Zaid Hamid spews the same message as Aamir Liaquat but goes about it in a different way. Where Liaquat speaks deliberately and with an affected accent, preferring emotional appeals to facts, Hamid has a rapid-fire delivery and peppers his monologues with dubious statistics and frequent anecdotes. The major thrust of all of Hamid’s sermons is that the Muslim world in general and Pakistan specifically is being targeted by an unholy American-Indian-Israeli axis. In this worldview, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan are the ‘bad’ Taliban who are agents of RAW and other nefarious intelligence agencies, while outfits like the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Lashkar-e-Taiba are the ‘good’ Taliban fighting in Kashmir and taking the battle to the enemies. For a while Hamid’s entertaining but dangerous rants led to great TV ratings but soon the bottom fell out. Advertisers didn’t want to be associated with this brand of conspiracy theorising, and the novelty value of his act wore off. Rumours that he had once been associated with a man claiming to be a prophet and his appearance on an FIR for a murder case further sullied the Zaid Hamid brand. But his hiatus proved to be short-lived. On the occasion of Nawaz Sharif making unexpected peace overtures to India, Hamid was invited as an expert panelist on a talk show. By now his routine has become predictable; so much of what he said was tiresome but expected. He, however, decided to use this platform to launch a tirade against a new target: the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA). On a show hosted by Meher Bokhari on Dunya TV, Hamid accused SAFMA of being Indian-funded and called them RAW agents. Zaid Hamid, it must be noted, is criticised by Pakistani journalists and Islamic scholars alike for propagating conspiracy theories without an iota of truth in them. Currently, he is being sued by SAFMA. Meanwhile, Hamid’s protege and co-host in a show called Iqbal ka Pakistan, Ali Azmat, has returned to his roots to propagate his conspiracy theories. The former Junoon singer released a song “Bum Phatta” that encapsulated his and Hamid’s worldview in a three-minute rock song. The video featured Azmat in various guises meant to symbolise those who truly control the world, included among them a cabal of Zionist bankers (for more on Ali Azmat read a 2010 Newsline exclusive interview with the singer/songwriter). No amount of chemotherapy seems to be effective in eliminating this cancer that is worming its way and spreading through public discourse in Pakistan. REFERENCE: Questionable Preachings By Zain Ali 30 OCTOBER 2011 http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2011/10/questionable-preachings/
On February 22,2012, Zaid Hamid made a baseless allegation against Hafiz Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi (Chairman Pakistan Ulema Council), posting a letter on his official Facebook page, written by UNESCO to General (R) Parvez Musharraf requesting him to send Hafiz Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi to Mullah Omar to resolve the issue of destruction of the Bamyaan Monuments. Zaid Hamid claimed that Hafiz Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi was a French Intelligence agent and was being sent by them to gather intelligence on Taliban before the invasion. Hafiz Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi contacted ZHE immediately and we posted a note on our facebook page refuting what Zaid Hamid had claimed. Zaid Hamid was forced to remove the post from his official Facebook page after the rebuttal of Hafiz Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi. On February 23,2012, a detail response was given to Zaid Hamid’s baseless allegations against Hafiz Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi on ZHE Blog. Hafiz Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi challenged Zaid Hamid to a public debate on the issue of calling him a French Intelligence Agent which Zaid Hamid never accepted. Now we have received an email from BT Volunteer Group, in which Zaid Hamid is claiming that it was Facebook that deleted the post and is asking his followers to spread the letter on all websites and blogs. Our question to Zaid Hamid is why didn’t he re-post the same letter on his official Facebook page? Why was he asking his followers to spread the letter when he himself could not re-post it? REFERENCE: Zaid Hamid fails to “Re-post” a post against Hafiz Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi “Deleted” by Facebook. http://zaidhamidexposition.org/2012/04/09/zaid-hamid-fails-to-re-post-a-post-against-hafiz-tahir-mahmood-ashrafi-deleted-by-facebook/
Hafiz Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi refutes allegations of Zaid Hamid
Zaid Zaman Hamid & General Hamid Gul
Tahir Ashrafi, on one hand claim to defend Mujahideen but on the other hand his dirty links are not just with RAW backed SAFMA but also with UN and French intelligence and he has been serving their interests for ages. Here we produce a confidential letter written by a UN officer just before the UN approved invasion of Afghanistan by the Zionists. Here, these UN Zionists are writing to Perzez Musharraf to send Tahir Ashrafi to Mullah Omar on the Bamiyan statue issues. This fasadi mullah was to plead the case of UN's french director, most probably to gather intelligence on Taliban before the US led invasion. Today, he works for SAFMA and RAW gathering intelligence on Mujahideen in Pakistan. This letter by UN clearly shows how much the crusaders trust this snake. Now he has also become the champion of Khatm e Nubuwwat also. Astaghfurullah! REFERENCE: Tahir Ashrafi - SAFMA - French intelligence - RAW Syed Zaid Zaman Hamid [Official] WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 http://brasstacks-media.blogspot.com/2012/02/tahir-ashrafi-safma-french-intelligence.html?m=1
Zaid Hamid - Lies and Deception Exposed
ISLAMABAD, Sept 16: Pakistan hopes to convince the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden in a last-ditch effort to ward off an impending US-led allied attack on Afghanistan, but deteriorating relations between the two leave very little hope that the initiative will be successful. The Musharraf government has absolutely no doubt in its mind that the US holds Osama and his protector, Mulla omar, fully responsible for the Sept 11 kamikaze attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It is sending a high-ranking delegation to meet Mulla Umar, headed by General Mehmood of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), to underline the point that the impending attack can destroy Afghanistan totally, and lead to a human catastrophe of unimaginable scale. General Mehmood, who was in Washington when the US faced its morning of terror, has been conveyed in no uncertain terms by the US officials what the mood in the United States is. Pakistan's plea is that while it is difficult choice for the Taliban but the costs of persisting with holding on to the line that proof of Osama's crime has to be produced before them to enable them to take a decision on the issue, will be death and destruction, and eventual fall of the Taliban government.
At present according to government sources, the US does not make a difference between Mulla Umar's men and Osama bin Laden unless the Taliban supreme leader severs his links with him and hands him over to the US. For Pakistan the considerations behind making the desperate effort to convince the Taliban to show flexibility are domestic, regional and global. Pakistani decision-makers are worried about a severe domestic backlash from the Taliban lobbies in the mosques and the bazaars. Sunday's rallies all over the country - more are planned today -- against the anticipated US strikes are just a tip of the iceberg of larger trouble that can erupt when the US military operation starts. That is why all the law-enforcement agencies have been given additional powers and a fully-fledged internal security plan, prepared at General Headquarters, and approved by President Gen Pervez Musharraf has been put in place. The governors of all four provinces, along with the respective area corps commanders, have been readied to meet with any exceptional law and order situation with standing orders to use force where necessary. Even more stringent measures have been taken for Karachi and the border areas of the NWFP and Balochistan, where the Afghan refugees are present in the thousands. Special monitoring and surveillance of the sectarian groups is being done and all possibilities of a nation-wide reaction by religious parties have been worked out. But still fears are that this may not be enough. The Taliban threat delivered by their ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdus Salam Zaeef on Saturday of invading any regional country that will provide bases or air space to the American-led strike force, has been taken seriously by the government.
