Sindh is located in the southeastern part of Pakistan. This territory was called Sindomani by the Greeks, the Sundhudesha by ancient Hindus, Sindh by Arabic geographers, and Sindu by its occupants, who also used the name Sindu for the Indus River. The Partition of 1947 changed the demographic complexion of Sindh. While the Muslim Sindhis constituted a majority, a substantial number of Hindu Sindhis, Christians, and Parsis were also living in that territory, particularly in Karachi, which at the time of partition was a city of 300,000 inhabitants. After partition, more migrants from India settled in Sindh, mostly in Karachi. Sindh is the only province of Pakistan where ethnic polarization is serious because of the presence of large ethnic groups and their clashes of interests.
Before 1947, there was no record of conflict between Sindhi and Urdu-speaking populations, while feelings of Sindhi nationalism were noticeable even before the emergence of Pakistan. When Sindh was a part of Bombay, Muslim Sindhis resented the manner in which their rights were usurped by the outsiders. In prepartition Sindh, nonlocals dominated business and administrative positions. Yet the Sindhi language and culture remained superior as compared to other languages of West Pakistan and Sindhis wanted to maintain their identity. The influx of millions of migrants from India after partition changed the demographic balance of the province. From 1947 to 1955, the Sindhi cities of Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkar, and Mirpurkhas became strongholds of Urdu-speaking migrants, called Mohajirs (Mohajir in Urdu means "migrant") from India. The exodus of the Hindu population from Sindh to India and the influx of a new Muslim population from India to Sindh changed the dynamics of politics and economics of that area. The original Sindhi inhabitants came to resent the domination of the Urdu language and the culture of Muslim migrants from India and other parts of Pakistan.
The Sindhi-speaking masses were faced with double jeopardy, first by the state and second by the feudal lords of their own ethnic background. Feelings of insecurity and paranoia began to deepen among native Sindhis because of the state policy to discourage local culture and impose the Urdu language as the medium of education. With the reemergence of the provinces in West Pakistan, Sindhi leaders began to hope for a better role in their province. The general elections of December 1970 clearly demonstrated the ethnic division of Sindh: the rural areas mainly voted for the Sindhi-dominated Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the urban areas of the province voted for the Urdu-speaking candidates. The PPP and Jayae Sindh Movement managed to unite the Sindhi-speaking population of Sindh against the injustices perpetrated by the state forces led by the Mohajir-Punjabi elite.
Political, Cultural, and Social Dynamics
Politically, the Sindhi-Mohajir relations were influenced by several trends, one reversing the other. First, there was the influx of millions of Urdu-speaking migrants from India in the postpartition period. This created a political crisis in which the Sindhis felt that they were being reduced to a minority in their own land. Such fears and insecurities among native Sindhis gave legitimacy to the cause of Sindhi nationalism, which gave birth to the Jayae Sindh Movement. The PPP, which was founded by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi leader, despite adhering to the concept of a federal structure, also became a champion of the rights of Sindhi people. The feeling of insecurity and fear prevailed among native Sindhis that their political control over Sindh was being compromised because of the Mohajir clout in the national power setup. The Mohajir community, given their better educational background and pivotal role in the Pakistan separatist movement, possessed political power. Things began to change in 1958 with the military coup and the imposition of martial law in which the Punjabi-Pathan elite began to replace the Mohajir's political, economic, and administrative influence. The federal capital was shifted from Karachi to Rawalpindi in 1959 and Karachi was separated from Sindh in the mid-1960s. A feeling of marginalization emerged within the Mohajir community, first during the martial law regime of Ayub Khan and later on during the rule of Bhutto. The emergence of Mohajir nationalism paved the way for the formation of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in 1984. Because of its focus on protecting the political and economic rights of the Urdu-speaking migrant community, MQM emerged as a big political force in urban Sindh, capturing maximum seats at the provincial and national assembly elections held in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997.
Cultural and social dynamics.
The Urdu-speaking migrants from India who settled in Punjab and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) were absorbed into the local cultural setup, but in Sindh the assimilation process, particularly in urban areas, did not take place. This was because of the small number of native Sindhis living in such areas. Since the Mohajir community assumed a dominant demographic status in the urban areas of Sindh, they did not feel the need to learn the Sindhi language or get an understanding of Sindhi culture. As a result, the cultural gap between the Mohajirs and Sindhis widened, resulting in growing social tension. The 1972 language riots in Sindh were an attempt of native Sindhis to assert their culture.
While the Sindhi culture was close to rural and feudal traditions, the Mohajirs had an urban middle-class background and were against reverting to social orthodoxy. As a result, the two cultures were unable to reach a level of mutual coexistence.
Economic and administrative issues.
The Mohajirs primarily belonged to business, trade, and other professional fields. Since they had an edge in education vis-¹-vis native Sindhis, their role in administration was quite significant. Native Sindhis resented the manner in which Karachi, which was the economic and administrative center of Pakistan in its formative phase, was dominated by the Mohajirs. However, things began to change in the early 1970s when the regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto formulated a policy based on 60 percent rural and 40 percent urban quota in state jobs and admissions in state-owned educational institutions. The purpose was to improve the socioeconomic standard of people living in rural areas. Since the majority of Sindhi-speaking people lived in rural areas, the objective of the quota system was to benefit their position. As a consequence to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's policy of promoting the interests of native Sindhis, the Mohajir community searched for its identity, resulting in the creation of the MQM. The Mojahir leaders legitimized their quest by asking why the rights of Urdu speakers to have a separate identity were not accepted by the state. The nationalization of banks, insurance companies, and various industries by the Bhutto regime in 1972 and his administrative measures to benefit native Sindhis in employment and in other areas led to the erosion of Mohajir influence in Sindh, resulting in a sense of deprivation in that community.
During the first twenty-four years after the creation of Pakistan, the Sindhi-Mohajir conflict remained low-key. After the establishment of the Pakistani nation in 1947, it became clear that the assimilation process, which could have developed basic understanding between Sindhis and Mohajirs, could not take place. Mohajirs remained committed to the "Two-Nation Theory" (the theory that Hindus and Muslims are separate nations) and possessed a hostile attitude toward ethnic nationalism. They pressed for the adoption of the Urdu language as a source of unity and identity. Sindhis viewed such an assertion as an attack on their culture and traditions. Steps taken to replace Sindhi with Urdu in educational institutions became a cause of insecurity among the Sindhis, and they developed hostility not only against the Urdu-speaking migrants from India but also against the state's power. When Urdu was introduced as a compulsory language for primary classes in 1962, the decision triggered a strike in November of that year. There was a Mohajir-Punjabi nexus that was considered detrimental to the interests of the Sindhi. It was argued by the Sindhi leaders that those who had migrated to Sindh at the time of partition should assimilate in local culture instead of expressing cultural arrogance. Moreover, the Mohajirs enjoyed a monopoly in business, trade, and jobs, which created resentment among Sindhis.
Between 1972 and 1977 there were violent confrontations between the two communities, first in July 1972. The trigger was the passing of a language bill by the Sindh assembly in that month, recognizing Sindhi as the language of the province. The bill was passed despite the adoption of Urdu as the language by the provinces of Balochistan, NWFP, and Punjab. The Urdu-speaking population protested because it considered such an act a source of promoting Sindhi nationalism at the expense of the ideology of Pakistan. The language riots created bitterness and hostility between the Sindhi and Mohajir communities and divided the province along ethnic lines. The Sindhi-speaking population migrated to the rural areas that they dominated, while the Urdu-speaking population primarily migrated to urban areas. To calm matters, it was decided that the chief minister of the province would be Sindhi-speaking while the governor of the province would be Urdu-speaking. The gradual introduction of the Sindhi language in educational institutions and reserving the quota of 40 and 60 percent respectively for the urban and rural Sindh lessened tensions somewhat. But the 60 percent employment reservation given to rural areas became another source of conflict between the Sindhis and the Mohajirs.
With the dismissal of Bhutto's government and the imposition of martial law on 5 July 1977, the Sindhi-Mohajir conflict took a new turn. While the majority of native Sindhis were supporting Bhutto's PPP, the bulk of the Mohajir population voted against his party during the elections of March 1977. Agitation against the regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto mostly concentrated in the Urdu-speaking cities of Karachi and Hyderabad. Ironically, Mohajirs didn't benefit during the martial law of General Zia-ul-Haq because the Zia regime did not try to resolve the issues, which were central to the Mohajir community. Between 1986 and 1988 tensions between the two communities gradually diminished. With the influx of Pathans and Punjabis in Sindh and their connections with the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, the traditional domination of the Mohajir community in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad began to erode. The taking over of the transport system by the Pathan community and the business and jobs by the Punjabis created a sense of insecurity among the Mohajirs, who feared more marginalization of their role in Sindh.
In August 1986, in a huge public meeting in Karachi, Altaf Hussain, the leader of the Mohajir community, proclaimed the formal launching of the MQM. He accused the Punjabi-dominated establishment of hurting the rights of the Mohajir community. In view of the marginalization of Sindhis and Mohajirs because of Zia's martial law, proposals for Mohajir-Sindhi unity were also presented. For the first time in Sindh's politics, there were indications of Mohajir-Sindhi reconciliation against their common enemy.
The Sindhi-Mohajir honeymoon came to an end in late 1988 when ethnic tension between the Sindhi and Mohajir communities living in the city of Hyderabad escalated over the policies of the MQM-dominated municipal body of the city. On 31 October 1988 hundreds of people were killed as a result of sniper fire in Hyderabad, resulting in bloody ethnic riots between Sindhi and Mohajir communities.
The renewed tension between Mohajirs and Sindhis was one of the outcomes of the breakup of the alliance between the MQM and Benazir Bhutto's PPP. The MQM, which had joined the Bhutto government after the November 1988 elections, left in August 1989 because of the nonfulfillment of its demands by the PPP regime. These demands centered on the repatriation of stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh, ending the quota system, and withdrawal of cases against MQM activists. With the rupture of the PPP-MQM alliance, ethnic violence in Sindh claimed hundreds of lives between May and June 1990. With the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government by the president on charges of corruption and mismanagement, the level of violence of Sindh was reduced.
During the October 1990 elections, the Sindhi-dominated PPP was defeated in general elections. The MQM retained its electoral upper hand in urban Sindh and joined the coalition government with the Punjabi-dominated Pakistan Muslim League of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which had won the general elections. For the first time since its inception, the MQM became a strong partner in Sindh's government. But its role in the government, both in Sindh and at the federal level, was short-lived because the army—fearful of MQM's growing strength—decided to launch an operation against the group in June 1992. As a result, the MQM withdrew its support of the Pakistan Muslim League and went underground. It launched a campaign against the role of intelligence agencies in dividing the MQM and weakening its power. This situation continued until the government of Nawaz Sharif was dismissed by the president on charges of inefficiency and corruption in April 1993. Although his government was reinstated by the supreme court in May 1993, Nawaz Sharif decided to resign from the post of prime minister, paving the way for the holding of general elections in October 1993, which brought Benazir Bhutto's PPP back to power.
The MQM mobilized its cadre for agitation against the government in early 1994. The Sindhi-dominated PPP, meanwhile, blamed the MQM for engaging in antistate activities and seeking support from India for an independent homeland for the Mohajirs of Sindh, charges the MQM denied. Between November 1994 and September 1995, Karachi witnessed violent incidents claiming thousands of lives. Violence in urban Sindh continued, despite the government crackdown. The defeat of the PPP in the February 1997 elections at the hands of Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League and the retention of its vote bank in these elections by the MQM again created an MQM–Pakistan Muslim League alliance, which again was short-lived. Despite joining the Muslim League in a coalition in Sindh and in the federal cabinet, the MQM continued to complain about discriminatory policies. In October 1998, the MQM left the government and again became a target of state repression.
The present phase in the Sindhi-Mohajir conflict, following the military coup of 12 October 1999, is based on three important realities. First, high-profile tensions between Mohajirs and Sindhis have been replaced with "realistic coexistence." To the Sindhis and the Mohajirs, it has become clear that both communities cannot annihilate each other and both need to recognize and respect their interests. The MQM, which had violent confrontations with native Sindhis during 1988–1990, has also come to the conclusion that sustained conflict with them can only benefit the Punjabi-dominated military and bureaucracy. The creation of trust and confidence and the removal of paranoia between the Sindhi and Mohajir communities can help ensure political stability and peace in the province of Sindh.
Recently, one can notice some systematic effort on the part of MQM and Jayae Sindh Quami Mahaz (Sindhi National Front) to seek Sindhi-Mohajir alliances on important issues such as the fair distribution of water. For the first time in many years, one can see organized efforts by Sindhi- and Urdu-speaking leaders to remove mistrust and past cleavages so as to form a united front against the Punjabi elite.
Before the formation and rise of the MQM, the struggle for the rights of the Urdu-speaking population in Sindh was not identified with any external hand. It was only in the course of the MQM drive for assertion and its demand for a separate Mohajir identity that the establishment began to link instability in urban Sindh with the involvement of foreign forces. Unlike urban Sindh, the Sindhi nationalist movement was believed to have obtained support from external elements.
Several conspiracy theories linking foreign elements in Sindh's ethnic conflicts have been presented over a period of years. During the Cold War days, the role of the Soviet Union and India was mentioned. After the emergence of the MQM as a strong force in urban Sindh, it was alleged by the state that the United States and India were behind creating unrest in the Urdu-speaking community and that the slogan of a separate Mohajir state composed of Karachi and Hyderabad had the blessings of Washington and New Delhi. In 1992, when the state had launched a crackdown operation against the MQM, official sources revealed that the prime objective of Mohajir nationalists was to create "Jinnahpur," which would have sovereign status with the support of India. When Karachi was in the grip of severe violence in 1994, the government asked the Indian consulate to close its operations in the city because of its alleged involvement in MQM-sponsored terrorism.
Sindh is the most ethnically diversified province of Pakistan and the two major ethnic groups, i.e., Sindhis and Mohajirs, still lack basic understanding. The third ethnic force in Sindh, i.e., Punjabis and Pathans, form another bloc. The unresolved ethnic issues of Sindh provide an opportunity for foreign elements to exploit the situation for their own interests.
Official Conflict Management
When the language riots broke out in 1972, the then government of Z. A. Bhutto tried to defuse the situation by giving concessions to the Urdu-speaking population. Although Bhutto's government had a soft spot for the Sindhi-speaking population, it realized that continuous violence in Sindh, particularly in its capital, Karachi, could be disastrous for the economy of the country. Some confidence-building measures to promote ethnic harmony between Sindhis and Mohajirs were also taken by Bhutto's government, such as keeping the post of governor of the province for the Urdu-speaking community. During Zia's time and in the post-Zia period (after 1988), official conflict management remained low-key. It can be argued that the state itself was involved in widening the ethnic cleavage between the Sindhis and Mohajirs instead of managing the conflict.
Official conflict-management activities in the Sindhi-Mohajir conflict may be seen at two levels, federal and provincial. There exists a wide belief in Sindh that most of the sources of grievances among Sindhis and Mohajirs against each other could be removed by official administrative measures both by the Sindh and the federal governments. If the quota system, which is still a major source of irritation between Sindhis and Mohajirs, is handled to the satisfaction of both communities and economic steps providing adequate development funds in both rural and urban Sindh are given, the ethnic discord in Sindh could be gradually minimized. The government can also introduce social and educational reforms so that the level of intolerance between Sindhis and Mohajirs could be reduced.
Multi Track Diplomacy
The role of civil society, state, and media in the Mohajir-Sindhi conflict is quite interesting because of their contradictory reactions. Civil society in Sindh remains weak and divided. There are a few reasons for this, but chief among them is the urban-rural divide. First, the rural population is overwhelmingly Sindhi (92 percent) while the urban population is half Urdu and one-quarter Sindhi (figures from the 1998 Provincial Census). Urban Sindh has high levels of literacy; rural Sindh has a poor educational standing. Urban Sindh is industrialized and politicized; rural Sindh lives in an oppressive and exploitative feudal structure. Urban Sindh has a strong middle class. The two faces of the province do not see eye to eye. These problems are exacerbated by a policy of divide and rule followed by the ruling elite and the absence of an assertive role of the intelligentsia and political parties of Sindh for democracy.
The state tried to deal with the issue of Mohajir nationalism by using force (particularly against MQM supporters), promoting division within the MQM, and encouraging Punjabi and Pathan settlers against the MQM. Since the state was not trying to deal with the problem of Mohajir or Sindhi nationalism in a political manner, the end result was more insecurity and ill will in Sindh against state policies. None of the mainstream political parties that have dominated the state apparatus have done anything to reduce ethnic tensions. Quite the contrary, they have been a complicating factor. The PPP is a case in point. When it controlled the federal and Sindh governments, tensions between Sindhis and Mohajirs increased because support for Sindhi nationalists had remained a hallmark for the PPP leadership since the days of Z. A. Bhutto. During the tenure of Z. A. Bhutto (1972–1977) and his daughter Benazir Bhutto (1988–1990 and 1993–1996), Sindhi-Mohajir relations were marred with violence. Given the fact that the Bhutto family hails from rural Sindh, Urdu-speaking Mohajirs held the view that they had followed a policy of patronizing Sindhis at the expense of Mohajirs. The media had a significantly negative impact on Sindh ethnic politics. The vernacular press printed stories and reports about Sindhi-Mohajir conflicts without proper investigation. The print media did not help much in creating reconciliation and goodwill between Sindhis and Mohajirs. A section of the print media was used by the establishment in order to promote a further rift between the two communities. The electronic media, which is under state control, did not help to create harmony and understanding between the two communities.
During the violent phases of the Sindhi-Mohajir conflicts, civil society generally failed to curb the level of violence and promote the process of peace between the two communities, although efforts at the community level by nonpartisan people proved to be useful in scaling down the level of violence in the two phases of active Sindhi-Mohajir conflicts. Other segments of civil society, such as labor movements, student groups, and social organizations, tried to promote ethnic harmony between Sindhis and Mohajirs but their scope was limited for two main reasons:
(1) the absence of a political process during the long spell of martial law (1977–1985)
(2) the vested interests pursued by the military-bureaucratic establishment to promote ethnic division in Sindh so as to counter the role of national political parties.
Because of illiteracy, backwardness, and other social ills, civil society could not play a cogent role in promoting a sense of ethnic tolerance in Sindh. A large section of the print media, particularly the vernacular press, acted in a totally irresponsible manner during spells of ethnic violence in Sindh and contributed to the ethnic divide.
The current absence of an active ethnic conflict between the two communities is not because of the positive role played by the civil society but because of a strong feeling among Sindhis and Mohajirs that as permanent residents of Sindh they should avoid the politics of hate and violence. Given the fact that only vested-interest groups benefit from violence, both Sindhis and Mohajirs are attempting to avoid direct confrontation with each other.
Presently, the dynamics of the Sindhi-Mohajir conflict contain not only a potential for meaningful cooperation but also the resurgence of violence between the two communities. From 1990 onwards, the nature of Sindhi-Mohajir relations has changed from overt hostility to covert acceptability. The process of assimilation, which should be a reciprocal process, has not yielded positive results because both Sindhi and Mohajir communities still possess deep-rooted mistrust and suspicions. Cultural, political, and economic cleavages between Sindhis and Mohajirs tend to discourage initiatives for ethnic harmony and cooperation in Sindh. Both state and nonstate actors need to play an active role in the prevention and management of Sindhi-Mohajir conflict in short- and long-term ways. Particularly, if the role of state is positive for promoting ethnic harmony in Sindh, much can be done to resolve decades-old Sindhi-Mohajir conflicts.
The events unfolding after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent U.S. war on terrorism have launched a discussion in Sindh on its implications for the political dynamics of the province. Following the subsequent war in Afghanistan leading to the collapse of the Taliban regime in Kabul, the centrifugal forces in Sindh will gain ground. Steps for seeking better understanding between progressive forces of Mohajirs and Sindhis are being taken in order to deal with the threat of religious fanaticism in Sindh. If the state fails to control the backlash of events in Afghanistan on Pakistani society, there is a possibility that the nationalist forces of Sindh will rise in order to deal with religious extremist elements. In that scenario, there is also a possibility of a patch-up between Sindhis and Mohajirs because both are concerned about the rising influence of jihadi elements. In this scenario, a Sindhi-Mohajir alliance, instead of sustained confrontation, is a long-term possibility. India can certainly intervene in a subtle manner in Sindh and support nationalist forces of the province if the jihadi elements create more problems for New Delhi in its controlled parts of Kashmir.
These may be divided into short-term and long-term recommendations because the nature of ethnic divide in Sindh is such that a step-by-step approach will have to be followed in order to build trust and confidence. Given the fact that the conflict is primarily internal, it has few chances of an external intervention at the state level or by foreign organizations such as the United Nations. Based on the passive nature of the conflict since 1990, it is expected that it will not escalate and has bright prospects for resolution if short- and long-term recommendations are taken into account by the community leaders and both provincial and federal governments. They are the following.
Reduction of mistrust by encouraging social contacts and interaction between Sindhis and Mohajirs. This is possible by discouraging migration in Sindh along ethnic lines.
Removal of the feeling among Sindhis that Mohajirs want to have a province at their expense. Reassurance given by Mohajir leaders that they are against the division of Sindh on ethnic grounds can help to reduce insecurity among the Sindhis. Similarly, an expression of tolerance by the Sindhi-speaking population vis-¹-vis their Urdu-speaking counterparts is also potentially helpful.
Reciprocal cultural exchange in order to bring the young generation of Sindhis and Mohajirs closer.
The best prospects for peacemaking lie with effectively dealing with the ignorance and backwardness in rural Sindh that promotes feelings of ethno-nationalism and extremism. There is a need on the part of Sindhi and Mohajir groups to target real issues such as water sharing, energy, and unemployment, instead of confronting each other. Investment and education need to be promoted in rural Sindh so that the sense of deprivation in that part of the province might be reduced. The state needs to formulate policies that could bring Sindhis and Mohajirs closer instead of doing nothing against those who promote hate and paranoia between the two communities. Mohajirs need to understand that as permanent residents of Sindh they should not have extraprovincial loyalties and should seriously think of working with Sindhis for the betterment of the province.
This would require a proactive approach: building confidence between Sindhis and Mohajirs at the grassroots level so that the forces of intolerance from both sides are curbed. Most important, Sindhi-Mohajir relations could be made cordial and tension-free only if there is a political process. In the absence of democratic political processes, ethnic discord cannot be removed. The media need to act in a responsible manner because the Urdu and Sindhi press follow a totally different line while dealing with lingual and cultural contradictions. The print media of Sindh can
contribute a lot to encouraging the process of assimilation.
The author is thankful to Ms. Nausheen Wasi, Mr. Farhan H. Siddiqi, Mr. Naeem Ahmed, and Mr. Fahim Raza for providing information and going through the earlier drafts of the survey.
Source: Khan Zafar Afghani, Taasub, Tashuddud Aur Tazad, Fanaticism, Violence and Clashes, vol. 1. Lahore, Al Mustafa publishing Systems, 1997, pp. 55–86.
Source: Ibid., pp. 268–495.
Source: Ibid., pp. 553–724, 870, 1601.
NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS: DAWN/The News International, Karachi;
Naqeeb, a magazine published by the Muhtada Quami Movement (MQM);
Sindh Quarterly (stopped publishing since early 1990s);
REPORTS: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Pakistan: Ethno-Politics and Contending Elites, by Abbas Rashid and Farida Shaheed.
Discussion Paper No. 45, June 1993,
Ethno National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors, by Tahir Amin. Islamabad, Institute of Policy Studies, 1988.
Pakistan Society: Islam: Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia, by Akbar S. Ahmed. Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1987.
State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity, by Iftikhar H. Malik. London, Macmillan, 1997.
The Sindh Story, by K. R. Malkani. Karachi, Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1984.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES: paknews.com/ (Pakistan news site);
sindh.net/ (Sindh Network);
www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/cbwebpg.html (Minorities at Risk project, info on Sindh and Mohajir ethnic groups and their current concerns);
www.kawish.com/ (Daily newspaper only avaliable in Sindh, Daily Kawish);
http://www.mqm.org/ (MQM's official web site);
www.mqmuk.demon.co.uk/ (Site of MQM International Secretariat);
http://www.satp.org/ (Institute for Conflict Management);
www.sindh.gov.pk/index.shtml (Government of Sindh);
http://www.world-sindhi-congress.com/ (World Sindhi Congress–Sindhi Unity Forum);
yangtze.cs.uiuc.edu/~jamali/sindh/res/ (Web directory of information about Sindh and Sindhis).
ORGANIZATIONS: Data on the following organizations can be found in the Directory section: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan; Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy;
Program on Peace Studies & Conflict Resolution; Sustainable Development Policy Institute.
About the author
Moonis Ahmar is associate professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, Pakistan, and director of the Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution. His field of specialization is confidence-building measures and conflict resolution in Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. He is teaching courses in conflict resolution and crisis management at the International Relations Department, University of Karachi. Formerly he worked at the Arms Control Program, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, United States. He was a visiting research associate with the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.; the Middle East Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.; and with Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Indiana. He has published extensively. Recently he has been awarded an Asia Fellowship to conduct research in Bangladesh on the theme 'A Comparative Study of Pakistan and Bangladesh: Economic, Political and Cultural Dynamics'.