Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Mansoor Ijaz: Mata Hari of La La Land!



She stood alone in the sodden field on the outskirts of Paris, her fashionable ankle boots firmly planted in the mud churned up by the cavalry who drilled there. No, she would not be tied to the stake, she told her executioners politely. And nor would she allow them to blindfold her. She faced the barrels of the firing squad without flinching. Earlier, at 5am, they had woken her in her filthy cell in the Prison de Saint-Lazare to tell her this was the day she would die. She dressed in her best - stockings, a low-cut blouse under a dove-grey, two-piece suit. On her head she perched a three-cornered hat at a jaunty angle, hiding her greying hair, unkempt and unwashed through nine months of incarceration. Over her shoulders she slung a vivid blue coat like a cloak to keep out the cold October air. In a black car with its window blinds down, Margaretha Zelle, convicted of espionage, was then driven at speed through the still streets of the capital - a place she loved with a passion, though she was Dutch not French - to this damp and drear spot. The 12 soldiers in their khaki uniforms and red fezzes raised their rifles. She waved to the two weeping nuns who had been her comfort in prison and on her last journey. She blew a kiss to the priest and another to her lawyer, an ex-lover. The sun was coming up when the shots rang out. Zelle slumped to the ground. The officer in charge marched forward and fired a single bullet into her brain, the coup de grace. An extraordinary life was over. The woman who was executed that day in 1917 was better known as Mata Hari, the name Zelle had chosen for herself when she became Europe's queen of unbridled eroticism, an exotic dancer, courtesan, harlot, great lover, spendthrift, liar, deceiver and thief. And German spy? That is what - in the fevered atmosphere of France in World War I, with the Kaiser's troops encamped within its borders - she had been shot for. She caused the deaths of tens of thousands of French soldiers, it was said, a crime that would ever after make her synonymous with seduction and treachery, the ultimate femme fatale. REFERENCE: Mata Hari was only interested in one thing - and it wasn't espionage by TONY RENNELL Last updated at 22:00 10 August 2007 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-474631/Mata-Hari-interested-thing--wasnt-espionage.html

La La Land: The term either refers to Hollywood, Los Angeles or a state of mind synonymous with Hollywood that is out of touch with reality, focusing on dreams, fantasies or frivolous endeavors. Now Jang Group should also believe this Video Interview and start issuing Charge Sheet: Mr. Rasul Bux Rais (Professor of political science at LUMS) has basically pleaded case against Pakistan, its Armed Forces and it's Prime Intelligence Agency in Indian Media and that too without even a proper enquiry and court proceedings and confirmed and authenticated the Baseless Allegations of a Person who is Rabidly Anti Pakistan i.e. Mansoor Ijaz, lets have a glimpse what are the thoughts of Mansoor Ijaz and his cohorts about Pakistan. He is being quoted and authenticated by Rasul Bux Rais, Mohammad Malick, Kamran Khan, Shaheen Sehbai, Ansar Abbasi, GEO TV/Jang Group of Newspapers/The News International and Imran Khan as if Mansoor's Memo is a Holy Scroll

