The Taliban Phenomenon - 26

Ahmed Quraishi wrote:

Zardari & Karzai: Democracy On The Back Of An American Tank By AHMED QURAISHI Tuesday, 9 September 2008.

http://www.ahmedquraishi.com/

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan—Party slogans pushing back the national anthem, Benazir Bhutto’s picture hung right next to that of the great Founding Father of the nation, and a smug-faced Hamid Karzai, Washington’s barking dog in Afghanistan, invited as a guest of honor.

http://www.ahmedquraishi.com/latest_col.php?id=66

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Dear Ahmed Quraishi Sahab,

You must go through some recent history of Afghan War before posting a comment to misguide everyone, even the daily newspapers would do the needful to enhance your knowledge, I wonder what kind of reporting you did back in Kuwait?


President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) remarked in 1939 for a Latin American Dictator [American Backed] "Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch."

Former PPP Interior Minister. Major General Retd. Naseerullah Babar's Interview narrates the Recent Afghan Conflict 1974 - 2001.

"QUOTE"

This interview is a bit out dated, but the man rarely gives such a comprehensive interview:

The Political Life of Gen Babar

http://www.paklinks.com/gs/pakistan-affairs/191013-interview-naseerullah-baber.html

11. When did Pakistan enter the Afghan scenario as a party, which was assisting the anti-Daud insurgents in Afghanistan?

In October 1973 while I was serving as IG FC an Afghan named Habibur Rahman (Shaheed) came and contacted me about setting up a resistance movement in Afghanistan with active military assistance of Pakistan. I conveyed the same to Mr Bhutto, who accepted my proposal in view of the changed situation in Afghanistan and asked me to organise training of Afghans.

12. What was the political and military aim of the Pakistani government of that time?

From 1947 till that date all Afghan governments had generally not been friendly towards Pakistan. They raised the bogey of Pakhtunistan but refrained from acting against us in 1965 and 1971 when at war with India because of the political environment after the Liaquat Bagh meeting. There were a large number of bomb blasts. Mr Z.A Bhutto was very clear even in 1973 after Daud's coup. An analysis of the regional environment was undertaken, highlighting the break in the Afghan system of continuity; the impending generational change in the leadership in the USSR and China (Chou had died). The inability of continuity/stability in Iran with removal of Shah of Iran from the scene. Being the last of the party ideologues it looked likely that the USSR leadership may take the opportunity to move once more and invade Afghanistan, a step towards the fulfilment of Peter the Great’s will (1777). Thus we established the base of Afghan Mujahideen resistance in 1973.

13. What type of assistance was provided to the Afghan resistance and which Pakistani agencies were involved?

We gave them basic infantry weapons, some specialised training in how to conduct guerrilla warfare under an SSG team until it was discontinued on 05 July 1977 by Gen Zia, who lacked the strategic vision.

14. At what stage did the SSG enter the scene as the principal agency that trained the Afghan resistance?

They (a team) imparted training in the belief that they were training Frontier Corps personnel (all trainees were enlisted in the Frontier Corps before training)

15. What was the ISI role in Afghanistan in the period 1974-77?

It was a top secret affair and the ISI had no role. The secret was shared between Mr Bhutto, myself, Aziz Ahmad and the then Army Chief Tikka Khan. This was for obvious reasons. The Foreign Office could with, nonchalance deny if the issue was raised at UN or any other forum.

16. Who were the pioneers of the anti-Daud Afghan resistance?

These were Ustad Rabbani, Hikmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masood and a host of others who came to Pakistan after October 1973.


22. How would Mr ZA Bhutto have behaved had he been in power when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan?

Mr Bhutto laid the foundation of the Afghan resistance in 1973. He had the foresight and vision to do it. As a matter of fact we created the organisational network which was used by Zia and the USA to oppose the Soviets. Zia had a short term vision and ignored the political angle of organising an Afghan government in exile with ulterior aims of gobbling US aid. Had Mr Bhutto been in chair he would not have deliberately neglected the political angle like Zia. Even Daud was convinced by Mr Bhutto in 1976 and said “Pakistan and Afghanistan are in the same boat. If it is the threat from the North (USSR) it is Afghanistan today and Pakistan tomorrow. If it is the threat from the South (India) it is Pakistan today and Afghanistan tomorrow”. You see after 1971 Indian strategists had placed Pakistan and Afghanistan in the same category as the next target. Mr Bhutto laid the foundation of the Afghan resistance for reasons discussed earlier. However, being a political animal, he also continued with a political alternative/solution. In November 1976, in consultation with the resistance leadership, two individuals, namely Wakil Azam Shinwari and Yunus Khugiani were selected to proceed to Rome and request King Zahir Shah to return as his father had done earlier, to lead a movement into Afghanistan. The caveat was that Zahir Shah could return as a constitutional monarch under the Constitution drafted by Mr Musa Shafiq, a former Prime Minister and the mentor/founder of the Hizb in Afghanistan. However, Zahir Shah indicated that he was willing to play his role but he would first visit Saadat (Egypt), then visit the Shah of Iran and finally arrive in Pakistan. Mr Bhutto was confident that King Zahir Shah could act as a rallying point and play his historical role. Events, however, took a different turn and martial law was imposed in Pakistan. The other aspect was the negotiations with Sardar Daud. Even Daud as earlier discussed had accepted the Durand Line in 1976 and wanted peace with Pakistan. Also the successful negotiations with Sardar Daud, to safeguard Pakistan’s, rightful interests are cases in point.


25. How would you assess Zia’s Afghan policy?

It was based on sheer opportunism and personal interest. Initially, he lacked the vision and, therefore, suspended financing the movement. This resulted in break-up of movement from one to seven groups, each leader fending for himself. Secondly, when the Soviet invasion took place he did not form a government in exile, which could gain experience during the Jehad and be available when the Geneva talks took place. Also all the US/Saudi and other assistance would have been routed through institutional organisations (Ministries) rather than individuals and would have prevented heart burning and divisive tendencies. Finally, he opposed the Geneva talks and visualised only a military solution — the bane of all our subsequent military leadership — Hamid Gul, Beg etc. We were very deliberate. Every resistance is based on a political centre, a hierarchy, like the DeGaulle government in exile, the Algerian and Yugoslav Government in exile etc. Zia deliberately kept the Afghan Mujahideen divided into various groups in order to ensure that the bulk of the US aid could be embezzled. The future events thus led to the post-1988 civil war in Afghanistan.

31. How would you define your Taliban policy?

The Taliban movement was purely indigenous and a direct reaction to the intra group fighting of the erstwhile Jehadi Groups i.e. between Hikmatyar and Rabbani; Ahmed Shah Masoud, Dostam, Sayyaf and others. The Afghan people had had enough of the infighting and desired peace so as to launch/undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. It also stemmed from a failure on the part of the Western Nations — after having achieved their objective (the destruction of Soviet Union) they abandoned the Afghans to their own devices. It would have been fair to launch a Marshall Plan or some such developmental activity. Regrettably, they failed to so so. The Pakistan Government (PPP) had no favourites and the only desire that motivated all activity was the unity, and integrity of Afghanistan and the well being of the Afghan people. In furtherance of this policy a tour (with permission from the Central Afghan Government — Rabbani) of S.W Afghanistan was undertaken. The purpose: Firstly, to prove to the world that peaceful conditions existed in the region; Secondly, the Central Asian Republics had attained political independence but not economic independence (integrated economy for 70 years); Thirdly, to utilise the energy sources available in the Central Asian republics by the entire region, including S.E Asia; Fourthly, to develop communication, and resultantly, trade between Central Asian Republics (markets) and India (industry) — Pakistan would act as a conduit and a single train/truck could take anyone/anything from Ukraine to Singapore uninterruptedly. Fifthly, and most importantly, enable the development of Gwadar port and thus reducing pressure on Karachi port (eliminating the persistent law and order problem).

During the tour these issues were raised with the leaders, and possibly, fell on good ears. Subsequently, within the space of a week a large number of Diplomats (mostly Western) were taken to Herat and Kandahar so as to familiarise them with the situation, and the need to assist in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan and ameliorate the economic difficulties of the Afghan people.

In view of the total absence of medicines and other essential goods a convoy with relief goods for Kandahar, Lashkargah, Shindand and Herat (organised through contribution from philanthrophists) arranged and despatched. The convoy was, regrettably, stopped at Kandahar by the Indo-Iranian Lobby. Then Iranians were justified as the opening of this route would have spelt the death-knell to their own ambitions considering the Central Asian Republics as their backyard. Moreover, the Iranian route linking Ashkabad, Mashad, Tehran, Bunder Abbas was 3200 KMs, whereas the contemplated route was 1600 KM, with 800 KM, from Karachi to Chaman already developed. The Indians, however, were atypically foolish and could not see/identify their strategic economic interests! The Taliban (former Jehadis) sensing their economic interests being endangered, came to the rescue and released the convoy. The convoy then proceeded to its destination. However, the Taliban phenomena had commenced and then there was no stopping until they finally entered Kabul in September 1996.

Consequent upon their entrance into Kabul in September 1996, negotiations were commenced/set apace between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in October 1996. The negotiations, after a few shuttles, were successful and a draft agreement compiled — reflecting a numbers of issues. Article 5 stipulated the future political system — the establishment of a commission: composed of representative from all the provinces of Afghanistan, based on the population of each province; the representatives, provided/nominated by the respective province could be local or from amongst those settled abroad. The meetings (on Dostam’s request and agreed to by Taliban) would be in Kabul. The plan quite obviously was federal and one that would enable suitable representation to all ethnic, cultural and religious groups. Regrettably, Para 5 (at the time of the signing) was erased by Dr. Holls, the then UN representative on Afghanistan, and this caused a furore by the Northern Alliance and the agreement was stalled. Subsequently, Dostam made a number of requests seeking finalisation of the accord — the final one being on 3 November 1996. The same evening i.e. 3 November 1996, a meeting was summoned at the Aiwan-e-Saddar with the President, PM, the COAS, the DGISI and the Foreign Secretary in attendance. It was decided/ruled that I should proceed to Mazar-e-Sharif and have the agreement finalised on 5 November 1996. On the night 4/5 November, for reasons known to him, the President, acting under article 58 (2) (b), dismissed our government. The Afghans were, regrettably, once again left to their own devices and the power struggle continues unabated.

A similar trade agreement/protocol was drawn up and signed between Kazakhstan. Kirghizia, China and Pakistan so as to enable movement of goods in the region via the Khunjrab Pass.

The Indians on their part have, regrettably, been not only short sighted but foolish and by siding with Iran (a natural antagonist — conflict of interest in Gulf and Indian Ocean) have lost the opportunity of a millennium to benefit from cheap/economic supply of power on the one hand and export of goods to Central Asia on the other. Nations, like individuals, at times act most foolishly and against their long term interests

32. What is your opinion about the Taliban Government and their future relations with Pakistan?

The Taliban movement was purely an indigenous movement in response to the local environment / conditions. It must be added with all emphasis that in view of the cornerstone of our Afghan policy, unity and integrity of Afghanistan and the well-being of the Afghan people, this was not the ultimate. This is amply borne out by setting a pace negotiations between the Taliban and northern alliance in October 1996, after the Taliban’s entry into Kabul in September 1996. The negotiations were aimed at establishment of a broad based government and a possible federal structure so as to apportion due rights to all ethnic and religious groups. These measures would lead to peace and stability in Afghanistan and enable its reconstruction and rehabilitation. The Afghans (all groups) are not only friendly to Pakistan but consider it their second home —- which, in turn has demolished the Pakhtunistan bogey. It is my firm belief / faith that in the event of a future misadventure by India, it would find not only Afghan people, but also at least 100,000 fully trained and armed Afghans on our side. The sub continental balance of power has imperceptibly but effectively changed.

"UNQUOTE"

The Taliban Phenomenon - 25

Shaikh Mohommad wrote:

UK Vacuum Bombs in Afghanistan

What we find is that USA has become a rogue state violating and trampling upon agreements which USA itself signed. International law accepts the right of occupied people to resis the aggressors.

Shaikh Mohommad
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USA is using this since 2001 in Afghanistan, I wonder what the hell Talibans were discussing [from 1996 - 2001] with the Former US Assistant Deputy Secretary of State Ms. Robin Raphel? Read about the Thermobaric Bomb after reading about the Taliban - US Axis of 90s.

"QUOTE"

It wouldn't make any sense at all, for example, to the Carlyle Group-described by the Industry Standard as 'the world's largest private equity firm', with $12 billion under management. Carlyle invests in the defense sector and makes its money from military conflicts and weapons spending.

Carlyle is run by men with impeccable credentials. Former US defense secretary Frank Carlucci is Carlyle's chairman and managing director (he was a college roommate of Donald Rumsfeld's). Carlyle's other partners include former US secretary of state James A. Baker III, George Soros, Fred Malek (George Bush Sr's campaign manager). An American paper-the Baltimore Chronicle and Sentinel-says that former President George Bush Sr is reported to be seeking investments for the Carlyle Group from Asian markets. He is reportedly paid not inconsiderable sums of money to make 'presentations' to potential government-clients.

Ho Hum. As the tired saying goes, it's all in the family.

