Imran Khan’s choice of candidate for prime minister has left many of his ardent fans, especially women, dumbfounded. The cricketer-turned-politician voted for Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal’s nominee for premier, against the advise of many liberal and progressive members within his Tehrik-e-Insaaf (TI). Imran used his solitary vote in parliament in Rehman’s favour, forwarding the argument that the MMA is the only political force that is independent and does not take dictation from abroad. He maintained that he found himself ideologically and politically close to the MMA, which denounces President Pervez Musharraf’s support to the international coalition in the war against terrorism, especially in neighbouring Afghanistan. “Khan has more than a soft corner for the ousted Afghan Taliban,” a senior leader of his party said on the condition of anonymity. “He thinks that the orthodox religious militia did a great service to Afghanistan and Islam before they became a target of the Americans.” Also, the MMA’s firm stand against Musharraf, especially his series of controversial constitutional amendments, won the heart of Pakistan’s former speedster, he added. Imran’s protracted bitterness towards the Pakistan Peoples’ Party and anger against the Pakistan Muslim League left him with no alternative other than the MMA, which secured 86 votes, including those of the Pakistan Muslim League (N). Khan’s vote for the pro-Taliban cleric has added to the political confusion within his party, which performed poorly in the October 10 elections. “It would have been understandable, had Imran voted for a candidate that was nominated jointly by the opposition,” said a senior Tehrik-e-Insaaf leader. “But by voting for the MMA, he most certainly has lost his standing among the liberal, democratic and progressive elements in society.” Human rights groups and the majority of the moderate and liberal Muslims have been extremely critical of the MMA’s narrow interpretation of Islam and the conservative views of its leaders on women, education, fine arts, television and sports. By voting for the MMA, the Tehrik-e-Insaaf chief has, in effect, endorsed the religious alliance’s stand on these issues as well. Will the women’s wing of the Tehrik-e-Insaaf, led by Jemima, Khan’s British-born wife, endorse the Taliban-like interpretation of Islam? That remains a moot point. Mairaj Mohammed Khan, the Tehrik-e-Insaaf’s secretary general who has spent a lifetime advocating socialism and secular politics, finds it hard to defend the somersaults of the party leader, who has drifted from one extreme (of being pro-Musharraf) to the other extreme (of being anti-Musharraf) within a short span of time. “Even we are finding it difficult to figure out the real Imran,” quipped another of his Karachi-based leaders. “He dons the shalwar-kameez and preaches desi and religious values while in Pakistan, but transforms himself completely while rubbing shoulders with the elite in Britain and elsewhere in the west.” REFERENCE: Will the Real Imran Please Stand Up? By Amir Zia 9 DECEMBER 2002 http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2002/12/will-the-real-imran-please-stand-up/
ISLAMABAD: A landmark bill seeking to deter all forms of domestic violence against women has reached a serious deadlock following stiff resistance by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F). Claiming that the bill undermines Islamic values, the party announced on Friday it would fight “tooth and nail” against it. Strong resistance by opposition parties, including the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), had forced the government on April 4 to defer the bill, introduced in 2009, which sought heavy jail terms for those involved in violence against women. “We cannot adopt a bill which is a ditto copy of a bill on women passed by India’s parliament,” observed JUI-F chief Fazlur Rehman, when lawmakers, under the leadership of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) senior leader Syed Khurshid Shah, met to forge a consensus on the issue. Fazl claimed the bill promotes Western culture and values rather than Islamic ones. “NGOs continue to promote the culture which keeps women away from Islam and that is not acceptable to us.” The JUI-F chief termed it an effort to destroy the dignity of women in Islam and urged followers to stand united against those who wanted to impose Western culture in Pakistan. “We know women’s rights better than the PPP… Western culture cannot be promoted under the pretext of protection in Islamic states,” maintained the JUI-F chief. On Thursday, lawmakers across party lines failed to evolve any consensus to amend a controversial clause of the aforementioned bill passed by the National Assembly in 2009. Since the bill was not adopted by the Senate in 90 days, rules stipulate it can only be passed in a joint sitting of Parliament. PPP MNA Yasmeen Rehman had tabled the bill earlier stressing the institutionalisation of measures required to protect women and children from domestic violence. Despite PPP senior minister’s efforts, the opposition could not be convinced into contributing positive suggestions so that the bill could be tabled once again before the joint sitting next week. “The PPP-led government has always been a strong supporter of women’s rights but some forces (followers of conventional schools of thought) are dead against the passage of this landmark bill,” Khurshid Shah told The Express Tribune after the meeting. PML-N, the top opposition party in the National Assembly, also dragged its feet over the bill when MNA Khawaja Saad Rafiq implied that external forces had stakes in the passage of its controversial clauses. He refrained from explaining his thoughts further. REFERENCE: Domestic violence bill a copy of Indian law: Fazl By Zahid Gishkori Published: April 7, 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/360999/domestic-violence-bill-a-copy-of-indian-law-fazl/
LAHORE, Nov 2: The JUI-F leaders and activists are stunned at the land scam reported against their chief, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, as elders of other politico-religious parties are avoiding to directly comment on it. The opposition leader in the previous National Assembly, Maulana Fazl allegedly got allotted hundreds of kanals of army land in Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP, to play the role of a friendly opposition. The land was reportedly transferred to the name of his personal assistant and brother Lutfur Rehman’s secretary in January 2005. Former president Pervez Musharraf had promised to take off his uniform by Dec 31, 2004 in return of the help by the six-party MMA, of which the Maulana was the secretary general, in indemnifying the army ruler’s action of staging a coup against the PML-N’s elected government in 1999. When contacted, former JUI-F secretary-general Hafiz Husain Ahmad instead of commenting on the scandal said he was seeing intensifying of a tussle between party’s Balochistan leaders -- Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani and MNA Rehmatullah Kakar. Central vice-president Syed Amir Husain Gilani said: “Allah knows better about the veracity of the scandal”. Information Secretary Maulana Amjad Khan sees it as a malicious campaign to disrepute the JUI-F leader for presenting Taliban’s point of view in parliament about the ongoing war on terror. The naib amir of Jamaat-i-Islami, the second largest component of the MMA, Liaquat Baloch says his party is ignorant of the issue, though it has been part of the alliance’s five-year rule in the NWFP. He suggests that as the JUI-F still has representation in parliament and provincial assemblies, its MPs should bring the issue to their respective houses for a clarification and proving the allegation false. He also proposes a foolproof mechanism at the national level for investigating such scandals and bringing to fore the facts. According to him, the Awami National Party (ANP), which is currently ruling the NWFP, also owes the responsibility to probe the issue and ‘misappropriation’ of the province’s lands. ‘Defunct’ MMA’s vice-president Senator Sajid Mir terms the allegation unfortunate. “If the allegation is true then it is deplorable.” Asked if the allegation would be considered while establishing any alliance of the religious parties, he said the issue would be discussed when the stakeholders (of the proposed alliance) would sit together in the founding session. REFERENCE: Partymen stunned: ‘Fazl in land scam’ By Our Staff Reporter November 03, 2008 Monday Ziqa'ad 4, 1429 http://archives.dawn.com/2008/11/03/nat32.htm