Mansoor Ijaz Venomous Tongue Against Pakistan Army & Islamists

video
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wInEfE460Fs



ISLAMABAD: The principal character in the memogate scandal, Mansoor Ijaz, has said that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is under nobody’s control and always keeps its hand in politics. In an interview with CNN host Fareed Zakaria, Mr Ijaz said: “The ISI has two critical branches in it. One is called CT, for counter-terrorism, and the other one is called S Branch for strategic —it’s sort of the arm of the ISI that does everything from political interventions in other countries, for example, Afghanistan, which is what they’re doing through the Haqqani network and the Taliban right now.” He said the ISI was an organ of the state that nobody could control. “And it is essentially the organ of the state that the army and the intelligence wings are using to, shall we say, coordinate or obstruct what it is that the political side of the government, the civilian side of the governments do in Pakistan,” he said. Mr Ijaz said the ISI does a lot of political interventions in its own country as it has been reported in the past by Pakistani press that S Branch was involved in manipulating elections and doing things of that nature inside Pakistan. “Now, there have been so many wrong things that have happened since the death of Bin Laden in the early part of May, so many things that indicated some hidden hand, if you will, in what was going on,” Mr Ijaz said. Mansoor Ijaz, who claimed himself a ‘messenger’ for a memo from Pakistan’s civilian government to the Pentagon asking Washington to clamp down on Pakistan’s military, said he had been involved in different operations in Pakistan now for a very long time. However, he did not mention that what kind of operations these were. He claimed that he had helped former prime minister Benazir Bhutto come back together with the Clinton administration as a part of the larger Pakistani-American community. “I was deeply involved in trying to broker a ceasefire in Kashmir,” he said. Blaming the ISI for interfering in the country’s politics, he said he found out in almost every single case that there was a political motivation and a political interference by the ISI. “It is my view, and it is still my view today that Section S of the ISI has been involved in some very, very nefarious activities. And so since nobody was able to get their arms around that, the United States had to take the lead on that,” he said. “The United States has done this in Iran. They’ve done it in other countries where they’ve labelled certain organisations as terrorists. And it had a material impact in terms of how both US policy as well as other country’s policies were formulated to handle the problems in those countries then,” he added. By bringing the issue of memogate into limelight Mansoor Ijaz claimed that he had helped civilian government in Pakistan. “We have strengthened Pakistan. Maybe we haven’t strengthened the civilian side of Pakistan’s government. But there may have been a rot there that needs to be cleaned up. And if that rot is cleaned out, you might find a very strong Pakistan emanating out of this, in which the judiciary does what it’s supposed to, the military does what it’s supposed to,” he said. REFERENCE: ISI always keeps its hand in politics: IjazOur Staff Reporter | National | From the Newspaper http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/05/isi-always-keeps-its-hand-in-politics-ijaz.html

Had I been somewhere near in decision making process I wouldn't have allowed him even anywhere near .22 calibre pistol what to talk of hiring him as a covert operative. He is the biggest slap on covert operation because on one hand he says he participated in Covert Operation and in the same breath he says he is a businessman.

Zakaria interviews Mansoor Ijaz on Memogate

video