Then there's that other branch of traditional family business-oil. Remember, President George Bush (Jr) and Vice-President Dick Cheney both made their fortunes working in the US oil industry.

Turkmenistan, which borders the northwest of Afghanistan, holds the world's third largest gas reserves and an estimated six billion barrels of oil reserves. Enough, experts say, to meet American energy needs for the next 30 years (or a developing country's energy requirements for a couple of centuries.) America has always viewed oil as a security consideration, and protected it by any means it deems necessary. Few of us doubt that its military presence in the Gulf has little to do with its concern for human rights and almost entirely to do with its strategic interest in oil.

Oil and gas from the Caspian region currently moves northward to European markets. Geographically and politically, Iran and Russia are major impediments to American interests. In 1998, Dick Cheney-then CEO of Halliburton, a major player in the oil industry-said: "I can't think of a time when we've had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian. It's almost as if the opportunities have arisen overnight." True enough.

For some years now, an American oil giant called Unocal has been negotiating with the Taliban for permission to construct an oil pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and out to the Arabian Sea. From here, Unocal hopes to access the lucrative 'emerging markets' in South and Southeast Asia. In December 1997, a delegation of Taliban mullahs traveled to America and even met US State Department officials and Unocal executives in Houston. At that time the Taliban's taste for public executions and its treatment of Afghan women were not made out to be the crimes against humanity that they are now. Over the next six months, pressure from hundreds of outraged American feminist groups was brought to bear on the Clinton administration. Fortunately, they managed to scuttle the deal. And now comes the US oil industry's big chance.

War Is Peace by Arundhati Roy, October 18, 2001

Originally Published on OutlookIndia.com via Znet.com

http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/10/18_roy_war-peace_print.htm

Glimpses of US Support to Taliban.

Robin Raphel and Karl Inderfurth Supported Terrorists Mullah Omar and Bin Laden's friends at State Department Documents confirm Pak aid to Taliban MANOJ JOSHI

http://www.persiancarpetguide.com/sw-asia/JBOC/jboc9997.htm

The September 11th Sourcebooks Volume VII: The Taliban File

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index.htm

New Thermobaric Bomb a Powerful Addition to US Arsenal in Afghanistan

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/1222-01.htm

The US military is about to use a powerful new weapon in the ongoing war in Afghanistan, a "thermobaric" bomb which can suck oxygen out of the cavernous hideouts where Osama bin Laden and remnants of his al-Qaeda terror network may be holed up. The laser-guided weapons contain an explosive that can penetrate deep into caves, as the hunt for bin Laden enters a new, more perilous stage, top Pentagon officials said Friday. Officials said 10 of the newly designed bombs were being shipped to Afghanistan after a successful test last week in Nevada.

Each thermobaric bomb -- also called fuel-air explosives -- contains two explosive devices and a highly flammable chemical that sends a deadly shock wave through enclosed spaces such as caves and tunnels without collapsing them. The weapons consist of a container of fuel and two explosive charges. When the first charge detonates, the fuel is dispersed. A second charge then detonates the billowing cloud of fuel.

Experts say such bombs tend to be far more powerful than conventional high explosives, and are more likely to kill or injure people hiding in caves, bunkers and similar shelters because they can suck the air out of such places. Earlier versions of thermobaric bombs were used in Vietnam by the United States and in Chechnya by Russia. The new version, called the BLU-1186, was developed specifically for use in the war against terrorism, officials here said.

The Taliban Phenomenon - 24

S Turkman wrote:

Now Aamir is quoting another false propaganda news item without confirming any facts. The article "War Is Peace" by Arundhati Roy, October 18, 2001 is nothing. Arundhati's articles stopped coming to me after I had chopped her down to her actual size a couple of times.
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Dear Turkman Sahab,

I just quoted Roy to set the record straight and to corroborate her i would quote The New York Times [issue of 1996]

"QUOTE"

JOHN F. BURNS and STEVE Levine, "How Afghanistan' s Stern Rulers Took Power," New York Times, December 31, 1996

From early on, American diplomats in Islamabad had made regular visits to Kandahar to see Taliban leaders. In briefings for reporters, the diplomats cited what they saw as positive aspects of the Taliban, which they listed as a capacity to end the war in Afghanistan and its promises to put an end to the use of Afghanistan as a base for narcotics trafficking and international terrorism.

Unmentioned, but probably most important to Washington, was that the Taliban, who are Sunni Muslims, have a deep hostility for Iran, America's nemesis, where the ruling majority belong to the rival Shiite sect of Islam.

Along the way, Washington developed yet another interest in the Taliban as potential backers for a 1,200-mile gas pipeline that an American energy company, Union Oil Company of California, has proposed building from Quetta, in Pakistan, to Turkmenistan, a former Soviet republic that sits atop some of the world's largest gas reserves, but has limited means to export them.

The project, which Unocal executives have estimated could cost $5 billion, would be built in conjunction with the Delta Oil Company, a Saudi Arabian concern that also has close links to the Taliban. Among the advisers Unocal has employed to deal with the Taliban is Robert B. Oakley, a former American Ambassador to Pakistan.

1-

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE6DF1130F932A05751C1A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1

2-

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE6DF1130F932A05751C1A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2

3-

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE6DF1130F932A05751C1A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=3

4-

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE6DF1130F932A05751C1A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=4

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As per Alternet Media

Four months ago, U.S. officials announced that Washington was giving $43 million to the Taliban for its role in reducing the cultivation of opium poppies, despite the Taliban's heinous human rights record and its sheltering of Islamic terrorists of many nationalities. Doesn't this make the U.S. government guilty of supporting a country that harbors terrorists? Do you think your obsession with the "war on drugs" has distorted U.S. foreign policy in Southwest Asia and other regions?

When the CIA was busy doling out an estimated $2 billion to support the Afghan mujahadeen in the 1980s, Osama bin Laden and his colleagues were hailed as anti-communist freedom fighters. During the cold war, U.S. national security strategists, many of whom are riding top saddle once again in your administration, didn't view bin Laden's fanatical religious beliefs as diametrically opposed to western civilization. But now bin Laden and his ilk are unabashed terrorists. Definitions of what constitutes terror and terrorism seem to change with the times. Before he became vice president, Dick Cheney and the U.S. State Department denounced Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress, as a terrorist. Today Mandela, South Africa's president emeritus, is considered a great and dignified statesman. And what about Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, who bears significant responsibility for the 1982 massacre of 1,800 innocents at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon. What role will Sharon play in your crusade against international terrorism?

13 Questions for Bush about America's Anti-terrorism Crusade By Martin A. Lee, AlterNet. Posted September 28, 2001.

http://www.alternet.org/story/11600/

http://www.alternet.org/story/11600/?page=2

"UNQUOTE"

The Taliban Phenomenon - 23

Regarding Turkmenistan's Oil and Gas Deal and UNOCAL:

In 1995, the Unocal oil company signed a tentative agreement with the Turkmenistan government to research the possibilities of constructing an oil pipeline to Pakistan by way of Afghanistan.

As the project developed, Unocal began to seek the agreement of the Taliban, who had seized power in Kabul in September 1996. On two separate occasions, in February and December 1997, Taliban officials were flown to the US to meet with, and be wined and dined by, Unocal executives.

Up until 1998, when it became clear that the Taliban were in alliance with the al Qaeda terrorist network, Clinton administration officials actively lobbied Taliban officials on behalf of Unocal.

In 1997, Zalmay Khalilzad, at that time a consultant with Cambridge Energy Research Associates, conducted risk assessments for Unocal on their proposed 1440 kilometre pipeline project to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan.

A member of the Project for a New American Century lobby group set up by current US Vice-President Dick Cheney and US war secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 1997, Khalilzad was appointed by President George Bush in December 2001 to be the US Special Envoy to Afghanistan, supervising the creation of Karzai's regime.

"QUOTE"

The following chronology tracks Unocal's involvement in the pipeline project:

October 1995 Unocal and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to give Unocal the right to buy natural gas, transport it to Pakistan, and market it. Unocal and Turkmenistan also signed an agreement in 1995 to develop an oil pipeline through Afghanistan.

August 13, 1996 Unocal and Delta Oil Company announced they had signed a memorandum of understanding with Gazprom and Turkmenrusgaz as additions to a consortium to build a pipeline that would cost an estimated $2 billion. Unocal and Delta were to hold 85 percent of the project.

September 26, 1996 Taliban forces took the capital city of Kabul. The United States initially expressed optimism about the possibility of new stability in the country, with a State Department spokesman reportedly expressing hope that "the new authorities in Kabul will move quickly to restore order and security and to form a representative interim government that can begin the process of reconciliation nationwide." The State Department backed away from this position within days, calling the situation "quite murky." Similarly, a Unocal executive reportedly told wire services that the pipeline project would be easier to build with the Taliban's control of Kabul; Unocal quickly retracted this statement. Sources: Elaine Sciolino, State Dept. becomes cooler to the new rulers in Kabul, New York Times, October 23, 1996. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2001).

February 1997 Taliban representatives visited Washington D.C., where they met with State Department officials and Unocal. Source: Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2001).

October 1997 The Central Asia Gas (CentGas) pipeline consortium was formed, with Unocal serving as its development manager. Source: here.

November 1997 Taliban representatives met with Unocal in Houston. According to a report by Caroline Lees of the Telegraph, the Taliban representatives visited the Houston zoo, NASA space center, a Super Target store, and the home of a Unocal vice-president. Source: Caroline Lees, "Oil barons court Taliban in Texas," Sunday Telegraph, December 14, 1997

August 1998 The United States launched a cruise missile attack against a training camp affiliated with Osama Bin Laden. Immediately afterwards, Unocal announced that it had suspended all activities involving the proposed pipeline project, citing "sharply deteriorating political conditions in the region." "We have consistently informed the other participants that unless and until the United Nations and the United States government recognize a legitimate government in Afghanistan, Unocal would not invest capital in the project. Contrary to some published reports, Unocal has not - and will not - become a party to a commercial agreement with any individual Afghan faction."

December 4, 1998 Unocal announced that it had withdrawn from the CentGas consortium for "business reasons" and that it "no longer has any role in supporting the development or funding of this project."

February 16, 1999 Unocal reiterated that it had no role with CentGas.

May 20, 2002 Unocal's chairman reiterated that it had no plans to become involved in any projects with Afghanistan.

Source: Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2001). Elaine Sciolino, State Dept. becomes cooler to the new rulers in Kabul, New York Times, October 23, 1996. Caroline Lees, "Oil barons court Taliban in Texas," Sunday Telegraph, December 14, 1997. The U.S. Energy Information Administration's report on Afghanistan is on-line here.

"UNQUOTE"

The Taliban Phenomenon - 22

S Turkman wrote:

Qyoting anything that is not true is same as telling a lie. Now Aamir is quoting another false propaganda news item without confirming any facts. The article "War Is Peace" by Arundhati Roy, October 18, 2001 is nothing.
========================================

Dear Sir,

Further Proofs are as under [As per US Congress]

"QUOTE"

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS HEARING BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION FEBRUARY 12, 1998

http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0.HTM

US Policy On Taliban Influenced By Oil Deal Negotiations

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/ENRON_MONEY_TO_TALIBAN.jpg

The two claim that the US government's main objective in Afghanistan was to consolidate the position of the Taliban regime to obtain access to the oil and gas reserves in Central Asia. They affirm that until August [2001], the US government saw the Taliban regime "as a source of stability in Central Asia that would enable the construction of an oil pipeline across Central Asia" from the rich oilfields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Indian Ocean. Until now, says the book, "the oil and gas reserves of Central Asia have been controlled by Russia. The Bush government wanted to change all that."

But, confronted with Taliban's refusal to accept US conditions, "this rationale of energy security changed into a military one", the authors claim. "At one moment during the negotiations, the US representatives told the Taliban, 'either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs,'" Brisard said in an interview in Paris.

In depth:

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/oil.html

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION FEBRUARY 12, 1998

Next we would like to hear from Mr. John J. Maresca, vice president of international relations, Unocal Corporation. You may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. MARESCA, VICE PRESIDENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNOCAL CORPORATION

Mr. Maresca. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's nice to see you again. I am John Maresca, vice president for international relations of the Unocal Corporation. Unocal, as you know, is one of the world's leading energy resource and project development companies. I appreciate your invitation to speak here today. I believe these hearings are important and timely. I congratulate you for focusing on Central Asia oil and gas reserves and the role they play in shaping U.S. policy.

I would like to focus today on three issues. First, the need for multiple pipeline routes for Central Asian oil and gas resources. Second, the need for U.S. support for international and regional efforts to achieve balanced and lasting political settlements to the conflicts in the region, including Afghanistan. Third, the need for structured assistance to encourage economic reforms and the development of appropriate investment climates in the region. In this regard, we specifically support repeal or removal of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act.

Mr. Chairman, the Caspian region contains tremendous untapped hydrocarbon reserves. Just to give an idea of the scale, proven natural gas reserves equal more than 236 trillion cubic feet. The region's total oil reserves may well reach more than 60 billion barrels of oil. Some estimates are as high as 200 billion barrels. In 1995, the region was producing only 870,000 barrels per day. By 2010, western companies could increase production to about 4.5 million barrels a day, an increase of more than 500 percent in only 15 years. If this occurs, the region would represent about 5 percent of the world's total oil production.

One major problem has yet to be resolved: how to get the region's vast energy resources to the markets where they are needed. Central Asia is isolated. Their natural resources are land locked, both geographically and politically. Each of the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia faces difficult political challenges. Some have unsettled wars or latent conflicts. Others have evolving systems where the laws and even the courts are dynamic and changing. In addition, a chief technical obstacle which we in the industry face in transporting oil is the region's existing pipeline infrastructure.

Because the region's pipelines were constructed during the Moscow-centered Soviet period, they tend to head north and west toward Russia. There are no connections to the south and east. But Russia is currently unlikely to absorb large new quantities of foreign oil. It's unlikely to be a significant market for new energy in the next decade. It lacks the capacity to deliver it to other markets.

Two major infrastructure projects are seeking to meet the need for additional export capacity. One, under the aegis of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, plans to build a pipeline west from the northern Caspian to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Oil would then go by tanker through the Bosporus to the Mediterranean and world markets.

The other project is sponsored by the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, a consortium of 11 foreign oil companies, including four American companies, Unocal, Amoco, Exxon and Pennzoil. This consortium conceives of two possible routes, one line would angle north and cross the north Caucasus to Novorossiysk. The other route would cross Georgia to a shipping terminal on the Black Sea. This second route could be extended west and south across Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.

But even if both pipelines were built, they would not have enough total capacity to transport all the oil expected to flow from the region in the future. Nor would they have the capability to move it to the right markets. Other export pipelines must be built.

At Unocal, we believe that the central factor in planning these pipelines should be the location of the future energy markets that are most likely to need these new supplies. Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union are all slow growth markets where demand will grow at only a half a percent to perhaps 1.2 percent per year during the period 1995 to 2010.

Asia is a different story all together. It will have a rapidly increasing energy consumption need. Prior to the recent turbulence in the Asian Pacific economies, we at Unocal anticipated that this region's demand for oil would almost double by 2010. Although the short-term increase in demand will probably not meet these expectations, we stand behind our long-term estimates.

I should note that it is in everyone's interest that there be adequate supplies for Asia's increasing energy requirements. If Asia's energy needs are not satisfied, they will simply put pressure on all world markets, driving prices upwards everywhere.

The key question then is how the energy resources of Central Asia can be made available to nearby Asian markets. There are two possible solutions, with several variations. One option is to go east across China, but this would mean constructing a pipeline of more than 3,000 kilometers just to reach Central China. In addition, there would have to be a 2,000-kilometer connection to reach the main population centers along the coast. The question then is what will be the cost of transporting oil through this pipeline, and what would be the netback which the producers would receive.

For those who are not familiar with the terminology, the netback is the price which the producer receives for his oil or gas at the well head after all the transportation costs have been deducted. So it's the price he receives for the oil he produces at the well head.

The second option is to build a pipeline south from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. One obvious route south would cross Iran, but this is foreclosed for American companies because of U.S. sanctions legislation. The only other possible route is across Afghanistan, which has of course its own unique challenges. The country has been involved in bitter warfare for almost two decades, and is still divided by civil war. From the outset, we have made it clear that construction of the pipeline we have proposed across Afghanistan could not begin until a recognized government is in place that has the confidence of governments, lenders, and our company.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have worked very closely with the University of Nebraska at Omaha in developing a training program for Afghanistan which will be open to both men and women, and which will operate in both parts of the country, the north and south.

Unocal foresees a pipeline which would become part of a regional system that will gather oil from existing pipeline infrastructure in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. The 1,040-mile long oil pipeline would extend south through Afghanistan to an export terminal that would be constructed on the Pakistan coast. This 42-inch diameter pipeline will have a shipping capacity of one million barrels of oil per day. The estimated cost of the project, which is similar in scope to the trans-Alaska pipeline, is about $2.5 billion.

Given the plentiful natural gas supplies of Central Asia, our aim is to link gas resources with the nearest viable markets. This is basic for the commercial viability of any gas project. But these projects also face geopolitical challenges. Unocal and the Turkish company Koc Holding are interested in bringing competitive gas supplies to Turkey. The proposed Eurasia natural gas pipeline would transport gas from Turkmenistan directly across the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey. Of course the demarcation of the Caspian remains an issue.

Last October, the Central Asia Gas Pipeline Consortium, called CentGas, in which Unocal holds an interest, was formed to develop a gas pipeline which will link Turkmenistan's vast Dauletabad gas field with markets in Pakistan and possibly India. The proposed 790-mile pipeline will open up new markets for this gas, traveling from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Multan in Pakistan. The proposed extension would move gas on to New Delhi, where it would connect with an existing pipeline. As with the proposed Central Asia oil pipeline, CentGas can not begin construction until an internationally recognized Afghanistan Government is in place.

The Central Asia and Caspian region is blessed with abundant oil and gas that can enhance the lives of the region's residents, and provide energy for growth in both Europe and Asia. The impact of these resources on U.S. commercial interests and U.S. foreign policy is also significant. Without peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the region, cross-border oil and gas pipelines are not likely to be built. We urge the Administration and the Congress to give strong support to the U.N.-led peace process in Afghanistan. The U.S. Government should use its influence to help find solutions to all of the region's conflicts.

U.S. assistance in developing these new economies will be crucial to business success. We thus also encourage strong technical assistance programs throughout the region. Specifically, we urge repeal or removal of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. This section unfairly restricts U.S. Government assistance to the government of Azerbaijan and limits U.S. influence in the region.

Developing cost-effective export routes for Central Asian resources is a formidable task, but not an impossible one. Unocal and other American companies like it are fully prepared to undertake the job and to make Central Asia once again into the crossroads it has been in the past. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

"UNQUOTE"

The Taliban Phenomenon - 21

Bint Waleed wrote:

True or not, Afghanistan never saw more peaceful time than the years of Taliban and never saw so much death, destruction and chaos after they were toppled at gunpoint.

Bint Waleed
===============================

Dear Ms Bint Waleed,

If it can be called Peaceful et all. Taliban supporters should not raise hue and cry now when you yourself are responsible for the present mess.