Shaikh Talib-ur-Rehmaan on those who declare Imam Abu Haneefah Kaafir
ISLAMABAD: The late 2008 ANP government operation, to repossess 6,049 kanals of agriculture department land in Dera Ismail Khan, illegally grabbed by men closely associated with Maulana Fazlur Rehman, was an eyewash as sources have revealed that the land continues to be in the possession of the same persons who in fact have grabbed another 500-600 kanals. It was claimed on the television screens by the provincial agriculture and revenue department officials in November 2008 that the land leased out to the JUI-F men during MMA’s regime, which was later cancelled, had been retrieved. Credible sources in the provincial government, however, said that it was all an eye-wash as within days and weeks of what was shown to the whole world in November 2008, the same state-land was given back to the men of the Maulana. These sources said the authorities in DI Khan had confirmed that not only 6,049 kanals of land continues to be in the possession of the same people but an additional 500-600 kanals of agriculture department land has been encroached by the same occupants. Officials of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa agriculture department, police and revenue department DI Khan had jointly launched a crackdown in November 2008 to get back the possession of the said land, which was leased out to several people associated with Fazlur Rehman, in 2006 but cancelled the following year. Those in whose names the lease was signed for a period of ten years for just Rs200 per kanal per year include personal staff of Fazlur Rehman and his brother Maulana Lutfur Rehman, their relatives and party men and cousin of former Chief Minister Akram Durrani. However, despite the cancellation order, the land, which was used by the agriculture department for their seeds farm, was never returned to the provincial government as the Maulana’s men got a stay order from a civil court and continued with its possession. The stay order was vacated on October 28, 2008 following which the officials of agriculture, police and revenue departments launched the operation to get back the possession of the land. In the said operation, the land was successfully retrieved but after the issue got off the media’s focus, it was conveniently given back to the possession of the same people, who later got a favourable stay order from a lower court. It was reported that in violation of the lease policy, approved by the Frontier government in December 2001, a total of 6,049 kanals of land mostly consisting of land in possession of agriculture department and used for seed farms in four different Mouzas — Ratta Kulachi, Rakh Zandani, Khutti and Rakh Mahra Prova — was given on lease to 11 men in mid 2006 on Rs200 per kanal per year. Those given the said land on lease included Sharifullah, son of Rehmatullah, who was PA to Lutfur Rehman and was also allotted 200 kanals of military land; Haji Obaidullah, son of Haji Rehmatullah, reportedly brother of Sharifullah; Muhammad Altaf, son of Obaidullah, reportedly nephew of Sharifullah; Muhammad Ashraf, son of Shahzad Khan, PA to Lutfur Rehman; Adam Khan, cousin of former chief minister Akram Durrani and son of Shahzada Khan, who was also allotted 200 kanals of military land under possession of Durrani; Haq Nawaz, a JUI-F supporter and father of reader tehsildar Dera; Alamgir, son of Raza Khan, a JUI-F activist; Haji Mian Khan, son of Haji Sultan Muhammad, reportedly from Loralai, Balochistan and also associated with the Maulana; Haji Shahzai, son of Haji Sultan Muhammad and brother of Haji Mian Khan; and Samiullah, son of Haji Fazal Dad. When the leasing of the land was under process there was a considerable opposition from within the bureaucracy but nothing stopped the land from being leased out to the favourites on throwaway prices. A deputy secretary of the Board of Revenue also wrote a letter to district officer revenue DI Khan directing him not to transfer the area and possession but these instructions were ignored. Because of bureaucracy’s continued opposition to this controversial leasing out of the land including to non-locals in violation of the lease policy and on throwaway prices, provincial secretary Board of Revenue had issued a cancellation order of the lease. The operative part of the letter read as, “I am directed to inform that lease of land to the following persons vide communication noted against each are hereby cancelled on the recommendation of the committee on the ground that the land in question was utilised by the Agriculture Department for their seed farms which is still required by them for the said purpose.” The said cancellation order was issued on July 4, 2007 when the JUI-F government was in power in the Frontier province. However, despite the said order the land remained in the possession of the controversial lessees, who got a stay from the civil court against the cancellation order, which was finally vacated on OCT 28, 2008. The reported case of 1,200 kanals of military land, said to be in possession of Fazlur Rehman and Akram Khan Durrani, is different as this land belonged to the Pakistan Army and formally transferred to six men, closely associated with these top JUI-F leaders. REFERENCE: DI Khan lands still illegally held, more grabbed Ansar Abbasi Wednesday, January 19, 2011 http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-3400-DI-Khan-lands-still-illegally-held-more-grabbed
Ahl-e-Hadith Scholar ISSUES Fatwa of Kufr on Imam Abu Haneefah, Deobandis & Barelvis
ISLAMABAD: The mystery behind General Pervez Musharraf’s success in convincing Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the JUI in 2004 not to oppose his uniform has been partially solved — the general had doled out hundreds of acres of military land worth millions of rupees to the near and dear ones of the Maulana. Documents of these land allotments obtained by The News explain why the Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA) always remained a friendly opposition to General Pervez Musharraf, bailed him out at critical times and why its JUI-led provincial government was able to complete a five-year term in the NWFP. The scale of the buyout price of the JUI, which has now been confirmed, is massive in terms of state land and money paid to the JUI leaders and their relatives. It is not clear whether the Pakistan Army could actually cancel these allotments of its lands to relatives of a politician even if it wanted to. Musharraf’s dubious promise of taking off his uniform by December 2004 was first quietly accepted by the MMA and then when he went back on his promise the JUI-led MMA never created any problem, except for low-level noises made off and on for public consumption. This was done all because JUI’s Maulana Fazlur Rehman had been allotted hundreds of acres of state land, mostly in the name of his relatives, staff and employees. Documents of these allotted lands, now in the possession of The News, reveal the blatant corruption of the JUI leaders, who use Islam to fool the people but never stop from compromising themselves and their principles for material and monetary gains. The ousted dictator is now known to have secretly allotted 1,200 Kanals of military land in D I Khan to his opposition leader in the last National Assembly Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his chief minister in the NWFP Akram Khan Durrani in 2004. Though the military land was transferred in the names of those who are either closely related to these two JUI-F leaders or are their relatives, the Revenue Department in DI Khan confirmed that both these leaders had at least 600 Kanals each in their personal possession. A senior member Board of Revenue in the Frontier government was also allotted 400 Kanals of the same land for his role in this highly controversial allotment from the land earmarked for soldiers, who are given this land for their services and in line with the policy derived by the GHQ. The allotment letters, relating to 1200 Kanals, were issued by the Army’s General Headquarters Adjutant General (Welfare and Rehabilitation Directorate), Rawalpindi under the signatures of Lt-Col Muhammad Zafar on behalf of the adjutant general and countersigned by Brigadier DWR-I Zafar Iqbal Shah on Oct 23rd 2004 — a little over two months prior to the deadline set for Musharraf’s stepping down as Army chief. Maulana Fazlur Rehman could not be reached for comments despite all efforts. However, his party spokesman categorically said that there was no truth in this and that it was a vilification campaign launched against the party and its leader. The spokesman said that the land was neither allotted in the name of the two leaders nor in the names of their close associates or relatives. Former JUI chief minister Akram Khan Durrani, however, admitted that some of his close associates/relatives were allotted lands but he said he had nothing to do with those. But the documents, available with The News, confirm that six men connected with Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Akram Durrani were allotted 200 Kanals each whereas a senior Revenue officer, serving in DI Khan, also acknowledged that the said land was actually in the possession of these two leaders. Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s main ally in the MMA at that time Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the Jamaat-e-Islami, when approached, said that he and his party did not have the hint of this wheeling and dealing. The documents show that whole of this land was allotted in Rakh Ghass, Tehsil and district Dera Imail Khan where the provincial government had allotted almost 136,000 Kanals of land to the Pakistan Army for its scheme under which the officers and JCOs and their families are allotted agriculture land of different sizes on the basis of their performance, seniority, sacrifice etc under a well determined formula. Adjutant General’s Branch, W&R Directorate, in its six separate letters dated Oct 23, 2004 and clearly tagged as “restricted”, allotted 200 Kanals of agriculture land in Rakh Ghass D I Khan to each of the following beneficiaries:
1. Abrar Ahmad Khan son of Muhammad Ismail Khan, street 41 Sector I-9/4 Jamia Masjid Farooq-e-Azam, Islamabad.
Generally known as Mufti Abrar, this allottee is the personal assistant of Maulana Fazlur Rehman. He has been allotted land in Khasra No 717, 716 and 715, the document shows;
2. Sharifullah son of Mr Rahmatullah, Mohallah Mehmood Khel, village Abdul Khel, district D I Khan. He is attached with the brother of the Maulana, Maulana Lutfur Rehman, and is considered as their family member. He has been allotted land in Khasra No 718, 719 and 720;
3. Muhammad Ramzan son of Mr Feroz Khan, Mohallah Mehmood Khel, village Abdul Khel district D I Khan. He is closely related to Sharifullah and is also close with the Maulanas. He was allotted land in Khasras No 715 and 714;
4. Ibrar Ali Shah son of Asghar Ali Shah, Mewa Khel, Fazal Haq Malwana, Bannu. He is cousin of Durrani, who admitted the same and asserted that his father is a retired soldier so the son got the land. He was allotted land in Khasra No 718, 719 and 720;
5. Muhammad Ashraf Ali Khan son of Muhammad Shahzad Khan, village Khutti, Tehsil and dist D I Khan. He is included in the personal staff of Maulana Fazlís brother Maulana Lutfur Rehman. He was allotted land in Khasra No 717, 716 and 715; and
6. Muhammad Shahzad Khan son of Alam Sher Khan, Hibak Sharzah Khan P/O Sikandar Khel Bannu. He is the uncle of Durrani as admitted by the former chief minister. Durrani said that his uncle was a retired soldier so was given land by the GHQ. Shahzad Khan was allotted land in Khasra No 715 and 714.
Following these allotment letters issued by the GHQ, the land was formally transferred by the concerned Revenue officer to the above mentioned on 26 January, 2005. After the issuance of the allotment letters, the provincial government referred the case of Reayat Khan, the then senior member Board of Revenue, to the GHQ for the allotment of 400 Kanals of land in the same Moza for the officer, who had reportedly played an important role in getting 1200 Kanals transferred in favour of the men of JUI-Fís top leaders. Though Maulana Fazlur Rehman was not accessible, party spokesman Maulana Amjad told this correspondent that this was all disinformation and aimed at maligning the name of the Maulana. He said that neither the land was transferred to the two top JUI leaders nor to any of their front men. Maulana Amjad said that they did not believe in the politics of opportunism. Akram Durrani clarified that the land was actually allocated to the Pakistan Army before he took over as the chief minister of the province. He said that during his rule, he tried his level best to get the decision reversed but in vain. He denied that the land allotted in 2004 to his close men belonged to him. He argued that his uncle was allotted plot because he was a retired soldier whereas his other relative was gifted 200 Kanals because his father was in the Army. “I have nothing to do with all this,” he said. Durrani, when asked about Maulana, said that he would not respond on behalf of his party head. The former chief minister of the Frontier province suggested to this correspondent that the media should focus on what is going on in Islamabad. When asked if he was the beneficiary of the four Agro-plots that the CDA was recently pressurized to allot, he said that it was just media gossip. A senior district Revenue official, serving in the D I Khan, however, said that the land in question was in possession of the Maulana and Durrani. He said he did not know under what law the then Army chief had made this allotment because such a military land was only allotted to army officers and NCOs or to the families of the martyred. REFERENCE: Hundreds of acres of Army land given as bribe to JUI Ansar Abbasi Sunday, November 02, 2008 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=18118&Cat=13&dt=11/2/2008
NIKKAH WITH SISTER IS ALLOWED in FIQHA HANFIA (URDU) 1
ISLAMABAD: Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his close associates were allotted another 6,000 kanals of agricultural land in 2006 but when in 2007 the authority of the Musharraf regime was challenged, the allotment was cancelled. Now, the NWFP authorities will carry out a massive operation to get possession of the land on Friday. “A shock and awe operation is being launched on Friday morning by the provincial police, Revenue and Agriculture departments to regain the possession of 6,049 kanals of the Agriculture Department land in DI Khan from the men closely associated with Maulana Fazlur Rehman, who got this land on lease but never returned it despite the cancellation of the lease,” a senior official said on Thursday. The earlier reported case of 1,200 kanals of military land, said to be in possession of Maulana Fazlur Rehman and former chief minister Akram Khan Durrani, is different as this land belonged to the Army and was formally transferred to six men closely associated with these top JUI-F leaders. The joint operation on Friday will try to recover the land given on lease for a period of 10 years for just Rs 200 per kanal per year. The personal staff of Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his brother Maulana Lutfur Rehman, their relations and party men and cousins of former chief minister Akram Durrani, have kept this land in their possession despite the cancellation order after they obtained a stay order from a lower civil court. The stay order was vacated on Oct 28, 2008 and now after a meeting between the officials of Agriculture, police and Revenue Departments, a decision has been taken to launch an operation on Friday to get back the possession of the land. Secrecy is being maintained to ensure that the other party does not get another stay order from the Sessions Court in DI Khan. District Agriculture Officer, DI Khan, Ahsanullah Khan Gandapur, when contacted, confirmed that the government agencies were on the move to get the precious land back from its illegal occupants. He said he wanted to get the possession soon after the vacation of the stay order but it was delayed because of some wavering by the Revenue officials of DI Khan. He hoped all would go well on Friday morning. Documents reveal that in violation of the lease policy approved by the NWFP government in December 2001, a total of 6,049 kanals of land, mostly possessed by the Agriculture Department and used for seed farms in four different Mouzas, Ratta Kulachi, Rakh Zandani, Khutti and Rakh Mahra Prova, was given on lease to 11 men in mid-2006 on Rs 200 per kanal per year. Those given the said land on lease included Sharifullah, son of Rehmatullah, who is the PA to Lutfur Rehman and was also allotted 200 kanals of military land, Haji Obaidullah, son of Haji Rahmatullah, reportedly brother of Sharifullah, Muhammad Altaf, son of Obaidullah, reportedly a nephew of Sharifullah, Muhammad Ashraf, son of Shahzad Khan, PA to Lutfur Rehman, Adnan Khan, cousin of former chief minister Akram Durrani and son of Shahzada Khan, who had been allotted 200 kanals of military land under possession of Durrani, Haq Nawaz, a JUI-F supporter and father of reader Tehsildar Dera, Alamgir, son of Raza Khan, a JUI-F activist, Haji Mian Khan, son of Haji Sultan Muhammad, reportedly from Loralai, Balochistan, and also associated with Maulana, Haji Shahazai, son of Haji Sultan Muhammad and brother of Haji Mian Khan, and Samiullah, son of Haji Fazal Dad. When the leasing was under process, there was considerable opposition from within the bureaucracy but nothing stopped the land from being leased out to favourites on throwaway prices. A deputy secretary of the Board of Revenue also wrote a letter to the district officer (Revenue), DI Khan, directing him not to transfer the area and possession but these instructions were ignored. Because of the bureaucracy’s continued opposition to this controversial leasing to some non-locals in violation of the lease policy and on throwaway prices, the secretary, Board of Revenue, NWFP, finally issued a cancellation order of the lease. The operative part of the letter reads: “I am directed to inform that lease of the land to the following persons vide communication noted against each are hereby cancelled on the recommendation of the committee on the ground that the land in question was utilised by the Agriculture Department for their seed farms which is still required by them for the said purpose.” The said cancellation order was issued on July 4, 2007 when the JUI-F government was in power in the NWFP. However, despite the said order, the land remained in possession of the controversial lessees, who got a stay from a civil court against the cancellation order, which was finally vacated on Oct 28, 2008. While the issue was taken up in the provincial assembly, the NAB NWFP (chapter) also initiated a probe into the matter. However, it is not clear if the NAB would take this inquiry to its logical conclusion or would leave it halfway. REFERENCE: JUI men hold on to another big chunk of land Ansar Abbasi Friday, November 07, 2008 http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=18207&Cat=13&dt=11/7/2008
NIKKAH WITH SISTER IS ALLOWED in FIQHA HANFIA (URDU) 2
ISLAMABAD: Against his public perception of being an anti-American, Maulana Fazlur Rehman is reflected in a cable released by WikiLeaks as a frequent and cooperative American interlocutor, who professes his support for cooperation with the United States. The JUI-F leader has been described in the secret US cable as “more politician than mulla”, and “a frequent and cooperative interlocutor” with the post (US Embassy Islamabad). The Maulana is also shown as professing his “support for cooperation with the United States.” US embassy’s CDA Peter Bodde wrote in his April 3, 2008 cable, released by WikiLeaks, that Rehman, more politician than mulla, has been a prominent and legitimate figure in Pakistani politics since the 1980s. He “has publicly denounced terrorist attacks, but prefers to use negotiations rather than military force against militants. Although he is known to have contacts with Taliban and their sympathisers, he has negotiated with religious militants on the government’s behalf, garnering him criticism from the more hard-line religious sectors.” The primary purpose of the message was to request the FBI to recall information about Fazlur Rehman, which indicated that an individual “Fasilur Rehman” believed to be associated with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) is behind the March 2008 bombing in Islamabad. The cable said that the information suggests that Fasilur Rehman refers to political party leader Fazlur Rehman of the JUI-F. The embassy “requests that FBI recall this information from all hardcopy and database records due to discrepancies and errors in the report.” It noted that prominent Pakistan politician Fazlur Rehman is not associated with the JI, but instead leads his own political party, the JUI-F. From 2002-2007, the two parties allied with other religious parties in the coalition Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). However, the JUI-F and JI retained separate leadership structures as well as separate political objectives and methods, it said. The cable said that Fazlur Rehman’s JUI-F is a conservative Deobandi religious party that has recently joined the new Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led government. The JI is a religious party that appeals to a narrow sector of the educated, conservative urban middle class. JI, which has a vibrant student wing, began as a movement for social change based on Sharia. “The JI party policy does not support violence as a means to achieve their political agenda, however, the party quietly has supported Jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir by providing recruits from their student corps. The party does not support violence perpetuated within Pakistan, such as the recent attack on the restaurant in Islamabad. In addition, Fasilur Rehman and Fazlur Rehman are extremely common Pakistani names, making it impossible to accurately identify the individual with the prominent JUI-F politician.” In an earlier cable, the WikiLeaks showed the Maulana approaching the then US Ambassador Anne Patterson to become the Prime Minister. It was revealed that the leader of the country’s most fiercely pro-Taliban religious party, hosted a jovial dinner for Patterson at which the Maulana sought her backing to become prime minister and expressed a desire to visit America. Maulana-like Maulana’s lieutenant Abdul Ghafoor Haideri acknowledged that “All important parties in Pakistan had to get the approval of the US (to get power).” REFERENCE: Fazl keeps regular contact with US embassy, says cable Ansar Abbasi Tuesday, December 07, 2010 http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-2507-Fazl-keeps-regular-contact-with-US-embassy-says-cable
Marriage with Mother and Sister in Hanafi Fiq - Maulana Amin Safdar Orkarvi
Punjabi Taliban: Here they came in contact with Taliban militants; both influenced each other and a new sectarian breed came into being in the form of the Punjabi Taliban, now led by Asmatullah Muavia and loyal to Hakimullah Mehsud. Initially based in South Waziristan, the Punjabi Taliban were ousted after the military operation in 2009. In reprisal, they carried out high-profile attacks such as the one on GHQ in Rawalpindi. Sources say that that particular incident was the turning point and led to a re-think by the establishment. Security officials — who wish to remain anonymous — say this was because the GHQ standoff was resolved not just by army commandos but mainly through negotiations by Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, chief of the SSP, who convinced those inside to surrender. Army officials dismiss these claims. They say military action broke the siege and that the so-called Punjabi Taliban remains their number one enemy. It may well be that both stories are true, as one security official points out. Ludhianvi’s intervention — while crucial — was definitely only limited to the GHQ attack. He appears to have little control over the Punjabi Taliban leadership, which continues to wreak all sorts of havoc across Pakistan. However, it’s also clear that Ahmed Ludhianvi now enjoys official protocol. The SSP and Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, Sipah-i-Sahaba’s current title, are both supposedly proscribed, yet these organisations hold rallies in major cities with ease where arms are openly displayed. Today it’s clear that the SSP and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, an even more extreme sectarian outfit, are inter-linked. Maulana Ludhianvi admitted as much to the BBC when he said in an interview that Malik Ishaq, the LJ chief, was released on his guarantees and that the notorious militant now answers to him. Since Malik Ishaq’s release it’s become easier for the LJ leaders to move around, and they have since started expanding and setting up cells in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. These cells are made of locals and have been greatly strengthened, especially in Balochistan — where they operate independently of the LJ central command. There the traditionally secular Baloch — and particularly Brahui — are increasingly turning to the radical Islamist militancy espoused by SSP/LJ. Security officials — and Shia leaders — say this turn of events is complemented by the growth of sectarian madressahs there. Perhaps the largest Sipah-i-Sahaba seminary outside southern Punjab is in Mastung, in the heart of territory controlled by the Raisani tribe. Another major reason, according to Shia leaders, is the alleged support by intelligence agencies to groups of pro-government Baloch tribesmen. Most of these have dual identities — the second being outright sectarian and extremist. It is no surprise, then, that the largest of the groups is considered to be the de facto Lashkar-i-Jhangvi in Balochistan. All that is perhaps irrelevant for the intelligence agencies, whose main aim is the tried tactic of using religion to suppress nationalism. Led by a close relative of a senior politician from the province, some of LJ Balochistan’s more high-profile attacks include the killing of Baloch nationalist leader Habib Jalib Baloch and the attacks on the Hazara Shias pilgrims in Mastung. A senior member of the group accepts it has been involved in attacks to protect the Baloch community – it denies it’s carried out attacks on Shias. “We are only carrying out defensive actions against people who are supported by foreign intelligence services. The Baloch people are with Pakistan – it’s just that they are scared of the militants.” He adds that while their group isn’t anti-Shia — the community has elements that act as agents of Iran in Pakistan and they should refrain from this. REFERENCE: Sectarian militancy thriving in Balochistan By Syed Shoaib Hasan http://dawn.com/2012/04/11/sectarian-militancy-thriving-in-balochistan/
Hanafi/Shia Fatwa of Apostasy against Dr. Zakir Naik (Ahle Hadith)
1. (S/NF) Summary: During recent trips to southern Punjab, Principal Officer was repeatedly told that a sophisticated jihadi recruitment network had been developed in the Multan, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan Divisions. The network reportedly exploited worsening poverty in these areas of the province to recruit children into the divisions’ growing Deobandi and Ahl-eHadith madrassa network from which they were indoctrinated into jihadi philosophy, deployed to regional training/indoctrination centers, and ultimately sent to terrorist training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Locals believed that charitable activities being carried out by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith organizations, including Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Al-Khidmat Foundation, and Jaish-e-Mohammad were further strengthening reliance on extremist groups and minimizing the importance of traditionally moderate Sufi religious leaders in these communities. Government and non-governmental sources claimed that financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from “”missionary”" and “”Islamic charitable”" organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments. Locals repeatedly requested USG support for socio-economic development and the promotion of moderate religious leaders in the region as a direct counter to the growing extremist threat. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) During a recent visit to the southern Punjabi cities of Multan and Bahawalpur, Principal Officer’s discussions with religious, political, and civil society leaders were dominated by discussions of the perceived growing extremist threat in Seraiki and Baloch areas in southern and western Punjab. Interlocutors repeatedly stressed that recruitment activities by extremist religious organizations, particularly among young men between the ages of 8 and 15, had increased dramatically over the last year. Locals blamed the trend on a strengthening network of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith mosques and madrassas, which they claimed had grown exponentially since late 2005. Such growth was repeatedly attributed to an influx of “”Islamic charity”" that originally reached Pakistani pseudo-religious organizations, such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Al-Khidmat foundation, as relief for earthquake victims in Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province. Locals believe that a portion of these funds was siphoned to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in southern and western Punjab in order to expand these sects’ presence in a traditionally hostile, but potentially fruitful, recruiting ground. The initial success of establishing madrassas and mosques in these areas led to subsequent annual “”donations”" to these same clerics, originating in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The value of such donations was uncertain, although most interlocutors believed that it was in the region of $100 million annually.
3. (S/NF) According to local interlocutors, current recruitment activities generally exploit families with multiple children, particularly those facing severe financial difficulties in light of inflation, poor crop yields, and growing unemployment in both urban and rural areas in the southern and western Punjab. Oftentimes, these families are identified and initially approached/assisted by ostensibly “”charitable”" organizations including Jamaat-ud-Dawa (a front for designated foreign terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyaba), the Al-Khidmat Foundation (linked to religious political party Jamaat-e-Islami), or Jaish-e-Mohammad (a charitable front for the designated foreign terrorist organization of the same name).
4. (S/NF) The local Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith maulana will generally be introduced to the family through these organizations. He will work to convince the parents that their poverty is a direct result of their family’s deviation from “”the true path of Islam”" through “”idolatrous”" worship at local Sufi shrines and/or with local Sufi Peers. The maulana suggests that the quickest way to return to “”favor”" would be to devote the lives of one or two of their sons to Islam. The maulana will offer to educate these children at his madrassa and to find them employment in the service of Islam. The concept of “”martyrdom”" is often discussed and the family is promised that if their sons are “”martyred”" both the sons and the family will attain “”salvation”" and the family will obtain God’s favor in this life, as well. An immediate cash payment is finally made to the parents to compensate the family for its “”sacrifice”" to Islam. Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rps. 500,000 (approximately USD 6500) per son. A small number of Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in Dera Ghazi Khan district are reportedly recruiting daughters as well.
5. (S/NF) The path following recruitment depends upon the age of the child involved. Younger children (between 8 and 12) seem to be favored. These children are sent to a comparatively small, extremist Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa in southern or western Punjab generally several hours from their family home. Locals were uncertain as to the exact number of madrassas used for this initial indoctrination purpose, although they believed that with the recent expansion, they could number up to 200. These madrassas are generally in isolated areas and are kept small enough (under 100 students) so as not to draw significant attention. At these madrassas, children are denied contact with the outside world and taught sectarian extremism, hatred for non-Muslims, and anti-Western/anti-Pakistan government philosophy. Contact between students and families is forbidden, although the recruiting maulana periodically visits the families with reports full of praise for their sons’ progress. “”Graduates”" from these madrassas are either (1) employed as Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics or madrassa teachers or (2) sent on to local indoctrination camps for jihad. Teachers at the madrassa appear to make the decision based on their read of the child’s willingness to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture versus his utility as an effective proponent of Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith ideology/recruiter.
6. (S/NF) Children recruited at an older age and “”graduates”" chosen for jihad proceed to more sophisticated indoctrination camps focused on the need for violence and terrorism against the Pakistan government and the West. Locals identified three centers reportedly used for this purpose. The most prominent of these is a large complex that ostensibly has been built at Khitarjee (sp?). Locals placed this site in Bahawalpur District on the Sutlej River north of the village of Ahmedpur East at the border of the districts of Multan, Bahawalpur, and Lodhran. The second complex is a newly built “”madrassa”" on the outskirts of Bahawalpur city headed by a devotee of Jaish-e-Mohammad leader Maulana Masood Azhar identified only as Maulana Al-Hajii (NFI). The third complex is an Ahl-e-Hadith site on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city about which very limited information was available. Locals asserted that these sites were primarily used for indoctrination and very limited military/terrorist tactic training. They claimed that following several months of indoctrination at these centers youth were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas. Many worried that these youth would eventually return to try and impose their extremist version of Islam in the southern and western Punjab and/or to carry out operations in these areas.
7. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly chastised the government for its failure to act decisively against indoctrination centers, extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar. One leading Sufi scholar and a Member of the Provincial Assembly informed Principal Officer that he had personally provided large amounts of information on the location of these centers, madrassas, and personalities to provincial and national leaders, as well as the local police. He was repeatedly told that “”plans”" to deal with the threat were being “”evolved”" but that direct confrontation was considered “”too dangerous.”" The Bahawalpur District Nazim told Principal Officer that he had repeatedly highlighted the growing threat to the provincial and federal governments but had received no support in dealing with it. He blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties — he is currently with the Pakistan Muslim League — neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan Peoples Party federal governments would take his requests seriously. The brother of the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, and a noted Brailvi/Sufi scholar in his own right, Allama Qasmi blamed government intransigence on a culture that rewarded political deals with religious extremists. He stressed that even if political will could be found, the bureaucracy in the Religious Affairs, Education, and Defense Ministries remained dominated by Zia-ul-Haq appointees who favored the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious philosophies. This bureaucracy, Qasmi claimed, had repeatedly blocked his brother’s efforts to push policy in a different direction.
8. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly requested USG assistance for the southern and western Punjab, believing that an influx of western funds could counter the influence of Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics. Principal Officer was repeatedly reminded that these religious philosophies were alien to the southern and western Punjab — which is the spiritual heartland of South Asia’s Sufi communities. Their increasing prominence was directly attributed to poverty and external funding. Locals believed that socio-economic development programs, particularly in education, agriculture, and employment generation, would have a direct, long-term impact in minimizing receptivity to extremist movements. Similarly, they pressed for immediate relief efforts — particularly food distribution and income support — to address communities’ immediate needs. Several interlocutors also encouraged direct USG support to Brailvi/Sufi religious institutions, arguing that these represented the logical antithesis to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith philosophy and that if adequately funded, they could stem the tide of converts away from their moderate beliefs.
9. (S/NF) A jihadi recruiting network relying on Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious, charitable, and educational institutions is increasing its work in impoverished districts of southern and western Punjab. Local economic conditions coupled with foreign financing appear to be transforming a traditionally moderate area of the country into a fertile recruiting ground for terrorist organizations. The provincial and federal governments, while fully aware of the problem, appear to fear direct confrontation with these extremist groups. Local governments lack the resources and federal/provincial support to deal with these organizations on their own. The moderate Brailvi/Sufi community is internally divided into followers of competing spiritual leaders and lacks the financial resources to act as an effective counterweight to well-funded and well-organized extremists.
10. (S/NF) Post believes that this growing recruitment network poses a direct threat to USG counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts in Pakistan. Intervention at this stage in the southern and western Punjab could still be useful to counter the prevailing trends favoring extremist organizations. USAID development resources in agriculture, economic growth, education, and infrastructure development are useful and necessary and will address some of the immediate needs. In post’s view short-term, quick impact programs are required which focus on: (1) immediate relief in the form of food aid and microcredit, (2) cash for work and community-based, quick-impact infrastructure development programs focusing on irrigation systems, schools, and other critical infrastructure, and (3) strategic communication programs designed to educate on the dangers of the terrorist recruiting networks and to support counter-terrorist, counter-extremist messages. HUNT REFERENCE: 2008: Extremist recruitment on the rise in south Punjab madrassahs DAWN.COM | 22nd May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/22/2008-extremist-recruitment-on-the-rise-in-south-punjab-madrassahs/
Deobandi Fatwa against Dr Zakir Naik Jamia Binoria Pakistan of Mufti Naeem
Dr. Zakir Naik K Mutalik Dar ul Ulloom Deoband Ka Fatwa
1. (S) Summary: A well-placed Deobandi religious leader told Principal Officer in a meeting on March 18 that extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) was increasing its activities in the central Punjab city of Faisalabad, the province’s second largest, in collaboration with elements of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a splinter group from the banned terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). The cleric reported that SSP had recently launched a pamphlet campaign across the city in which it called for people to take steps to enforce Islamic law including: (1) cease business and social activities at the five daily calls to prayer, (2) remove all sources of “”vulgarity”" such as televisions, cd players, and radios from their homes, (3) seek dispute resolution through local imams rather than the courts, (4) take Friday rather than Sunday as the weekly holiday, and (4) strictly enforce purdah for female family members. The pamphlet states that it comes from SSP with support from the TTP and specifically praises “”the enforcement of Sharia in Swat”" and recommends it as a model for Faisalabad. According the religious scholar, a number of girls’ educational institutions in Faisalabad have received letters stating that if they fail to observe purdah, they could be attacked by suicide bombers. The cleric surmised that SSP activities would increase in Faisalabad on the return of its leader Maulana Ludhianvi from a Libyan-government sponsored trip to that country. End Summary.
2. (S) Leading Faisalabad-based Deobandi scholar and IVLP alumnus Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX called on the Principal Officer on March 18 to discuss his concerns regarding what he termed as “”growing extremist activity”" in Punjab’s second-largest city Faisalabad. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that in the last month he has observed a dramatic increase in propaganda activities from Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). He believed that this increase coincided with a number of visits to Faisalabad from activists both of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a splinter group from the southern Punjab-based Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). XXXXXXXXXXXX believed that the activists were involved in recruiting for TTP militant operations in the FATA and NWFP through madrassas in southern Punjab and hoped to replicate that success in Faisalabad. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that SSP leaders had long-standing ties with JeM, as both were Deobandi organizations that had collaborated in the past in anti-Shia and anti-India activities.
3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with Principal Officer an Urdu-language sticker that he claimed he had confiscated from several of his madrassa students in Faisalabad. The sticker, which he stated was also being printed and distributed as a pamphlet, praised the implementation of Sharia law in Swat and exhorted Muslims to pursue the same sort of Sharia law in Faisalabad. It then recounted five steps that every Faisalabad based Muslim should take to begin the process of implementation in the district. The steps were: : (1) cease business and social activities at the five daily calls to prayer, (2) remove all sources of “”vulgarity”" such as televisions, cd players, and radios from their homes, (3) seek dispute resolution through local imams rather than the courts, (4) take Friday rather than Sunday as the weekly holiday, and (4) strictly enforce purdah for female family members.
4. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX told Principal Officer that he had initially dismissed the pamphlet campaign, but became increasingly concerned after learning of specific threats received by several girls’ schools (NFI) in Faisalabad. He claimed that these schools had received letters sent from SSP, referencing the situation in Swat, and warning that if these schools did not begin having their students observe complete purdah, the schools could be the target of violence, including suicide bombing. Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX did not produce a copy of the threat letter. Principal Officer inquired whether any violence had yet occurred in Faisalabad in connection with the SSP campaign. Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX responded that to his knowledge it had not, but he believed that it could occur in short order if police did not check SSP activities.
5. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that in addition to its pamphlet campaign, SSP had organized a number of traditional religious conferences in Faisalabad during the Islamic month of Rabwa (currently ongoing). Traditionally such conferences are organized in this month of the Prophet’s birth to discuss the model life that the Prophet lead and to exhort Muslims to follow his example. According to Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX, this year during the SSP conferences, the organizers have exhorted attendees to follow the Prophet’s example and press for the adoption of complete shariah law in Faisalabad, using Swat as a model. These exhortations specifically call for action against vulgarity and women not observing purdah. In one case, Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that he learned that leaders of the recently banned al-Rashid Trust were coming to address a March 8 SSP conference. He stated that he had informed the District Police Officer, who cancelled the event.
6. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX shared that he had received reliable information that SSP leader Maulana Ludhianvi was on a fundraising trip to Tripoli sponsored by the Libyan government. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that Ludhianvi had made contact with Libyan officials in the guise of working against Iran and Shia agents in Pakistan. (Note: SSP was originally founded as a violent anti-Shia organization and has, in the past, received extensive foreign funding from a variety of Sunni states, including Saudi Arabia. End Note). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ludhianvi was scheduled to return to Pakistan in “”a few days”" and was bringing with him a “”donation”" from the Libyan government valued at nearly 25 million Pakistani rupees (approximately $312,000) that XXXXXXXXXXXX was certain would be used to increase further SSP activities.