Mansoor Ijaz: Well, Fareed, first of all, it's good to be with you. You know, the thing that was really behind this thinking process of mine is that, you know, I've been involved in different operations in Pakistan now for a very long time. I helped Benazir come back together with the Clinton administration as a part of the larger Pakistani-American community. I, as you know, was deeply involved in trying to broker a ceasefire in Kashmir. And during these various interventions that I tried to effect in Pakistan, what we found out in almost every single case was that there was a political motivation and a political interference by the ISI. Now there have been so many wrong things that have happened since the death of bin Laden in the early part of May, so many things that, you know, indicated that there was some hidden hand if you will in what was going. And it is my view and it is still my view today that section S of the ISI has been involved in some very, very nefarious activities, and so since nobody was able to get their arms around that, the United States had to take the lead on that. And the United States has done this in Iran. Read: David Frum on whether Pakistan was tipped off to the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. They have done it in other countries where they have been very, very hard in, you know, labeling certain organizations in those countries as terrorists. And it had - a material impact in terms of how both U.S. policy as well as other country policies were formulated to handle problems in those countryside. Fareed Zakaria: Explain what the S Branch of the ISI is. The ISI is the intelligence wing of the Pakistani military. What is the S Branch? Mansoor Ijaz: Yes. So the ISI has two critical branches in it, one is called CT for counterterrorism, and the other is the S branch for strategic - it's sort of the arm of the ISI that does everything from political interventions in other countries, for example, Afghanistan, which is what they're doing through the Haqqani Network and the Taliban right now. They do a lot of political interventions in their own country. You know, there are many times when it has been reported in the past and authentically reported and authoritatively reported by the Pakistani press that S Branch was involved in manipulating elections and doing things of that nature inside Pakistan. So it's an organ of the state that nobody can control, and it is essentially the organ of the state that the army and the intelligence wings are using to shall we say coordinate or obstruct what it is that the political side of the government, the civilian side of the governments do in Pakistan. Fareed Zakaria: Now the whole thrust of op-ed is that the ISI, the Pakistani military, operates in very nefarious ways often. Has involved itself as you just said in the domestic affairs of Pakistan and really brooks tolerates no adversaries. So what I'm wondering is, why would you make public the fact that the Pakistani civilian government was concerned about the ISI and was trying to curtail it? It seems to undercut the very purpose of your own article to reveal that the civilian government was trying to clip the wings of the Pakistani military. Mansoor Ijaz: Yes. That's a fair question. And all I will tell you is that you've written enough op-ed pieces to know that the way the op-ed process, the writing process works is that there has to be some authenticity in the way that a writer presents his particular argument. Now I'm not a writer of a book like Ahmed Rashid, I'm not a decorated veteran of some war, I'm not a former secretary of state, I'm not you. You've got a great credibility to do these things just on your name alone. In my case because I'm a businessman who theoretically has nothing to do with these kinds of issues, what I wrote and how I wrote needed to have a certain authenticity to it – Fareed Zakaria: But I still have to ask you, isn't the net effect of what you've done been to silence the democratically elected branch of government and empower the very people who you seem to be opposed to? Mansoor Ijaz: I don't think that's what's happened. If you ask me, we have strengthened Pakistan. Maybe we haven't strengthened the civilian side of Pakistan's government, but there may have been a rot there that needs to be cleaned up. And if that rot is cleaned out, you might find a very strong Pakistan emanating out of this in which the judiciary does what it's supposed to. The military does what it's supposed to. There will never be a time in my view where the military is subservient to the civilians in our lifetime. It may take 30, 40 years for that transformation to come. But when it does come, at least what we did was make sure the civilian government has an equal shoulder to the military and the judiciary. And if I look at the broad picture, that's a pretty good result in terms of making sure these facts got known. REFERENCE: Zakaria interviews Mansoor Ijaz on Memogate By Fareed Zakaria, CNN December 5th, 2011 http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/05/zakaria-interviews-mansoor-ijaz-about-memogate/