ظَهَرَ الْفَسَادُ فِي الْبَرِّ وَالْبَحْرِ بِمَا كَسَبَتْ أَيْدِي النَّاسِ لِيُذِيقَهُمْ بَعْضَ الَّذِي عَمِلُوا لَعَلَّهُمْ يَرْجِعُونَ

English Translation:

Corruption doth appear on land and sea because of (the evil) which men's hands have done, that He may make them taste a part of that which they have done, in order that they may return. [AL-ROOM (THE ROMANS, THE BYZANTINES) Chapter 30 - Verse 41]

لَهَا مَا كَسَبَتْ وَعَلَيْهَا مَا اكْتَسَبَتْ

English Translation:

"For it (is only) that which it hath earned, and against it (only) that which it hath deserved." [Verse - 286 II The Cow - Soorah Al Baqarah]

AFGHANISTAN Under The Taliban:

http://www.hrw.org/reports98/afghan/

THE MASSACRE IN MAZAR-I SHARIF

Taliban troops entered the western outskirts of Mazar-i Sharif at about 9:30 a.m. on August 8. Residents reported hearing firing from the west from the early morning; many stated that they assumed that fighting had broken out between various factions within the United Front and that they did not realize that the Taliban had reached the city until they saw their characteristic black turbans and white flags. The firing continued until about 1:00 p.m. One witness described it as a "killing frenzy." Although several witnesses reported seeing bodies of Hizb-i Wahdat fighters in some locations, from the descriptions provided by survivors it is clear that many of those killed were noncombatants. One witness who passed through a market area on her way home saw that among those killed were a boy who had been selling bread from a cart, a woman who she was told had been on her way to a social gathering, and a man who had been grinding wheat. Many merchants in the bazaar were reportedly killed as the Taliban moved through the streets shooting at random. In some cases the Taliban used machine guns mounted on jeeps to fire continuously into the streets. A witness who watched from the roof of a shop described the scene of panic in the city:

From the roof I could see smoke coming from the west. I came out of my shop and went to the customs area from where I could see people fleeing from the west. It was chaos. People were running and being hit by cars trying to leave, market stalls were overturned. I heard oneman say, “It’s hailing,” because of the bullets. I went home and from the windows I could hear shouting and see white flags on the cars.8

A woman described the killing of her thirteen-year-old son:

He was working in a carpet factory and was shot on the first day near Rouza-e Mubarak [the shrine in the center of Mazar]. Some people came and told me he had been taken to the hospital. They said that before he died he said, "We came to Mazar [from Kabul] to survive and now I am going to die. Who will support the family?" I did not even see him. I did not want to leave because of him, but we had to leave.

A man who was in the bazaar when the Taliban entered the city hid in a friend's house from which he could see the Taliban come into the bazaar.

At about 4:00 p.m. I saw someone running and another man pulling a cart. A Datsun full of Taliban came down the street, and the soldier inside shot the man who was running and then went after the second man and shot him, too.

Human Rights Watch obtained testimony from a number of other residents who witnessed indiscriminate and arbitrary shooting by the Taliban. A merchant stated that he was in the bazaar when the shooting started. He was with a cousin, and when they saw people running they decided to run as well. The cousin was shot in the leg and could not walk. Unable to carry him, the merchant left him and continued on to his home. He later learned that the Taliban had killed his cousin. A moneychanger witnessed the killing of two of his neighbors as they stood in the street. He had gone upstairs in his house and was watching out the window as the Taliban cars passed. His two neighbors were standing in front of their house when two of the Taliban cars stopped and the soldiers inside shot the two men.

Searches and Summary Executions

The shooting, which had been nearly continuous since 10:30 a.m., had largely ceased by midday on August 8, and except for sporadic outbreaks of gunfire, the city fell silent. Later that day and continuing for at least several days after, Taliban forces began house-to-house searches for male members of the Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek communities. On the basis of information apparently provided by local Pashtun forces or other informers, they targeted predominantly Hazara neighborhoods and in some cases knew beforehand which houses belonged to Hazaras. They were also looking for weapons. Witnesses testified that the soldiers specifically demanded to know if there were Hazaras present in the houses and asked residents to point out Hazara houses. Residents who could speak Pashto, or who did not look Hazara, or who could prove that they were not from Mazar could sometimes convince the Taliban not to search the house. Those conducting the searches included regular Taliban forces as well as Balkh Pashtuns.

In some cases the detained male members of the families were beaten or shot on the spot. Some had their throats slit. In other cases they were taken to assembly points from which they were transported by truck or other vehicle to the city jail. While most of those killed were Hazara, Human Rights Watch interviewed a number of witnesses who saw or knew of executions of Tajik and Uzbek men as well.

A Tajik man who was detained on August 10 provided this description:

I lived in Karte Bokhti. On the third day the Taliban surrounded the streets and searched every house looking for Hazaras. They were asking, "Where are the Hazara houses?" Therewas only one near us. There were four young Hazara men in the house, including a friend who was visiting and a young man who was doing some work at the house. The Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras in the neighborhood were also all arrested. We were all put into trucks, but the four Hazaras’ hands were tied very tight and they were taken elsewhere. There were two other Hazara boys in our truck. When we stopped near the customs area, the two Hazaras were taken off and told to go to the square behind the customs area. A Taliban soldier pushed them and then shot them both in the head. I was told later that the four others were taken to Takhaneya Mahdia and shot there. They were all workers, not fighters. They were all nineteen to twenty years old.

He was held overnight with other Tajiks and Uzbeks in a place behind the customs area. The next day he and the others were taken to the jail. After he was released, he saw another victim of a summary execution, this time a Tajik.

I saw that a young Tajik boy had been killed—the Taliban soldier was still standing there, and the father was crying, “Why have you killed my son? We are Tajiks.” The Talib responded, “Why didn’t you say so?” and the father said, “Did you ask that I could answer?”

One witness recounted that on August 13 or 14 the Taliban came to his house and stated that they were looking for Hazaras. The witness was himself Hazara and was hiding a Hazara family in his house at that time. A neighbor who could speak Pashto told the Taliban that there were no Hazaras there, and as soon as they heard Pashto, they left. Fearing that he might still be identified, the witness went to a predominantly Sunni neighborhood, but residents there warned him not to stay there. In his own neighborhood, a Taliban supporter who owed the witness a favor also warned him to leave, and other neighbors expressed fear that his presence there would endanger the whole neighborhood. As a result, he decided to leave for Pakistan with his family.

Another witness told Human Rights Watch that he was arrested on the evening of the first day as he was moving about the city checking on relatives. As he passed a truck filled with men who had been arrested, the Taliban called out for him to come to them. He was put into the truck and when it was filled they drove toward the jail.

I was afraid they were going to shoot me. So when we reached Sarake Dostum I threw myself out of the truck. Five or six other men threw themselves out after me. I landed on the right side of the road where there was a mosque. I ran into the mosque and began to wash as if I was preparing to pray. The other men all landed on the left side of the road and were shot there in the street. I stayed inside the mosque for more than an hour and left with the others when they finished their prayers.

He did not return to his home but stayed with friends. About a week after the Taliban had come he heard that they had said that Hazaras who were not fighters could return to their homes. Two families he knew went back and the men were arrested that day.

A seventeen-year-old boy who was trying to reach his house at about noon on the first day saw three Hazaras standing at the eastern gate of Rouza Sharif. He stated that seven or eight Taliban stepped out of a Toyota Hilux and shot the three men in the head. The boy, his mother, and his siblings left the Karte Ariana neighborhood the next day for the mountains.

Another witness who lived in the Karte Ariana neighborhood stated that the Taliban came to their house on the second day. In this case the Taliban were local Pashtuns from Chohar Bolak working under a commander named Mulla Baradar. The witness’s husband and daughters were hiding in the basement.

There were about five or six of them. They broke the television and demanded weapons andcommunications equipment. I told them that we only had one Kalashnikov, and I gave it to them and they left. Five minutes later they came back and said, "You are Hazara. Give us your husband." I told them he was not at home. I was yelling at them, and they did not search the house. Then we all left.

A woman who lived in Kamaz camp, where persons who had fled Kabul and other cities were living, stated that a large number of Taliban came searching for men at the camp the first day. Most of the men were beaten and then taken away, but some were shot on the spot.

From one tent they took six boys. They were all seventeen, eighteen, or twenty years old. They just shot them dead in front of the tent. The bodies lay there for four days until the women could finally bury them.

A medical student testified that the Taliban also searched the hospital looking for Hazaras.

I saw two Hazara boys, one about thirteen years old and one about twenty. One had a broken arm. The Taliban wanted to take them away, but the director intervened. But they came back the next day and took them.

One witness stated that he saw bodies that had been left in the city’s cemeteries.

We passed by the cemetery at Dasht-e-Shour. The cemetery is along the main road. There are also shops along the road. These shops were built with the dirt taken in the same area. So there are many holes left along the road. All these holes were filled with bodies.

As he was preparing to leave Mazar he witnessed one execution.

The morning we left, with one friend, in Darvazeye Taj-Korghan, it was around 7:00 a.m., a few shops were open. We saw one Hazara porter moving flour and rice for someone. Some Taliban were having breakfast in the Arefan hotel. They saw him and shot him immediately. The owner of the flour and rice was frightened. One Talib told him, “Take your belongings and go. This man was a Hazara.” Along the way the Taliban were looking for Hazaras. Soldiers asked me if I were Hazara. My friend said, “He is not Hazara, he is Pushtun.” They believed him and did not stop us.

Witnesses also reported seeing bodies in a number of areas in the city, some with their hands tied behind their backs with their turbans. A large number were reportedly taken to some of the city’s cemeteries. One man told Human Rights Watch that he accompanied a neighbor who was searching for the body of her husband who had been taken away the first night. After looking at twenty bodies they stopped because she said she could not look anymore. When relatives attempted to retrieve bodies or bury the dead, they were stopped by the Taliban, who told them that the bodies had to lie on the streets "until the dogs ate them," as had happened to Taliban soldiers killed in the city in 1997. Dozens of civilians were reportedly executed at the tomb of a Hazara leader Abdul Ali Mazari, who was killed while in Taliban custody in 1995. Although some residents buried bodies in secret, most bodies remained on the street for several days until the smell and the fear of health problems persuaded Taliban officials to permit burials.

In the Jail

According to witnesses who had been detained there, the central jail in Mazar-i Sharif has only one well for drinking water and two toilets. After the Taliban arrived in Mazar they reportedly released some hundreds of prisoners held in the jail and began to fill it with men arrested during their search operations. Witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that the jail quickly became extremely crowded: there were so many in the jail that there wasno room for anyone to lie down.


As the Taliban were detaining men throughout the city, relatives of the detainees, women and children for the most part, gathered outside the jail and outside the governor's headquarters to plead for the release of relatives. In some cases they waited all day in the heat without receiving any information. Witnesses reported that Taliban troops surrounding the jail would occasionally beat those gathered there with whips.9 Children were occasionally allowed in to bring food to their relatives, but no other visitors were permitted to speak with the detainees.

A Tajik witness who was detained told Human Rights Watch:

Some of the prisoners were beaten, mostly Hazaras. They were tied up and made to lie face down and then the Taliban would beat them with cables. The Taliban were telling everyone to surrender their arms and tell them where they could find Hazaras. They said, "If you hand over a Hazara, we will let you go."

He was held for three days. Taliban officials at the jail, who were reportedly all non-local "mainstream" Taliban, separated the prisoners on the basis of ethnicity; Hazaras and other Shi'as were kept on one side, Uzbeks and Tajiks on the other. Some detainees were forced to help identify members of different ethnic groups. In some cases the authorities required the detainees to prove that they were Sunni by reciting a Sunni prayer. Many of the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, and the few Pashtuns there were released after someone came and vouched for them.

As the jail filled, large numbers of prisoners were transferred to other prisons in Afghanistan, principally in Shiberghan, Herat and Qandahar. The vehicles used to transport the prisoners were large metal container trucks which were twenty to forty feet in length. Witnesses estimated that the large trucks could hold between one hundred and 150 people packed closely together. At least thirty-five truckloads of prisoners were reportedly transferred from the prison in Mazar. One witness who was detained for several days stated that on at least one occasion, Governor Niazi personally oversaw the process of selecting prisoners for transfer. Another witness reported seeing many such trucks leaving the jail.

I saw containers coming out of the jail every day, several times a day. They were these big Iranian containers, twenty or forty feet long. I saw them regularly because the house we lived in is near the jail. They filled them with people they arrested and left the city.

A Tajik man who had been detained in the prison at the time described how the prisoners were ordered into the trucks:

As the jail filled up they would bring container trucks. It is hard to say exactly who was being put in. They were going to put me in, but I yelled, “I am old and Tajik—what are you doing?” It was very hot. People were already very thirsty. They put them inside and closed the doors. It was clear they would not survive ten minutes. I saw this happen once. There were maybe 120 to 150 men inside.

In at least two instances, nearly all of the prisoners inside the trucks died of asphyxiation in the crowded conditions and desert heat by the time the trucks reached Shiberghan, a three-hour drive from Mazar. One witness saw the trucks in Shiberghan:

In Shiberghan, they brought three containers to Bandare-i Ankhoï, close to the jail. When they opened the door of one truck, only three persons were alive. About 300 were dead. The three were taken to the jail. I could see all this from [where I was sitting]. This was seven days after the takeover. The containers were about twenty feet long. ... I know that there were many dead bodies because the Taliban asked [someone I know] and three Turkmens to go with them to Dasht-e-Leili [a desert site outside Shiberghan]. The Taliban did not want to touch the bodies so the porters took the bodies out of the containers.

From the testimony obtained by Human Rights Watch, it is not clear whether the deaths of the prisoners inside the trucks were intentional. Many other trucks did transport at least the majority of their prisoners without such a result. At the same time, the use of container trucks to punish or kill prisoners reportedly has several precedents in Afghanistan.10 Even if the killings were not intentional, the crowded conditions and extreme heat amounted to cruel and inhumane treatment under customary international humanitarian law, even for those prisoners that survived.

