Friday, December 2, 2011

Nawaz Sharif, Memogate & Secret US Deals.

Liaquat Ali Khan did not write or instruct the then ambassador to send any secret memorandum to the Americans. He was pretty open about it. During his first trip to the United States in 1950, he met the press at the National Press Club in the American capital. A reporter asked how large a standing army Pakistan wanted. Liaquat Ali Khan’s reply was quite simple to the inquisitive American reporter and here is a direct quote from the prime minister’s answer: “If your country will guarantee our territorial integrity, I will not keep any army at all.” Ayub Khan allowed the Americans to use Pakistani territory to fly U2 spy planes over the Soviet Union. Pakistanis came to know about these covert operations when the Soviets downed an American plane and captured its pilot and put him on television screens for the world to see. Pakistanis, all along, were told that the Americans were using the base outside Peshawar for weather-monitoring purposes. REFERENCE: Memogate and historyFrom the Newspaper | Opinion | By Haider Nizamani November 27, 2011 http://www.dawn.com/2011/11/27/memogate-and-history.html



HARIPUR: PML-N president Nawaz Sharif said on Friday that he was willing to help the government and army stop secret agreements with the US, Geo News reported. Speaking during a news conference Sharif said that he did not raise a finger at anyone in the Supreme Court nor did he call anyone a traitor. "If the Parliament was performing its duties, then I would not have needed to approach the Supreme Court," Sharif said. The PML-N president further said that the present government was continuing with the policies of the Musharraf era. Sharif added that no party could be revolutionary if it was associated with the establishment. REFERENCE: Willing to help government and army stop secret agreements with US: Nawaz http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=27798&title=Willing-to-help-government-and-army-stop-secret-agreements-with-US:-Nawaz-


Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry ILLEGALLY Favours Nawaz Sharif

Nawaz Shareef didn't Walk through Security Gates in Supreme Court

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=izVozwXvEaw

ISLAMABAD: Former Director-General of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Tariq Khosa has refused to head a one-man commission to investigate the memo scandal, DawnNews reported on Saturday. The commission was set up by the Supreme Court. Khosa, who has also served as inspector general of Balochistan police, is a brother of Justice Asif Saeed Khosa and Punjab Chief Secretary Nasir Khosa. Earlier, former law minister Babar Awan had questioned Khosa’s nomination at a press conference by saying that he was a brother of the Punjab chief secretary and a judge of the Supreme Court. But those who worked with Khosa called him an ‘upright’ man and a ‘clean’ government officer. The scandal erupted when US citizen of Pakistani origin, Mansoor Ijaz, accused Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, of masterminding an alleged memo sent to a senior US military official asking for help to rein in the Pakistani military after the American raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May. Haqqani denied the allegation and resigned from his position of ambassador in the wake of the controversy. REFERENCES: Tariq Khosa refuses to head commission on memogate December 3, 2011 http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/03/tariq-khosa-refuses-to-head-commission-on-memogate.html •One-man commission named •PPP’s angry reaction •President, COAS, ISI chief to explain position: SC orders memogate inquiry, tells Haqqani not to go abroad December 2, 2011 http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/02/one-man-commission-named-ppps-angry-reaction-president-coas-isi-chief-to-explain-position-sc-orders-memogate-inquiry-tells-haqqani-not-to-go-abroad.html


Friday, December 02, 2011, Moharram-ul-Haram 06,1433 A.H. Updated at: 1400
http://jang.com.pk/jang/dec2011-daily/02-12-2011/u89082.htm



Would Mr. Nawaz Sharif & Loudmouth PML - N Leaders explain the below mentioned "Treason Against The Country & Pakistan Army"

"QUOTE"








Geo Report- Stopping Secret Agreements - 02 Dec 2011
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vmyJW4VAJ-I


Washington, June 21: Contrary to common belief, President Bill Clinton did not intervene on his own in the Kargil dispute in 1999 to bring about a withdrawal of Pakistani forces and avert a war between India and Pakistan. The former President says in his autobiography that “Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan called and asked if he could come to Washington on July 4 to discuss the dangerous standoff with India that had begun several weeks earlier when Pakistani forces under the command of General Pervez Musharraf crossed the Line of Control (LoC)”. The autobiography, My Life, is to be published on Tuesday, but an advance copy of the book, which promises to be America’s publishing sensation of the year, was obtained by The Telegraph on Sunday night. Clinton’s first person account of US diplomacy and his summit meeting with Sharif in Washington at the height of the Kargil conflict throws authoritative light on America’s approach to India-Pakistan issues and is certain to be a factor with the new policymakers in New Delhi as they weigh their positions on the vexing trilateral issues involving India, Pakistan and the US. Clinton writes in his memoirs that following the now-exiled Pakistani Prime Minister’s plea to be allowed to visit the White House: “I told Sharif that he was always welcome in Washington, even on July 4, but if he wanted me to spend America’s independence day with him, he had to come to the US knowing two things: first he had to agree to withdraw his troops back across the LoC; and second, I would not agree to intervene in the Kashmir dispute, especially under circumstances that appeared to reward Pakistan’s wrongful incursion.” According to the former President: “Sharif said he wanted to come anyway. On July 4, we met at Blair House”, the residence for state guests adjacent to the White House. “Sharif was concerned that the situation Pakistan had created was getting out of control… Once more, Sharif urged me to intervene in Kashmir, and again I explained that without India’s consent it would be counterproductive, but that I would urge (Prime Minister Atal Bihari) Vajpayee to resume the bilateral dialogue if the Pakistani troops withdrew. He agreed and we released a joint statement saying that steps would be taken to restore the LoC and that I would support and encourage the resumption… of bilateral talks once the violence had stopped.” The rest is history. The broad premise of what Clinton writes about his Kargil diplomacy was revealed two years ago by Bruce Riedel, Clinton’s special assistant for South Asia on the National Security Council, in a policy paper for the University of Pennsylvania, but Clinton’s first person account is significant for its confirmation that the US was not doing India any good turn by securing a Pakistani withdrawal of forces from territory it occupied. In recent years, the Kargil experience with the US has been repeatedly used by those who favour an Indo-US alliance to argue that New Delhi could be a strategic beneficiary of any such alliance. Clinton’s book reveals that the US was unwilling — at least at that stage — to do anything beyond what it had already done to help India and that it was Sharif’s desperation for a settlement that forced Washington into the picture. Indeed, Sharif had to force himself on Clinton to make peace with India. Those who favour an Indo-US alliance also cite the Bush administration’s subsequent pressure on Pervez Musharraf to end cross-border terrorism to argue for such an alliance, though their claims have lately been pricked by Washington’s decision to grant Pakistan the status of a major non-Nato ally. Clinton reveals in his memoirs that his major consideration in dealings with Sharif was that “I needed his cooperation in the fight against terrorism”, the very same rationale of the Bush administration in support of Musharraf, the author of Kargil. “Before our July 4 meeting”, writes Clinton, “I had asked Sharif on three occasions for help in apprehending Osama bin Laden… We had intelligence reports that al Qaida was planning attacks on US officials and facilities… perhaps in the US as well. We had been successful in breaking up cells and arresting a number of al Qaida members, but unless bin Laden and his top lieutenants were apprehended or killed, the threat would remain.” REFERENCE: Revealed: Clinton’s Kargil crisis secret - Autobiography says US intervention was not voluntary, prompted by Sharif K.P. NAYAR Tuesday, June 22, 2004 http://www.telegraphindia.com/1040622/asp/frontpage/story_3401726.asp









Nawaz Sharif says Kargil Was A Mistake.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4OiDARlI4E



In 1999, the CIA secretly trained and equipped approximately 60 commandos from the Pakistani intelligence agency to enter Afghanistan for the purpose of capturing or killing Osama bin Laden, according to people familiar with the operation. The operation was arranged by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his chief of intelligence with the Clinton administration, which in turn promised to lift sanctions on Pakistan and provide an economic aid package. The plan was aborted later that year when Sharif was ousted in a military coup. The plan was set in motion less than 12 months after U.S. cruise missile strikes against bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan that Clinton administration officials believe narrowly missed hitting the exiled Saudi militant. The clandestine operation was part of a more robust effort by the United States to get bin Laden than has been previously reported, including consideration of broader military action, such as massive bombing raids and Special Forces assaults. It is a record of missed opportunities that has provided President Bush and his administration with some valuable lessons as well as a framework for action as they draw up plans for their own war against bin Laden and his al Qaeda network in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington. The Pakistani commando team was up and running and ready to strike by October 1999, a former official said. "It was an enterprise," the official said. "It was proceeding." Still stung by their failure to get bin Laden the previous year, Clinton officials were delighted at the operation, which they believed provided a real opportunity to eliminate bin Laden. "It was like Christmas," a source said. The operation was aborted on Oct. 12, 1999, however, when Sharif was overthrown in a military coup led by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who refused to continue the operation despite substantial efforts by the Clinton administration to revive it. Musharraf, now Pakistan's president, has emerged as a key ally in the Bush administration's efforts to track down bin Laden and destroy his terrorist network. The record of the CIA's aborted relationship with Pakistan two years ago illustrates the value -- and the pitfalls -- of such an alliance in targeting bin Laden. Pakistan and its intelligence service have valuable information about what is occurring inside Afghanistan, a country that remains closed to most of the world. But a former U.S. official said joint operations with the Pakistani service are always dicey, because the Taliban militia that rules most of Afghanistan has penetrated Pakistani intelligence. "You never know who you're dealing with," the former senior official said. "You're always dealing with shadows."

'We Were at War'

In addition to the Pakistan operation, President Bill Clinton the year before had approved additional covert action for the CIA to work with groups inside Afghanistan and with other foreign intelligence services to capture or kill bin Laden. The most dramatic attempt to kill bin Laden occurred in August 1998, when Clinton ordered a Tomahawk cruise missile attack on bin Laden's suspected training camps in Afghanistan in response to the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. At the time, the Pentagon informed the president that far more ambitious and riskier military actions could be undertaken, according to officials involved in the decision. The options included a clandestine helicopter-borne night assault with small U.S. special operations units; a massive bombing raid on the southeastern Afghan city of Kandahar, the spiritual home of the Taliban and a place frequently visited by bin Laden and his followers; and a larger air- and sea-launched missile and bombing raid on the bin Laden camps in eastern Afghanistan. Clinton approved the cruise missile attack recommended by his advisers, and on Aug. 20, 1998, 66 cruise missiles rained down on the training camps. An additional 13 missiles were fired at a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that the Clinton administration believed was a chemical weapons factory associated with bin Laden. Clinton's decision to attack with unmanned Tomahawk cruise missiles meant that no American lives were put in jeopardy. The decision was supported by his top national security team, which included Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, officials said. In the aftermath of last month's attacks on the United States, which the Bush administration has tied to bin Laden, Clinton officials said their decision not to take stronger and riskier action has taken on added relevance. "I wish we'd recognized it then," that the United States was at war with bin Laden, said a senior Defense official, "and started the campaign then that we've started now. That's my main regret. In hindsight, we were at war." Outside experts are even more pointed. "I think that raid really helped elevate bin Laden's reputation in a big way, building him up in the Muslim world," said Harlan Ullman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. "My sense is that because the attack was so limited and incompetent, we turned this guy into a folk hero." Senior officials involved in the decision to limit the attack to unmanned cruise missiles cite four concerns that in many ways are similar to those the Bush administration is confronting now. One was worry that the intelligence on bin Laden's whereabouts was sketchy. Reports at the time said he was supposed to be at a gathering of terrorists, perhaps 100 or more, but it was not clear how reliable that information was. "There was little doubt there was going to be a conference," a source said. "It was not certain that bin Laden would be there, but it was thought to be the case." The source added, "It was all driven by intelligence. . . . The intelligence turned out to be off." A second concern was about killing innocent people, especially in Kandahar, a city already devastated by the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Large loss of civilian life, the thinking went, could have cost the United States the moral high ground in its efforts against terrorism, especially in the Muslim world. The risks of conducting a long-range helicopter assault, which would require aerial refueling at night, were another factor. The helicopters might have had to fly 900 miles, an official said. Administration officials especially wanted to avoid a repeat of the disastrous 1980 Desert One operation to rescue American hostages in Iran. During that operation, ordered by President Jimmy Carter, a refueling aircraft collided with a helicopter in the Iranian desert, killing eight soldiers. A final element was the lack of permission for bombers to cross the airspace of an adjoining nation, such as Pakistan, or for helicopters to land at a staging ground on foreign soil. Since Sept. 11, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have offered the United States use of bases and airspace for any new strike against bin Laden. Bin Laden, 44, a member of an extended wealthy Saudi family, was expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1991 and stripped of his citizenship three years later. In early 1996, the CIA set up a special bin Laden unit, largely because of evidence linking him to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. At the time, he was living in Sudan, but he was expelled from that country in May 1996 after the CIA failed to persuade the Saudis to accept a Sudanese offer to turn him over. After his subsequent move to Afghanistan, bin Laden became a major focus of U.S. military and intelligence efforts in February 1998, when he issued a fatwa, or religious order, calling for the killing of Americans. "That really got us spun up," recalled retired Marine Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, who was then the chief of the Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. When two truck bombs killed more than 200 people at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August of that year, and the U.S. government developed evidence that bin Laden was behind both attacks, the question was not whether the United States should counterattack, but how and when. And when depended on information about his whereabouts. Two weeks later, intelligence arrived in Washington indicating that bin Laden would be attending a meeting in eastern Afghanistan. Much turned on the quality of the intelligence provided by CIA Director George J. Tenet, recalled a senior official who had firsthand knowledge of the administration's debate on how to respond. "Some days George was good," the official said, "but some days he was not so good. One day he would be categorical and say this is the best we will get . . . and then two days later or a week later, he would say he was not so sure." 'It Was a Sustained Effort' The quality of the intelligence behooved restraint in planning the raid. Hitting bin Laden with a cruise missile "was a long shot, very iffy," recalled Zinni, the former Central Command chief. "The intelligence wasn't that solid." At the same time, new information surfaced suggesting that bin Laden might be planning another major attack. Top Clinton officials felt it was essential to act. At best, they calculated, bin Laden would be killed. And at a minimum, he might be knocked off balance and forced to devote more of his energy to hiding from U.S. forces. "He felt he was safe in Afghanistan, in the mountains, inside landlocked airspace," Zinni said. "So at least we could send the message that we could reach him." In all, 66 cruise missiles were launched from Navy ships in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Pakistan into the camps in Afghanistan. Pakistan had not been warned in advance, but Air Force Gen. Joseph Ralston, then the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with Pakistani officials at the precise time of the launch to tell them of the operation. He also assured them that Pakistan was not under surprise attack from India, a potential misapprehension that could have led to war. At least one missile lost power and crashed in Pakistan, but the rest flew into Afghanistan and slammed into suspected terrorist training camps outside Khost, a small town near the Afghan-Pakistani border. Most of the cruise missiles were carrying loads of anti-personnel cluster bomblets, with the intention of killing as many people as possible. Reports from the scene were inconclusive. Most said that the raid killed about 30 people, but not bin Laden. Intelligence that reached top Clinton administration officials after the raid said that bin Laden had left the camp two or three hours before the missiles struck. Other reports said he might have left as many as 10 or 12 hours before they landed. Sources in the U.S. military said the launch time was adjusted some to coordinate it with the Sudan attack andto launch after sundown to minimize detection of the missiles. This had the effect of delaying the launch time by several hours. An earlier launch might have caught bin Laden, two sources said. Cohen came to suspect that bin Laden escaped because he was tipped off that the strike was coming. Four days before the operation, the State Department issued a public warning about a "very serious threat" and ordered hundreds of nonessential U.S. personnel and dependents out of Pakistan. Some U.S. officials believe word could have been passed to bin Laden by the Taliban on a tip from Pakistani intelligence services. Several other former officials disputed the notion of a security breach, saying bin Laden had plenty of notice that the United States intended to retaliate. There also is dispute about the follow-up to the 1998 raid, specifically about whether the Clinton administration, having tried and failed to kill bin Laden, stopped paying attention. There were attempts. Special Forces troops and helicopter gunships were kept on alert in the region, ready to launch a raid if solid intelligence pinpointed bin Laden's whereabouts. Also, twice in 1999, information arrived indicating that bin Laden might possibly be in a certain village in Afghanistan at a certain time, officials recalled. There was discussion of destroying the village, but the intelligence was not deemed credible enough to warrant the potential slaughter of civilians. In addition, the CIA that year launched its clandestine operation with Pakistani intelligence to train Pakistani commandos for operations against bin Laden. "It was a sustained effort," Cohen said recently. "There was not a week that went by when the issue wasn't seriously addressed by the national security team." Berger said, "Al Qaeda and bin Laden were the number one security threat to America after 1998. It was the highest priority, and a range of appropriate actions were taken." But never again did definitive information arrive that might have permitted another attempt to get bin Laden, officials said. "I can't tell you how many times we got a call saying, 'We have information, and we have to hold a secret meeting about whether to launch a military action,' " said Walter Slocombe, the former undersecretary of defense for policy. "Maybe we were too cautious. I don't think so." Researcher Jeff Himmelman contributed to this report. REFERENCE: CIA Trained Pakistanis to Nab Terrorist But Military Coup Put an End to 1999 Plot By Bob Woodward and Thomas E. Ricks Washington Post Staff Writers Wednesday, October 3, 2001; 12:18 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/18/AR2007111800629.html

No comments: