and pay a $1,000 fine. US District Judge Douglas P Woodlock said that he would decide at Masood’s sentencing on May 22 whether to accept the agreement or hand down a different punishment for five federal crimes of making false statements and committing fraud in an immigration application. “Regardless of the sentence, Masood’s guilty plea could lead to the expulsion of the 49-year-old imam, the judge said. Before Masood was indicted last August, he faced civil immigration charges, including overstaying his visa,” reported the Boston Globe. Masood is the brother of Hafiz Saeed, founder of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. He has said that he has nothing to do with his brother, nor does he share his outlook on religion and politics. Masood came to the United States in 1987 under a special visa for exchange students and enrolled at Vanderbilt University, transferring to Boston University the following year. He became the imam of the Sharon mosque around 1998. In December 2002, Masood admitted, he falsely told authorities in an application for permanent legal residency that he returned to Pakistan from 1991 to 1993 after ending his studies. Immigrants with the kind of visa Masood had are required to return to their country for two years before they can seek a green card. Masood faces a maximum of 10 years in prison on three of the federal charges and a maximum of five years in prison on the other two charges. The plea deal calls for the dismissal of four other federal charges. REFERENCE: Pakistani imam may be deported * US judge says Muhammad Masood lied to obtain Green Card By Khalid Hasan Saturday, March 01, 2008 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C03%5C01%5Cstory_1-3-2008_pg7_17
"LIE" with General (R) Hamid Gul on AAJ TV - 2 (Ikhtilaf 10th February 2012)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jaXvLjumfWs
LAHORE: Chief operational commander of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT) Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, arrested on December 10 by the Pakistani authorities in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, is furious at the Jamaat-ud-Daawa (JuD) leadership’s decision to publicly disown him in his hour of trial instead of trying to bail him out. According to circles close to the Pakistani authorities, involved in grilling Lakhvi to ascertain whether the LT is actually involved in the Mumbai mayhem, the commander is extremely hurt by a recent statement from a JuD spokesman that both the arrested Lashkar leaders Zakiur Rehman and Zarar Shah never had any link with either Hafiz Mohammad Saeed or the JuD. In a bid to shield Saeed, JuD spokesman Abdullah Muntazir told the Times of India on January 9, 2008: “In any case, Lakhvi and Zarar, the two men India is talking about, were never associated with the JuD, which has always been into charity work only.” It had been conveyed by Hafiz Saeed himself in the wake of the Mumbai terror strikes, the spokesman said, adding there were elements in the Pakistan government that wanted to target religious organisations. Circles close to Hafiz Saeed say there was nothing new in the JuD spokesman’s stance as its leadership had repeatedly denied any link with them. But a former LT office-bearer — now a part of the JuD — confirmed on condition of anonymity that Lakhvi was extremely upset over the U-turn taken by his former close associates and complains they had abandoned him at a time when he desperately needed their backing. Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, alias Abu Waheed Irshad Ahmad, comes from the Okara district of the Punjab province. Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone Mumbai attacker caught alive by the Indian authorities, belongs to the same area. Born on December 30, 1960 to the lower middle class family of Hafiz Azizur Rehman in Chak No. 18 of Rinala Khurd in Okara, Lakhvi is considered to be a close associate of Hafiz Saeed and has been named by Ajmal Kasab as his trainer as well as the planner of the Mumbai carnage. While Pakistan has already turned down an Indian demand for Lakhvi’s extradition despite American pressure, the JuD has deemed it fit to disown him. In 1988, Abu Abdur Rahman Sareehi, a Saudi national and allegedly a close associate of Osama bin Laden, founded in Afghanistan’s eastern province of Kunar an organisation which recruited Afghan youths and Pakistanis from the Bajaur Agency to fight Soviet occupation troops in the Central Asian country. Sareehi, the brother-in-law of Zaki Lakhvi, is believed to have contributed a hefty amount of Rs10 million to the construction of the Muridke headquarters of the Lashkar-i-Taiba, called the Markaz Daawa Wal Irshad, way back in 1988. The organisation flourished in Kunar and Bajaur areas as thousands of youths from Pakistan belonging to the Deobandi Salafi school of thought instantly joined its camps set up in Afghan provinces of Kunar and Paktia, both of which had a sizable number of Ahle Hadith (Wahabi) followers of Islam, besides hundreds of Saudis and Afghans. International media reports say Zaki Lakhvi was one of the main trainers at the Kunar camp of anti-Soviet militants. As the Lashkar had joined the Afghan jihad at a time it was winding down, the group did not play a major part in the fight against the Soviet forces, which pulled out in 1989. However, the