Video Clip: "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein," Iraqi President Saddam Hussein greets Donald Rumsfeld, then special envoy of President Ronald Reagan, in Baghdad on December 20, 1983. - Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82 Edited by Joyce Battle February 25, 2003 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/


Donald Rumsfeld meets Saddam Hussein 1983
video
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zaP7ZrmkcuU


Mansoor Ijaz wants whole Arab World to be bombed:)


Ding Dong the Bitch is Dead! Message of Saddam's Execution
Get More: Ding Dong the Bitch is Dead! Message of Saddam's Execution

http://www.spike.com/video-clips/cs9rht/ding-dong-the-bitch-is-dead-message-of-saddams-execution


The case for forcibly removing Saddam Hussein and his Baathist Party from power in Iraq could not be clearer. On the two charges that matter most to the American people -- Hussein's collusion with Al Qaeda's global terrorist enterprise and Iraq's ongoing development of chemical and biological weapons -- the growing body of publicly available evidence offers sufficient proof of Baghdad's mendacious designs to warrant the immediate use of force. President Bush's classified stash surely offers more; it is time for him to use it. Since 1998, when United Nations weapons inspectors were forced to leave Iraq, Hussein has rebuilt an intricate, clandestine global procurement system to funnel banned materials and technologies into his weapons programs. From 1998 to 2001, the Los Angeles Times' Bob Drogin has reported, a private Indian engineering exporter used front companies in Dubai and Jordan to supply Hussein's scientists with 3 metric tons of atomized aluminum powder, a key ingredient for making rocket propellant. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice referred to this illegal transfer in a New York Times opinion piece, citing Iraqi deceit in not declaring "its manufacture of specific fuel for ballistic missiles it claims not to have." The same company shipped titanium centrifugal pumps and membranes used in constructing chemical weapons through its Middle East shell companies to a major Iraqi chlorine manufacturing plant. Titanium pumps enabled Hussein to churn out chlorine, a precursor chemical for everything from mustard and chlorine gas to blister and nerve agents, at much higher rates than anything Iraq could have hoped to use for civilian purposes. Then, in a blatant example of Hussein's deception and lies, the plant suddenly became "inoperable" in December as the new weapons inspectors came in. Intelligence sources in the region indicate that Al Qaeda cells in Dubai may have financed the shipments using a traceless, underground money transfer system called hawala that is often employed by Islamist terrorists. Other troubling data about links between Hussein and Al Qaeda have surfaced recently as well. During an October speech in Cincinnati, Bush identified a senior Al Qaeda leader as having received medical treatment in Baghdad in the months after allied bombing in Afghanistan. Since then, confessions that Jordanian police obtained from two Al Qaeda operatives accused of assassinating U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan, show that they received money and weapons from this same man, Abu Musab Zarqawi. Zarqawi, a Jordanian with expertise in chemical and biological weapons design, is reportedly the No. 3 Al Qaeda official. He has lived at an Al Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan where traces of the poison ricin were found last year. Zarqawi has been tied to a northern Iraqi terror group backed by Hussein to oppose Kurdish rebels. At minimum, Hussein's regime provided Zarqawi with safe harbor and free passage into and out of Iraq. In the worst case, Hussein provided chemical and biological agents directly to a senior Al Qaeda leader. British intelligence reportedly believes that Zarqawi sent recipes for making ricin from raw materials to Al Qaeda cells in London and perhaps other European cities. Algerian terrorists said to be connected to Al Qaeda and the northern Iraqi group, several of whom worked for food preparation companies, were arrested in London three weeks ago. How much clearer does the picture have to be before the international community's refusal to dismantle terrorism's nerve center results in another catastrophic attack against civilians? Iraq and Al Qaeda are working together. Hussein, the Arab nationalist, continues to build and stockpile dangerous chemical and biological weapons. His messianic partner, Osama bin Laden, is churning out brainwashed legions of homicidal maniacs to carry these weapons to their targets worldwide. Whether the U.S. disarms Iraq now or later or never, Al Qaeda remains bent on destroying the civilized world, and Hussein is its chief enabler. Detoxifying Iraq is not a separate, unrelated thread but the most important next step in the global war on terrorism. REFERENCE: Evidence to Justify War Is Plentiful Commentary Saddam Hussein is building banned weapons and is in league with Al Qaeda. January 28, 2003 |Mansoor Ijaz and Tim Trevan | Mansoor Ijaz, a New York financier, was involved from 1996 to 1998 in failed negotiations between Sudanese officials and the Clinton administration concerning Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Tim Trevan was special advisor to the chief U.N. weapons inspector from 1992 to 1995. http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/28/opinion/oe-ijaz28 


World Knows the truth behind WMD in Iraq but Jang Group of Newspapers/GEO TV's New Love Mansoor Ijaz support Bombing on Iraq  - Commentary Saddam Hussein is building banned weapons and is in league with Al Qaeda. January 28, 2003  http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/28/opinion/oe-ijaz28  Islamic truths February 18, 2006|Mansoor Ijaz | MANSOOR IJAZ is an American Muslim of Pakistani ancestry. http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/18/opinion/oe-ijaz18 How Secure Is Pakistan's Plutonium? By MANSOOR IJAZ and R. JAMES WOOLSEY Published: November 28, 2001 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/28/opinion/28WOOL.html but The United Nations' former chief weapons inspector in Iraq told the official inquiry into the war that he had cautioned Tony Blair the month before the 2003 invasion about the possibility that no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be found. (The Telegraph)

Mansoor Ijaz's Partner Ex CIA Chief James Woolsey on War on Iraq


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrgjqOa8A48

The United Nations' former chief weapons inspector in Iraq told the official inquiry into the war that he had cautioned Tony Blair the month before the 2003 invasion about the possibility that no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be found. (The Telegraph) Former head of UN weapons inspectors tells Chilcot inquiry 'alarm bells' should have rung when his staff failed to find evidence of WMD (The Guardian)