Pakistan officials say that they are extremely disappointed with this statement. They see this as audacious and uncalled for and a sad reflection on the sense of gratitude that the Taliban should have, considering that Pakistan, at grave risk to its own image, has been sticking its neck out for them. More than that Pakistani officials see in the threat a real potential for the Taliban in a moment of crisis using their Madaris links inside Pakistan to create upheaval and unrest. Pakistan officials also believe that there is a real danger of sectarian terrorism erupting in the wake of the strikes because the Taliban continue to harbor some of the most wanted sectarian criminals on their soil. The other danger to which the Musharraf government is paying attention to is that of random terrorism of the sort that Pakistan has experienced emanating primarily from Afghanistan. In the 80s and early 90s Pakistan cities and bazaars were repeatedly hit by bombs that went off in crowded places killing hundreds of people. However, Pakistan's biggest threat comes not from the ordinary Taliban or sympathisers of Osama bin Laden, but from that close circuit of friends who have the resources to carry out massive operations inside its territory. If the case that the US is building against Osama bin Laden has any factual basis, Pakistan is the most vulnerable state in the world to terrorism. That is why, some government military observers believe, intelligence sharing with the US is of vital importance. Because it will be Pakistan that will have to deal with the blow-back of the inferno that Afghanistan will become when the military operation starts against Afghanistan.
Just as worrying are regional concerns for the Musharraf government. Pakistan is mortally fearful of the possibility of the facilities that it will grant to the US troops being misused. Military analysts admit that Pakistan will bear the brunt of a fully-fledged military operation in its neighbourhood because of its geo-graphic proximity to Afghanistan. More precisely, when the operation starts the sheer scale of it and the confusion it may generate can afford, according to senior military officials, an opportunity to take the risk of sabotaging Pakistan's strategic assets - the nuclear installations. This is the reason why extra measures have been taken to guard these installations and the air force has been instructed to hunt down any aerial danger in Pakistan's air-space. The details of which air-path can be used by the US-led forces have been worked out and there are other routes that are out-bounds for any alien aircraft. Pakistan policy-makers are also concerned about the possibility of an accidental or misfired hit at any of Pakistan's vital installations. Modern weapons especially aerial weapons that can move in all the wrong directions. Pakistan is equally concerned over the new political arrangement in Afghanistan. The strikes are surely going to leave the Taliban totally destroyed. For decades Pakistan has invested in the policy of having a friendly government in Afghanistan, and the Taliban, when they had not become an international pariah, were the closest it could come to that idea.
However, with the Taliban likely to be destroyed as a political entity in the wake of the strikes and the movement disintegrating along its tribal and local lines, the emerging scenario can lead to a political arrangement that would not be according to the wish list of Pakistan. Pakistan officials still hope that they will be able to have a say in the final shape of the new Afghanistan government -- if it did come to that point. In fact this is one of the many issues that Pakistan has put forward to the US in its on-going discussions with Washington. However, it is not sure yet what will be the response of the international community, particularly the US, to Pakistan playing such a role because of late Islamabad has been, rightly or wrongly, seen by a majority of the countries around the world as part of the problem in Afghanistan. But the most immediate concern for the Musharraf government is the US pressure. Close associates of President General Pervez Musharraf say that he is under tremendous pressure because "events are moving at a bewildering pace." Saturday night's telephone call from the US President George Bush was not just to thank him on his support but to also ask what has Pakistan decided on providing logistical assistance to the military operation. The US is not keeping according to the schedule of Pakistan's final decision; it wants a decision and a final detailed yes according to its own plans - not all of which have been shared with Pakistan. Pakistan according to some officials wants the US to also provide it with some incentives: economic and military assistance, removal of sanctions, debt relief, active role in helping it to solve the Kashmir problem and no role of India and Israel in this military operation. However, the signals from Washington are that while these demands will be considered sympathetically, at this point in time the only incentive that is available to Pakistan is negative. "Pakistan has the option to live in the 21st century or the Stone Age" is roughly how US officials are putting their case. The pressure is being added by advice from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries that have sent message and emissaries to convey their sentiments to General Pervez Musharraf. Against this background, Pakistan's best hope is that its delegation will come back with the good news of Taliban changing its position on Osama bin Laden. REFERENCE: Last-ditch effort to ward off impending attack Special Correspondent DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending : 22 September 2001 Issue : 07/38 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2001/sep2201.html#last