participation of the Lashkar cadres in the Afghan jihad helped its leaders, particularly Hafiz Saeed and Zaki Lakhvi, win the trust of the Pakistani establishment. The insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, beginning in 1989, came at an appropriate time to provide an active battleground for the Lashkar fighters when its leadership was made to divert its attention from Afghanistan and devote itself to the jihad in Kashmir, where it gained fame. As Lakhvi was subsequently made the supreme commander of the military operations in Jammu and Kashmir, his prime responsibility was to identify young men and indoctrinate them in jihad. In an April 1999 interview to an English daily from Muzzaffarabad, Lakhvi said: “We are extending our Mujahideen networks across India and preparing the Muslims of India against India. When they are ready, it will be the start of the break-up of India.” A few months later, at the three-day annual congregation of the LT held at its Muridke headquarters, 30 kilometres from Lahore, Lakhvi justified the launching of fidayeen missions in Jammu and Kashmir. He continued: “Following Pakistani withdrawal from the Kargil heights and the Nawaz-Clinton statement in Washington, it was important to boost the morale of the Kashmiri people... These fidayeen missions have been initiated to teach India a lesson as they were celebrating Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil. And let me tell you very clearly that our next target would be New Delhi.” Incidentally, the Indian parliament was attacked later on December 13, 2001. Subsequently, the US State Department declared the Lashkar a terrorist outfit, followed by a similar decision by the Musharraf regime. The LT later renamed itself as Jamaat-ud-Daawa (JuD) in a bid to separate its military actions in Kashmir from its religious undertakings in Pakistan. While stepping down as the Lashkar ameer at a press conference in Lahore on December 23, 2001, Hafiz Saeed appointed Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri as his successor. But Lakhvi was retained as the supreme operational commander of the LT. However, differences soon erupted between Saeed and Lakhvi over distribution of the organisation’s assets, prompting the latter to revolt against Saeed and launch his own splinter group with the name of Khairun Naas (KuN). Their animosity grew to the extent that some of the Zaki-led rebel group members — largely consisting of LT fighters — reportedly took oath to assassinate Hafiz Saeed. According to Saeed’s aides, he first came under fire from Zaki when he decided to launch JuD and separated the LT infrastructure from the Jamaat. Lakhvi, being the chief operational commander of the LT, disapproved of the decision, saying it was meant to put the JuD in control of all the funds collected locally and abroad. He was of the view that as heavy donations were being collected in the name of the Kashmir jihad from all over Pakistan as well as abroad, the JuD leadership had no right to the money because it was only a preaching organisation. Sources close to Lakhvi revealed many of the dissident aides to Saeed were basically annoyed at his second marriage with a fallen mujahid’s 28-year-old widow. Saeed was 58 at the time of his marriage and had justified his act by saying the wedding was only meant to provide shelter to the widow of the fighter, who had lost his life in Jammu and Kashmir and had left behind two kids. However, a year later, Saeed and Lakhvi were made to mend fences and the two were the best of friends at the time of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. But Zaki Lakhvi had already moved the LT headquarters from Muridke to Muzaffarabad by then. In July 2006, the Indian authorities alleged that Azam Cheema, a LT operative accused of being the ring leader in the 2006 bombing of the Mumbai rail network [that killed over 200 people] was trained and sent to the Indian port city by Lakhvi. The Mumbai police commissioner then claimed that an arrested militant, Abu Anas, has confessed to being the bodyguard of Lakhvi. In May 2008, the US Treasury Department announced freezing the assets of four LT leaders including Lakhvi. In October, 2007, Lakhvi’s 20-year-old son Mohammad Qasim was reportedly killed in an encounter with the security forces at the Gamaroo village in Jammu and Kashmir’s Bandipora area. In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the Indian authorities alleged Zaki Lakhvi, usually based in Muzaffarabad, had moved to Karachi in August 2008, the port city from where LT militants set off, so he could direct operations. The sole survivor of the Mumbai attacks, Ajmal Kasab, apparently told police Lakhvi had helped indoctrinate all the attackers. On December 3, 2008, India finally named him as one of four major planners behind the Mumbai terror attacks. And that he had allegedly offered to pay the Kasab family Rs150,000 for his participation in the assaults. On December 7, 2008, the Pakistani security forces arrested Lakhvi after raiding the JuD headquarters in Muzaffarabad. The Indian dossier handed over to Pakistan on January 5 includes transcription of intercepted telephonic conversation between the Mumbai attackers and Lakhvi. However, circles close to the arrested LT chief operational commander reject the Indian dossier as a pack of lies and insist Lakhvi has nothing to do with the Mumbai strikes. REFERENCE: LeT commander furious at JuD chief Amir Mir Thursday, January 15, 2009 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=19630&Cat=13&dt=1/16/2009