Hans Blix, who has not been called to give evidence to Sir John Chilcot's inquiry, said his team had grown suspicious of the quality of intelligence pointing to Saddam Hussein having WMDs. The inspectors visited many sites said by intelligence services in the UK, the US and elsewhere to contain WMDs, but had only ever found conventional weapons, documents or nothing at all, he said. ''I think this was one of the most significant things of the whole story,'' he told BBC Radio 4's Today programme. ''We got tips not only from the UK but from other intelligence, the US as well, so perhaps some 100 all in all. ''We had time to go to about three dozen of these sites and in no case did we find any weapons of mass destruction.''He added: ''We said if this is the best (intelligence), then what is the rest? Doubts arose from that.'' Dr Blix said he spoke to Mr Blair in February 2003, ahead of the March invasion, about his team's findings. ''I said to Mr Blair 'Yes, I also thought there could be weapons of mass destruction', but I said 'Are you so sure? Would it not be paradoxical if you were to invade Iraq with 200,000 men and found there were no weapons of mass destruction?'. ''His response was 'No, no', he was quite convinced, the intelligence services were convinced, and even the Egyptians were convinced, so I had no reason to doubt his good faith at the time. But I was doubtful.'' Dr Blix rejected suggestions by Jack Straw, who was foreign secretary in 2003, that he had since ''applied gloss'' to what he was saying in the months leading up to the invasion. And he said the Iraqis were finally making progress in opening up to inspections and should have been allowed more time. ''We warned the Iraqis that they needed to be more active and they became more active and we reported that to the (UN) Security Council, that we were actually making a great deal of progress,'' he said. Dr Blix added: ''We could not exclude that there was still something hidden, because you cannot prove the negative, but I think they should have taken to heart that there was a change in the Iraqi attitude, that there was more cooperation and that things that were unresolved were becoming resolved.'' REFERENCE: Hans Blix warned Tony Blair Iraq might not have WMD 9:19AM GMT 22 Jan 2010 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/7051059/Hans-Blix-warned-Tony-Blair-Iraq-might-not-have-WMD.html

Former head of UN weapons inspectors tells Chilcot inquiry 'alarm bells' should have rung when his staff failed to find evidence of WMD (The Guardian)

Mass Destruction: Truth and Consequences with Hans Blix

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSPB4U8GVpU


Britain and the US relied on dubious intelligence sources ahead of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the former head of the United Nations weapons inspectors said today. Giving evidence to the Iraq inquiry, Hans Blix said it should have set alarm bells ringing in London and Washington when the inspectors repeatedly failed to turn up any evidence that Saddam Hussein still had active weapons of mass destruction programmes. Blix said he warned the then prime minister Tony Blair in a February 2003 meeting that Saddam Hussein might not have any weapons of mass destruction. He told the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, the same thing. He said: "When we reported that we did not find any weapons of mass destruction they should have realised, I think, both in London and in Washington, that their sources were poor. They should have been more critical about that." Blix said that he had privately confided to Blair in autumn 2002 – before the inspectors returned to Iraq – that he thought it "plausible" that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. However in the weeks leading up to the invasion in March 2003 – after the inspectors had failed to uncover anything significant – he said that he had cautioned Blair that there might not be anything. He said that he told Blair: "Wouldn't it be paradoxical if you were to invade Iraq with 250,000 men and find very little?" He added: "I gave a warning that things had changed and there might not be so much." Blix has claimed in the past that inspectors had too little time to assess whether Saddam was concealing weapons of mass destruction, as the US and Britain believed. He said that, immediately before the 2003 US-led invasion, his inspectors checked around 30 sites said by British and US intelligence to contain weapons of mass destruction, but discovered little more than some old missile engines and a sheaf of nuclear documents. He also said told the inquiry that he never felt "weapons of mass destruction" was a useful term because it conflated nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and the British more or less accepted there was no nuclear threat. Blix acknowledged the pressure of the US military buildup in the region had led Saddam to agree to the return of the UN inspectors in September 2002. However he said that he did not believe that Britain and the US had been entitled to invade Iraq without a further UN security council resolution specifically authorising military action. He accused the administration of US president George Bush of being "high on military" in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001. "They felt that they could get away with it and therefore it was desirable," he said. He also condemned claims by Britain and the US that Iraq had tried to acquire raw uranium for its supposed nuclear programme from Niger, based on a forged document. Blix said: "That was perhaps the first occasion I became suspicious about the evidence. I think that was the most scandalous part." REFERENCE: Hans Blix: Allies used 'poor' intelligence ahead of Iraq invasion - Staff and agencies Tuesday 27 July 2010 17.39 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/27/hans-blix-iraq-war-inquiry

No comments: