LONDON, May 15: The following is the text of the Charter of Democracy signed by former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif here on Sunday: We the elected leaders of Pakistan have deliberated on the political crisis in our beloved homeland, the threats to its survival, the erosion of the federation's unity, the military's subordination of all state institutions, the marginalisation of civil society, the mockery of the Constitution and representative institutions, growing poverty, unemployment and inequality, brutalisation of society, breakdown of rule of law and, the unprecedented hardships facing our people under a military dictatorship, which has pushed our beloved country to the brink of a total disaster; Noting the most devastating and traumatic experiences that our nation experienced under military dictatorships that played havoc with the nation's destiny and created conditions disallowing the progress of our people and the flowering of democracy. Even after removal from office they undermined the people’s mandate and the sovereign will of the people; Drawing history’s lesson that the military dictatorship and the nation cannot co-exist – as military involvement adversely affect the economy and the democratic institutions as well as the defence capabilities, and the integrity of the country - the nation needs a new direction different from a militaristic and regimental approach of the Bonapartist regimes, as the current one;
32. The ISI, MI and other security agencies shall be accountable to the elected government through Prime Minister Sectt, Ministry of Defence, and Cabinet Division respectively. Their budgets will be approved by DCC after recommendations are prepared by the respective ministry. The political wings of all intelligence agencies will be disbanded. A committee will be formed to cut waste and bloat in the armed forces and security agencies in the interest of the defence and security of the country. All senior postings in these agencies shall be made with the approval of the government through respective ministry. REFERENCE: Text of the Charter of Democracy May 16, 2006 Tuesday Rabi-us-Sani 17, 1427 http://archives.dawn.com/2006/05/16/local23.htm http://archives.dawn.com/2006/05/16/local23.htm Benazir & Nawaz sign Charter of Democracy By Ashraf Mumtaz May 15, 2006 Monday Rabi-us-Sani 16, 1427 http://archives.dawn.com/2006/05/15/top1.htm
Reporter - Why Can't Parliament And Judiciary Hold Intelligence Agencies Accountable? - Ep158 - Pt 1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYWYvwTJliM
dawnnewspakistan
LAHORE, June 24: On the fifth death anniversary of Omar Asghar Khan on Monday (today), his family members wonder in sheer dejection if his killers will ever be identified and brought to justice. He was found dead in mysterious circumstances at the residence of his in-laws in Karachi on June 25, 2002. His father air marshal Asghar Khan and widow Samina Khan feel enormously frustrated not merely because they have lost Omar at a time when he was rising to political stardom but also because the regime, which took him on its cabinet of technocrats before going for the quasi-political and democratic dispensation, has behaved in a manner as if it is under no obligation to expose the reason and culprits behind his murder which remains shrouded in a mystery till today. The extent of official apathy towards the issue could be gauged from the fact that even a police and judicial inquiry have not so far been conducted to make the circumstances of Omar’s death public. Even the Sindh police took no time in proclaiming it suicide without carrying out a probe. Omar marched out of the cabinet of technocrats in 2001 and launched the Awami Jamhoori Party as a middle class political organisation comprising progressive and liberal elements and was an instant success. Mostly attracting educated people, professionals and rights activists, the party aimed at contributing towards the national polity to bring about a radical change in the system and governance. Within one year, Omar’s party started making meaningful undulation in the country’s power politics and many eyebrows were raised on the young organisation taking big strides. REFERENCES: Omar Asghar’s family wants no more ‘probes’: Five years of state apathy By Mahmood Zaman June 25, 2007 Monday Jamadi-us-Sani 09, 1428 http://archives.dawn.com/dawnftp/72.249.57.55/dawnftp/2007/06/25/nat18.htm Omer Asghar’s ‘suicide’ Questions still unanswered By Sarfaraz Ahmed Sunday, June 30, 2002 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-6-2002_pg7_29 Judge appointed to probe Omar Asghar’s death By Sarfaraz Ahmed Monday, September 23, 2002 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_23-9-2002_pg7_8 Reporter - Why Can't Parliament And Judiciary Hold Intelligence Agencies Accountable? - Ep158 - Pt 2
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SKb9PvnR7C8
dawnnewspakistan
THE VANISHED ARROGANCE OF THE GENERALS AFTER 9/11.