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IARY4EYVhzg
Why the Pakistani Military used to Support Taliban, Several Sectarian Outfits and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba before 911? And while the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi stand officially disbanded, their most militant son and leader, Maulana Azam Tariq, an accused in several cases of sectarian killing, contested elections from jail - albeit as an independent candidate - won his seat, and was released on bail shortly thereafter. Musharraf rewrote election rules to disqualify former Prime Ministers Mohammed Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, and threatened to toss them in jail if they returned from abroad, which badly undermined both Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League and Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Musharraf has plainly given the religious groups more free rein in the campaign than he has allowed the two big parties that were his main rivals. In Jhang city, in Punjab province, Maulana Azam Tariq, leader of an outlawed extremist group called Sipah-e-Sahaba, which has been linked to numerous sectarian killings, is being allowed to run as an independent despite election laws that disqualify any candidate who has criminal charges pending, or even those who did not earn a college degree. "It makes no sense that Benazir can't run in the election," says one Islamabad-based diplomat, "and this nasty guy can."References: And this takes me back to Pervez Musharraf’s first visit to the US after his coup. At a meeting with a group of journalists among whom I was present, my dear and much lamented friend Tahir Mirza, then the Dawn correspondent, asked Musharraf why he was not acting against Lashkar-e Tayba and Jaish-e Muhammad. Musharraf went red in the face and shot back, “They are not doing anything in Pakistan. They are doing jihad outside.” Pakistani neocons and UN sanctions Khalid Hasan This entry was posted on Sunday, December 28th, 2008 at 6:00 pm. http://www.khalidhasan.net/2008/12/28/pakistani-neocons-and-un-sanctions/ For The 'General' Good By Sairah Irshad Khan Monthly Newsline January 2003 http://www.newsline.com.pk/newsJan2003/cover1jan2003.htm - General's Election By TIM MCGIRK / KHANA-KHEL Monday, Oct. 07, 2002 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,361788,00.html - MORE DETAILS: General Musharraf, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Brigadier [R] Usman Khalid & Deobandi Taliban. http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2009/02/general-musharraf-colonel-muammar.html
Pakistan’s chief spy Lt. General Mahmoud Ahmad “was in the US when the attacks occurred.” He arrived in the US on the 4th of September, a full week before the attacks. He had meetings at the State Department “after” the attacks on the WTC. But he also had “a regular visit of consultations” with his US counterparts at the CIA and the Pentagon during the week prior to September 11. REFERENCE: Cover-up or Complicity of the Bush Administration? The Role of Pakistan’s Military Intelligence (ISI) in the September 11 Attacks by Michel Chossudovsky Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), Montréal Posted at globalresearch.ca 2 November 2001 http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO111A.html
Michel Chossudovsky is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa. TFF Associates http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/tff/people/m_chossudovsky.html
AFTER 9/11.
In the afternoon, Mahmood was invited to CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, where he told George Tenet, the CIA director, that in his view Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief, was a religious man with humanitarian instincts and not a man of violence! This was a bit difficult for the CIA officials to digest and rightly so as the Taliban’s track record, especially in the realm of human rights, was no secret. General Mahmood was told politely but firmly that Mullah Omar and the Taliban would have to face US Military might if Osama Bin Laden along with other Al-Qaeda leaders were not handed over without delay. To send the message across clearly, Richard Armitage held a second meeting with Mahmood the same day, informing him that he would soon be handed specific American demands, to which Mahmood reiterated that Pakistan would cooperate. {Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York}, p 32. {Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Owen Bennett Jones, published by New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002}, p. 2.
General Mahmood on September 13, 2001, was handed a formal list of the US demands by Mr. Armitage and was asked to convey these to Musharraf and was also duly informed, for the sake of emphasis, that these were “not negotiable.” Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and the assisstant secretary of state, Christina Rocca, had drafted the list in the shape of a “non-paper”. It categorically asked Pakistan:
Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end ALL logistical support for Osama Bin Laden.
