Najam Sethi on Siachen, Kargil & Kashmir.

The Maharaja of Kashmir’s letter to the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, on October 26, 1947 and the Governor-General’s letter in reply dated October 27, 1947. - 26th October 1947

My Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have to inform your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request immediate assistance of your Government. As your Excellency is aware the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to either the Dominion of India or to Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous to both the Dominions. It has vital economic and cultural links with both of them. Besides my State has a common boundary with the Soviet Republic and China. In their external relations the Dominion of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact. I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede, whether it is not in the best interest of both the Dominions and my State to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with both. I accordingly approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into a standstill agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this is view of the developments indicated below. In fact the Pakistan Government under the standstill agreement are operating Post and Telegraph system inside the State. Though we have got a standstill agreement with the Pakistan Government, that Government permitted steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like good, salt and petrol to my State. Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes, with modern weapons, have been allowed to infilter into the State at first in Poonch area, then in Sialkot and finally in mass in the area adjoining Hazara district on the Ramkote side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at several points simultaneously that is has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and looting. The Mahoora Power House which supplies the electric current to the whole of Srinagar has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the Summer Capital of my Government, as a first step to over running the whole State.

The mass infiltration of tribesmen drawn from the distant areas of the NWF Province coming regularly in Motor Trucks using Mansehra-Muzaffarbad road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provincial Government of the NWF Province and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of repeated appeals made by my Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or stop them from coming to my State. In fact both the Pakistan Radio and Press have reported these occurrences. The Pakistan Radio even put out a story that a Provincial Government has been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State both the Muslims and non-Muslims generally have taken no part at all. With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to freebooters. On this basis no civilised government can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will never allow to happen so long as I am the Ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country. I may also inform Your Excellency’s Government that it is my intention at once to set up an Interim Government and ask Sheikh Abdulla to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister. If my State has to be saved immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. Mr. Menon is fully aware of the situation and he will explain to you if further explanation is needed.

In haste and with kindest regards.

Hari Singh

Reply from Governor-General, India, Delhi,

dated October 27, 1947

My Dear Maharaja Sahib,

Your Highness’s letter, dated the 26th October has been delivered to me by Mr. V.P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people. Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness’s appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people. My Government and I note with satisfaction that your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdulla to form an Interim Government to work with your Prime Minister. [. . .] Mountbatten of Burma. REFERENCE: Excerpted with permission from Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir (HISTORY/POLITICS) By A.G. Noorani Oxford University Press, Karachi EXCERPT: State of affairs 25th March, 2012 http://dawn.com/2012/03/25/excerpt-state-of-affairs/

Hindustan Times Jammu & Kashmir Problem Oct 28, 1947

ISLAMABAD, Sept 5: Air Marshal (retired) Nur Khan, the man who led the airforce achieve complete superiority over the three times bigger Indian airforce on the very first day of the 1965 war, had all but resigned the post the very day that he took command of Pakistan Air Force on July 23, 1965. “Rumours about an impending operation were rife but the army had not shared the plans with other forces,” Air Marshal Nur Khan said. Sharing his memoirs with Dawn on the 40th anniversary of 1965 war, Air Marshal Khan said that he was the most disturbed man on the day, instead of feeling proud. Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan while handing over the command to Nur Khan had not briefed him about any impending war because he was not aware of it himself. So, in order to double check, Nur Khan called on the then Commander-in-Chief, General Musa Khan. Under his searching questions Gen Musa wilted and with a sheepish smile admitted that something was afoot. Nur Khan’s immediate reaction was that this would mean war. But, Gen Musa said you need not to worry as according to him Indians would not retaliate. Then he directed a still highly skeptical Nur Khan to Lt-Gen Akhtar Hasan Malik, GOC Kashmir, the man in-charge of “Operation Gibraltar” for further details. The long and short of his discussion with Gen Malik was, “don’t worry, because the plan to send in some 800,000 infiltrators inside the occupied territory to throw out the Indian troops with the help of the local population”, was so designed that the Indians would not be able retaliate and therefore the airforce need not get into war-time mode. A still incredulous Nur Khan was shocked when on further inquiry he found that except for a small coterie of top generals, very few in the armed forces knew about “Operation Gibraltar”. He asked himself how good, intelligent and professional people like Musa and Malik could be so naive, so irresponsible. For the air marshal, it was unbelievable. Even the then Lahore garrison commander had not been taken into confidence. And Governor of West Pakistan, Malik Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh did not know what was afoot and had gone to Murree for vacations. REFERENCE: Nur Khan reminisces ’65 war By Our Special Correspondent September 6, 2005 Tuesday Shaban 01, 1426 http://archives.dawn.com/2005/09/06/nat2.htm

Najam Sethi on Siachen, Kargil & Kashmir - 1 (Aapas Ki Baat - 16/4/12)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQI8io4sIPE

They demand Azadi but it is a concept, which has not been choreographed — Brigadier Arjun Ray - The same malaise of ambiguity, which affects all other areas of national life, also affects the Kashmir policy of Pakistan. A former army chief sees the Kashmir issue being historically linked to Chechnya, Palestine and Afghanistan. He calls this a ‘wave of Islamic revival’ and ‘core of the global resistance’. In the same article, he then takes the position that Kashmir issue ‘demands a different approach to solve it with means, other than force of arms’.38 General (r) K. M. Arif is now suggesting that ‘it is a folly to use military means for settling political disputes’.39 A retired Lt. Colonel sees the solution of Kashmir problem in ‘physical and financial thrashing to India as a consequence of Kargil operation and not the Indian ploy of Lahore Declaration’.40

1965 war between India and Pakistan was a direct result of the Operation Gibraltar. How Pakistani military leadership reached that decision? There was a general consensus among officers’ corps that they have missed a golden opportunity to settle Kashmir issue in 1962, when India was involved in a border dispute with China. Regarding India, they thought that it had not yet achieved the indigenous arm manufacturing capacity and in near future with rapid expansion of its armed forces, the military option will be impossible. The general despise of Hindus and doubting their capacity of able to give a good fight was almost universal. General Ayub Khan in his letter to C-in-C General Muhammad Musa stated, “as a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows delivered at the right time and place. Such opportunities should, therefore, be sought and exploited”.41 Ayub Khan was of the view that Indian army had expanded too rapidly and lacked disciplined leadership.42 The limited clash of Indian and Pakistani forces in April 1965 at Runn of Kutch was blown out of proportion by Pakistani leadership. Rather than analyzing the situation professionally, they became victim of their own propaganda of invincibility. On international front, they perceived that US may not like the action but in view of its involvement in Vietnam, it will not be a position to influence the situation much. In April 1965, Ayub Khan had visited Moscow where he was warmly welcomed. From this reception they wrongly concluded that in any encounter with India, Soviet Union will remain neutral and will not support India. In 1965, on his visit to Pakistan, Chou-en-Lai gave a statement of support for the Muslim Liberation Front of Kashmir. This was somehow seen as a proof that China will support Pakistan’s adventure. In this background, what was the defence establishment’s planning? The senior military leadership was seriously divided. General Headquarters (GHQ) opposed the operation as it had rightly concluded that it will result in war with India for which Pakistan was not prepared. Chief of General Staff (CGS), Major General Sher Bahadur viewed this operation as ‘a bastard child born of the liaison between foreign office and HQ 12 Division’.43 It was this lack of strategy for consideration of all possible scenarios at highest level in defence establishment which did not yield the desired results. In a military organization, surely some will differ with the plan but once a decision is made by the high command, there are only two choices for an upright and professional soldier. If he sees the operation seriously flawed with extreme danger for national security, he informs his superiors about his reservations and then resigns. If he does not agree with the plan completely but decides to go along then it is his duty to give his best efforts to make the operation successful. Those who disagreed simply let the events happen and did not vigorously helped to tie up the loose ends. When the plan did not yield the desired results, they conveniently joined the group of ‘see I told you’. ‘The near successful initial Pakistani military thrust into the Chamb-Jurian sector of Jammu nearly decapitated Kashmir from the rest of India. It was only Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri’s decision to internationalize the war across the boundaries of Indian and Pakistani Punjab, and Rajasthan and Sindh, that prevented what appeared to be the Indian loss of Kashmir’.44 The most tragic effect of 1965 war was not military but political which military mind was unable to comprehend. The remarks of an East Pakistani summarize the feelings of Bengalis about 1965 war, “while the West Pakistan was using its American tanks and American planes to fight India for the precious five million Kashmiris, 65 million Bengalis were left to fight with their bare hands if the Indians had attacked us”.45

In late 80s, Pakistan policy about Kashmir saw a new direction. The cornerstone of this policy was that ‘Pakistan could only protect itself from India by encouraging its dissolution’.46 This change was brought due to the heavy influence of the intelligence community of the armed forces. ISI was the main architect of the policy. They were flushed with their recent victory in Afghanistan. Surely, a large number of mid-level officers performed their task in Afghanistan professionally and efficiently which was one of the factors of Soviet withdrawal. They argued that if a superpower can be defeated by guerrillas and then why not India? They didn’t fully evaluated Afghan experience and didn’t learn the lessons of Afghanistan. This lack of detailed analysis resulted in replication of Afghan experience in Kashmir with significant negative fall out both for Kashmir struggle and Pakistan itself. The strategy was two pronged. ‘One, it sought to maximize the cost of occupation for the Indian army in Kashmir and, in the process, bleed it white. Two, it thought it could keep the cost of its own offensive to pittance by sending religiously swayed armed volunteers across the Line of Control’.47 This ‘privatization of Jehad’ would be the blunder which would come back to haunt them a decade later. Majority of Kashmiri population of Indian Controlled Kashmir (ICK) is thoroughly alienated from India. For Pakistani policy makers, this fact of hatred of India was enough proof that Kashmiris want merger with Pakistan. They failed to critically analyze the society in ICK.

In the early part of the struggle, Pakistan was careful and only Kashmiris from both sides of the LoC were involved in operations and logistics. They drew wrong conclusions from earlier success stories not fully analyzing the ground situation. In early nineties, the policy-makers also failed to analyze the situation in Kashmir comprehensively. The initial success of the armed rebellion was perceived as the inferiority of Indian Armed Forces. They failed to take the account of the fact that initially, it was the Kashmir state police and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), which were responsible for security of the state. These two organizations were poorly armed, corrupt, and inefficient and had no clue about the counter insurgency operations. They were armed with old rifles and their only experience had been dispersing unruly unarmed mobs for the control of law and order. Later, Border Security Force (BSF) became increasingly involved in operations. In addition, another critical factor was ignored. There was a general political chaos in India and the state of Kashmir and constant bickering among various political parties prevented a coordinated and effective response from the Indian government. Once Indian army was given the task with full authority, the situation began to change. Lt. General Muhammad Ahmad Zaki, Corps Commander of 15th Corps stationed in Srinagar was a decisive factor in reasserting the state authority in Indian Controlled Kashmir (ICK).48 This re-assertion of Indian state came with a heavy price tag as violence against civilians reached an unprecedented level having long-term effects on Kashmiri society.

When dealing with Kashmir struggle, ISI fell back on their only recent experience of Afghanistan. Initially, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) under Amanullah Khan was favoured. JKLF had a strong popular support in Srinagar area and it was the only group, which deliberately made the decision of armed struggle. The major drawback was that they were pro-independence. Despite their pro-independence stance, Pakistan went along with JKLF as it was the only organized group who could start the armed struggle. In less than three years, Pakistan organized groups, which openly opted the policy of accession to Pakistan. A dejected Amanullah complained that he was disillusioned with Pakistani government because it first supported his organization and then raised other militant organizations to counter it physically and ideologically.49 Pakistan took a page from the recent experience of Afghanistan covert operations without bothering to make necessary changes, which will suit the Kashmir situation. Every guerrilla group have to maintain a office in Muzaffarabad to be eligible for money and weapons from ISI. ISI also tried to arrange a forced marriage of various groups, each one with a total different vision about Kashmir. A political umbrella organization called Tehreek-e-Hurriyat-e-Kashmir (This included both secular and religious groups and included Jamaat-e-Islami, People’s League, Muslim League, Muslim Conference, Jamiat-e-Ahle-Hadith) and a military umbrella organization called Muttahida Jihad Council (Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Al Jihad — groups which advocated Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan were included in this organization) were hastily set up. As one ISI operative put it that ‘the indigenous Kashmiri leadership had no choice but to eat out of ISI’s hand’.50 Surely, the introduction of battle-hardened and ideologically motivated ‘guest’ Mujahideen and improved quality of operations inside ICK due to well trained guerrillas and improved quality of weapons and communications (Initially AK-47, pistols and other small arms were used but later machine guns, advanced sniper rifles, rocket propelled grenades, launchers and sophisticated communication systems with frequency hopping and digital burst were gradually introduced) took a great toll on Indian armed forces. By 1998-99, Pakistan finally realized that their expectation of India disintegrating with Kashmir guerrilla warfare was not realistic. They now forwarded another theory. Some senior officers were now of the view that, “As long as India is busy in Kashmir, it cannot have a 3:1 ratio which is needed for any aggressive force. This situation should continue until there is a resolution of the Kashmir issue. We will have to pay a price, but then, there is no other way out of it”.51 Pakistani policy-makers have run out of new ideas and found themselves in a dead end.

Failure to recognize changing ground realities and taking appropriate steps forced Pakistan to use ‘foreign’ or ‘guest’ guerrillas especially in 1992-93 to give a boost to the morale of the fighters. Surely, they were very effective and conducted some daredevil operations and inflicted significant casualties on Indian forces but it further complicated the situation. Not only Pakistanis but also Afghans, Saudis, Sudanese and Yemenis ended up in ICK. Pakistani and other foreign volunteers fighting in Kashmir followed the Afghan model and ‘became a destabilizing force, rather than melding with the indigenous resistance into a force of cohesion’.52 While Pakistan made a deliberate operational decision, the guerrilla groups started to play this factor to media. In interviews published in newspapers in ICK, one fighter Ibn-e-Masud of Sudan boasted that about 6,000 foreign Mujahideen were preparing to enter the valley. Similarly, when four ‘guest’ Mujahideen (Abu Khalid, Abu Muhammad Sharif, Malik Ali and Abu Muhammad) died in an encounter, Al Barq ran an advertisement in Srinagar Times, to show efficiency of foreign fighters, stated that the four fighters had wiped out an entire platoon of Indian army.53 In Pakistan, the publications of various guerrilla groups flashed the success of Pakistani and other foreign fighters. In their euphoria, the guerrillas gave India an excellent opportunity in a changed world to prove to the world that insurgency inside ICK was foreign instigated. Diplomatically, Pakistan repeatedly found itself in an embarrassing position and its official stance of ‘only moral and diplomatic’ support to Kashmir cause became a laughing matter even among its allies. In 2002, General Musharraf would regretfully state that, “the objectives of various Jehadi outfits are individually selfish rather than for the community good, they grandstand for primetime TV”.54 Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan now is of the view that presence of foreign militants in Kashmir is detrimental to Kashmir struggle.55

