Showing posts with label Devolving Corruption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Devolving Corruption. Show all posts

Friday, November 20, 2009

Kamran Khan, Rigged Military Contracts & Partial NAB.


The National Accountability Bureau is Pakistan's apex anti-corruption organization. It is charged with the responsibility of elimination of corruption through a holistic approach of awareness, prevention and enforcement. It operates under the National Accountability Ordinance-1999, with its headquarter at Islamabad. REFERENCE: http://www.nab.gov.pk/


During 1999 Ansar Abbasi was Praising General Musharraf Martial Law regime's "Alleged Reforms" when Ansar Abbasi used to be a Correspondent in Daily Dawn, he never mentioned even a single time that Impsoing Martial Law is Treason and Violation of Article 6 of 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. Read the news reports which Ansar Abbasi filed in the Daily Dawn in 1999. Not a single time Ansar adress Musharraf as CMLA but Ansar was very respectful towards "alleged Chief Executive" Musharraf. You may not find a single personal observation by Ansar Abbasi on Constitutional Tampering by Military Regime. Musharraf was given mandate by the Judiciary to tamper with the Constitution. Everybody knows who was part of that Supreme Court Bench. REFERENCES: Special courts to try cases of accountability Ansar Abbasi 06 November 1999 Issue : 05/45 [Courtesy Daily Dawn Wire Service] http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1999/06nov99.html
Musharraf approves pre-1973 authority for FPSC by Ansar Abbasi Week Ending : 29 January 2000 Issue : 06/05 [Courtesy Daily Dawn Wire Service] http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/29jan00.html Sharifs lose 80pc of assets, says Qureshi by Ansar Abbasi Week Ending : 16 December 2000 Issue : 06/48 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/dec1600.html Beneficiaries of NRO cannot get bail: NAB By Ansar Abbasi Friday, November 13, 2009 http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=25545 Finally, dreaded NRO list is out and official By Ansar Abbasi Friday, November 20, 2009 http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=25672


"QUOTE"

NAB has evidence of mass corruption in past defence deals NAB still to take up cases against corrupt officers; documents with NAB suggest many deals made by military men involved kickbacks News Intelligence Unit by Kamran Khan ‘The News’ dated August 29, 2000 - KARACHI: The long arm of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), which has already twisted some of the "untouchables" among the political, bureaucratic and business elite of the country, is still far away from touching the veteran military top brass that was at the helm of affairs when questionable military purchases worth billions of dollars were made in the past two decades. In a month-long investigation by the News Intelligence Unit (NIU), during which more than three dozen present and retired civil and military officials were interviewed and scores of related documents examined, it emerged the national exchequer may have lost up to Rs. 570 crore (US $1 billion) in the shape of alleged kickbacks in contracts. These related to tanks, submarines, mine hunters, Mirage fighters and army jeeps in multi-purpose deals signed by the Army Welfare Trust, Shaheen and Bahria foundations.

The NIU investigation has revealed that the NAB is already in possession of enough documentary or circumstantial evidence to launch a full-scale probe against at least 20 retried senior military officials including three former chiefs of army staff, two naval chiefs and an Air Force chief in purchases of tanks, submarines, naval mine hunters, Mirage fighters and army jeeps. But there is nothing to suggest NAB is close to filing a reference against any former ranking military official or even serve them with a questionnaire. Interestingly, the documents seen by the NIU providing extensive clues about alleged corruption in mega defence contracts and in the affairs of the Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Shaheen Foundation, Bahria Foundation and Defence Housing Authority (DHA) were made available from the NAB's huge reservoir of incriminating documents, much of which was built by the former Ehtesab Bureau. There is no indication yet NAB would, at any time in the near future, make any use of this reservoir. Besides sizeable documentary evidence, the army-run NAB is also equipped with experienced serving military officials who have brought with them personal expertise and knowledge about many of the questionable defence deals. Among the NAB's much-talked about consultants, is Major (retd) Saeed Akhter Malik, a former representative for Styer sniper rifles in Pakistan. Saeed can provide an insight to NAB about the "invisible prerequisites" for selling sniper rifle to army-run organisations like ASF and Pakistan Coast Guards.

Though the defence budget of Rs 135 billion, including the military purchases of about Rs 1100 crore per annum, far exceeds the total budget of all civilian departments of the Government of Pakistan, NAB is barred from investigating the corruption cases that relate to the active service military officials. There is, however, no restriction on the organisation from investigating past military deals and retired military officials. While a majority of contracts relating to controversial defence purchases have not yet been touched by the NAB, the organisation is making a low-key effort to seek the extradition of former chief of Naval Staff Admiral Mansurul Haq from the United States. The NAB is in possession of documentary evidence, left by the former Ehtesab Bureau, that the DCN-I (Direction des Constructions Navales International) of France had made an indirect payment of about US $ five million to Admiral Mansurul Haq for a grossly over-invoiced up-gradation project for three Agosta B submarines. The NAB is seeking Admiral Mansur's extradition on that count, but it seems to be not interested to get to the bottom of the most embarrassing defence purchase episode of Pakistan's history.

During its investigation the NIU discovered that behind a much- publicised demand for Admiral Mansur's extradition lay an institutional effort to cover up the whole scandal. Unimpeachable sources have informed the NIU that while the NAB made public demands for Mansur's extradition, the former Naval chief, who had received advance information to that effect from an official channel, has already left her daughter's Austin residence in the state of Texas for a new undisclosed location outside the US. The NIU can disclose that Commodore Shahid, the former director of Naval Intelligence who was convicted by a Field General Court Martial (FGCM) to seven years of rigorous imprisonment for his alleged role in the submarine corruption case, was pardoned by the former Naval chief Admiral Fasih Bukhari, only three months after the conviction. Commodore Shahid spent 12 weeks of this imprisonment in the comfortable atmosphere of his residence in Islamabad, during which there was no restriction on his movement in the city. For receiving heavy kickbacks in a submarine deal Commodore Shahid and Captain Liaquat Ali Malik, both considered close to the top Naval hierarchy involved in the submarine deal, were awarded seven and three years rigorous imprisonment, respectively, by a military court in November 1998. These officials had been convicted on the basis of irrefutable bank statements and other documentary evidence, besides damning evidence from another serving Pakistan Navy Captain.

During the trial and after their conviction both officers, however, rigidly maintained they were just the pawns in a large game, and they have been made the scapegoats. Commodore Shahid, who had held the sensitive post of director Naval Intelligence, was believed to be privy to each and every behind-the-scene development on this subject and his threat to spill the beans is understood to have resulted in his unprecedented pardon by the former naval chief. Before his pardon, the Navy never allowed the authorities to shift the convicted commodore from his house to a prison. Evidence in black and white available with NAB also provides ample evidence that kickbacks were also paid in the purchase of Edrian class minesweepers for the Pakistan Navy. The deal worth US $ 250 million had raised several eyebrows regarding the cost and the effectiveness of the project. NIU believed that Commodore Shahid was loaded with inside information on this particular deal also, and his honest testimony may provide vital links to establish payment of kickbacks.

The NIU has learned that while NAB appeared to be not interested in investigating Commodore Shahid's statements and the events that led to his dramatic pardon, it has not yet questioned Admiral A U Khan and Rear Admiral Mujtaba, the two senior ranking naval official who had played a significant role in the navy's decision to buy Agosta submarines under the then naval chief Admiral Saeed Khan. Admiral A U Khan, who had received a surprising extension in the service in Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (PNSC), after the military take-over, is also closely related to a Federal minister. Admiral Mansurul Haq's financial deals while heading the PNSC before he was handpicked to head Pakistan Navy, though caused the collapse of the PNSC, but NAB is yet to start its probe into the PNSC affairs. The NIU is told the NAB is "fully loaded" with evidence against Admiral Mansur and two other top-ranking former naval officials on the kickbacks worth Rs 500 million they received on the land deals involving Bahria Foundation.

Admiral A U Khan or Rear Admiral Mujtaba are yet to be questioned by NAB about their role in the submarine deal. Several sources said Admiral A U Khan's 1994 visit to France was the turning point in the Navy's final decision to prefer the French subs over the Swedish model. A former Citibank official in Karachi, who had travelled to France with Admiral Mansurul Haq on his famous visit to conclude the up-gradation deal with the DCN-I, is now working closely with a top NAB official, but there is nothing to suggest if he had shared his knowledge, or has been asked to do so, about the kickbacks in the submarine deal with NAB. In his private Sindh Club circle, the same former Citibank official is claiming that it was because of his personal relationship with Admiral Mansurul Haq, NAB has not yet moved to seize three personal houses of the former naval chief that are worth at least Rs 15 crore. A senior NAB official, however, informed the NIU that this individual was involved in NAB's plea of bargain with Tas Jumani who was wanted by NAB in a Rs 8 crore corruption case involving Pakistan State Oil. The NAB source emphatically denied the former Citibank official had anything to do with Admiral Mansur's investigation.

Whatever may be the role of the former Citibank official in the submarine saga, but the documents available with NAB and other informed sources have named a Monte Carlo and London-based former BCCI official, as the principal go-between the DCN-I, the submarine manufacturer and the top naval officials in Pakistan. NAB officials estimate that in US$100 million kickback in the submarine deal, this go-between made a cool US$10 million in commission. He also acted as the principal go-between with Mirage 2000 manufacturer Dassault Aviation and the Government of Pakistan for an aborted purchase of 40 Mirage 2000 for a deal worth US$4 billion. At that time he was believed to be closely tied with both political and key Pakistan Air Force players. Although the Mirage 2000 deal never materialised, this individual's role remained unclear in PAF's surprise deal to buy 40 pieces of old model Mirages for US$120 million.

NAB's reservoir of documents has some interesting material about this PAF purchase of 34 Mirage-vf and 6 Mirage 3 BE from the SEGAM of France. The role played by the then Director General Defence Procurement (DG, DP) Rear Admiral Saeed Akhter remained central to the whole deal, which had been concluded by the then Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal Abbas Khattak and the SEGAM officials in France. Amid charges of kickbacks worth US$20 million, distributed between the PAF command and the DG, DP, Rear Admiral Saeed Akhter left his job, under unexplained circumstances, and left for Europe where he settled permanently. At the time of the deal and afterwards, the dismissed Vice Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Arshad Choudry had voiced concern about rising corruption in the PAF, and in a specific meeting with the then President Farooq Leghari, the Vice Air Chief offered to prove kickbacks and commission in deals ranging from land deals in Karachi to Mirage purchases to the Mirage rebuild factory in Kamra.

Imprudent and sometimes intriguing financial decisions, during the same period, caused losses worth tens of crores of rupees to the active-service PAF officers-run Shaheen Foundation, the Shaheen Air venture with a Karachi-based General Sales Agent (GSA) for some foreign airlines resulted in more than Rs 500 million losses to the Foundation. The situation at the Shaheen Foundation, mostly because of some decisions directed by ACM Abbas Khattak, came to a point that Air Marshal Shafiq Hyder, a highly regarded officer, asked for a premature retirement citing affairs at the Shaheen Foundation. The Shafiq Hyder episode came at a time when the Shaheen Foundation had offered to give its name to a shadowy Shaheen Pay TV project that was to be controlled by PAY TV (Ireland), a mysterious company that did not reveal the names of its directors even to the Shaheen Foundation chief, who had instruction from the ACM Abbas Khattak to sign this deal with PAY TV (Ireland).

Several sources mentioned that a Peshawar-based individual, Andrew Shalom, with mysterious connections in Europe, was the go-between the then Air Force chief in various projects including the Shaheen Pay TV project undertaken by the Shaheen Foundation. Sources said if NAB ever decides to undertake a probe into the alleged PAF corruption scandals under the former ACM Abbas Khattak, the two former Air Marshals of the PAF would love to extend their cooperation and their insight. Acquisition of new tanks has remained central to the defence strategy envisioned by the successive chiefs of Army Staff since Gen Ziaul Haq. In the past one decade alone, cash-strapped Pakistan has spent about Rs 900 crore (US$1.6b) to equip the Army with the finest of desert battle machines. Allegations of kickbacks, also from senior army circles, were made each time the army leadership went into serious negotiations for tank purchases since General Ziaul Haq witnessed the final trial run of American made Abraham tanks at the Army's tank trial site of Khairpur Tamewali on August 17, 1988. The same afternoon that day, Gen Ziaul Haq's plane, also carrying the top leadership of Pakistan Army, crashed not far from Khairpur Tamewali.

While Gen Zia had favoured the US built model of the tanks for an about US$700 million purchase, his successor Gen Mirza Aslam Beg opted for the US $1 billion Al-Khalid manufacturing plant to build MBT 2000 tanks with Chinese cooperation. While Gen Beg's US$1 billion Al-Khalid plan was still operational, his successor Gen Asif Nawaz went full swing to conclude a US$ 450 million purchase for 320 T-72 tanks from Poland. Though Gen Asif Nawaz had died by the day when this deal was to be signed with the visiting Polish team, his successor Gen Abdul Wahid Kakar's team of experts rejected the deal outrightly, citing the reasons that could form the basis for a NAB investigation. For his part Gen Abdul Wahid thought there was no reason to rush through a tank deal, and Pakistan was better off concentrating on Gen Beg's Al-Khalid programme. Gen Wahid's successor General Jehangir Karamat, however, thought it was vital for the country's defence to immediately equip the army with the best possible tanks. He struck a US$550 million deal with Ukraine, which at that time did not even have a diplomatic presence in Pakistan, for 320 T 80 UD tanks in 1996. General Asif Nawaz wanted to purchase the same number of 320 tanks for a price tag of US$450 million, while Gen Karamat negotiated to buy the same number of tanks, with almost the same capacity, for US $550 million, through a deal which finally cost the nation a cool US $650 million.

The criticism of General Beg's ambition to build the Pakistani version of MBT 2000 at a cost of Rs 570 crore remained restricted to an influential circle in the army that principally backed Gen Asif Nawaz, and Gen Jehangir Karamat's drive for speedy induction of the tanks, but allegations of kickbacks in the Al-Khalid project had surfaced several times in the past. The reservations of the successive army chiefs about this expansive project may also explain the snags that caused huge delays in the completion of the project. NAB's present reservoir of documents has nothing to substantiate allegation of kickbacks in the tank deals, but several NAB insiders who had also worked closely with the former Ehtesab Bureau chief Senator Saifur Rehman Khan have revealed that the former Senator had personally investigated General Jehangir Karamat's T80UD tanks with Ukraine. Sources said in this respect the affairs of TFT Progress, the company that acted as the go-between the GHQ and the Ukrainian supplier, were fully investigated to establish the role played by Col Mahmood (retd) alias Moda, a former course mate of Gen Jehangir Karamat. As representative of the Ukrainian supplier, Col Mahmood, Army sources acknowledge, had played a key role in bringing the GHQ and the Ukrainian government close to a deal. Confirmed reports indicated that while Gen Jehangir Karamat was still serving as the COAS and also after his resignation, Col Mahmood had been vigorously questioned by the people acting on the Ehtesab Bureau's behalf. One reliable source informed the NIU that the Nawaz Sharif government probe into this tank deal also focused on a retired major general and a close personal friend of General Jehangir Karamat, who was then serving as an additional secretary in the Ministry of Defence. Knowledgeable sources however discounted rumours that during his last meeting with Gen Jehangir Karamat, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif ever mentioned to the former COAS the outcome of his probe against the Ukrainian tank deal.

Several present and retired officials who spoke to the NIU on the subject of corruption in defence contracts desired that 1995 army purchase of 3700 Land Rover Jeeps - that had carried a price tag of about Rs 180 crore for the army - be investigated by NAB. These sources said NAB only needs to investigate the price Bangladesh army had paid for the same vehicle around the same time period that the GHQ finalised this deal. NIU has learned the owner of the key supplier of this vehicle to the army was a close relative of a then serving Lieutenant General, who was also the main decision-maker in the purchase. Though NAB has no documents on this controversial purchase of Land Rover jeeps by the Army, top NAB officials have been given extensive briefings and documentary evidence on the corruption that has now created a financial crisis in the Army Welfare Trust, an organisation dedicated to the welfare of retired army personnel.

Based on these briefings and documents, NAB is yet to question the former AWT chairman Lt Gen Farrukh Khan for his 1994 decision to borrow US $200 million from the famous US investment Bank Merrill Lynch. A decision later by Merrill to invoke a clause in its agreement with the AWT to call its loan any time in the future brought AWT to its knees, as the National Bank of Pakistan was called to rescue the Welfare Trust. NAB is yet to respond to the pleas for investigation into Lt Gen Farrukh Khan's decision to allow an advance payment of Rs 25 crore to Mitsubishi for a power plant for the AWT's Nizampur Cement plant. Once again, due to the weaker agreement, the Japanese concern reneged its commitment with the Nizampur Cement Plant, causing a straight Rs 25 crore loss. Millions of AWT's dollars were wasted in a useless pharmaceutical plant constructed in association with a Chinese company. Sources said only a week of "NAB-style" probing was enough to unearth the scam in the pharmaceutical project. Detailed documents obtained by NIU on corruption in the AWT-run cement plants and its former chairman's dealing with the Privatisation Commission on the subject of cement plants in 1995 are already available with NAB, awaiting executive orders for a probe.

Like most of the defence-related organisations, the affairs of the Defence Housing Authorities in Karachi and Lahore, despite having an average turnover of about Rs 750 million a year, have never seen an independent scrutiny of their affairs. The present DHA administrators in Karachi and Lahore appeared to have worked hard to free these organisation from institutionalised corruption, of sorts, but this NIU investigation discovered that despite serious complaints of financial corruption, particularly in the years between 1994-97, no action was taken against the perpetrators who had converted the DHA Karachi into one of the most corrupt organisations in the country. The NIU met several individuals to confirm that almost every allottee in the DHA's Marina Scheme in its phase 8 had to pay an additional sum of up to 20 per cent, which went to top DHA officials of that time. This particularly attracted tremendous attention because in this scheme the DHA had allowed allotments for the civilians to create recreational facilities on the shore front. As expected, the real estate prices in this area sky-rocketed within one year of the announcement of the scheme. While the prices were showing an upward swing the DHA restricted the allotment only to people close to its then director Planning and the administrator.

The largest plots went to the people widely known to be close to the director planning. One such individual was the father of a Pakistani model who made her name in India. While the Marina Scheme was in full swing in 1994, precious land, particularly in the phase 2 and 5 of DHA in Karachi was allotted in the name of "extra land adjacent to the existing commercial and residential plots at the reserved DHA prices". The NIU discovered that some of the known investors in the DHA Karachi, colluded with the former Director planning, who was then thought to be the most powerful DHA official to multiply their millions in overnight deals involving allotment of extra land. While the Marina Scheme and extra land allotment continued, the then DHA administrator and his director Planning created more plots for flat sites, a scheme that was knitted in close collaboration with some of the known builders of Karachi, who were supposed to get the larger piece of the cake. The scheme, however, got busted in its early phase as the Federal Defence Secretary, who also serves as the Chairman of DHA, got wind of this plan and ordered the scrapping of the scheme.

"If the NAB is not probing against the DHA and particularly its longest serving director planning and a former administrator, it should stop its anti-corruption crusade in the country," a DHA insider observed while expressing surprise as to how the Army can allow the worst type of corruption to continue just under its nose. Senior NAB sources said they had no explicit instruction from Chief Executive General Pervaiz Musharraf or anyone else in the top Army brass to avoid a probe against the ex-army officials. These sources said the multi-million dollar defence deals and other defence-related corruption cases will be investigated "sooner rather than later." One senior source said the Chairman, NAB has himself ordered an extensive probe on charges that relate to the family fortunes of the sons of a former top military official. At least one of his sons is an active politician .

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Wednesday, November 5, 2008

Playing with basic law: Devolution Plan of Musharraf - 3


Part 3


DEVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 22 March 2004


V. IMPLEMENTING DEVOLUTION


A. THE POLITICS OF DEVOLUTION


On 13 August 2001, all four provincial governments issued local government ordinances to operationalise the devolution plan. The irony was not lost on critics of the plan that the "Local Government Ordinance 2001 was prepared by the federal government but each province was directed to notify it as its own law". On 14 August, Pakistan's independence day, elected local governments were formed in 97 provincial districts and the four city districts of Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta. Its internal contradictions leave Local Government Ordinance 2001 (LGO) open to varying interpretations and make its implementation difficult. No clear lines of authority delineate the relationship between the nazim and the bureaucratic head of a district, the DCO, who represents the centre. The LGO designates the zila nazim as the head of the district government to be assisted by the DCO but many zila nazims complained to ICG that DCOs often ignore them in administrative matters since there is no provision in the LGO to ensure their compliance with local government directives. Section 20 makes nazims personally responsible for financial losses and unlawful expenditures. Several nazims complain this creates "responsibility without authority" and leaves them vulnerable. The manner of implementation suggests that the military government is far more interested in political manipulation than political devolution. The political use of the scheme is best demonstrated by the April 2002 referendum that extended President Musharraf's term by five years with 97.5 per cent approval. The military used the newly installed nazims to help ensure a favourable outcome. They were persuaded or coerced to mobilise their constituents for a pro-Musharraf vote. Many organised and funded rallies in return for economic and political rewards.

According to some reports, union councillors were funded by local governments to campaign on Musharraf's behalf. Others were warned of the withdrawal of government support and termination of development projects in their areas if they did not cooperate.

Those who refused were also threatened with prosecution for corruption. Shah Mehmood Qureshi, then Multan District nazim and a PPP leader, said: "The provincial government wanted me to release money from the district budget for Musharraf's referendum. I refused since I could not transgress my authority". This resulted in the provincial government prosecuting him for misuse of public resources. Nafisa Shah, nazim of Khairpur district in upper Sindh, refused to attend Musharraf's referendum rally, branding it a political gimmick. Since then, district officials are transferred without her knowledge, and development funds are frequently withheld. From the start, the military has carefully controlled the pace and direction of devolution. Military personnel have remained intimately involved in the day-to-day affairs of local bodies. District transition teams, formed to facilitate the start of the new structures, were headed by military officers who called the administrative and financial shots. With the structures in place, the military has continued to oversee administration as well as the disbursement of development funds.

Several nazims in the Punjab say they have received direct orders from senior officers to undertake certain "visible development projects that could later be cited as achievements of the military government". Field officers, as well as union council nazims interviewed by ICG, say that the elected local governments have been empowered only in name and do not enjoy any meaningful administrative or financial autonomy. Of special concern is the imbalance of powers between the directly elected union councillors and the indirectly elected zila nazims. "The actual intent was to consolidate the military's power at the district level through zila nazims", says a union councillor from Quetta. "Below that level, we mostly do what previous councils did: register marriages, deaths and births". It was with this primary objective in mind, critics say, that the military's devolution plan has tilted power in local structures in favour of district and tehsil nazims. Elected councils retain only residual functions. "Devolution has stopped at the level of the district nazim", says a Baluchistan district naib nazim. "The [directly elected] district council is a rubber stamp". Given the indirect nature of their elections, district nazims are answerable to a narrow "electoral college" of union councillors. "Under the new local government scheme", says one in the Punjab, "the allocation of limited development funds is the central pivot around which political loyalties revolve". In several districts ICG visited, councillors claimed that their union councils are neglected in development projects because of their opposition to the nazim.

The nazim's need to reward supporters "has resulted in a lopsided situation where some union councils are richer and more developed than others". Hence the local government scheme has created its own pro-military elite, with strong political and financial stakes in the military-created system. As a zila nazim from the Punjab told ICG, "our loyalties should lie not with a political party or government but with General Musharraf who has really empowered the people at the grassroots". Contrary to official claims that the devolution scheme has successfully increased representation of women in government, it has done little to guarantee legal, administrative or financial responsibility for them other than the reservation of 33 per cent of local council seats. "When the local councils are powerless as a whole", asks a woman councillor from Baluchistan, "Can you imagine the extent of our influence on local affairs"? Most women councillors interviewed agree. Says one from the NWFP, "We don't get anything. We have no vote. We have no voice". Says another from Sindh, "we are mere rubber stamps. The zila council approves schemes and we are asked to vote for them". The facts speak for themselves. In the 101 districts, only two nazims are women and both come from traditionally dominant political families in Sindh. Male councillors say that since they have nominated women councillors, these are "unequal". "If the military government was really serious about giving women powers rather than appeasing donors", says a woman councillor, "it would have reserved a share of nazim slots at the district and tehsil levels". Women councillors complain that the government and NGOs raised their hopes unrealistically. Most say they have received no special training to familiarise them with the provisions of the LGO or the functioning of the local government system. Their participation in Council meetings is made even more difficult in the absence of adequate pay, though male counterparts frequently cite this problem also.


B. ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT


1. Restructuring Administration


With the promulgation of the four provincial LGOs, the previous system of administration ceased to exist. But while elected governments took the oath of office on 14 August 2001, decentralisation of the administration took far longer. The entire divisional tier that acted both as a coordination link between the district and the province, as well as the appellate authority in the district system, was abolished. A new bureaucratic structure, with the district coordination officer (DCO) at the top and executive district officers (EDOs) heading each district department, was put in place. The administrative, financial and appellate powers of divisional officers were devolved to this restructured district administration. Staff from older local councils and municipal bodies was transferred to the district and tehsil levels. Provincial line departments such as education, health, and works were devolved to those levels and new departments, including information technology, law, and literacy, were created. The new system was flawed since it was installed in haste, reflecting the military government's need to meet its own arbitrary independence day target. Not enough preparation was devoted to implementation details. The perception within the NRB was that once the system was in place, the military's backing would ensure smooth operation. While transition modalities were worked out on paper and provincial transition mechanisms put in place, little attention was given to the actual dynamics of replacing a well-entrenched system with an unfamiliar, untested one. Even less was paid to the weak administrative capacity at local levels. Not unsurprisingly, the initial weeks were marked by confusion within the official machinery and among the public.


While teething problems were gradually removed, structural problems remain. Many administrative powers previously exercised by the district commissioner remained unspecified in the new system. Poorly defined enforcement mechanisms are another problem. While the tehsil administration enjoys quasi-judicial powers such as imposing fines, its officials find it nearly impossible to enforce their writ without the enforcement powers previously exercised by executive magistrates backed by the police. According to a Baluchistan minister, "in the previous system, the DC had executive magistrates at his disposal who could effectively check prices, food quality and encroachments. There is a vacuum now, and the writ of the state has been weakened". The NRB is critical of the "the absence of horizontal integration and the consequent inadequacy of functional co-ordination between the line departments at the division, district, and tehsil levels which lead to inefficiency and corruption, and are the root causes of the crisis of governance at the grass root level".

Coordination has grown worse. There are no hierarchical linkages between the various levels of local government, and each practically operates in isolation. "Lack of vertical linkages and coordination between tehsil and district often lead to jurisdictional conflicts", says Ahmed Wassan, a Lahore town nazim. A former Karachi DCO adds, "intra-local government coordination is zero", thus reducing the NRB's "goals of coordinated planning and coherent administration to a practical joke". The stand-alone nature of administrative changes at district level is another shortcoming. Absent wider civil service reforms at provincial and national levels that address the broader problems of poor skills, low incentives, weak capacity and widespread corruption, the ambitious changes sought by the plan have little chance. Officers of the District Management Group, who continue to run district and tehsil-level administrations, feel unfairly targeted, not least because they were completely ignored during the process that led to adoption of the devolution plan. And despite NRB claims, the district coordination officer and his deputies enjoy wider administrative and financial powers than the former DC, however reduced the new administration' s law enforcement and judicial authority may be. In addition, the current form of administrative decentralisation cannot address the issue of corruption and misuse of office unless there are corresponding changes in the lower structures of land revenue management, that is, at the level of the tehsildar/patwari (pre-independence revenue officials). Says a former federal secretary, "merely re-orienting the upper links in the chain of exploitation and corruption will only bring cosmetic changes...the common man still has to deal with the horrifying reality of bribing the patwari or the local policeman to get things done". Provincial line departments were to be devolved and new ones created at the district level.


Aided by a bureaucracy unaccustomed to change, however, provincial governments adopted a go-slow approach in devolving line ministries and relinquishing administrative controls over their staff in the districts. In some districts, several departments remained under provincial control for over a year. "There is need for the real devolution of departments of the provincial government such as health and education", says Malik Asad, district nazim of Kohat in the NWFP. "So long as the provincial government retains control, there will only be surface devolution". The precarious position of the city district government of Karachi is a case in point. Under section 182 (3) (a) of the LGO, "the control of the development authorities, water and sanitation agencies and solid waste management bodies was to be vested in a city district government". Nevertheless, citizens continue to face serious water and sanitation problems, and the Karachi Sewerage and Water Supply Board (KSWSB), the civic agency delivering water and sanitation services, remains outside the operational control of district authorities. In several poor localities of the city, water shortages have led angry residents to demonstrate outside town council offices. Elected officials fear water riots if problems persist. Says Muslim Pervez, a senior presiding officer of the city district council, "people bring their complaints to us, and we have no powers over the water board. I am afraid things could easily spiral out of control".


District authorities in Gwadar, a remote coastal district in Baluchistan, face similar problems. The provincial chief minister heads the governing body that controls the Gwadar Development Authority, and a provincially appointed director general acts as head of administration. The provincial government also retains control over the works and services department while staff salaries are deducted from the account of the district government. Says Babu Gulab, a zila nazim, "for the last two years, I have felt powerless in the face of the continued provincial control over the district's affairs".


2. Devolving Corruption?


Another key problem with the devolution scheme is the lack of checks and balances between and across the various levels of district government. There is a virtual absence of accountability of district nazims. The provincial Local Government Commission can initiate special audits and inspections of district governments but these can be at best sporadic and are not a viable substitute to permanent, institutionalised checks and balances at district level. Technically, the zila council can be an effective check on the nazim, and through its monitoring committees on the district government as a whole. By law, the council approves by-laws, taxation proposals, annual development plans and the district budget. The extensive range of financial controls and their effective exercise, however, remain contingent on the political relationship between nazims and the council headed by the naib nazim. Since the nazim and naib nazim are elected on a joint ticket, the former can wield enormous influence over the council without enduring corresponding legislative checks on his authority. The joint ticket was conceived with the ostensible goal that the naib nazim would be the link between the nazim and the council. But this interface is under severe strain because of the gross imbalance of powers between the two offices. "The naib nazim is a show piece who can't even sign a legal document", says one of those officials. In districts where the relationship is antagonistic, the naib nazim can simply refuse to summon the council when required by the nazim. In such cases, the nazim, as executive head of the district, often runs the government without consulting the council, which can at best censure his actions through non-binding resolutions. Under the LGO, the district coordination officer is the principal accounting officer of the district government. He is, however, responsible to the public accounts committee of the provincial assembly in financial matters, not to the nazim or the zila council. He also heads the district development committee (DDC), which can approve development schemes up to Rs.5 million (U.S.$90,000) "The new DCO is the financial kingpin of the district", says a provincial minister in the Punjab, "with access to a larger financial pie than the former district commissioner but without any substantial changes in contracting or other financial procedures". Consequently, corruption opportunities have increased. "The checks and balances system envisaged under devolution is practically absent or operationally ineffective" , says an EDO (Finance), in the Punjab. "This has increased the already rampant and unchecked corruption" in the province. Under the LGO, elected monitoring committees of zila, tehsil and union councils are responsible for reporting administrative malpractice and corruption in local governments to the nazim for appropriate action. But these committees exist mostly on paper. While many have been elected, there are no financial or administration provisions for their functioning. The head of a district education monitoring committee in Punjab's Khushab district told ICG, "We have no
resources or capacity to monitor governmental functions. Besides, there are no official rules of business that govern our operations". Elected councillors interviewed in Baluchistan, the NWFP and Sindh cited bureaucratic resistance as a key stumbling block: "Executive district officers who are supposed to furnish us with information rarely respond to our queries since they know we have no powers over them".

The tehsil is the designated level at which most local municipal services such as water, sanitation, and sewerage are delivered. The tehsil municipal administration (TMA) is also responsible for awarding contracts for signboards and advertisements, an area prone to opportunities for rent seeking. Since there are virtually no financial checks on the tehsil administration, and it can assign or contract out any of its functions to private and public sector organisations, allegations of corruption in contracts are rife. In theory, the zila nazim can initiate inspections of tehsil and municipal administrations but in practice, they have neither the time nor the enforcement machinery. According to a senior official in the Sindh Ministry of Local Government, "corruption is up with a new mafia of nazims, tehsil officers and contractors emerging under the devolution plan that works in unchecked collusion with respect to awards of public contracts". Access to information can enhance transparency and accountability by creating pressure on the government to take into account citizen preferences when reaching decisions. While the devolution plan claimed commitment to "information empowerment" , public and media access to information about the actions and performance of government is still subject to tight controls exercised by government. "Devolution will remain meaningless without an effective Freedom of Information Act", says a newspaper editor in Baluchistan. "The presence of legal obstructions like the Official Secrets Act practically preclude the possibility of access to any information unless explicitly declared public by the government of the day". The LGO envisages "transparent, automated information systems at all levels in each district", but little provision has been made for the lack of local information technology capacity, infrastructure and resources.


3. Development and Service Delivery


The devolution plan emphasised community involvement in development through creation of citizen community boards (CCBs). Nevertheless, the NRB took almost two years to frame by-laws. While many districts in the Punjab and some in Sindh have registered many CCBs, they can receive project-based cost sharing support from local governments only up to 80 per cent. "In rural districts," says a zila nazim from Punjab, "it is impossible to generate the remaining 20 per cent funds from communities who can barely make ends meet".

The cost sharing provision, many officials and analysts believe, effectively works against the official LGO policy of "energizing the local communities through voluntary, proactive and self-help initiatives" . An observer says that, "it seems that the concept of CCBs is more a function of the flowery rhetoric of the writers of the devolution plan aimed mostly at international donor agencies and the domestic NGO community than ground realities or real intent". Most nazims interviewed by ICG, however, argue that elected local councils have improved public access to official business. Devolution has certainly reduced the gap between state and citizen since local councillors and elected nazims are easily accessible, unlike a district commissioner. This could facilitate the local solution of day-to-day problems that were previously managed by bureaucrats in provincial capitals. In addition, budgets, prepared at district level, can reflect local priorities. Development schemes (roads, sanitation, water supply) can be locally planned and executed, thus eliminating delays involved in getting approvals from provincial or federal authorities. Yet, many senior federal and provincial as well as local government officials told ICG that the system is not working, citing as evidence the steady deterioration in delivery of basic social services like education and health.


According to one federal health official, "nazims tend to focus on quick impact projects like sanitation and sewerage rather than longer term investments in education or health". Says a critic: the plan may have facilitated the creation of new facilities and infrastructure but so did Ayub's Basic Democracy system. The real test is visible improvements in the basic living standards and services of the people. There is no evidence of that happening anytime soon. Others point out that municipal infrastructure, especially in urban areas, has come under enormous pressure as tehsil administrations try to cope with the expansion of their functions to rural areas. "Mitigating the rural-urban divide is a good idea in the long run. But at the moment, it has undermined service delivery", believes a tehsil nazim in Sindh province. Many nazims typically blame the shortage of development funds and the lack of staff capacity. "Whatever development funds we get", says Amjad Noon, zila nazim of Sargodha in the Punjab, "flow mostly through federally or provincially funded schemes, leaving districts little leeway over the planning, implementation and budgeting". Shortage of funds is a serious problem with many district and tehsil administrations struggling to pay the monthly salaries of employees. In the absence of any reliable national data, it is hard to reach definitive conclusions on the impact of devolution on service delivery but the widespread perception remains that it has done no better, if not worse, than the system it replaced.


C. FISCAL DECENTRALISATION


The bulk of local government resources come as fiscal transfers from provincially appointed provincial finance commissions (PFC) -- 98 per cent in some cases. Provinces transfer some 40 per cent of their total receipts to local governments, fuelling already widespread perceptions of encroachment on provincial autonomy. District governments, however, have limited discretion over their budgetary resources. Over 80 per cent of the money transferred is for salaries and cannot be used for any other purposes. Except in Punjab, salaries are still paid from provincial accounts. Only the non-salary component (utilities and other recurring costs), a fraction of the total expenditure, is transferred to district-controlled accounts. By and large, transfers are population rather than needs-based. Population estimates remain problematic in light of the controversial nature of the census the army conducted in 1998. In Baluchistan, for instance, the Pashtun Khwa Milli Awami Party called for a boycott of the census. Rahim Kakar, the Quetta City district nazim, said, "this resulted in an unfair PFC award for Quetta since the census grossly underestimated the city's actual population". Under the LGO, local governments can raise additional revenues through specified taxes. Previously the main source of taxation revenue for local councils was the octroi (urban) and zila tax (in rural areas) on the movement of goods in and out of the territorial jurisdiction of the council. Under IMF directives, the federal government abolished this in 1998 to remove tax distortions. To make up for the revenue loss, 2.5 per cent of the revenue generated by the centre from the new general sales tax is now allocated to provinces. Provinces transfer this directly to the tehsil administrations. Without an octroi tax, however, the taxation base of local governments (especially urban councils) is severely circumscribed. Says an economist in the Federal Planning Commission, "The LGO does not significantly increase the tax base of the district governments, without which meaningful devolution will remain elusive". The tehsil administration can collect the more lucrative urban immovable property tax (UIPT) and transfer of property tax. Any proposal for new taxation, however, requires approval of the relevant provincial authority. "Previous councils were more financially autonomous as they could raise substantive taxes", says a former chairman of the zila council and now a town nazim in the Punjab. "This is devolution with a centralised financial system". Financially starved, many districts are centralising taxation powers. In Karachi, for instance, the city district government collects the fee on advertisement billboards and posters, otherwise a tehsil fee.
Cont/P-4