In the afternoon, Mahmood was invited to CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, where he told George Tenet, the CIA director, that in his view Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief, was a religious man with humanitarian instincts and not a man of violence! This was a bit difficult for the CIA officials to digest and rightly so as the Taliban’s track record, especially in the realm of human rights, was no secret. General Mahmood was told politely but firmly that Mullah Omar and the Taliban would have to face US Military might if Osama Bin Laden along with other Al-Qaeda leaders were not handed over without delay. To send the message across clearly, Richard Armitage held a second meeting with Mahmood the same day, informing him that he would soon be handed specific American demands, to which Mahmood reiterated that Pakistan would cooperate. {Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York}, p 32. {Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Owen Bennett Jones, published by New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002}, p. 2.General Mahmood on September 13, 2001, was handed a formal list of the US demands by Mr. Armitage and was asked to convey these to Musharraf and was also duly informed, for the sake of emphasis, that these were “not negotiable.” Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and the assisstant secretary of state, Christina Rocca, had drafted the list in the shape of a “non-paper”. It categorically asked Pakistan:
Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end ALL logistical support for Osama Bin Laden.
Give blanket overflight and landing rights to US aircraft.
Give the US access to Pakistani Naval and Air Bases and to the border areas betweeen Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Turn over all the intelligence and immigration information.
Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism.
Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Talibans, and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban. Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda Network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbour him and his accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, end support for the Taliban, and assist the US in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama and his network.
Having gone through the list, Mahmood declared that he was quite clear on the subject and that “he knew how the President thought, and the President would accept these points.” {Bush at War by Bob Woodward, published by Simon & Schuster, 2002, New York}, p 58-59. Interview: Richard Armitage, “Campaign Against Terror,” PBS (Frontline), April 19, 2002}
Mahmood then faxed the document to Musharraf. While the latter was going through it and in the process of weighing the pros and cons of each demand, his aide de camp that Colin Powell was on the line. Musharraf liked and respected Powell, and the conversation was not going to be a problem. He told him that he understood and appreciated the US position, but he would respond to the US demands after having discussed these with his associates. Powell was far too polite to remind him that he in fact was the government, but did inform him that his General in Washington had already assured them that these demands would be acceptable to the government of Pakistan. {Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism : Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror by Hassan Abbas, published by An East Gate Book , M.E. Sharpe Armonk, New York. London, England.}.
More Explicit:
Common "civilians" in Pakistan can be picked up from anywhere without any cogent reason and can be detained for months [without producing them in the Court of Law] if not years without a trace and incommunicado too. You can slap, oust, try, imprison, torture, insult and discredit them through media trial and even hang the elected representatives of the people but when the real test comes those who are entrusted with the responsibility of defending the country always show you clay feet, read and lament.
The first thing they do after retirement is to join the Tableeghi Jamat. Whom you are trying to hoodwink? You cannot hoodwink Allah.
WASHINGTON : Richard Armitage, Daily Times can confirm, did not use the words attributed to him by President Pervez Musharraf in a CBS 60 Minutes interview, namely that unless Pakistan did American bidding, it will be bombed into the “stone age”. However, neither the President of Pakistan, nor Richard Armitage, who has denied using such language, nor President Bush who said he was “taken aback” when he learnt what had been said, is being untruthful. What actually happened was that after his meeting with Richard Armitage, Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed – who now wears a long, white beard and has reportedly gone Tableeghi – called Gen Musharraf from the Pakistan embassy in Washington. The conversation took place in Urdu and when the president asked him what the bottom line of the American message was, Gen Mahmood replied in Urdu that the Americans were intent on the removal of the Taliban regime and would not let Pakistan stand in their way and if Pakistan did not fall in line and cooperate, “wo hamari eent se eent baja dey gain” or words to that effect. That being so, President Musharraf’s recollection of the conversation with Gen Mahmood, who was then the director general of the ISI, is accurate, only he translated into English what he had been told in Urdu. It is time for Gen Mahmood to go on record and reproduce exactly the words in which he conveyed the Armitage message to Gen Musharraf on that September day five years ago. khalid hasan. REFERENCE: 'Wo eent se eent baja dein gay’, ISI DG told Musharraf Monday, September 25, 2006 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006/09/25/story_25-9-2006_pg1_4ISLAMABAD: Former ISI chief General Mehmood has simply vanished from the media which is trying hard to get his comments on the Musharraf-Armitage controversy over the wording of the post-9/11 threat hurled at Islamabad by Washington to win its unconditional support for the so-called war on terror. Mehmood, who has already retired from the Army, is settled in Lahore but despite repeated attempts since Saturday last he is not available to offer his comments on the issue on which his statement really matters a lot. Every time the former ISI chief was approached at his Lahore residence telephone number, the home servant-cum-operator, who identified himself as Banaras Khan, gave the ready response, ‘General Saab is out of the city, he will Inshallah call you upon his return.’ On Saturday afternoon when initially contacted, Banaras said Mehmood would be back by the evening. However, later attempts the same evening and again on Monday and Tuesday, showed that Mehmood is still out of the city. Banaras has no answer when asked where exactly has the general gone. He also claims to have no contact number of Mehmood, who Banaras insists, doesn’t carry a cell phone after it was lost recently. President Musharraf in a recent interview with CBS News magazine show “60 Minutes,” charged that after 9/11 the then deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage told the then DG ISI General Mehmood to “be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age”. According to a report, Mehmood, who had seen ups and downs with Musharraf in the post Oct 12, 1999 coup, has joined the Tableeghi Jamaat after he was relieved of his post-retirement assignment to head Fauji Fertilizer. Mehmood is amongst those few top generals (all retired now) including General Aziz, General Usmani and General Jamshed Gulzar, who had strongly opposed Musharraf’s siding with America in its attack on Afghanistan. REFERENCE: General Mehmood ‘vanishes’ By Ansar Abbasi The News International http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=3286 Sunday, October 01, 2006, Ramzan 7, 1427 A.H.Reporter - Why Can't Parliament And Judiciary Hold Intelligence Agencies Accountable? - Ep158 - Pt 3
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfQV86HFRbg
dawnnewspakistan
ISLAMABAD: While Pakistan might have benefited from hardcore actionable intelligence provided by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI in countering terrorism, one possible negative aspect has been the creation of a vast network of CIA and FBI agents – mostly Pakistanis. Though intelligence cooperation between Pakistan and the US multiplied extensively after 9/11 and was aimed at the Taliban and al-Qaeda, many in Pakistan fear the network for these foreign agencies within Pakistan was also being used for other tasks, some probably falling into the definition of interference in our internal affairs. Top authorities in Pakistan are said to be in knowledge of this phenomenal spread in the American spy agencies’ network as the country's intelligence agencies have already reported this matter and even identified a number of those on the payroll of the US agencies.
Besides others, a large number of retired Army officers, including ex-brigadiers, are presently working here as American spies. An official of an intelligence agency, however, explained that spy agencies of different countries had their worldwide networks and they handled spy matters according to their resources and needs because importance of spying had increased tremendously after 9/11.
Because of the alleged presence of al-Qaeda-Taliban in Pakistan, the interest of the foreign intelligence agencies here has gone up. The official added that the US had the largest intelligence network in the world and Pakistan was also benefiting from this because through this network the CIA and FBI shared intelligence with Pakistan and gave important information to nab terrorists.
Pakistan allowed concessions to the US as part of intelligence cooperation in the controversial war on terror but some official sources are of the view that these concessions and their parameters were not being adhered to within the agreed limits. Foreign Office spokesman Muhammad Sadiq, when contacted, said he had no information of this sort. He said intelligence cooperation between Islamabad and Washington was a fact but doubted that the local agents could be hired. He, however, said if there was any interference in our matters by any foreign spying agencies, it was illegal and not allowed. Sadiq said the ISPR would be in a better position to respond to such questions. Director General ISPR and military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas, when asked about the feared massive expansion of local CIA and FBI agents in Pakistan after 9/11, said, "I don't think so." He added that the government would never allow the CIA or FBI to expand their network in Pakistan. "I deny this," the military spokesman said. A defence source, however, recently told this correspondent it was a routine operation of all agencies around the world to recruit agents for espionage in every country. He said CIA and FBI did not need to come to Pakistan and start recruiting their local agents here because they could do the same while sitting in Washington. "These things are neither cut and dried nor done in black and white but this always happens and cannot be denied," the source said
Caretaker Interior Minister Lt Gen (retd) Hamid Nawaz, when approached said the US influence was not only in Pakistan but also in almost every other country. He acknowledged that there was a feeling that the network of US intelligence agents had spread here but he had no proof with him to substantiate this. He, however, admitted that the US influence was there in all areas. The retired general, who has also been secretary defence for some years and left the job much after 9/11, said there was a standard rule that no foreign intelligence agent could subvert against the state. Elizabeth Colton, the Press Attache of the US embassy in Islamabad, told this correspondent, in response to a set of questions sent to her, that the Embassy could not discuss intelligence issues with the media. She said the Embassy had no comment on the questions sent to her which included one asking whether the Embassy or its legal section had any role in recruiting Pakistanis for CIA and FBI.
The Embassy was also asked whether they shared the concerns of some Pakistani authorities that the US intelligence agencies, which were given some concessions in the tribal belt of Pakistan, were crossing their limits and hurting the strategic interests of Pakistan. US National Intelligence Director Mike McConnel was quoted to have admitted recently that the US administration had already spent $50 billion during the current year on spying. A considerable chunk of this budget for spying is believed to have been spent on the US war on terror. Part of this money would have also travelled to Pakistan to pay off the CIA/FBI local agents, who are said to be paid well. Parts of the US media have been reporting on this subject and the most significant report was in The Washington Post in 2002 when the influential newspaper claimed that the United States had organised its own espionage network in Pakistan due to lack of cooperation from the ISI in locating the al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives.
"The FBI decided to set up a Spider Group, a band of former Pakistani Army officers and others, after it concluded that lack of cooperation from the ISI made it impossible to hunt down Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives in the tribal areas of the country.” Quoting a federal law-enforcement official in Washington, the newspaper reported that the US move marked an attempt by the FBI to develop "free flow of information" to US agents who previously had worked under some restriction with Pakistan's official Inter-Services Intelligence agency. The Spider Group, the report said, was also asked to recruit locals in Pakistan's tribal areas, where hundreds of wanted "terrorists" are allegedly holed up under the patronage of tribal chiefs. Members of the Spider Group include a mix of Muslim and Christian retired Army and intelligence officers and have been trained and equipped by the FBI.
Background interviews reveal that today the CIA's intelligence local network is far more extensive than that of the FBI. The sources said that during the initial years of War on Terror, the Americans were not satisfied with the intelligence gathering of local agencies in the tribal areas of Pakistan, so they launched their own agencies that had now developed a vast network in the country.
A source quoted an incident in which the CIA officials once distributed awards amongst Pakistani intelligence people in the headquarters of the agency in Langley, Virginia. "This is perhaps unprecedented," the source said.
A spymaster of one of the country's intelligence agency reported to the Interior Ministry that a provincial head of a private security agency, besides others, was spying for the CIA. The security agency was contacted and the said official was removed. It was also reported that a large number of private security agencies personnel were doing espionage work.
A retired lieutenant general confided to this correspondent on condition of not being named that during his career he had gone to the US twice for military related training, where he was openly offered to work for the US. "I was praised and offered that why don't I join them," he said, adding that once an official encouraged him to inform the US about the problems of Pakistan's defence without even talking to his seniors.
He said the same intelligence officials asked him to settle his children in the US for better life and education. "I was openly told that I should not be worried about their expenses," the retired general said.
Meanwhile, a local journalist Azaz Syed told this correspondent that quite a few years back, he approached the legal section of the US embassy in Islamabad, after reading an advertisement in an international publication for recruitment of FBI agents for South Asia. For the purpose of doing an investigative story, he offered his services for FBI. He said he offered his services to spy on Taliban in exchange for information from the US embassy but the diplomat interviewing him was not interested in Taliban but wanted info about civil bureaucracy. He was not ready to give any information either.
"I was told that I would get assignments relating to civil bureaucracy and in return would be paid well," Syed said, adding that later he did a story for an Urdu newspaper with which he was associated at that point of time.
The US Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) – the spy military plane – are yet another source of concern for many here. The UAVs were allowed to do espionage in tribal areas of Pakistan for "specific jobs" only but since the UAVs were not caught by radars, these spy planes crossed their limits a number of times.
Initially, the Pakistan Air Force objected to such US surveillance but the government decided otherwise because of US insistence that it was inevitable to track down the so-called al-Qaeda targets.
The sources revealed that the murdered top tribal leader resisting the US war on terror, Nek Muhammad, became the target of a UAV despite the peace deal he had signed with the then corps commander Lt Gen Safdar Hussain.
Getting uncomfortable with the UAV activities, some Pakistani officials have expressed their concerns at the highest level. The Pakistan Army is trying to develop its own UAV but so far these planes are not up to the required international standards. Pakistan has also been trying to buy these UAVs but some international forces are creating impediments in such deals. Once Pakistan contacted South Africa to purchase these small aircraft but the price demanded was $10 million, which was far higher than the price of the equipment. The UAV intelligence capacity and its advantage of not being traced by radars, some believe, could pose serious threats to Pakistan's strategic interests. REFERENCE: Is cooperation with CIA-FBI posing a threat to Pak strategic interests? Monday, February 25, 2008 By Ansar Abbasi http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=98191&Cat=6&dt=2/25/2008
Reporter - Why Can't Parliament And Judiciary Hold Intelligence Agencies Accountable? - Ep158 - Pt 4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gof5u-mg_d0&feature=channel_video_title
dawnnewspakistan
Pakistan’s chief spy Lt. General Mahmoud Ahmad “was in the US when the attacks occurred.” He arrived in the US on the 4th of September, a full week before the attacks. He had meetings at the State Department “after” the attacks on the WTC. But he also had “a regular visit of consultations” with his US counterparts at the CIA and the Pentagon during the week prior to September 11. REFERENCE: Cover-up or Complicity of the Bush Administration? The Role of Pakistan’s Military Intelligence (ISI) in the September 11 Attacks by Michel Chossudovsky Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), Montréal Posted at globalresearch.ca 2 November 2001 http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO111A.html
Michel Chossudovsky is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa. TFF Associates http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/tff/people/m_chossudovsky.html
Read Ayub Khan's Information Secretary's Late Altaf Gauhar's Column on ISI published in The Nation in English 17 Aug 97 p 4 - Islamabad The Nation in English 17 Aug 97 p 4 Article by Altaf Gauhar.
"QUOTE"
"How Intelligence Agencies Run Our Politics"
I had an opportunity to watch quite closely the working of our intelligence agencies during the 1965 war with India. At that time the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was headed by Brigadier Riaz Hussain, who later became the Governor of Balochistan, the Military Intelligence (MI) was under Brigadier Muhammad Irshad and A.B. Awan was the Director of the Intelligence Bureau (DIB). Each agency had its own sphere of duties but they had a common goal -- preserving the national security. Since there is hardly any significant political activity, domestic or foreign, national or international, which does not, directly or indirectly, impinge on national security, there was much overlapping in the work of the three agencies. Despite the all-embracing definition of national security unnecessary conflict in day to day working was avoided as the lSl and the MI confined themselves to matters of direct military interest and the IB concentrated on domestic political activities. The DIB reported directly to the Prime Minister and the two military agencies to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (C-in-C). It was left to the C-in-C to bring all matters of interest to the notice of the Prime Minister through the Ministry of Defence. This arrangement continued fairly smoothly until the imposition of Martial Law in 1958. I was in the Prime Minister's Secretariat during the last days of parliamentary government in 1957-58 and Malik Feroz Khan Noon used to get reports of the contacts which military intelligence agencies were making with the political leaders of different parties. There was little that he could do about it since President Iskander Mirza was drawing up his own plan of action to put an end to parliamentary rule in collusion with the C-in-C, General Ayub Khan. Noon was resisting Mirza's pressure to grant a four-year extension of term to Ayub Khan. I remember Ayub Khan bursting into my office one afternoon in full, uniform. I was relieved when he said: "Since the Principal Secretary has gone for lunch I thought I would ask you to request the Prime Minister to stay with me in Rawalpindi when he comes on a formal visit next week." He left the room before I could recover my breath. When I conveyed the message to the PM he said: "I know he wants me to give him an extension of term. His term does not end till 1959. Why is he in such a hurry?" Years later when I mentioned this incident to Ayub Khan he said: "The fellow was under the influence of his wife. He wanted to promote General Sher Ali. My boys were keeping tabs on him."
Once the Martial Law was promulgated in 1958 all the intelligence agencies came under the direct control of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. The maintenance of national Security, which was the principal function of these agencies, came to mean the consolidation of the Ayub regime; any criticism of the regime was seen a threat to national security. The three intelligence agencies started competing with each other in demonstrating their loyalty to Ayub Khan and his system of government. Since Ayub Khan was reluctant to increase the military budget, neither the ISI nor the MI could post their officers in the districts and because of that limitation their domestic activities remained quite restrained. But they continued to be assigned specific duties to keep a watch on 'undesirable' politicians and civil servants. When I came to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, I found a psychological warfare unit under operation in the office of the Secretary. It was, headed by Col Mujibur Rahman, who later became the Secretary of the Ministry in the Ziaul Haq regime. Was it an intelligence plant meant to keep an eye on the working of the civil government? Whatever its purpose, I found it a complete waste of time and I was able to persuade the President to have it recalled by the GHQ.