In 2000, in changed international situation and almost total isolation of the military regime forced it to re-think its Kashmir policy. The government tried to control a complex situation without alienating guerrillas. While decreasing its support to guerrillas, it appealed to international community to help resolve the issue. A former DG ISI embarked on nuclear scare factor. Instead of forwarding a rational plan, he stated, “USA, G-8 and the rest must act, and act quickly, before it is too late, if they want to save the billion plus of South Asia and the rest of the world from a nuclear holocaust”.56 Such rhetoric had opposite effect. In a changed international environment of post-September 11 world, going became tough for Pakistan despite its cooperation with US in Afghanistan. Pakistan have to shut down many offices of guerrilla groups. The leaders of two most active groups (Maulana Masud Azhar of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Hafiz Muhammad Saeed of Lashkar-e-Taiba) were detained while Maulana Fazlur Rahman of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Bakht Zamin of Al Badr went underground. In April-May 2002, India decided to climb up the escalation ladder. The alarmed international community put all its weight on Pakistan forcing General Musharraf to almost completely halt passage of guerrillas from Pakistani Controlled Kashmir (PCK) to ICK. A senior member of a militant group confirmed that, ‘Pakistan has told us to suspend our activities’ and another leader admitted that Pakistan army was turning militants back from control line.57 It is too early to predict the outcome of such efforts. One of the senior members of a militant organization said, “We feel very betrayed”.58 An educated young Pakistani who had gone through the guerrilla training stated that Pakistan army had used us and now dumping us under international pressure. He stated that we were used as cheap and dispensable commodity. If one Pakistani soldier dies in combat, government have to pay the pension to the family. On the other hand hundreds of us can die and they don’t have to worry.59 This also illustrates the failed methodology of Afghan adventure. In Afghanistan, Pakistan also used different leaders and groups to forward their agenda and when they were unable to deliver they were dumped unceremoniously. In case of Afghanistan, this exercise has earned Pakistan almost universal hostility from each group. The so-called masters of covert operations fail to recognize one simple fact that human beings are not robots which can be switched on and off according to wishes of anybody. (Every country has learned this painful lesson — when pawns become strong enough they refuse to go back into the box. There are several examples of that, Israel in case of Hamas, India in case of Jarnel Singh Bhindrawale and US in case of radical Islamists). The question is not whether intensification of armed struggle was right or wrong decision, the most important thing is the methodology of planning and execution of an agreed policy. It is the haphazard and ad hoc nature of some serious ventures, which had long-term effects on country’s security, which need to be studied dispassionately.

The military mind acting on its own ideas with no input from any other segment of the society has natural limitations. They cannot comprehend the complex nature of the world they are living in. They are unable to calculate the cost of Pakistan’s military adventurism in Kashmir. The issue of denial of Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir is a tricky one. When things are so obvious and both domestic and international media has ample proof of that, no diplomat can defend this policy. When certain policies cannot be effectively kept secret, then it is imperative to think of a strategy of how to present the case to domestic and international audience. One can use the argument that Kashmir is a disputed territory and LoC is not an international boundary, therefore, Pakistan is not obliged according to international laws to give same status to LoC as of a recognized international boundary between two sovereign countries. Regardless of any country’s position on Kashmir issue, one thing is sure, outside world is not blind. Key policy- makers and academics have repeatedly ‘express disgust over Pakistan’s assumption that no one knows the reality’.60 Some Pakistani defence commentators then lament that the foreign office ‘seem to have been caught unprepared to deal with world opinion in understanding our point of view’.61 Regarding the role of Pakistani troops across LoC during Kargil crisis, one retired Vice Admiral stated, “The sad part is, that practically the whole of the Pakistani intelligentsia fell prey to this Indian propaganda of infiltration by Pakistanis across the LoC just because a superpower found it convenient to support the Indian canard for good reasons of its own”.62 Even a common man on the street in Pakistan was aware of the fact that Pakistan is directly involved in the affair. As one commentator has put it rightly that all government official media is still busy in an exercise, which is nothing but ‘a desperate attempt to justify failed policies’. He also correctly points that ‘in such circumstances it is futile, rather counter-productive to send delegations to convey the same old message’.63

India tried to get advantage of the changed international scene and after the initial operations in Afghanistan quite down, it decided to climb one step up on escalation ladder. In early 2002, India started to mobilize troops along international border. An astute Pakistani defence analyst correctly pointed in early March 2002 about the stand off between India and Pakistan. She pointed that, ‘through a combination of actual military mobilization, diplomatic and psychological manoeuvres, New Delhi could force Islamabad to change its policy regarding the militants that would ultimately have an effect on the struggle in Kashmir’.64 This is what actually happened in June 2002, when Pakistan effectively curtailed the movement of armed guerrillas across the line of control to ICK. In contrast to that, a former army chief is of the view that, “The implicit irony is in the fact that Vajpayee’s brinkmanship has bestowed upon Pakistan, phenomenal advantages confidence and strength”. This he attributes to the assertion of ‘Divine Will’.65 Pakistani policy makers have yet to catch up on the rapidly changing situation in Kashmir. India is banking on the idea that once the flow of guerrillas is markedly decreased, it can effectively wipe out the remaining guerrillas inside Kashmir (India is confidant of its previous experience in Mezoram, Nagaland and Punjab). This stick of overwhelming force will be matched by the carrot of opening dialogue with the Kashmiris, elections and an economic package. The problem for India is that Kashmir has undergone a radical change. It is not possible to go back to the status quo of pre-1989 Kashmir. The situation is very complex and will need significant concessions from India. Pakistan’s sudden reversal of stance about armed struggle under duress is seen as a signal by Kashmiri political leadership to assert their control. In ICK, there has been a flurry of diplomatic activity by different countries. (Former Swedish ambassador Kasu Inglap, First Secretary of French embassy and three US diplomats have met several Kashmiri leaders including Shabbir Ahmad Shah (Chief of Democratic Freedom Party) and Abdul Ghani Bhat (Chairman of Hurriyat).66 Shabir has also held discussions with A. S. Dulat, officer on special duty in Prime Minister Office and also met delegates of European Union in New Delhi.67 The most significant change which has gone unnoticed in Pakistan is assertion of Kashmiri leadership that Kashmiris being the primary party have to be included in any dialogue process. This means that the role of Pakistan will be significantly decreased. In an unprecedented move, Hurriyet has asked Indian government to allow them to go to PCK to ask militants to agree to a ceasefire. REFERENCE: Martial Mind Pakistan Officer Corps thought-process about Defence Columnist Hamid Hussain explores the Pakistan military mind-set. http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/july/martial.htm

Najam Sethi on Siachen, Kargil & Kashmir - 2 (Aapas Ki Baat - 16/4/12)

