Thursday, December 22, 2011

Mansoor Ijaz: Bangladesh Model for Pakistan & General Pervez Musharraf.

It is interesting to note that the ISPR clarification denied ‘false assertions’ by blogger Omar Warraich, but it was silent on what Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz — the central character in the scandal — said in his interview whose quotes were reproduced in the blog posting. In his interview with Mr Warraich, Mr Ijaz had claimed that a ‘senior intel source’ had told him that his “information was that Pasha had travelled to a few of the Arab countries to talk about what would be necessary to do in the event they had to remove Zardari from power and so forth”. He had made a similar claim during his BlackBerry message exchange with former ambassador to the US Husain Haqqani. The ISPR, however, contradicted Omar Warraich who had questioned the credibility of Mr Ijaz’s claim and even talked about a CIA link to the scandal. Mr Warraich wrote in his posting: “Even if Gen Pasha did travel to these countries… perhaps nothing unseemly took place. Perhaps all that was discussed, quite appropriately, was Pakistan’s reaction to the Bin Laden raid.” The only plausible explanation to this incongruity is that denying Mr Ijaz could question the credibility of his other allegations in the memo affair. REFERENCE: ISPR denies Pasha’s ME trip Pakistan’s “Memogate”: Was there ever going to be a coup? By Omar Waraich The Foreign Desk - International dispatches from Independent correspondents - Tuesday, 13 December 2011 at 7:35 pm

Capital Talk - 20 Dec 2011

Twin terrorist attacks earlier this week in Rawalpindi and Islamabad underscored the troubles confronting Gen. Pervez Musharraf as he struggles to stabilize Pakistan and hang on to whatever is left of his power there. He faces unprecedented challenges to his rule from two former prime ministers, and is attempting to co-opt one while keep the other out of power. He has picked unnecessary fights with the judiciary and is now facing the wrath of a chief justice whose power he can no longer undermine. He tries to cut deals with Islamists when others won’t talk to him. When they do, he gets into even deeper trouble with his western allies. Ever the tactician and rarely the strategist, Musharraf’s end game this time seems to have no good outcome for the people of Pakistan. The state, it seems, is inching closer to failure on his watch. Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, now of the ritzy Belgravia neighborhood in London, is set to return to Pakistan on Monday after a Supreme Court ruling allowed him to come home from exile. He is hardly fit to lead Pakistan — he has support neither in Washington nor within the Pakistani army. Muslim states, most importantly Saudi Arabia, have dubbed him an unwelcome visitor for abrogating agreements to stay out of Pakistani politics until 2010. The on-again, off-again power-sharing romance with Benazir Bhutto — which now seems off again — would only bring back venal, corrupt governance to civil institutions — hardly a fix for anything. A return to a politics of greed and power is no solution to what ails this nuclear-armed state; it would serve no end but the self-perpetuation of Pakistani robber-barons. A national unity government is needed, and its leaders need to be independently minded and well-respected men and women who are prepared to serve Pakistan in the same way Muhammad Ali Jinnah, its founder, did. If the general, who so desperately seeks to cobble together patchwork solutions for hanging onto power, legitimately believes he should be president, he should appoint a caretaker administration and step down as both army chief and president. He should run for office like all other candidates on the merits of whatever record he has compiled while in office. Musharraf’s first act should be to appoint Gen. Ehsan ul Haq as the new army chief for a fixed one-year term before he retires officially on October 7. Gen. Haq, the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the senior most active military officer in the army, distancing others in seniority by nearly a decade. He is a moderate who believes in making peace with India over disputed Kashmir and has much firsthand experience with the outside world on matters of counterterrorism and security. He is a apolitical military officer who would firmly march the army back into the barracks and out of civilian affairs. As former director of both military intelligence and the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, his working knowledge of how these organizations can rebuild Pakistani security, rather than harming it with ill-advised adventures (such as backing Taliban forces in Afghanistan), would be a welcome change in Pakistani foreign policy and security strategy. The general’s second act should be to appoint a caretaker government before his term ends on November 15, one that has leading members of each of the main political factions so groundwork can be prepared for free and fair elections by June 2008. He should then resign the presidency and become a candidate, and he should not block any other politician or Islamist from becoming a candidate either. He should run on his record and let others run on theirs, and then trust the Pakistani people to make a choice that is in the best interests of their country. The caretaker government should be headed by Jehangir Karamat, former army chief and ex–ambassador to the United States, who has a reputation and knack for telling his bosses where to get off when they are wrong. Karamat would fuse together the support of Pakistan’s only two functional institutions — the judiciary and the army — and would carry the support of important ally countries, including the United States. Most important, he is genuinely committed to improving the lot of Pakistanis on the street. He has their trust, and he can rebuild confidence in civil institutions. He could be joined on the roster by the current prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, to maintain continuity and stability of the financial markets and economy (GDP has grown at a 7-percent annual rate and national debt has been cut from 100 percent to 60 percent of GDP during Mr Aziz’s tenure). So to should senior advisers of Ms. Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party join; Aitzaz Ashan would be an ideal candidate, being a close adviser and confidante of Ms. Bhutto, and having fought for and won the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikar Chaudhry late last month. The ruling faction of Mr. Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League could offer former foreign and finance minister Sartaj Aziz and former Musharraf ally Chaudhary Shujaat Hussein. Mukhtar Mai, the woman who became a national hero by standing up to her rapists and tormentors — and whom Mr. Musharraf vilified for embodying all that was wrong with Pakistan — could become the representative of the disaffected and poor to ensure their voices were brought to bear on the country’s future. Pakistan’s political institutions are decimated by years of neglect and army rule. They are not yet ready for a prime time appearance that would be required by a Bhutto-Musharraf power-sharing arrangement, or by the reemergence of Nawaz Sharif. These leaders have tried, and failed, to govern the country. They seek power its own sake, and voters are only important to them on Election Day. The day after, they go back to plundering the country once more. Musharraf, an Indian-born migrant to Pakistan, has spent a lifetime trying to convince Pakistanis that he has their best interests in mind. Perhaps he does, and if so, then he should selflessly execute a game plan that could make him the odds-on favorite to recapture his leadership position, but this time with the real support of Pakistanis, not via a manufactured and artificial government that has no credibility to lead Pakistan’s industrious people away from the brink of failure. REFERENCE: Stepping Down General Musharraf needs to abdicate the throne he seized. MANSOOR IJAZ SEPTEMBER 8, 2007 12:00 A.M.

Pakistan is one of those unfortunate countries where the Sanctimonious Intellectuals discuss the blame on speculations and assumptions even if it is at the cost of the integrity and sovereignty of the country. Differring with PPP or any other government is one thing and putting country's fate at the stake for settling some political score is quite another and that is the usual story with the Jang Group of newspaper and their Journalists/TV Anchors particularly Shaheen Sehbai, Kamran Khan, Mohammad Malick and Ansar Abbasi despite knowing an established fact (with reference, history and footage) that Mansoor Ijaz and his Neocon Lobby had destroyed Iraq by raising False Alarm of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Mansoor Ijaz is exactly doing the same again and Jang Group of Newspapers is part and parrcel in this ugly game. During a TV Show of GEO TV "Aaj Kamran Khan Kay Sath dated 18 Nov 2011" and earlier on Bolta Pakistan of AAJ TV dated 16 Nov 2011 the resident editor of The News International, Mr. Mohammad Malick opined that raising objection on Mansoor Ijaz' credibility is of no use! Very well as Mr. Malick suggest we should apply Mansoor Ijaz "Rant" as a cardinal truth and Mr. Mohammad Malick should plead case against Pakistan in the world community particularly in UN by quoting from Mr. Mansoor Ijaz "Excellent Pieces" on Pakistan, and particularly Mansoor's Lie on WMD in Iraq, let us proceed but before proceeding to the detailed background of this Neocon War Monger i.e. Mansoor Ijaz, we must keep one thing in mind that Mohammad Malick (Resident Editor, The News International) also has several blot on his character e.g. Muhammad Malick (List of journalists given plots in Islamabad Published: November 1, 2010 Journalist Corruption Scandal – Mohammad Malick JUNE 3, 2009

 Bolta Pakistan with Nusrat Javed - Part 1 (16 NOV 2011)

Mansoor Ijaz is against Pakistan Nuclear Deterrence. (Fox News 2007)

Developing a Global Intelligence Center (GIC). In a world faced with asymmetric threats, good human-source intelligence is vital to countering enemies successfully who rely on low-tech means to advance their hideous causes. China’s failure to adequately assess Kim Jong Il’s determination to conduct nuclear tests, or the loyalties of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence to aid and abet the Taliban’s resurgence, or the collective Western intelligence failure on Saddam Hussein’s WMD program, all point to a need for gathering and sharing good intelligence more transparently — particularly from human sources. GIC would effectively be a global library of data from sources with unique language skills, cultural affiliations, and knowledge of remote regions. Its processors and analysts would be independent teams of respected individuals who would rotate periodically to prevent politicization of intelligence. GIC would boost intelligence capabilities in weaker countries where extremists breed and operate and, in doing so, would strengthen the value of the intelligence weak countries gather through their limited capacities. REFERENCE: NOVEMBER 28, 2006 11:30 A.M. A New Threat and a Renewed Organization NATO needs to evolve in order to fight terrorism. MANSOOR IJAZ & KRISTIN KROHN DEVOLD

Anti Pakistan Rasul Bux Rais VS Pakistan in Indian Media - 1 (Nov 2011)

Anti Pakistan Rasul Bux Rais VS Pakistan in Indian Media - 2 (Nov 2011)

