Showing posts with label David Ignatius. Show all posts
Showing posts with label David Ignatius. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

How to Aggravate Pakistan by David Ignatius

Columnist and Associate Editor David Ignatius


He joined The Post in 1986 as editor of The Post's Outlook section, and then served as foreign editor from 1990 to 1992. Prior to becoming a columnist, Ignatius was The Post's assistant managing editor in charge of business news, a position he assumed in 1993. He continued to write weekly after becoming executive editor of the Paris-based International Herald Tribune in 2000, and resumed writing twice a week for the op-ed page in 2003. Before joining The Post he worked for ten years as a reporter for The Wall Street Journal, covering at various times the steel industry, the Justice Department, the CIA, the U.S. Senate, the Middle East, and the State Department. Ignatius has written six novels: "Body of Lies" (April 2007), "The Sun King" (1999), "A Firing Offense" (1997), "The Bank of Fear" (1994), "SIRO" (1991), and "Agents of Innocence" (1987). Courtesy: David Ignatius
Editorial; Associate Editors http://projects.washingtonpost.com/staff/articles/david+ignatius/


How to Aggravate Pakistan By David Ignatius Sunday, October 11, 2009

It's a classic example of the law of unintended consequences: Congress triples its assistance to Pakistan as part of a deepening strategic relationship. But members of Congress, always eager to tell other countries what to do, insert conditions that Pakistanis find insulting. As a result, rather than welcoming American aid and friendship, Pakistanis are indignant at U.S. meddling.

When I was in Islamabad a week ago, the Pakistani press was dripping with anti-American outrage. And last week, the Pakistani military and parliament were both protesting U.S. interference. All this in response to legislation that was meant to symbolize U.S. support for Islamabad's growing firmness in fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Strangely, this uproar seems to have taken the Obama administration by surprise, with senior officials initially denouncing as inaccurate a Tuesday New York Times story [U.S. Push to Expand in Pakistan Meets Resistance By JANE PERLEZ Published: October 5, 2009 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/world/asia/06islamabad.html?_r=2&scp=5&sq=Pakistan&st=cse] that reported Pakistani anger and opposition to the bill. Richard Holbrooke, the administration's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, should have seen this one coming.

The trigger for this latest flap with Islamabad is something known as the Kerry-Lugar bill, named for its Senate co-sponsors, John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). It should more properly be known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, since the language that has peeved the Pakistanis mostly came from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Rep. Howard Berman (D-Calif.).

Some of the popular anger in Islamabad is being manipulated by the Pakistani military, which should know better than to toss a match in the dry tinder of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. And some of it, frankly, is a sign of Pakistani political immaturity. But the larger point is that this hiccup in the relationship is unnecessary. It's a product of gratuitous language that was written into the legislation despite warnings that it would trigger just this sort of reaction. The finger-wagging conditions in the bill illustrate a special form of American hubris. U.S. politicians become so accustomed to lecturing others that they lose sight of how their words will be read in foreign capitals and how legislative boilerplate will play on foreign insecurities and anxieties. That's the foreigners' problem, you might say. But when a few gratuitous phrases can destabilize relations with our most important ally against al-Qaeda, then it's our problem, too.

It's useful to trace how this imbroglio developed, for it is largely a self-inflicted wound. In 2008, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began drafting a bill that was aimed at increasing non-military assistance and, in the process, encouraging Pakistan's fledgling civilian government. The heart of the bill was a big increase in civilian aid, from the $400 million range to $1.5 billion annually for five years. That bill finally cleared the Senate and House last month.

The Senate version included modest conditions on U.S. military aid to Pakistan, requiring that before money was delivered the secretary of state must certify that Pakistan's security forces were not "materially interfering" in politics and were making "concerted efforts" to curb the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Lashkar-i-Taiba group believed responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attack. That didn't prompt any backlash in Pakistan.

The conditions in the House bill were much harsher, and the final bill passed by Congress had the tone of a diktat. Kerry tried to soften the House language, but sharp words remained: Pakistan wouldn't get military aid unless it "demonstrated a sustained commitment" against terrorism by showing it was "ceasing support" to terrorist groups and "dismantling terrorist bases" in Quetta and Muridke (where Lashkar-i-Taiba operates).

Although Pakistan's intelligence service has had past contacts with these groups, this public congressional scolding was guaranteed to upset Pakistani military and intelligence officers. They argue that their soldiers are dying in the fight against the Taliban and other extremist groups, and they don't need hectoring from Congress. Pakistan's fight against the Taliban was vividly evident in Saturday's terrorist assault on the military's headquarters in Rawalpindi.

The Pakistani side is hardly blameless. The military may be peeved that the bill leans toward a civilian government it doesn't fully trust. It's possible, too, that Pakistani intelligence chiefs still are playing a double game with the terrorists. But that's hard to square with their actions in recent months -- their successful assault on the Taliban in the Swat Valley and their planned offensive in Waziristan.

The only benefit I can see here is a perverse one: It may actually be easier for the Pakistani military to battle the Taliban and al-Qaeda if it's seen by the public as standing up defiantly to American pressure. There's no better cover for a pro-American policy, after all, than bashing Uncle Sam.

davidignatius@washpost.com

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

The View From Pakistan's Spies by David Ignatius

Columnist and Associate Editor David Ignatius
He joined The Post in 1986 as editor of The Post's Outlook section, and then served as foreign editor from 1990 to 1992. Prior to becoming a columnist, Ignatius was The Post's assistant managing editor in charge of business news, a position he assumed in 1993. He continued to write weekly after becoming executive editor of the Paris-based International Herald Tribune in 2000, and resumed writing twice a week for the op-ed page in 2003. Before joining The Post he worked for ten years as a reporter for The Wall Street Journal, covering at various times the steel industry, the Justice Department, the CIA, the U.S. Senate, the Middle East, and the State Department. Ignatius has written six novels: "Body of Lies" (April 2007), "The Sun King" (1999), "A Firing Offense" (1997), "The Bank of Fear" (1994), "SIRO" (1991), and "Agents of Innocence" (1987). Courtesy: David Ignatius
Editorial; Associate Editors http://projects.washingtonpost.com/staff/articles/david+ignatius/


The View From Pakistan's Spies By David Ignatius Tuesday, September 29, 2009


ISLAMABAD -- The headquarters of Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence directorate is a black-ribbed stucco building in the Aabpara neighborhood of the capital. Its operatives, described by wary Pakistanis as "the boys from Aabpara," play a powerful and mysterious role in the life of the country. Their "tentacles," as one ISI officer terms the agency's spy networks, stretch deep into neighboring Afghanistan.

The ISI agreed to open its protective curtain slightly for me last week. This unusual outreach included a long and animated conversation with Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the agency's director general, as well as a detailed briefing from its counterterrorism experts. Under the ground rules, I cannot quote Pasha directly, but I can offer a sense of how his agency looks at key issues -- including the Afghanistan war and the ISI's sometimes prickly relationship with America.

At an operational level, the ISI is a close partner of the CIA. Officers of the two services work together nearly every night on joint operations against al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas, perhaps the most dangerous region in the world. Information from the ISI has helped the CIA plan its Predator drone attacks, which have killed 14 of the top 20 targets over the past several years.

But on the political level, there is mistrust on both sides. The United States worries that the ISI isn't sharing all it knows about Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis, meanwhile, view the United States as an unreliable ally that starts fights it doesn't know how to finish.

A test of this fragile partnership is the debate over the new Afghanistan strategy proposed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal. The ISI leadership thinks the United States can't afford to lose in Afghanistan, and it worries about a security vacuum there that would endanger Pakistan. But at the same time, the ISI fears that a big military surge, like the up to 40,000 additional troops McChrystal wants, could be counterproductive.

ISI officials believe Washington should be realistic about its war objectives. If victory is defined as obliteration of the Taliban, the United States will never win. But the United States can achieve the more limited aim of rough political stability, if it is patient.

In the ISI's view, America makes a mistake in thinking it must solve every problem on its own. In Afghanistan, it should work with President Hamid Karzai, who, for all his imperfections, has one essential quality that American strategists lack -- he's an Afghan. ISI officials suggest that Karzai should capitalize on the post-election ferment by calling for a cease-fire so that he can form a broadly based government that includes some Taliban representatives.

ISI officials say they want to help America with political reconciliation in Afghanistan. But they argue that to achieve this goal, the U.S. must change its posture -- moving from "ruler mode" to "support mode" -- so that Afghan voices can be heard.

The American suspicion that the ISI is withholding information about the Taliban, or is otherwise "hedging its bets," makes ISI leaders visibly angry. Pakistanis have the most to lose from a Taliban victory in Kabul, they argue, because it would inevitably strengthen the Taliban in Pakistan, too. A Pakistani version of Mohammad Omar is anathema to them, the ISI leaders say.

As for American allegations that the ISI maintains direct links with Siraj Haqqani, a key ally of the Taliban, the ISI officials insist it isn't so. They do have a network of agents within the insurgent groups and tribes, but that's part of a spy agency's job. America's suspicion that Pakistan secretly pulls the Taliban's strings is many years out of date, they contend.

One ISI analyst loudly calls my name at the end of a briefing and then recites a summary of Pakistani casualties since Sept. 11, 2001, from terrorism. The list totals 5,362 dead and 10,483 wounded. "Trust us," says another ISI official, referring to this casualty toll. "Do not interfere in a way that infringes on our sovereignty and makes us look bad in the eyes of the public."

Talking with ISI leaders, I am reminded of something you see around the world these days. People want to help America more than we sometimes think. But they want to be treated with respect -- as full partners, not as useful CIA assets.

Trust is always a conditional word when you are talking about intelligence activities, which are built around deception. But in this case, where America and Pakistan share common interests, the opportunities are real.

davidignatius@washpost.com


NOTE: Picture of Hamid Karazi with Details is not in the Post article, both are inserted by me. Aamir Mughal


Hamid Karzai - Incumbent President of Afghanistan Assumed office 22 December 2001
Acting until 7 December 2004 - Profile: Hamid Karzai became the first popularly elected president of Aghanistan in 2004 - nearly three years after being appointed the country's interim leader. After taking up power in December 2001, he survived an early assassination attempt and infighting among ethnic groups to carve out a reputation as a shrewd statesman. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3135938.stm MORE DETAILS ON HAMID KARZAI Richard Holbrooke, USA, Taliban, Karzai, Zalmay Khalilzad & Narcotics http://chagataikhan.blogspot.com/2009/07/richard-holbrooke-usa-taliban-karzai.html