When Zia assumed power in mid-1977, Pakistan was out of the limelight and indeed was considered by some observers to be a political backwater. By the time of Zia's death in 1988, it had, because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, become an important actor occupying a central position in the world arena. Although Zulifqar Ali Bhutto had tried to redirect Pakistan's regional orientation toward West Asia and Zia continued this trend, the nation's geostrategic interests dictated a concentration on South Asia. Pakistan's foreign policy was very much centered on India. Less than two years after Zia's assumption of power, Congress, led by Indira Gandhi, was voted out of office and replaced by the Janata Party, whose foreign minister was Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Jana Sangh, long seen as anti-Pakistan. Nonetheless, relations between Pakistan and India may have reached their most cordial level during the almost three years Janata was in power. Vajpayee visited Pakistan in February 1978. There were exchanges on many issues, and agreements were signed on trade, cultural exchanges, and communications-but not on such key issues as Kashmir and nuclear development. The nuclear issue was of critical importance to both Pakistan and India. In 1974 India successfully tested a nuclear device. Bhutto reacted strongly to this test and said Pakistan must develop its own Islamic bomb. Zia thus inherited a pledge that for domestic reasons he could not discard, and he continued the development program. He asked India to agree to several steps to end this potential nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. One of these measures was the simultaneous signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The second step was a joint agreement for inspection of all nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan also proposed a pact between the two countries to allow for mutual inspection of sites. And, finally, Pakistan proposed a South Asian nuclear-free zone. It appeared that Zia was looking for a way to terminate the costly Pakistani program. But in order to sell this idea in Pakistan, he required some concessions from India. Termination would also get him out of difficulties the program was causing with the United States, including the curtailment of aid in 1979. These proposals were still on the table in the early 1990s, and were supplemented by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's call for a roundtable discussion among Pakistan, India, the United States, Russia, and China on nuclear weapons in South Asia. Not all relations within South Asia were negative. President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh proposed an organization for South Asian cooperation. Pakistan was at first reluctant, fearing Indian domination, but eventually agreed to join the group, along with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formally inaugurated at a summit meeting in Dhaka in 1985. There have been some positive steps toward cooperation, and regular rotating summits are held, although often with some delays.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India (1984-89) came to Islamabad in 1988 to attend a SAARC summit, the first visit of an Indian prime minister since 1960, when Nehru visited to sign the Indus Waters Treaty. Zia stopped briefly in New Delhi in December 1985 and in February 1987 visited again, having invited himself to see a cricket match between the two countries. Zia's estimation was that he and Rajiv could meet quite cordially but could not agree on substantive issues. Active and potential conflict continued to be a constant factor in Pakistan's relations with India. The dispute over the precise demarcation of the Line of Control in Kashmir at the Siachen Glacier heated up periodically and over time caused substantial casualties on both sides because of numerous small skirmishes and the extreme cold in the remote area. Also, in the 1986-87 winter the Indian army conducted Operation Brass Tacks, maneuvers close to the Pakistan border, and Pakistan mobilized its forces. However, the dangerous situation was defused, and no hostilities took place. India accused Pakistan of aiding Sikh insurgents in India's state of Punjab. Pakistan denied this accusation, but some people thought that Operation Brass Tacks might have been a means to strike at alleged bases in Pakistan's Punjab Province. Zia skillfully handled the diplomacy during the period of tension.

Zia continued the process, begun by Bhutto, of opening Pakistan to the West and drew on Pakistan's Islamic, trade, and military ties to the Middle East. Military ties included stationing Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia and training missions in several other countries. Remittances from Pakistanis employed as migrant workers in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf area, increased during the Zia years and became an important factor in Pakistan's foreign-exchange holdings. Zia played a prominent role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). A Pakistani was secretary general of the OIC, and Zia served on committees concerning the status of Jerusalem and the settlement of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), neither of which were successful. At the 1984 summit at Casablanca, he played a key role in the readmission of Egypt to the OIC and, in doing so, reminded his fellow heads of government that the organization was one for the entire Muslim community and not only for Arab states. The United States under the administration of Jimmy Carter did not welcome the displacement of Bhutto by Zia; representative government, human rights, and nuclear nonproliferation were also of concern to Carter. The execution of Bhutto only added to the United States displeasure with Zia and Pakistan. In March 1979, Pakistan-and Iran-terminated their membership in CENTO. A number of United States laws, amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, applied to Pakistan and its program of nuclear weapons development. The 1976 Symington Amendment stipulated that economic assistance be terminated to any country that imported uranium enrichment technology. The Glenn Amendment of 1977 similarly called for an end to aid to countries that imported reprocessing technology-Pakistan had from France. United States economic assistance, except for food aid, was terminated under the Symington Amendment in April 1979. In 1985 the Solarz Amendment was added to prohibit aid to countries that attempt to import nuclear commodities from the United States. In the same year, the Pressler Amendment was passed; referring specifically to Pakistan, it said that if that nation possessed a nuclear device, aid would be suspended. Many of these amendments could be waived if the president declared that it was in the national interests of the United States to continue assistance. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, causing a sudden reversal of United States policy. Carter, who had described Pakistan as a frontline state in the Cold War, offered US$400 million in military and economic aid to Pakistan- an amount that Zia spurned and contemptuously termed peanuts. When the Ronald Reagan administration took office in January 1981, the level of assistance increased substantially. Presidential waivers for several of the amendments were required. The initial package from the United States was for US$3.2 billion over six years, equally divided between economic and military assistance. A separate arrangement was made for the purchase of forty F-16 fighter aircraft. In 1986 a follow-on program of assistance over a further period of six years was announced at a total of more than US$4 billion, of which 57 percent was economic aid and the rest military aid.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, under its new leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, was reassessing its role in Afghanistan. Indirect proximity negotiations in Geneva under the auspices of the UN were going on between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the United States and the Soviet Union as observers. In April 1988, a series of agreements were signed among the United States, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, and Afghanistan that called for the withdrawal of Soviet forces by mid-February 1989. The withdrawal was completed on time. Throughout the years of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, relations between the United States and Pakistan were best characterized by close cooperation. Still, United States policy makers became increasingly concerned that Zia and his associates- -most notably, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, then head of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence-appeared to give preferential treatment to the Islamic fundamentalists, especially mujahidin leader Gulbaddin Hikmatyar. Other disagreements persisted, particularly over the failure of the Zia regime to convert to representative government. Documented Pakistani violations of human rights were another major issue; Pakistani involvement in narcotics trafficking was yet another. But the issue that after Zia's death led to another cutoff of aid was Pakistan's persistent drive toward nuclear development. The event of the Zia period brought Pakistan to a leading position in world affairs. However, Pakistan's new visibility was closely connected to the supportive role it played for the anti Soviet mujahidin in Afghanistan-and this deceased when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. In the 1990s, Pakistan faced some major domestic problems-mounting ethnic and sectarian strife as well as widespread civil disorder. Pakistan will need to address these problems as it strives to improve its international standing as a maturing democratic nation and one aspiring to be the industrial and technological leader of the Muslim world. REFERENCE: PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD DURING THE ZIA REGIME In a report prepared for the US library of congress, an overview is taken about Pakistan vis-a-vis the world during the period 1977-1988 http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/july/martial.htm

Najam Sethi on Siachen, Kargil & Kashmir - 3 (Aapas Ki Baat - 16/4/12)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0psqa2QNCk

Kargil: The decision of Pakistan in Spring of 1999 to occupy the positions on hills in Kargil area has resulted in a confusing intense debate both about the nature of the operation and its outcome. Lets briefly review what was the thought-process of the officer corps about the operation. A former army chief during the Kargil crisis was of the view that, “India could never venture a war with Pakistan with more than half of its ground forces committed in Kashmir, and if it did, it would do so at its own peril, and Kashmir could be liberated earlier than one could anticipate’.68 A defence commentator stated, ‘In all our history there will not be more golden opportunity than at present time to settle the Kashmir issue once and for all”.69 Some were of the opinion that ‘about 75,000-100,000 well trained battle hardened volunteer Afghan Mujahideen are only a day or two’s drive away from the LoC’.70 while others dwelled on dangerous ideas that, “India knows it well, that in case of an all out war, China, Afghanistan and Iran, will support Pakistan meaningfully and particularly Afghanistan who may be directly involved in Pakistan’s war against India”.71 He confidently announced that, “They have occupied Kargil, Daras and batalik heights. Tomorrow they shall move forward to hold Zojilla pass, and Srinagar, and force India to negotiate peace”.72 In the first few weeks Pakistan was euphoric about mounting Indian casualties. Pakistani leadership saw the initial Indian offer of safe passage to guerrillas as a sign of weakness and refused. One defence commentator saw this as a panic reaction and claimed that ‘considerable military, diplomatic, political and psychological damage has already been inflicted on Delhi’.73 A former Vice Admiral saw, “Indian military actions were replete with signs of panic”.74 A former army chief was re-assuring the apprehensive nation that, “Between China and Pakistan there exists strategic consensus on issues having bearing on peace and stability of the region, Pakistan, therefore, is not isolated and vulnerable”.75 The real situation on ground was that when Nawaz Sharif dashed to China, Chinese in their usual polite and non-belligerent manners plainly told him to ‘cool down’ the temperature which essentially meant that back off from Kargil. In June 1999, when India decided to climb up the escalation ladder, it shocked Pakistani policy-makers. Pakistani high command had exaggerated the nuclear deterrent factor. They never anticipated such a forceful reaction from India especially use of air force. ‘The military hierarchy was confident that unlike what had happened in 1965, India would not go to war this time as it was heavily committed in Kashmir and in other areas, where a large number of troops were engaged in putting down secessionist movements’.76 A Wing Commander aware of the dangers commented, “A point to be highlighted is the unprecedented Indian action of using air-power to bomb out Kashmiri insurgents that is the cause of present escalation, this campaign must stop as a first step towards de-escalation tensions”.77 Prime Minister Sharif telephoned Vajpayee and told him that, ‘Sending planes will only make matters worse’.78 Off course, Vajpayee was not going to take the advice of his adversary.

A Lt. General while commenting on Kargil retreat gave extreme rhetorical statement stating that, “India was considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the heights of Kargil to offset the Mujahideen’s tactical superiority... It was Pakistan’s initiative to start dialogue to de-escalate the Kargil situation by sending the Foreign Minister Mr. Sartaj Aziz to Delhi”.79 To date, there has been no evidence that in that limited operation, India had any thought of use of nuclear weapons. Despite immense pressure from the military hierarchy, Indian political leadership plainly told the military leaders that LoC should not be crossed. They were not evaluating only the military situation but keeping view of the overall scenario. Despite initial shock and significant casualties, India recovered from the fumble quickly and went on a multi-faceted response. Military operations were on the Indian side of LoC, therefore India could raise the heat by using artillery and air force. On the other hand, by not crossing the LoC, India got the credit from international community of a responsible party, which was showing restraint. Under immense international pressure, when Pakistan had to pull back, the mood went from euphoric to depressive. How was retreat assessed? Same ambiguity and confusion was written everywhere. A former army chief while commenting on Kargil withdrawal stated, “Withdrawal, however was imposed on the Kashmiri Mujahideen, through the 4th July 1999 Washington Declaration, and Pakistan was overawed by the diplomatic pressures to manage a victory for India, which otherwise was not possible militarily”.80 A former Vice Admiral saw it as, ‘part of the overall strategy of the Indian government to frighten the world into forcing Pakistan to do, what all of India’s military might could not have achieved in the time frame available” and ‘The best solution for India, therefore, was to use USA and the rest of the world to do for India what its Armed Forces were unable to do i.e. force out the Mujahideen in time to relieve the Indian troops caught in the Sack’.81 One retired Colonel while commenting on Kargil retreat states that, “It can be said that India compelled Pakistan’s political leadership appeal to Mujahideens, because of India’s media victory and Pakistan’s media defeat”.82 A defence analyst is of the view that, “India was able to turn a military defeat into a diplomatic victory” and ‘Pakistan was unable to translate a tremendous military success into a politico-diplomatic victory’. She also states that the reason United States got involved was because ‘it saw success for Pakistan and sidelining of the Americans’.83 A former Lt. Colonel considers Kargil as a victory for Pakistan because ‘The explosive nature of Kashmir problem has been highlighted internationally in an unprecedented manner’ and in future ‘inflated defence will have devastating fall out on Indian economy’.84 A retired Lt. General also is of opinion that ‘The Mujahideen explosion in Kargil certainly brought the problem of Kashmir to the world’s attention’.85

There was almost a general consensus among most senior officers that Pakistan was close to a complete military victory against India in Kashmir during Kargil adventure. This was partly due to the unavailability of any information about the operation and self-exaggerated opinion of self. Some were of the view (highly exaggerated and misleading) that within six weeks, about three divisions of Indian army will either surrender or abandon the territory up to Siachin glacier. After the nuclear detonation in 1998, a new wave of thinking quickly swept the defence establishment without any serious study or debate. Everybody mistakenly convinced themselves that a conventional war was out of question due to the nuclear factor. On psychological level, this was the single most important factor, which resulted in the Pakistani decision of embarking on raising the entente at Kargil in 1999. The clandestine nature of the whole exercise and complete silence afterwards had caused significant disturbance in armed forces and have left the whole nation bewildered. REFERENCE: Martial Mind Pakistan Officer Corps thought-process about Defence Columnist Hamid Hussain explores the Pakistan military mind-set. http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/july/martial.htm

Najam Sethi on Siachen, Kargil & Kashmir - 4 (Aapas Ki Baat - 16/4/12)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6y1XLWJx2c

Human Memory is weak and when one is prejudiced then it is more detrimental and that is the case of Mr. Kamran Khan, Senior Correspondent Jang Group of Newspapers/The News International and GEO TV [Judge, Jury & Executioner]. Nowadays "Kamran Khan, Jang Group of Newspapers, GEO TV, and The News International "advising" Nawaz Sharif for the Long March whereas 11 Years ago read what Kamran Khan had filed in The News International/Daily Jang and most hilarious thing is that after 11 Years the same Jang Group [GEO TV] is denying through [Jawab Deyh with Iftikhar Ahmad] their own Chief Correspondent Kamran Khan and his Lies which he used to file under-captioned "The News Intelligence Unit" and more shameful is that a Former General [now deceased] Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani had also trashed Kamran Khan's propaganda which he filed 11 Years ago. Liars need to have good memories. Tragically Mr Kamran Khan has played this "Game" with every Democratically Elected Government after the death of General Zaiul Haq in 1988. 

Kamran Khan and Jang Group brazenly supported 12 Oct 1999 Coup and Najam Sethi was also one of the supporter of 12 Oct 1999 Coup. 

ISLAMABAD: Within half an hour of his surreptitious climb to the post of the Chief of Army Staff on Tuesday afternoon, the former Inter-Services Intelligence chief, General Khawaja Ziauddin knew that the Army he was supposed to lead was not prepared to accept his command. The News Intelligence Unit (NIU) has gathered that all of Ziauddin`s phone calls to the Corps Commanders and the Chief of General Staff — placed from the Prime Minister`s House in Islamabad on Tuesday — drew a blank, a reaction that almost instantly drew down the curtains on former prime minister Nawaz Sharif`s second term in office. Debriefing sessions with detained aides of the Nawaz Sharif administration by security officials here have disclosed that the former ISI chief-led operation to stage an in-house coup in the Army was driven by his personal ambitions ignoring the actual situation on the ground. “Even a layman in Pakistan is aware that any operation of this sort can never be completed without the active support of the troops and commanders posted in the cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi,“ an Army official commented. “It was foolish of the former prime minister not to be aware that his nominee for the Army chief didn`t have the key support of the 10 Corps and more specifically the 111 brigade,“ he added. It has now become clear that Lt. Gen. Ziauddin was the architect of the secret operation that envisioned the official announcement of his promotion to the post of COAS once Gen Pervez Musharraf boarded PIA Flight PK 805 in Colombo for a journey that severed his contact with the GHQ for a good 200 minutes. It was also Lt. Gen. Ziauddin who, along with the former principal secretary Saeed Mehdi, had suggested to Nawaz Sharif that General Pervez Musharraf`s plane must not be allowed to land at Karachi so that he could be arrested at any other less busy airports in Sindh. REFERENCE: Ambitious Ziauddin steered Nawaz to political disaster News Intelligence Unit By Kamran Khan [AS QUOTED IN Fears of a Military Coup in Pakistan Chowk P Room October 12, 1999 http://www.chowk.com/site/articles/index.php?id=4644  http://www.chowk.com/interacts/4644/1/0/16