President Bush could ease his hosts’ concerns by simply providing India with a ceiling on the number of nuclear weapons it is allowed to produce. From there, he could let uranium-enrichment mathematics determine how many of India’s key reactors would need to be designated for military purposes. This will help to achieve a deal with with India, which will in turn make it easier to later approach Pakistan to get it to sign on to a non-proliferation program. In Pakistan, Bush will find a troubled ally beset by rising anti-American sentiment, a floundering domestic counterterrorism effort, and an overwhelming fiscal need to help the victims of last October’s devastating earthquake. President Pervez Musharraf will need new pledges of American financial support and a very public apology for the botched U.S. cruise-missile attack that missed al-Qaeda’s No. 2 man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, last month. As America’s top diplomat, President Bush should be forthcoming with both apologies and offers of assistance. But in private, he needs to demand brutally candid answers on two points critical to global security: Did Pakistan’s rogue nuclear scientist, Dr. A.Q. Khan, give Iran the full array of technologies required to assemble and detonate even a crude nuclear device? And how is it possible that Pakistan’s military intelligence apparatus cannot do more to infiltrate tribal areas where militants are thought to be harboring al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, including Osama bin Laden? Every day these men remain free is a day al-Qaeda’s legions grow stronger and their doomsday scenario draws nearer. If Musharraf understands the realpolitik that characterizes Washington’s current politically charged climate, and if he accepts the responsibility Pakistan has undertaken as a front-line ally in fighting terrorists wherever they hide, he would do well to give the American delegation some result-oriented answers–even if these answers are unpalatable for Pakistan’s global image. Presdient Musharraf can start by telling President Bush that he is readying a political strategy, nonexistent as it is today, to persuade the Pashtun tribal chiefs to end their safe harbor of al-Qaeda leaders. Islamabad’s political void has eviscerated the Pakistani army’s capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations in the no-man’s land along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, allowing al-Qaeda to fortify its protective layers. Pakistani army troops numbering almost 75,000 remain holed up at outposts along the border rather than being permitted to actively scour and police the tribal regions. Bush would do well to tell President Musharraf that Americans don’t want their taxpayer dollars spent on making a big show of trying to catch Osama bin Laden while his deputy routinely gets invited to dinner at the homes of al-Qaeda-harboring tribal chieftains. The Bush trip to South Asia has the potential to enhance regional and global security. But political leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad have got to want it. REFERENCE: MARCH 1, 2006 8:12 A.M. W, The Peacemaker Nonproliferation opportunities in south Asia. MANSOOR IJAZ

Mansoor Ijaz's Partner Ex CIA Chief James Woolsey on War on Iraq

Four years and two wars later, having suffered the destruction of much of the physical infrastructure and basing areas that Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq offered, al Qaeda and its affiliate terrorist networks have evolved their global operating system into an airborne virus capable of infecting concentrated cells of disaffected followers to carry out by proxy the orders of their hidden masters. Citizens and residents of targeted countries who are able to lie dormant longer and at a fraction of the cost of transplanted cells are the new weapons of choice. Couriers carrying handwritten notes or memorized messages from the likes of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi have been caught in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey during the past four years. A suspected London bomber even appeared on video with al-Zawahiri three weeks ago. The terror masters would like us to believe that state sponsorship with its highly organized logistics, funding, weaponry, and intelligence are still unnecessary support structures in the continuing expansion of their global terrorist enterprise.We must adopt effective international standards for tracking would-be terrorists from the early stages of their transformations, whether at Pakistan’s Madrassah schools or in southern California’s universities, by installing technologically innovative systems like fingerprint I.D. that register and catalogue masses of faceless, nameless people–enabling us to track them right to our shores. And we must be ruthless in compromising the intelligence and military industrial complexes of the states that seek to dismember us, whether through expert computer hacking or advanced surveillance airships that can monitor the most sensitive communications of the terror masters and their corps of transmitters, so we know who or what the enemy really is. Time is no friend of societies infected with terror’s new fatal viral operating system. REFERENCE: SEPTEMBER 16, 2005 8:33 A.M. Terrorism’s New Operating System Reforming our thinking. MANSOOR IJAZ

Mansoor Ijaz Poisonous Propaganda Against Pakistan Army (FOX NEWS May 2011)

By the sound and look of his video, bin Laden is counting on a Bush victory, and hoping it doesn’t come to pass. Kerry would change the political equation rather dramatically with the two states, Iran and Pakistan, where bin Laden is believed to have, or recently have had, sanctuary. Pakistan would be ratcheted down several levels as an important U.S. ally, and therefore allow bin Laden’s thriving Pakistani-based enterprise freer movements and planning/staging grounds. Iran would be coddled once again in an attempt to persuade the Mullahcracy to make nice and stop enriching uranium or extracting plutonium while al Qaeda’s dirty bombers refine their craft for the next attack. REFERENCE: NOVEMBER 1, 2004 12:47 P.M. Bin Laden’s Bluster Al Qaeda adopts Madison Avenue gimmickry to intimidate U.S. voters. MANSOOR IJAZ

Mansoor Ijaz Venomous Tongue Against Pakistan Army & Islamists (Fox News 2007)

The picture could not have been more replete with irony. At London’s fabled Royal Albert Hall last Wednesday, Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, was leading a jam session to chants of Pakistan Zindabad (“Long live Pakistan”) with his country’s superstar rock band, Junoon. At home, Islamic fundamentalists opposed to his continued rule as both Pakistan’s army chief and chief politician were banning all forms of music in a concerted effort to Talibanize two of Pakistan’s four provinces. Such are the contradictions that define the world’s only Islamic nuclear state as Musharraf sits down with President George W. Bush at Camp David later today to ask for major debt relief, a coveted textile-trade deal, and, if things go well, renewal of the military-supply relationship that was halted in 1990 when the U.S. imposed unilateral sanctions against Islamabad for developing nuclear weapons. Key to Pakistan’s request will be a package that includes advanced U.S. F-16 fighter jets — aircraft deliveries that could begin a process of rectifying the growing conventional imbalances between the Pakistani and Indian air forces. Musharraf has repeatedly implied (the Indians would say threatened) the need for Islamabad to rely on its nuclear arsenal if this disparity is not redressed. He is right to do so, and the administration needs to listen carefully to his arguments. But as Washington lines up support on all three counts for its embattled ally, Bush must make clear how Islamabad’s requests square with U.S. national-security interests. Musharraf may still be the best bet for stabilizing a very dangerous region, but he’s not invincible and no U.S. president should ever again rely on a single man to represent the alliance between two nations. Asking Musharraf to settle his self-manufactured domestic political crisis, in which Islamist parties demand his overly broad powers of governance be curtailed, must be at the top of the Bush agenda whether bilateral protocols allow for it or not. Its resolution alone will define the manner in which the general can move on matters of most concern to ordinary Americans. For the U.S., ending the operations of Osama bin Laden’s terror franchises on Pakistani soil is a vital first step. It is no longer acceptable for Pakistan to deem itself a key ally in the war on terror while terrorist plotting against the U.S. and its allies continues and bin Laden maintains refuge in Pakistan’s northern tribal regions. Neither is it acceptable that the American people be extorted over a few al Qaeda arrests every time Pakistan’s bank balances need replenishing, or hawkish generals run to Musharraf to demand more funding for the next generation of nuclear-capable missiles. Pakistani intelligence has had a pretty good idea of bin Laden’s whereabouts for some time. President Bush must tell his guest that Pakistan’s babysitting services are no longer needed. The Iraq campaign is over. Al Qaeda cells in Europe and the Middle East have been largely dismantled or are at least under surveillance. And so the time has come to bring the Saudi fugitive to justice before new cells can regenerate and attempt another major terrorist attack. Since Musharraf can’t sell U.S. special forces’ raids into tribal areas to his army hardliners and Islamic fundamentalists, he needs to quickly agree to a political power-sharing formula with the religious parties who oppose him so he can gain their support for ending al Qaeda operations on Pakistani soil. This is best done by giving Islamists the role in governance their votes assured them of last October, rather than excluding them from it. Who better to talk to the intransigent tribal warlords of the northwestern areas on the merits of sacrificing a few bad apples among them for the sake of Pakistan’s larger interests than their Islamist brethren? Another three years as army chief, rather than the five Musharraf wants or the six months the opposition offers, will not materially change his powers or affect Pakistan’s future. Demanding Islamist performance in government over that time is a fair quid pro quo for agreeing to revoke the president’s constitutional powers to dismiss elected parliaments. If the mullahs have been chosen to represent a segment of Pakistani society, so be it. But they should demonstrate their ability to deliver real results that positively affect the everyday lives of the working classes before Musharraf relinquishes his authority to get rid of them. Pakistan’s religious parties also sense that compromise is in their interest. By having a stake in the nation’s business, and a responsibility to insure its future, they increase prospects for larger voter support in future polls. Perhaps it’s not the democracy Washington would have preferred when it pushed Musharraf to hold last October’s elections (it certainly was not the outcome he expected), but it could at least be a primitively functioning democracy with some measure of accountability. Even Islamists should be allowed to learn the ropes of self-rule. Still, the religious parties should understand that much-needed Western investment cannot flow if terrorism strikes at targets domestically. They should understand that a reticent U.S. Congress won’t allow resumption of military sales, or sanction further debt forgiveness at U.S. taxpayer expense, to a state that at a moment’s notice could be taken over by the fanatics in their ranks. That is why they now need to help find and capture the likes of bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s strategic mastermind, so U.S. special forces won’t have to enter the tribal areas and do it for them later. We can only hope they understand that the collateral damage a chaotic, even violent, confrontation with Musharraf could inflict on the country’s long-term viability is an unacceptable price to pay for what is essentially a clash of titanic egos. Democracy, particularly in Muslim countries, should not be a one person, one vote, one time, exercise. In the event Pakistan’s Islamists understand none of the above, it should by now be clear to even the most avowed anti-U.S. fanatic that there is zero tolerance in U.S. strategic-planning circles for the emergence of radicalized Islamic states, no matter their previous value to U.S. interests. ZERO. Which is where India, and the Kashmir dispute, come into the equation. Musharraf will ask Bush to pressure India to come to the negotiating table without making any further concessions on ending Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri militants crossing the Line of Control into Indian-held Kashmir. And he will say no further incursions are taking place — which he can, of course, since most of them went across two months ago. But rather than getting bogged down in definitions of who’s a terrorist and who’s a freedom fighter, Bush should tell Musharraf that his compromise at home with the religious parties could offer an opportunity to their leaders to become partners in peace negotiations with India over Kashmir’s future. Giving Pakistan’s Islamists the Kashmir brief would also inspire confidence in India, where political, military, and intelligence officials know very well that only those who support the jihadist culture in Kashmir can dismantle it and thereby settle on a just and peaceful outcome. That outcome is very much in doubt today because of the visceral distrust both sides have for each other’s leaders. Only last week, India’s deputy prime minister, Lal Krishna Advani, in Washington to front-run Musharraf’s visit, called Pakistan the “epicenter of global terrorism.” Musharraf, in London on the same day Advani met his British counterparts, reminded India that another military showdown in the snowy peaks of Kashmir, as the two sides did in 1999 at Kargil, was not out of the question if India didn’t heel. With such insane statements coming from the two men who make perhaps the most important decisions in South Asian military and political affairs, it is time for the Bush administration to step in and help build some trust between the two sides that is rooted in factual exchanges rather than hyperbolic dissertations. Musharraf should be encouraged to direct Pakistan’s intelligence chief, Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, to meet his Indian counterpart so that hard data about what is or is not happening along Kashmir’s Line of Control can be exchanged between the two sides instead of the heated rhetoric Musharraf and India’s political leaders seem insistent on bandying about. The Indians stand ready to do so. Pakistan’s reticence is unjustifiable and damages the prospects for a long-term, durable peace. If India and China can agree on formulas for building trust that resolve decades-old border disputes, and can thereby develop strategic ties that benefit both sides, it is inconceivable that India and Pakistan cannot do the same. Musharraf needs to understand that South Asia’s peace train has already left the station and that he should get onboard before its too late. Finally, Bush needs to ask his guest to accept nuclear-monitoring equipment as part of any U.S. military-aid package — vaults, sensors, alarms, labels, closed-circuit cameras, etc. — that will insure the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear materials from terrorist hands. The equipment would be solely for Islamabad’s internal use to monitor its nuclear facilities. No violation of sovereign rights is implied by becoming a technologically sophisticated, and therefore more responsible nuclear state. Musharraf should accept this assistance without delay. To help Musharraf understand the magnitude of the problem, the U.S. should share hard intelligence data that shows how far terrorist planning has evolved to build highly explosive dirty radiological bombs for a new wave of attacks. The recent seizure of 750 tons of explosives, enough to create an atomic-sized explosion, on the “Baltic Sky” by Greek authorities is proof positive that al Qaeda’s fleet of tankers and ships around the world are the most likely transport vehicles and detonation chambers for these devices. And with North Korea threatening to use its Pakistani-assisted nuclear program to sell everything it can produce to any terrorist any day now, the least Pakistan can do for the U.S. is to insure its own nuclear assets don’t fall into the wrong hands. Musharraf comes to Washington in need of clear signs that the U.S. is not going to walk away from Pakistan’s side again. If he can agree to some important steps that address U.S. concerns, every form of assistance should be on the table: Full debt forgiveness; restructured International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans; a textile deal that relieves pressure on Pakistan’s economy; the best F-16s money can buy so Pakistan can reduce its reliance on missiles and nuclear weapons as deterrents to India’s burgeoning conventional-military superiority. A strong, responsible Pakistan is in America’s best national interest. REFERENCE: JUNE 24, 2003 8:45 A.M. Strengthening Pakistan Helps Protect The U.S. Pervez Musharraf may be flawed, but he's still our best bet for stability. MANSOOR IJAZ

Kamran Khan Says Pakistan is a Terrorist State (GEO TV MAY 2011)

Mansoor Ijaz is Imran Khan's Friend.

Pakistan’s intelligence services have a notorious reputation for being indistinguishable from the hoodlums they chase in the name of preserving national security for the country’s 155 million citizens. So it was in the wee hours of last Saturday morning that a masterful raid on an al Qaeda safe house near Islamabad by Inter-Services Intelligence officials netted one of the world’s most dangerous men, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. He left behind a veritable gold mine of information about al Qaeda’s current and future terrorist operations. In the process, the ISI may have recast its tarnished image as a stalwart in the global war against terrorism and strengthened Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s hands in rooting out terror cells on his soil. The raid was a product of months of patient and deliberate planning in close coordination with U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement authorities to unearth terrorist hideouts throughout the region. It marked the first time since September 11, 2001 that ISI had used strategic surveillance and stalking techniques to flush out an al Qaeda bigwig. And while U.S. signals intelligence and other monitoring equipment were crucial in expanding the scope of the operation and gleaning vital statistics prior to the arrests last Saturday, there was a marked shift inside ISI to employ its cultural expertise and deep knowledge of Pakistan’s underground in order to bring down senior al Qaeda leaders. The trail got hot after Osama bin Laden’s spokesman, Abul Baraa Qarshi, issued instructions in code over the terror group’s underground Internet system, which revealed in some detail the next “big operation” against the United States and its allies. Reference was repeatedly made to follow the path of “Mukhtar” (translated: the “authorized one”) amid Qarshi’s bin Laden-inspired exhortations to heed calls for jihad. Mukhtar is the codename of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (“KSM”). Armed with this finding, Pakistani authorities immediately started tracking known KSM associates and found a stunning correlation between the coded underground message and activities of al Qaeda operatives above ground. KSM and his key al Qaeda cells around the world were planning significant new attacks against the United States, with never-before-employed terror tactics. That is why the Bush administration’s Homeland Security Department raised the terror alerts three weeks ago. My intelligence sources confirm that the planned attacks were on the order of magnitude of a September 11 operation, with nearly as many cells involved in various parts of the United States as were recently uncovered in Europe. Weapons of mass destruction were not contemplated for use in these acts on U.S. soil. As tracking and surveillance continued, a little help from lady luck entered the equation. In the al Qaeda-infested border town of Quetta, an elderly couple motivated by large offers of reward money reported unusual movements of young Arab men into and out of what turned out to be an al Qaeda safe house next door to their home. Hours later, Pakistani police officials and the ISI had a pretty clear idea that KSM was in residence. Rather than swoop in and capture him then, a strategic decision was made by ISI chief Gen. Ehsan ul Haq to blanket KSM’s entourage with surveillance and stalk them to see how far and wide the network was operational inside Pakistan. KSM was flushed out of the safe house in such a way that his computers and other evidence would be left behind. On the hard drive of KSM’s Quetta safe-house computer, Pakistani police officials found a goldmine of information — names of other senior al Qaeda operatives, e-mails, telephone numbers, wire-transfer information (KSM is also Chief Financial Officer for all al Qaeda operations around the world), travel itineraries, future terror scenarios — the list goes on. One e-mail was addressed to Abdul Qadoos, the son of a microbiologist in Rawalpindi and resident of the house where a haggardly but clean-shaven KSM was nabbed on Saturday morning when ISI, CIA, and FBI officials had concluded the stalking and surveillance was no longer yielding sufficient data to warrant the risk of losing him. A series of lightning raids followed, netting KSM, an as yet unidentified Egyptian man known only as “Ahmed” (and some suspect, possibly a relative of Egyptian-born al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri), and Abdul Qadoos in round one, and seven Arab and Pakistani men, as yet unidentified, in round two. More arrests of significant al Qaeda operatives are expected in the coming days. So unaware was KSM that he was being stalked that even his cell phones and audiotapes, some reportedly with instructions from bin Laden, were found amid the mess in his uptown flat. The data his computers, audiotapes, and handwritten notes yield will in all likelihood supersede in importance what we get from his hardened criminal mind, even under the most severe interrogation. As Husain Haqqani at the Carnegie Endowment has articulated with great clarity, KSM is not chief executive officer of a corporation called al Qaeda. He is a franchise owner who knows all the other franchisees. Or at least his computer knows where the key ones are. And that’s just fine for U.S. purposes, because a lesser al Qaeda operative found through decoding the franchise network may yield more important and highly localized data about the next planned attacks than a hardened senior leader would. This is precisely how the poisons network was dismantled in Europe, a network whose chief franchise owner was an Iraqi resident and a key evidentiary link between Iraq and al Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. So, what does the arrest of this terror mastermind mean for America’s war on terror? When Osama bin Laden spoke from the ether three weeks ago, the Islamist phraseology and verses of the Koran he chose to convey his jihadist message demonstrated, for the first time since September 11, a growing sense of urgency and fear about al Qaeda’s ability to retaliate in the event of a U.S.-led war to disarm Iraq. His original thinking (my hypothesis) was to use the event of U.S. troops storming Baghdad as justification for a series of retaliation strikes around the world, starting in Europe and the Middle East (to effect political divides within NATO and between the U.S. and its stalwart Arab allies), and then later in the U.S. and possibly even Canada. The retaliation infrastructure al Qaeda had set in place was extensive, very hard to build up with the proper expertise (for biological and chemical weapons), and increasingly more expensive to maintain as the U.S. succeeded in progressively shutting down sources of financing available to bin Laden. With much of bin Laden’s European network systematically dismantled by Western intelligence and bin Laden himself trying to nebulously link al Qaeda to Iraq in order to provoke the “Islam vs. West” confrontation, retaining whatever was left of the terror group’s retaliation infrastructure in the Middle East and North America became a paramount concern in recent weeks. Musharraf also apparently felt bin Laden’s anxiety, and ISI profilers sensed an opportunity to get an upper hand in their own backyard against al Qaeda’s hidden cells. This, coupled with a little well-timed pressure from Washington about towing the line in rooting out senior al Qaeda cells before the military campaign against Iraq was to start (a message delivered by our able Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca on her recent trip to Islamabad), sparked the sea change inside ISI about the emerging national-security threat posed by nuts the agency had once helped to create. KSM’s arrest therefore represented an opportunity, if done right, to dismantle the Middle East retaliation infrastructure before launching the war to disarm Saddam. Pentagon planners have long fretted about the cauldrons of fire al Qaeda’s Saddam-enabled retaliation cells could unleash on weak Middle East governments if and when the U.S. decided to move against Iraq. Decapitating al Qaeda’s nerve center with KSM’s capture could lead to a collapse of its Middle East cells, much the same way one intercepted phone call between al Qaeda biochemical czar Zarqawi and one of his Jordanian operatives led to the dismantling of much of the ricin-poison network throughout Europe. Musharraf should now seize on the success of this capture to squeeze the warlords in his ungovernable tribal regions to cough up what remains of al Qaeda’s senior leadership in their midst, including bin Laden. He could easily choke economic supply routes into the areas along the Pakistan-Afghan border, thereby raising the cost of harboring terrorists there, as well as conduct repeated lightning raids in border towns such as Quetta and Peshawar, where lesser al Qaeda leaders are still hiding, to send a message that Pakistani soil is no longer available for terrorist planning. Maintaining the vigil in large, densely populated urban centers where al Qaeda is known to have safe houses is also an imperative. The ISI should effect a veritable quarantine on Pakistan’s rivers and exits at Karachi’s seaports to insure al Qaeda is not able to use its sea vessels to get key leaders, including a possibly disguised bin Laden and Egyptian mastermind Ayman Zawahiri, out of the country. With KSM’s capture and all that it implies for war in the Middle East, Musharraf may have delivered an invaluable gift at an opportune time to his embattled friend, U.S. President George W. Bush — the possibility that a U.S.-led strike on Iraq can no longer be met with large-scale al Qaeda reprisals. He must not let that message be diluted by either abstaining or voting against the U.S. in upcoming deliberations on Iraq at the United Nations Security Council. It cannot be overstated how the operation to capture KSM demonstrates the Bush administration’s deliberate and calibrated efforts to root out those responsible for murdering 3,000 of our fellow citizens on that bright September morning. Rooting out Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction so they never make their way into the hands of people like Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is not a separate task or detour along the way in fighting terror. It is the next most important step. America must not let its guard down in the understandable need to rejoice in this major triumph of good over evil. We are finally ahead of the terror curve aligned against us — it’s time to get on with finishing the job. REFERENCE: Brain Drain - Pakistan's intelligence services have a notorious reputation for being indistinguishable from the hoodlums they chase in the name of preserving national security for the country's 155 million citizens. So it was in the wee hours of last Saturday morning MARCH 4, 2003 9:00 A.M. MANSOOR IJAZ 

Close analysis of the available evidence lets us see how this nexus works. For the past seven years, I have witnessed Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda operations in various countries firsthand, visiting with his followers in safe houses in Sudan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Malaysia — some as recently as September last year. I have spent tens of hours trying to fathom and decode their hatred for westerners and even brought the terror groups less radicalized adherents into the peace framework that led to a ceasefire of hostilities between Muslim separatists and Indian security forces in Kashmir in 2000. But the al Qaeda that struck America on September 11 is no longer an organization with a flowchart of country-specific responsibilities and 37 card-carrying vice presidents planning and coordinating actions in each locale. The Afghan bombing campaign saw to that. No, al Qaeda today is a viral infection with a few powerful germinators — Egyptian-born mastermind Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, Pakistani-born Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Jordanian-born Abu Musab Zarqawi, to name the top three — who have been exceedingly successful in infecting a wide berth of radical Islamist groups from Indonesia to France. These groups, like the cancerous Algerian terror cells broken up throughout Europe during the past month, are well established in their local environments and are willing to host al Qaeda’s overseers while continuing to execute their own politically motivated agendas locally. Iraq continues to deny any involvement in training al Qaeda operatives, and Pakistani intelligence very effectively, and quickly, suppressed evidence of these clandestine meetings after September 11. But erasing the fingerprints cannot change the irrefutable fact that Ricin and other chemicals first found in al Qaeda’s Afghan safe houses after years of covert collaborations with Iraq inside Pakistan and Afghanistan are now being repeatedly uncovered in al Qaeda affiliated terror cells throughout Europe. REFERENCE: FEBRUARY 18, 2003 9:00 A.M. Hand in Glove Iraq and al Qaeda. MANSOOR IJAZ

World Knows the truth behind WMD in Iraq but Jang Group of Newspapers/GEO TV's New Love Mansoor Ijaz support Bombing on Iraq  - Commentary Saddam Hussein is building banned weapons and is in league with Al Qaeda. January 28, 2003  Islamic truths February 18, 2006|Mansoor Ijaz | MANSOOR IJAZ is an American Muslim of Pakistani ancestry. How Secure Is Pakistan's Plutonium? By MANSOOR IJAZ and R. JAMES WOOLSEY Published: November 28, 2001 but The United Nations' former chief weapons inspector in Iraq told the official inquiry into the war that he had cautioned Tony Blair the month before the 2003 invasion about the possibility that no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be found. (The Telegraph)

Mansoor Ijaz's Partner Ex CIA Chief James Woolsey on War on Iraq

The United Nations' former chief weapons inspector in Iraq told the official inquiry into the war that he had cautioned Tony Blair the month before the 2003 invasion about the possibility that no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be found. (The Telegraph) Former head of UN weapons inspectors tells Chilcot inquiry 'alarm bells' should have rung when his staff failed to find evidence of WMD (The Guardian)

Hans Blix, who has not been called to give evidence to Sir John Chilcot's inquiry, said his team had grown suspicious of the quality of intelligence pointing to Saddam Hussein having WMDs. The inspectors visited many sites said by intelligence services in the UK, the US and elsewhere to contain WMDs, but had only ever found conventional weapons, documents or nothing at all, he said. ''I think this was one of the most significant things of the whole story,'' he told BBC Radio 4's Today programme. ''We got tips not only from the UK but from other intelligence, the US as well, so perhaps some 100 all in all. ''We had time to go to about three dozen of these sites and in no case did we find any weapons of mass destruction.''He added: ''We said if this is the best (intelligence), then what is the rest? Doubts arose from that.'' Dr Blix said he spoke to Mr Blair in February 2003, ahead of the March invasion, about his team's findings. ''I said to Mr Blair 'Yes, I also thought there could be weapons of mass destruction', but I said 'Are you so sure? Would it not be paradoxical if you were to invade Iraq with 200,000 men and found there were no weapons of mass destruction?'. ''His response was 'No, no', he was quite convinced, the intelligence services were convinced, and even the Egyptians were convinced, so I had no reason to doubt his good faith at the time. But I was doubtful.'' Dr Blix rejected suggestions by Jack Straw, who was foreign secretary in 2003, that he had since ''applied gloss'' to what he was saying in the months leading up to the invasion. And he said the Iraqis were finally making progress in opening up to inspections and should have been allowed more time. ''We warned the Iraqis that they needed to be more active and they became more active and we reported that to the (UN) Security Council, that we were actually making a great deal of progress,'' he said. Dr Blix added: ''We could not exclude that there was still something hidden, because you cannot prove the negative, but I think they should have taken to heart that there was a change in the Iraqi attitude, that there was more cooperation and that things that were unresolved were becoming resolved.'' REFERENCE: Hans Blix warned Tony Blair Iraq might not have WMD 9:19AM GMT 22 Jan 2010

Former head of UN weapons inspectors tells Chilcot inquiry 'alarm bells' should have rung when his staff failed to find evidence of WMD (The Guardian)

Mass Destruction: Truth and Consequences with Hans Blix

Britain and the US relied on dubious intelligence sources ahead of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the former head of the United Nations weapons inspectors said today. Giving evidence to the Iraq inquiry, Hans Blix said it should have set alarm bells ringing in London and Washington when the inspectors repeatedly failed to turn up any evidence that Saddam Hussein still had active weapons of mass destruction programmes. Blix said he warned the then prime minister Tony Blair in a February 2003 meeting that Saddam Hussein might not have any weapons of mass destruction. He told the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, the same thing. He said: "When we reported that we did not find any weapons of mass destruction they should have realised, I think, both in London and in Washington, that their sources were poor. They should have been more critical about that." Blix said that he had privately confided to Blair in autumn 2002 – before the inspectors returned to Iraq – that he thought it "plausible" that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. However in the weeks leading up to the invasion in March 2003 – after the inspectors had failed to uncover anything significant – he said that he had cautioned Blair that there might not be anything. He said that he told Blair: "Wouldn't it be paradoxical if you were to invade Iraq with 250,000 men and find very little?" He added: "I gave a warning that things had changed and there might not be so much." Blix has claimed in the past that inspectors had too little time to assess whether Saddam was concealing weapons of mass destruction, as the US and Britain believed. He said that, immediately before the 2003 US-led invasion, his inspectors checked around 30 sites said by British and US intelligence to contain weapons of mass destruction, but discovered little more than some old missile engines and a sheaf of nuclear documents. He also said told the inquiry that he never felt "weapons of mass destruction" was a useful term because it conflated nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and the British more or less accepted there was no nuclear threat. Blix acknowledged the pressure of the US military buildup in the region had led Saddam to agree to the return of the UN inspectors in September 2002. However he said that he did not believe that Britain and the US had been entitled to invade Iraq without a further UN security council resolution specifically authorising military action. He accused the administration of US president George Bush of being "high on military" in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001. "They felt that they could get away with it and therefore it was desirable," he said. He also condemned claims by Britain and the US that Iraq had tried to acquire raw uranium for its supposed nuclear programme from Niger, based on a forged document. Blix said: "That was perhaps the first occasion I became suspicious about the evidence. I think that was the most scandalous part." REFERENCE: Hans Blix: Allies used 'poor' intelligence ahead of Iraq invasion - Staff and agencies Tuesday 27 July 2010 17.39 BST

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