The President used to receive regular reports on the political situation in the country from the ISI and the MI. These reports in sealed envelopes marked 'Eyes Only' were usually handed over to the President by the C-in-C. On a few occasions the President gave me these reports and it seemed to me that the agencies were keeping the politicians, particularly the East Pakistanis, under close surveillance. I rarely found anything insightful in these reports. The DIB had direct access to the President and his weekly reports used to be fairly exhaustive. It was during the presidential election in l964 that the ISI and the MI became extremely active.. While the DIB gave the President a detailed, assessment of his prospects in the election the ISI and the MI kept him informed of the trend of public opinion based largely on gossip. The election results showed that the three agencies had seriously under estimated the popularity of Mohtrama Miss Fatima Jinnah and given Ayub Khan too optimistic a picture of his prospects.
The crisis of intelligence came during the 1965 war. Brigadier Riaz was good enough to show me his set-up, an impressive affair judging by the sophisticated equipment and the operators at work. He told me that he had contacts inside the Occupied Kashmir and in other major Indian cities. "I will flood you with news. Don't worry". When the war started there was a complete blackout of news from all the intellience agencies. When I got nothing out of the ISI for two days I went to Brigadier Riaz only to learn that all his contacts had gone underground. The performance of the MI was even more frustrating. The mobile transmitter which the MI had acquired to broadcast the Voice of Kashmir conked out and Brigadier Irshad came to me to find him a spare transmitter. When I told him that it would take at least a month to import another transmitter he pleaded with me to take over the broadcast part of the operation. "How can I do that I know nothing about the operation?" I protested. "But that is the beauty of it." said Irshad, "even I know very little about it." It did not take the Indians long to extract the whole operational plan out of the 'infiltrators' whom they captured the moment they entered the Indian occupied territory in Kashmir. Four of them were put on All India Radio to make a public confession. I heard the details of the operation on the air in utter disbelief. I rushed to Muzaffarabad to acquaint Irshad with what I had heard. He fell back in his chair and moaned: "The bastards have spilt the beans."
After the cease-fire I brought these incidents to Ayub Khan's notice and urged him to review the working of these agencies. "They have no idea of intelligence work," I submitted "all they can do is investigative work like sub-inspectors of police, tapping telephone conversations and chasing the suspects." Much later Ayub Khan set up a committee to examine the working of the agencies under General the Yahya Khan. Both A.B. Awan and I were members of the committee. The GHQ tried to put all the blame on IB for their own incompetence. Yahya wanted the committee to recommend that officers of ISI and the Ml should be posted at district headquarters. Awan strongly opposed the idea and I backed him. We could not understand the purpose of getting the military agencies involved in domestic administration. As we left the meeting Awan said to me "They are planning to impose martial law." He proved right though it took the Army quite some time to get rid of Ayub Khan after unleashing a popular campaign against him.
The intelligence agencies got even more deeply involved in domestic politics under General Yahya Khan. The ISI jumped headlong into the Political crisis in East Pakistan. A National Security Council was created under the chairmanship of General Yahya Khan with Major General Ghulam Umar as second in command to control the intelligence operation which was meant to ensure that no political party should get an overall majority in the general election. An amount of Rs 29 lac was put at the disposal of General Umar for the purpose. Before the Army action General Akbar, who was the head of the ISI and with whom I had good relations when I was in service, requested me that I should introduce him to some Bengali academics and journalists. The ISI was trying to infiltrate into the inner circles of the Awami League. Had I given him any names they too have been put on Rao Farman Ali's hit list of Bengali intellectuals. The operation proved a total disaster. Lawrence Ziring says: "New efforts at a political solution might have been attempted later, but army intelligence failed time and again to correctly assess the situation, and the demeanor of the generals was hardly conducive to rational decision-making." (Lawrence Ziring, The Tragedy of East Pakistan, OUP, 1997). For General (retd) Aslam Beg to claim on solemn oath before the Supreme Court of Pakistan that the ISI got involved in the internal politics of the country only after a special cell was created by Prime Minister Bhutto in 1975 is a culpable attempt at concealing the truth and distorting the record of the operations of the military intelligence agencies since independence. The present government has only to report to the Supreme Court that the ISI deals with matters relating to Pakistan's national security and that would be the end of Asghar Khan's writ petition against Aslam Beg. Who will provide a definition of national security to rule out the involvement of the ISI and the MI in domestic politics which is seen as the biggest threat to the security and solidarity of Pakistan?
"UNQUOTE"
THE END
No comments:
Post a Comment