ISLAMABAD, Sept 18: The high-level delegation led by ISI Chief Lt. Gen. Mahmood came back, leaving Taliban behind mussing over tough choices which would be further discussed at a meeting of 600 Afghan clerics in Kabul. No official announcement about the outcome of two-days discussions with the Taliban in Kandahar and Kabul was made after the arrival of the delegation. When contacted a highly placed government source said no official announcement was expected till a decision was made from Afghan Shura which is reportedly meeting in Kabul. "The delegation went to Afghanistan not for negotiations but to impress upon the Kabul regime the gravity of the situation," Foreign Office Spokesman Riaz Ahmed Khan told a news briefing earlier in the day. Unconfirmed reports said the Taliban had set three conditions including lifting of UN sanctions, commitment of financial assistance for restructuring of war ravaged country and trial of Osama bin Lander in a neutral country for handing over the Saudi millionaire and alleged prime suspect in World Trade Centre and Pentagon incidents. The foreign office spokesman did not offer any comment on the outcome of the talks or the three conditions reportedly set by Taliban. REFERENCE: ISI team back from Afghanistan By Faraz Hashmi DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending : 22 September 2001 Issue : 07/38 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2001/sep2201.html#isit
Zaid hamid and yusuf kazab ka jalwa
On the morning of Sept. 11, Goss and Graham were having breakfast with a Pakistani general named Mahmud Ahmed -- the soon-to-be-sacked head of Pakistan's intelligence service. Ahmed ran a spy agency notoriously close to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. A Goss aide handed a note to his boss. Goss read it and handed it to Graham. Soon they would evacuate the Capitol, but not before Goss, the designated speaker pro tempore, symbolically opened the House for one minute. The discussion that morning touched on Taliban links to terrorism, but Goss says his greatest worry was the dispute in Kashmir -- and the nuclear weapons possessed by feuding Pakistan and India. A few weeks earlier, Goss and other lawmakers had visited the region on a fact-finding tour, but he admits he wasn't focused on bin Laden at the time. "I had it wrong," he says. "I was looking east [toward Kashmir] instead of west [toward Afghanistan] when I was standing in Islamabad." He says this with no embarrassment or defensiveness. This is part of why people like Goss. When he gets it wrong, he doesn't dissemble. "Seek Ye the Truth" -- that's the CIA's motto. He would affix the same slogan to his investigation. "This is a professional, responsible, nonpartisan activity," Goss says. But as far as what kind of weaknesses, flaws or lapses (don't call them failures) he thinks the investigation will uncover -- and how to fix them -- there is little point asking. The chairman is an impenetrable target in a denied area. That's the way it is in the intelligence game. "You can spend two hours in here saying, 'I've talked to Porter Goss,' and still not have a clue what my plans and intentions are," the Company man says, before bidding farewell to his interrogator with a handshake and smile. REFERENCE: A Cloak But No Dagger An Ex-Spy Says He Seeks Solutions, Not Scapegoats for 9/11 By Richard Leiby Washington Post Staff Writer Saturday, May 18, 2002; Page C01 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A36091-2002May17?language=printer
Funny ZAID HAMID Exposed
On the eve of the 9/11 terror attacks, in a crucial National Security Council meeting at the White House, Colin Powell, the then U.S. secretary of state, strongly asserted: “We have to make it clear to Pakistan and Afghanistan, this is show time.” General Mahmood Ahmed, who was on an official visit to the United States as a CIA guest, and Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, were asked to attend a meeting with senior American officials on September 12, 2001. To be fully prepared, Mahmood called Musharraf to discuss the emerging scenario and take instructions for the important meeting. Musharraf told him to report back immediately after the meeting and gauge how the wind was blowing. On the morning of September 12, the U.S. deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, in a “hard-hitting conversation,” told Mahmood that Pakistan had to make a choice—“you are either 100 percent with us or 100 percent against us—–there is no gray area.” In the words of Armitage, Mahmood “was immediately willing to cooperate.” In the afternoon, Mahmood was invited to CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, where he told George Tenet, the CIA director, that in his view Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief, was a religious man with humanitarian instincts and not a man of violence! This was a bit difficult for the CIA officials to digest. General Mahmood was firmly told that Mullah Omar and the Taliban would have to face U.S. military might if Osama bin Laden along with other Al-Qaeda leaders were not handed over without delay. To send the message across clearly, Richard Armitage held a second meeting with Mahmood the same day, informing him that he would soon be handed over specific American demands which are “non-negotiable”, to which Mahmood reiterated that Pakistan would cooperate. Having gone through the list that was provided to him on September 13, Mahmood declared that he was quite clear on the subject and that “he knew how the President thought, and the President would accept these points.” Mahmood then faxed the document to Musharraf and in a subsequent call conveyed his impressions. Mahmood was of the view that the words used by Armitage about Taliban were in fact meant for Pakistan and he didn’t consider it necessary to emphasize this point. Musharraf genuinely believed that such a direct threat was given. While Musharraf had hardly gone through the list of demands, his aide de camp informed him that Colin Powell was on the line. Musharraf liked and respected Powell, and the conversation was not going to be a problem, he thought. He told him that he understood and appreciated the U.S. position, but that he would respond to the U.S. demands after having discussed these with his associates. Powell was a bit perplexed at this response and thought it necessary to inform him that General Mahmood had already assured them that these demands would be acceptable to the government of Pakistan. It is not certain if Musharraf bit his lip when he heard this, but he did grit his teeth, and his relationship with Mahmood suffered a crack. Interestingly, Mahmood on his return from the US, also informed Musharraf about his visit to the Pentagon after the tragedy and argued that there were no traces of any commercial plane having hit the Pentagon. He also made a case that in his assessment, the attacks were an inside job! Some senior generals surrounding Musharraf at that time were convinced by this line of argument largely based on Mahmood’s “first hand” narrative. On September 16, 2001, Musharraf sent a delegation to the Taliban with the mission to convince them to hand over Osama bin Laden. It included Lieutenant General Mahmood, and a group of religious figures known to have good relations with the Taliban. The mission failed, but more worrisome was the revelation that Mufti Shamzai of the Binori mosque in Karachi, instead of conveying the official message, encouraged Mullah Omar to start a jihad against the United States if it attacked Afghanistan. Musharraf came to know of this fact through an ISI official who had accompanied the team and had loyally reported the matter to Musharraf. After this, Mahmood, whose arrogance and presumption had come to grate on Musharraf’s expansive tolerance by now, was offered the ceremonial slot of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, because Musharraf was still grateful to him for what he had done for him on the eve of October 12, 1999. Mahmood refused the offer thinking that he was indispensable and a possible successor to Musharraf. But things were changing fast and Musharraf now had the support of most of his corps commanders about his new alignment with the US (except Generals Usmani, Mahmood and Mohammad Aziz who had advised caution). Gauging the mood of changing circumstances and knowing that Musharraf was about to make some important changes in the military, Mahmood, through a close friend of Musharraf, a retired brigadier based in Islamabad, put in a request to be retained as director general of ISI, even if an officer junior to him was to be promoted to the rank of four star general for the post of CJCSC. This time Musharraf refused and Mahmood had to go home. This sudden departure of Mahmood led to many rumors. Mahmood went into a low profile and started working on his favorite project – a book on the 1965 war. When he finished the work, he sent the manuscript to GHQ for permission to publish. Interestingly the title of the work was “Myth of 1965 victory”. Musharraf himself looked at the manuscript and noted on the file that Mahmood should re-consider the title – especially use of the word myth in relation to the 1965 war. This was enough of a hint and Mahmood almost shelved the idea of publishing the book for a while. Mahmood had already requested Musharraf for a job and thought that he should not annoy Musharraf on any count. He was right - he did get a job soon. And instead, Musharraf started working on his book project. REFERENCE: Inside story of Musharraf-Mahmood tussle By Hassan Abbas Tuesday, September 26, 2006 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\09\26\story_26-9-2006_pg7_13 What happened between Musharraf & Mahmood after 9/11 attacks MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2006 http://watandost.blogspot.com/2006/09/what-happened-between-musharraf.html