Give blanket overflight and landing rights to US aircraft.
Give the US access to Pakistani Naval and Air Bases and to the border areas betweeen Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Turn over all the intelligence and immigration information.
Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism.
Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Talibans, and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban. Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda Network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbour him and his accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, end support for the Taliban, and assist the US in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama and his network.
Having gone through the list, Mahmood declared that he was quite clear on the subject and that “he knew how the President thought, and the President would accept these points.” {Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York}, p 58-59. Interview: Richard Armitage, “Campaign Against Terror,” PBS (Frontline), April 19, 2002}
Mahmood then faxed the document to Musharraf. While the latter was going through it and in the process of weighing the pros and cons of each demand, his aide de camp that Colin Powell was on the line. Musharraf liked and respected Powell, and the conversation was not going to be a problem. He told him that he understood and appreciated the US position, but he would respond to the US demands after having discussed these with his associates. Powell was far too polite to remind him that he in fact was the government, but did inform him that his General in Washington had already assured them that these demands would be acceptable to the government of Pakistan. {Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism : Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror by Hassan Abbas, published by An East Gate Book , M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York. London, England.}. NOTES/REFERENCES - Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Owen Bennett Jones, published by New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. Interview: Richard Armitage, “Campaign Against Terror,” PBS (Frontline), April 19, 2002; last accessed June 2, 2003, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/armitage.htm Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism : Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror by Hassan Abbas, published by An East Gate Book , M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York. London, England
"LIE" with General (R) Hamid Gul on AAJ TV - 4 (Ikhtilaf 10th February 2012)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8A3cF22huSo
General Mahmood on September 13, 2001, was handed a formal list of the US demands by Mr. Armitage and was asked to convey these to Musharraf and was also duly informed, for the sake of emphasis, that these were “not negotiable.” Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and the assisstant secretary of state, Christina Rocca, had drafted the list in the shape of a “non-paper”. It categorically asked Pakistan:
Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end ALL logistical support for Osama Bin Laden.
Give blanket overflight and landing rights to US aircraft.
Give the US access to Pakistani Naval and Air Bases and to the border areas betweeen Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Turn over all the intelligence and immigration information.
Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism.
Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Talibans, and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban. Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda Network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbour him and his accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, end support for the Taliban, and assist the US in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama and his network.
Having gone through the list, Mahmood declared that he was quite clear on the subject and that “he knew how the President thought, and the President would accept these points.” {Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York}, p 58-59. Interview: Richard Armitage, “Campaign Against Terror,” PBS (Frontline), April 19, 2002}
Mahmood then faxed the document to Musharraf. While the latter was going through it and in the process of weighing the pros and cons of each demand, his aide de camp that Colin Powell was on the line. Musharraf liked and respected Powell, and the conversation was not going to be a problem. He told him that he understood and appreciated the US position, but he would respond to the US demands after having discussed these with his associates. Powell was far too polite to remind him that he in fact was the government, but did inform him that his General in Washington had already assured them that these demands would be acceptable to the government of Pakistan. {Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism : Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror by Hassan Abbas, published by An East Gate Book , M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York. London, England.}. NOTES/REFERENCES - Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Owen Bennett Jones, published by New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. Interview: Richard Armitage, “Campaign Against Terror,” PBS (Frontline), April 19, 2002; last accessed June 2, 2003, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/armitage.htm Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism : Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror by Hassan Abbas, published by An East Gate Book , M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York. London, England
"LIE" with General (R) Hamid Gul on AAJ TV - 4 (Ikhtilaf 10th February 2012)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8A3cF22huSo
“… as the doctors in Karachi continue their protest against the targeted killings of their colleagues, the failure of the government to be moved into action is shocking. … Thirty-two people have been killed in sectarian incidents in the country since the beginning of the year, of whom seven were doctors. What comes as a matter of shock and dismay is the weak response of the government to a ghastly situation … Its half-hearted statements condemning the killings do not reflect serious official concern. This also confirms the insensitivity of the military government to the sentiments and security needs of the people. The distressing message conveyed by the government’s inaction is that it is unable, or worse still, unwilling to act …” Editorial in the Karachi newspaper Dawn, 16 March 2002. PAKISTAN: No protection against targeted killings http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/030/2002/en/571b9b61-d7a7-11dd-b024-21932cd2170d/asa330302002en.pdf
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