Saeed Mehdi Exposes Kamran Khan's 11 Years Old Story Part 1 Jawab Deyh - 7th Nov 2010 - Saeed Mehdi ( Nawaz Sharif's Principal Secretary)

Saeed Mehdi Exposes Kamran Khan's 11 Years Old Story Part 2 Jawab Deyh - 7th Nov 2010 - Saeed Mehdi ( Nawaz Sharif's Principal Secretary)

Saeed Mehdi Exposes Kamran Khan's 11 Years Old Story Part 3 Jawab Deyh - 7th Nov 2010 - Saeed Mehdi ( Nawaz Sharif's Principal Secretary)

Saeed Mehdi Exposes Kamran Khan's 11 Years Old Story Part 4 Jawab Deyh - 7th Nov 2010 - Saeed Mehdi ( Nawaz Sharif's Principal Secretary)

Sources said that Ziauddin had assured Sharif that he would gain the full command of the Army much before the landing of General Pervez Musharraf`s plane at Karachi airport, a dream that suddenly transformed itself into Sharif and Ziauddin`s worst nightmare. Officials here believe that because of his family and, more particularly, his father`s old ties with Khawaja Ziauddin`s family, Sharif always wanted to appoint him to the coveted post of the COAS, but he couldn`t do that since he had ignored a senior-most three star general as General Jehangir Karamat`s replacement. Several close aides to Sharif had often conceded in the past that Gen Kuli Khan Khattak was ignored because Sharif was not comfortable with a Pathan general. Ziauddin, an officer from the Army`s Corps of Engineers, was one course junior to Gen. Ali Kuli Khan and Gen. Pervez Musharraf at the Pakistan Military Academy, but even before Karamat`s dramatic exit from the Army, Ziauddin had told his friends about the likelihood of his replacing Gen. Jehangir Karamat. Sources said that General Karamat had posted him as the Corps Commander, Gujranwala in response to a personal request from Sharif, who wanted to give him a fair chance at the time of Karamat`s retirement. Those who had close access to Sharif always contended that his decision to appoint Gen Musharraf was a stopgap arrangement between Gen. Karamat`s abrupt resignation and Ziauddin`s eventual appointment as the COAS. Ziauddin`s appointment as the ISI chief, minutes after Musharraf`s posting as the COAS, spoke volumes of Sharif`s bent of mind at the time. With the knowledge that doubts deliberately created about Musharraf`s tenure as the COAS would further deteriorate worsening relations between the Army and the former prime minister, Ziauddin using his position as the ISI chief nonetheless invented an intriguing conspiracy theory on the Kargil crisis and helped fuel misinformation that the Army leadership got Sharif trapped by launching the Kargil operation. REFERENCE: Ambitious Ziauddin steered Nawaz to political disaster News Intelligence Unit By Kamran Khan [AS QUOTED IN Fears of a Military Coup in Pakistan Chowk P Room October 12, 1999 http://www.chowk.com/site/articles/index.php?id=4644  http://www.chowk.com/interacts/4644/1/0/16

Saeed Mehdi Exposes Kamran Khan's 11 Years Old Story Part 5 Jawab Deyh - 7th Nov 2010 - Saeed Mehdi ( Nawaz Sharif's Principal Secretary)

General (Retd) Ziauddin Butt exposing 11 Year Old lies of Kamran Khan - Part 1 - Gen Ziauddin Khawaja on Oct 12, 1999: Jawab Deyh 31 Oct 2010

General (Retd) Ziauddin Butt exposing 11 Year Old lies of Kamran Khan - Part 2 - Gen Ziauddin Khawaja on Oct 12, 1999: Jawab Deyh 31 Oct 2010

General (Retd) Ziauddin Butt exposing 11 Year Old lies of Kamran Khan - Part 3 - Gen Ziauddin Khawaja on Oct 12, 1999: Jawab Deyh 31 Oct 2010

General (Retd) Ziauddin Butt exposing 11 Year Old lies of Kamran Khan - Part 4 - Gen Ziauddin Khawaja on Oct 12, 1999: Jawab Deyh 31 Oct 2010

During the Kargil crisis, Gen. Ziauddin`s exclusive briefing to the former prime minister almost always contradicted the GHQ`s version. “He was responsible for planting the seeds of intrigue on the Kargil issue in Sharif`s mind,“ according to a reliable official source. In his rash drive to convince Sharif that Musharraf`s removal as the COAS would ease tension with the Army, Ziauddin is believed to have also encouraged the former Intelligence Bureau chief Colonel (retd) Iqbal Niazi, to invent a variety of Army-backed threatening scenarios for Sharif, who apparently had an unlimited appetite for stories that painted a highly negative picture of Musharraf and the corps commanders considered close to the COAS. Khawaja Ziauddin`s desperation to please Nawaz Sharif became evident on the first day of his appointment as the ISI chief when he readily confirmed a police-doctored version about the culprits allegedly involved in the ghastly murder of Hakim Mohammad Said. On Ziauddin`s report, submitted without any independent verification, Sharif got an excuse to knock out the democratic set-up in Sindh, an act that later emerged as part of a well-engineered plot to make way for the installation of an exclusive PML-run unelected administration in Sindh. An independent Army probe later discovered that the Sindh Police`s version of the Hakim Said case, with a stamp of ISI confirmation from Gen. Ziauddin, was nothing but “a pack of lies.“ Neither Sharif nor Ziauddin, however, ever acknowledged the blunder. In another desperate attempt to please the former prime minister, Ziauddin ordered the illegal detention of Najam Sethi, the editor Friday Times, for more than two weeks. Despite the Army`s blunt refusal to initiate sedition or treason charges against Sethi, Ziauddin obliged Sharif and Saifur Rahman by keeping Sethi locked up for about 20 days. Sethi had been handed to Ziauddin`s ISI after being abducted by IB goons from his Lahore residence. Sources said Ziauddin agreed to hold Sethi in illegal detention in response to a single phone call from Saifur Rahman, who later also made Sharif speak to him on the subject. Reliable sources said that Ziauddin was also behind severe criticism of the Kargil crisis by at least two corps commanders, who later met Sharif in Ziauddin`s presence. These meetings were never reported to the COAS, who later reacted by removing both corps commanders from their posts. For Sharif, sources said, Ziauddin`s mission was to divide the corps commanders on ethnic and professional lines and to create an anti-Musharraf lobby amongst the corps commanders. “Since his appointment as the DG ISI, Ziauddin was playing a dangerous game that pitched his boss against the Army,“ observed a senior official. “His operation ultimately turned out to be hara kari (suicide).“ REFERENCE: Ambitious Ziauddin steered Nawaz to political disaster News Intelligence Unit By Kamran Khan [AS QUOTED IN Fears of a Military Coup in Pakistan Chowk P Room October 12, 1999 http://www.chowk.com/site/articles/index.php?id=4644  http://www.chowk.com/interacts/4644/1/0/16

Courtesy: Agha H. Amin http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/

MORE HARSH TRUTH:

Lieutenant General Jamshed Gulzar Kiani's forthright revelations on a TV channel about Kargil prove what this scribe stated more than 5 years ago.Lieut General Jamshed Gulzar Kiani called Kargil a debacle:-- The Kargil Conspiracy The Nation 29 May 2003 A.H Amin

There is general consensus on the fact that military juntas are convenient agents of change employed by larger powers to bring desired policy changes in smaller countries.This is more true for Pakistan where the USA has had a record of using the military juntas as agents of change . Ayub was cultivated in the 1950s and proved his worth as USA’s collaborator par excellence in destroying democracy in Pakistan . The Zia coup was US inspired and had complete US blessings since the USA viewed Mr Z.A Bhutto as a dangerously charismatic leader capable of uniting the Islamic/Third World ! Thus Operation Foul Play of 5th July 1977 ! When Liaquat Ali Khan the then prime minister of Pakistan warned the US Ambassador to Pakistan that the Graham Report on Kashmir must be presented in the UN by 15th October 1951 he was assassinated on 16th October 1951 ! Raja Ghazanfar Ali then Pakistan’s ambassador to Iran noted that Liaquat had planned an Islamic conference to discuss Kashmir , Anglo Iranian Oil Company and Palestine !

Late . General Jamshed Gulzar Kayani Exposes Kamran Khan's LIES - Part 1

URL: http://youtu.be/n2Enn7Z5eqA

Keeping this background in mind the fact that a deliberate conspiracy with a design to control and manipulate Pakistan’s geopolitical future with Kargil as the key point cannot be ruled out.It is possible that Kargil may have been designed as the catalyst to create a civil-military political conflict in Pakistan and as a future launching pad of a military coup. In 1998 Nawaz Sharif often criticized as a man with limited IQ took one of Pakistan’s most decisive strategic command decisions defying USA , not appeasing it as Musharraf took in September 2001 ! It is on record that Nawaz Sharif did not surrender on one telephone call from US president like General Musharraf did and defied US threats not to go on with the nuclear tests despite four telephone call threats from US president Clinton and resolutely went on with Pakistan’s Nuclear blasts ! Recently Dr Qadeer Khan speaking at a function in Karachi on 3rd April 2003 stated that Nawaz even refused an offer of bribe from Clinton wherein Clinton had offered to deposite 100 Million USD in Nawaz Sharif’s personal bank account ! All evidence proves that Nawaz Sharif’s decision to go on with the Nuclear blast was a political decision and the role of the armed forces was merely that of a technocrat consultant ! It appears that from May 1998 the US policy makers came to the conclusion that Nawaz was an irresponsible man and must be taken to task..

Late . General Jamshed Gulzar Kayani Exposes Kamran Khan's LIES - Part 2

URL: http://youtu.be/m8vdvf92JNw

By September 1998 it appears that the Americans had succeeded in their manipulations . The then Army chief General Karamat at this stage started pressurizing the political leadership to include the army in the political decision making . Nawaz had done his homework well.With the ISI firmly under the prime ministers command under Lieutenant General Ziauddin one senior officer Zulfiqar presently chairman WAPDA had been sent to Ukraine to find details of kick backs given to General Jahangir Karamat in the Ukraianian tank deal with Pakistan.Full evidence was prepared of Jahangirs complicity in taking kick backs.Once Karamat asserted his political ambitions Nawaz threatened him with prosecution for taking kick backs ! Thus Jahangir Karamat’s unceremonial exit from power ! USA’s likely agent of change had been removed ! 

Late . General Jamshed Gulzar Kayani Exposes Kamran Khan's LIES - Part 3

URL: http://youtu.be/njCufTcjiZ8

Now comes Kargil. With the appointment of Musharraf as army chief the more Machiavellian geopolitical moves were planned ! Major general Javed Hassan Khan previously military attaché to Washington where many military attaches are successfully cultivated by US intelligence was posted as Commander FCNA incharge of the forces in Gilgit ,Northern Areas including Kargil.The readers may note that this officer presently the commandant of the Pakistan Army’s National Defence College , back in early 1990s made Mughal Emperor Humayun fight in Second Battle of Panipat in his book “India- A Study in Profile�? ! The fact is that Humayun was dead while Panipat was fought and Humayun had no connection with Second Battle of Panipat ! The men who planned Kargil military operation using Pakistan’s 80 Brigade to infiltrate Indian positions in Kargil Sector were instruments of a grand conspiracy to destabilize Pakistans political government which had defied the USA and wanted to make peace with India without US involvement !

Late . General Jamshed Gulzar Kayani Exposes Kamran Khan's LIES - Part 4

URL: http://youtu.be/Jj-nEUShtrQ

Ambition of General Musharraf and his team while planning Kargil had infected the entire military thought process ! The Kargil plan was adventurist,superpower manipulated and its intrinsic violence penetrated and cut open the very arteries of the Pakistani state, spurting out in civil military strife and finally a military coup ! The heroes of those rocky pinnacles are all dead ! Sacrificed in vain ! Diabolically launched into the valleys of death by men who now are dead earnest to make peace with India but propelled by promiscuous and unadulterated ambition wanted to sabotage Nawaz Sharif’s Lahore Peace move in 1999 ! Once Vajpayee came to Lahore on Nawaz’s initiatiave in 1999 he was a vampire but once Musharraf went to Agra later Vajpayee was an angel ! At the super power level Kargil was planned with a view to ridicule Pakistan’s political leadership , embarrass the Pakistani prime minister and to create a civil military divide aimed at a military coup in Pakistan ! Why ! Someone may ask naievely ! Because the USA views the military junta in Third World countries as a more reliable collaborator agent of change than a prime minister who repeatedly defies US threats of retaliation and a 100 Million USD bribery offer !

Thus Kargil operation was launched with an ulterior motive to divide Pakistan’s political and military leaderships ! It is an unfortunate fact of history that Nawaz Sharif was mot aided by a good defence analyst team ! Those who were with him and supposedly considered defence experts were either in secret league with Nawaz’s handpicked military man or too naieve to understand the military intricacies of Kargil ! Kargil in the final analysis stands out as the meticulously planned conspiracy catalyst employed to trigger a chain of events that led to the primacy of the military junta on 12 October 1999 ! So far the Americans have succeeded ! The Pakistani Nuclear programme is in safe hands ! Pakistan , the beautiful woman in words of General Habibullah has sold herself to , not the highest bidder , but the only bidder at a relatively low price ! The military junta has divided the society ! Bought the pillars of state ! Balkanised the political parties ! Marginalised the society introducing unjust ethnic domination in the army , reduced the Sindhis into a political minority , pitched Punjab against Sindh by Machaievellian agreement to Thal Canal and is all set to strike a deal with India which would ensure that Pakistan’s military junta is given a permanent share in the political hierarchy simply because it is USA’s best and most reliable agent of change ! Life goes on !



Kargil stands as perhaps the final military effort on Pakistans part to settle the Kashmir dispute by military means. Analysis has mostly centred around political aspects of the operation while the military aspects have been largely left to the imagination of the public.Lately it has been claimed that Kargil was launched to bail out Mujahideen as a last resort ! This is an insult to the memory of the Pakistani armed forces "Volunteers" who died in that Himalayan wasteland without a funeral and in circumstances of unimaginable misery !

Kargil operation cannot be understood unless the personalities and motives of the principal characters are examined ! Every action in history is the final culmination of a personality's self perception,ambition and subconscious as well as conscious urges.

In this context the Kargil operation was born out of two key factors ! One was the personality of general Pervez Musharraf and the second was the unceremonial manner in which Nawaz Sharif ousted General Jahangir Karamat Musharraf's predecessor army chief of Pakistan Army.

Musharraf as those who have served with him know which includes this scribe also has always been an intensely ambitious man ! One hallmark of his personality is that he wants to stand out as a great military commander ! Propelled by an enormous ego wherever he served he endeavoured to do something extraordinary ! However fate did not allow him the glory in battle which his other coursemates like shabbir sharif achieved ! In 1965 Musharraf was a subaltern in an artillery unit which saw little action apart from supporting operatiions by indirect fire ! The 16 SP unlike 3 SP which fired on Indian tanks with direct gunsights at Chawinda stayed in conventional artillery role ! In 1971 Musharrafs commando company was not involved in action ! Nevertheless Musharraf compensated for this lack of combat laurels by achieving laurels in army courses and in various command assignments ! His final opportunity came when he ascended to the post of army chief in a situation when the army was in a subservient position vis a vis the civilian head of state , something which was regarded by the military herarchy as worse than blasphemy ! The forced retirement of General Karamat by prime minister Nawaz Sharif was regarded as a personal defeat by the Pakistani military brass and by Musharraf who felt that he would be a far weaker army chief under a strong prime minister who had asserted civilian control over the military machine ! These two factors were the fathers of the Kargil operation ! Ambition accompanied by a perception that the Pakistani public must be convinced that the soldiers were better than politicians.

Kargil at the military level was the brainchild of three men i.e General Musharraf the army chief ,Aziz the then army Chief of general Staff and Mahmud the then corps commander 10 Corps ! Musharraf and Mahmud were motivated by intense ambition to achieve military glory and Aziz was motivated by his Kashmiri ancestry plus military ambition.The person they selected to execute the operation was again one distinguished by out of proportion ambition i.e Major General Javed Hassan , author of a book in 1990s that claimed that India was on its way to disintegration and in which mughal king Humayun was resurrected from the grave to fight at Second Battle of Panipat ! In November December 1998 just one month after Musharraf's elevation to the post of army chief volunteers were asked for at the army level for an operation in Kashmir ! Many thousand volunteered including both officers and men from various units ! At no stage did any Mujahideen enter Kargil ! This is a piece of fiction and has no veracity ! These were attached to NLI units in the 80 Brigade sector for training.The principal idea of the plan was to infiltrate four battalions of NLI (Northern light Infantry) stationed in 80 Brigade Sector into Kargil Heights overlooking and dominating the Srinagar Ladakh road the lone Indian link with the Siachen and Leh Sectors ! The idea being to cut the lifeline of Indian supplies to Leh and Siachen Sectors ! Indian held heights in Kargil were to be occupied in February 1999 while Indian infantry had abandoned these heights at the approach of winter snow as an annual routine since 1948.In occupying the heights no fighting was involved ! The real issue was that of supplying Pakistani troops holding these heights which was far more difficult from the Pakistani side than from the Indian side !

Plans were kept secret and even the Commander 10 Corps Engineers of was not allowed to enter the Operations Room in 10 Corps Pindi. The distance involved in reaching the heights varied from 15 to 35 kilometres from Pakistan side over mountains as high as 13 to 19,000 feet .To do this each battalion was divided into two parts , one acting as porters taking supplies forward and one half occupying the heights . The heights were occupied as per the plan but the four units while doing so were severly exhausted ! In March-April the Indians discovered the Pakistani presence and reacted severely ! Severe fighting continued till July once the Indians finally re-captured the heights after Pakistani troops had been left to the mercy of Indian artillery and overwhelming troop concentrations as a result of the Blair House Accord !

A brief military examination of the plan reveals following weaknesses.(1) Failure to assess strategic repercussions of the operation at geopolitic and national strategic level .(2) Logistic failure in incorrect appreciation of supplying the troops . (3) Failure to understand that by occupying the heights the Indians were driven into a corner and had no choice but to retaliate , not for glory as was the Pakistani military's case but for pure military survival . (4) At a more subtle level the use of the Chora-Batalik Sector as a future spring board for Pakistani operations against India was sealed since Indians heavily fortified this sector for any future war. The Pakistani planners failed to assess that war as an instrument of policy is no longer in vogue at the international level and their temporary military success would only bring greater international censure and a negative war mongering image without any corresponding military gain at the strategic level. This scribe interviewed a former commander of FCNA and 10 Corps about logistics and General Imtiaz Warraich replied as following :--

" We initiated this operation but failed to support it with comprehensive operational planning and above all buildup for essential logistic support without which no operation can succeed"......'" the principal reason for our heavy casualties and lack of progress was unimaginative and callous logistic operations to support the units".

At one point the sepoys who had volunteered to fight and had come from many other infantry units to the NLI units refused to act as porters carrying supplies over 15 kilometres and were so exasperated that they defied Javed Hassan's personal orders in unit durbars to carry supplies and when Javed Hassn threw his cap on the ground threatened to march over it unless they were not employed as porters ! One such volunteer told this scribe that we had volunteered to fight ,not to act as porters ! The same fact was also mentioned in ISI chief Ziauddin Butt's secret report to Nawaz Sharif prepared by an Engineer officer on Zia's staff in ISI ! The failure to assess the "Enemy" factor was another strategic planning failure at the highest level .I asked General Warraich this question and he stated " Capture of Kargil Heights would totally stop all Indian movement to Leh and Ladakh Sectors unlike Pakistan in Siachen and Indians had no option but to do and die " ! Lust for glory and honour in battle are perfectly reasonable aspirations as long as they are accompanied by commensurate military talent in the generals who are at the helm of affairs ! This was sadly lacking in the Musharraf team who planned the operation. Their egos were many times larger than their real military talent ! By promoting an intensely ambitious man to the rank of army chief Nawaz did a favour which could only be repaid by betrayal ! The plan was based not on sound military reasoning but on burning ambition and an unrealistic desire for glory by men far away from the heat of battle ! No one above major level died , yet in a report to the military secretarys branch Javed Hassan recommended retiring 75 % of officers involved in the operation below colonel level !

The prime minister was not fully briefed because of ulterior motives ! Had the operation succeeded it would have been projected as a proof of Musharraf's Napoleonic brilliance and if it failed as it did Nawaz Sharif would have been made the scapegoat ! The operations planners were distinguished neither by loftiness of thought,nor audacity in the conduct of battle athe operational or strategic level.Thus boldness at tactiacl level was sacrificed because of operational and tactical timidity at the highest level. No one appreciated that the army men who were employed , and it is a fiction that there was a single Mujahid in Kargil , had flesha nd blood ! These men mourned by a few hundred families were sons husbands fathers and brothers !

The Kargil operation at the military level is a watershed ! Idealism that propelled many hundred to die in those Himalayan wastes is buried for good ! Now there is a new breed which dominates the army ! The ones who aim at going on lush UN secondments or to KESC,WAPDA or as well paid consulatants ! What can one conclude ! It was the human heart that failed in Kargil and this heart which failed was housed in the ribcage of men sitting in the GHQ and not on the rocky pinnacles of Kargil ! Once the supply lines were closed under Indian threat of a counter attack , these brave men all Pakistan Army regulars were abandoned to die , pounded by artillery fire , bayoneted by overwhelming numbers , weakened by starvation ! Who can hear their cries ! Our ears are covered with heaps of lies ! Truth died at Kargil ! What remains is a body guard of lies! REFERENCES: Kargil-A Military Analysis 15 June 2003 A.H Amin - Debacle-As per Pakistani ex Corps Commander Posted: Jun 2, 2008 Mon 11:04 am http://www.chowk.com/ilogs/67171/47736