7. (S) Comment: Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX is a long-standing contact of Consulate Lahore, who visited the United States in XXXXXXXXXXXX as part of our International Visitor Leadership Program. XXXXXXXXXXXX repeatedly credits his trip to the United States and particularly his discussions with Muslim leaders there for changing his previously anti-Western views. XXXXXXXXXXXX has numerous ties within the broader Deobandi community and is well-positioned to obtain information on activities of Deobandi-linked terrorist/extremist groups such as SSP and JeM. He has not/not previously shared such extensive information with post about these groups’ activities in Faisalabad. Post believes he has done so on this occasion largely out of concern for his and other moderate Deobandi leaders’ safety if these groups expand activities in Faislabad. The significant decline in the Pakistani textile industry and accompanying large-scale lay-offs in Faisalabad –the center of that industry in Punjab — provides groups like SSP with a ready pool of unemployed recruits, who are susceptible to these groups’ rhetoric about an Islamic utopia based on Sharia and prepared to engage in violence to bring it about. End Comment. HUNT “ REFERENCE: 2009: Was Qaddafi funding Sipahe Sahaba? 26th May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/26/2009-was-qaddafi-funding-sipahe-sahaba/
Jamat e Islami Sindh president-Asad ullah Bhutto Speech on Imam Khomeini (Part - 1)
KARACHI: A US official in a cable sent to the State Department stated that “financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith clerics in south Punjab from organisations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments.” The cable sent in November 2008 by Bryan Hunt, the then Principal Officer at the US Consulate in Lahore, was based on information from discussions with local government and non-governmental sources during his trips to the cities of Multan and Bahawalpur. Quoting local interlocutors, Hunt attempts to explain how the “sophisticated jihadi recruitment network” operated in a region dominated by the Barelvi sect, which, according to the cable, made south Punjab “traditionally hostile” to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith schools of thought. Hunt refers to a “network of Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith mosques and madrassahs” being strengthened through an influx of “charity” which originally reached organisations “such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Al-Khidmat foundation”. Portions of these funds would then be given away to clerics “in order to expand these sects’ presence” in a relatively inhospitable yet “potentially fruitful recruiting ground”.
Outlining the process of recruitment for militancy, the cable describes how “families with multiple children” and “severe financial difficulties” were generally being exploited for recruitment purposes. Families first approached by “ostensibly ‘charitable’” organisations would later be introduced to a “local Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith maulana” who would offer to educate the children at his madrassah and “find them employment in the service of Islam”. “Martyrdom” was also “often discussed”, with a final cash payment to the parents. “Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rs 500,000 (approximately USD 6,500) per son,” the cable states. Children recruited would be given age-specific indoctrination and would eventually be trained according to the madrassah teachers’ assessment of their inclination “to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture” versus their value as promoters of Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith sects or recruiters, the cable states. Recruits “chosen for jihad” would then be taken to “more sophisticated indoctrination camps”. “Locals identified three centres reportedly used for this purpose”. Two of the centres were stated to be in the Bahawalpur district, whereas one was reported as situated “on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city”. These centres “were primarily used for indoctrination”, after which “youths were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas”.
The cable goes on to quote local officials criticising the PML-N-led provincial and the PPP-led federal governments for their “failure to act” against “extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-i-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar”. The Bahawalpur district nazim at the time told Hunt that despite repeatedly highlighting the threat posed by extremist groups and indoctrination centres to the provincial and federal governments, he had received “no support” in dealing with the issue unless he was ready to change his political loyalties. The nazim, who at the time was with the PML-Q, “blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties…neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan People’s Party federal governments would take his requests seriously”. REFERENCE: Saudi Arabia, UAE financing extremism in south Punjab By Qurat ul ain Siddiqui 22nd May, 2011
Jamat e Islami Sindh president-Asad ullah Bhutto Speech on Imam Khomeini (Part - 2)
In a television programme aired recently, former chief of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and an important leader of Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) General (retd) Hamid Gul cast doubts over the authenticity of a picture run by the website of The Express Tribune. The picture in question was that of Malik Ishaq, commander of the banned outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), who was shown to be in attendance at the DPC meeting in Multan – a meeting also attended and addressed by General Gul. During a talk show on Aaj TV, host Wajahat S Khan showed Gul the picture on The Express Tribune’s website as evidence of Ishaq’s attendance – in response to which the retired general alleged that the photo had been doctored. When he was further challenged by the show’s host, Gul resorted to questioning the reporter of the story. The Express Tribune takes strong exception to General Gul’s allegations and contends that the picture is authentic. It was taken by our photographer, who was assigned to cover the gathering. In fact, the picture was also run by other newspapers. If Gul has the slightest doubt regarding the authenticity of the photograph, we ask him to take the matter to court. Express Media Group Published in The Express Tribune, February 16th, 2012. REFERENCE: Notice: A note to Hamid Gul Published: February 16, 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/337252/notice-a-note-to-hamid-gul/ Difa-e-Pakistan: Malik Ishaq out to 'defend' Pakistan http://tribune.com.pk/multimedia/slideshows/329282/
Malik Ishaq attended Multan rally: Jamaatud Dawa
LAHORE: Chief of banned militant outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Malik Ishaq was in attendance at the Difa-e-Pakistan Council rally in Multan, a spokesperson for the council’s member organisation Jamaatud Dawa has said. “General (retd) Hamid Gul was wrong in denying Ishaq’s presence at the rally. He was present on stage,” said Yahya Mujahid, a spokesperson for Islamic chairty, which is blacklisted by the United Nations for its alleged ties to LeJ but not by the Pakistan government. Gul, in an interview with Express News television channel, had categorically denied that Ishaq was present at the rally. “It was DPC’s unanimous decision that Ishaq will not address the rally,” Mujahid told The Express Tribune on Friday. “It’s a simple rule that whoever addresses the people from stage at a DPC rally cannot be a member of a banned militant outfit.” Mujahid was attending an emergency protest, called by the JuD outside their main mosque Jamia Qudsia in Lahore under the DPC’s banner, against resumption of Nato supply routes and trade talks with India. The council has also called a meeting of heads of member parties on February 19 in Islamabad.
Apology to media
He also apologised for statements made against the media at the council’s Karachi rally. “The statements should be condemned in the strongest terms. I, as a representative of JuD, have written letters of apology to media organisations.”
The spokesperson said that the DPC is an organised platform. “Funding [for the organisation] is provided by member parties while host parties for different rallies fund events in their own cities,” he explained. For instance, he said, JuD hosted the Lahore rally, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat organised the one in Multan, Sheikh Rasheed hosted the Rawalpindi event and Jamat-e-Islami hosted the Karachi rally. “The nationwide networks of all member parties provide support in organisational procedures.”
In defence of Hafiz Saeed
Amir Hamza, a senior leader of the JuD, said that the reason the US is against JuD chief Hafiz Saeed is because he speaks out about human rights violations by US allied forces in the region. He also blamed former president Pervez Musharraf for joining hands with the US in the ‘war on terror’ and the Balochistan crisis. CORRECTION: Former president Pervez Musharraf’s name was erroneously written as Pervez Sharif. The error is regretted. REFERENCE: Malik Ishaq attended Multan rally: Jamaatud Dawa By Rabia Mehmood Published: February 17, 2012 http://tribune.com.pk/story/337998/malik-ishaq-attended-multan-rally-jamaatud-dawa/