8 The Taliban fly white flags from their vehicles.


9 These whips, which are either those used for controlling donkeys and horses or are refitted lengths of cable, are used by the Taliban's religious police of the Ministry for the Enforcement of Virtue and Suppression of Vice to exact punishment of persons who commit transgressions of the strict dress code or other edicts.

10 Abdul-Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf, head of the Pashtun faction Ittihad-i Islami, reportedly killed Hazara prisoners by locking them in a metal container and then building a fire around it. Malik reportedly dumped a container of Taliban prisoners in the Amu Darya river. While the facts in each case are difficult if not impossible to confirm, such reports have widespread currency, and the events described are treated as precedents and reasons for revenge.

By the second day of the Taliban takeover of Mazar, the newly installed governor, Mulla Manon Niazi, delivered speeches at mosques throughout the city, sometimes several in one day, threatening violence against Hazaras in retaliation for the killing of the Taliban prisoners in 1997, criticizing them for being Shi’a and urging them to convert, and warning other residents that they would also be punished if they protected Hazaras. Virtually every witness who stayed in Mazar after the first day heard one or more of these speeches. While they differed in some details, the themes were uniformly anti-Shi'a and anti-Hazara and consistently held Hazaras responsible for the 1997 killings. These speeches, given by the most senior Taliban official in Mazar at the time, clearly indicate that the killings and other attacks on Hazaras were not the actions of renegade Taliban forces but had the sanction of the Taliban authorities.

In one speech, Niazi was reported to have stated, "Last year you rebelled against us and killed us. From all your homes you shot at us. Now we are here to deal with you." In another speech he reportedly said, “Hazaras are not Muslim, they are Shi’a. They are kofr [infidels]. The Hazaras killed our force here, and now we have to kill Hazaras.”Although he reportedly stated, "We are not here for revenge. What has happened has happened," he told Hazaras that "If you do not show your loyalty, we will burn your houses, and we will kill you. You either accept to be Muslims or leave Afghanistan." In another speech he warned Hazaras that "wherever you go we will catch you. If you go up, we will pull you down by your feet; if you hide below, we will pull you up by your hair." Families petitioning Niazi for the release of detained relatives were told that he would consider releasing anyone except the Hazaras.

At the university, Niazi was asked to provide identity cards to the faculty so that they could come and go without being harassed. He agreed and asked for the names of all the faculty, so that they would be given cards. The names were written down for him, but those who sounded Shi'a were not given cards. Niazi also made a point of threatening those who might be hiding Hazaras. In one speech he said, "If anyone is hiding Hazaras in his house he too will be taken away. What [Hizb-i] Wahdat and the Hazaras did to the Talibs, we did worse...as many as they killed, we killed more." The speeches were also broadcast on the radio.

ABDUCTIONS OF AND ASSAULTS ON WOMEN


Information gathered by Human Rights Watch indicates that assaults on women also featured in the Taliban’s takeover of Mazar-i Sharif. Although the Taliban in general have, in contrast to most of the opposition parties, refrained from assaulting and raping women during their military campaigns, Human Rights Watch received consistent reports that young women were abducted by the Taliban from a number of neighborhoods in Mazar-i Sharif and that their whereabouts remain unknown. While such abductions do not appear to have been widespread, certain neighborhoods appear to have been targeted. Human Rights Watch was not able to locate witnesses who were willing or able to describe specific incidents in detail, but we believe the allegations are serious enough to warrant special attention in any formal investigation into assaults on civilians during the takeover of Mazar-i Sharif.

A witness living in Kamaz camp stated that some of the Taliban took away young women from the camp at the same time that they were arresting men. She knew of four or five girls who were taken from the camp, all in their early twenties. A witness from the neighborhood of Karte Ariana told Human Rights Watch that she had seen teen-age girls in the area being pushed into the Taliban's Pijaro cars and taken to an unknown destination.

A male medical student who worked and lived in one of the city hospitals for twenty days straight after the takeover stated that he saw one rape case during that time. A Hazara woman, who was a nurse, and her sister had walked to the hospital from Ali Chopan.

The nurse was in a very bad shape, she had sharp stomach pains. I could not examine her because the hospital was full of Talibs. This was a day before they segregated the hospital and put women in the children’s building. I just asked a few questions and finally she said that she was raped by the Talibs. She did not say which ones. We could not talk long with the Talibs watching. I could not do much, I just gave her analgesics.

Another witness described an encounter with a nurse who had been raped who may have been the same woman.

An acquaintance of ours came to our house seven or eight days after the takeover. She became ill in our house because she had taken over twenty pills to kill herself, I don’t know what kind. We called doctors from the neighborhood who gave her something to wash out her stomach. She lived in Ali Chopan, but her family was staying elsewhere, and she had gone back to check on the house when she was picked up by the Taliban. At first she did not want to tell us anything, but then she said that when she went to their house, the Talibs abducted her and locked her up in a house with twenty to twenty-five other young girls and women. They were raped every night. They were all Hazaras. She was the only one released. One Talib told her that now they are halal [sanctified], and she should go to his parents in Qandahar and wait for him to come and marry her. He gave her a pass and his own identity card and told her to go to the Taliban’s headquarters and from there to Qandahar, but instead she escaped.

The difficulties inherent in documenting such attacks on women are many. The refugees from Mazar-i Sharif are scattered throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan. Rape victims are unlikely to seek medical attention unless their injuries are severe. The whereabouts of abducted women and girls remain unknown. Rape victims are often reluctant to report their assaults because of the shame and stigma that they may bear as a result. And Afghan women coping with upheaval and the loss of family members in particular may fear the added worry of being identified as rape victims. Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch received consistent and reliable reports of abuses against women. We thus underscore the need for an investigation that is prepared to examine the full range of reported violations, including sexual violence.

The Taliban Phenomenon - 20

S Turkman wrote:

Qyoting anything that is not true is same as telling a lie. Now Aamir is quoting another false propaganda news item without confirming any facts. The article "War Is Peace" by Arundhati Roy, October 18, 2001 is nothing.

===========================================

Dear Sir,

For you kind perusal,

"QUOTE"

The US and the Taliban: a done deal By Pierre Abramovici

http://mondediplo.com/2002/01/05deal

The Taliban invented


But first stability had to be restored to Afghanistan. During the civil war fighting in 1995 the first substantial numbers of Taliban appeared, "invented" by the Pakistani ISI and perhaps funded by the CIA and Saudi Arabia. Unocal and its Saudi partner Delta Oil may have even played a major role in buying off local commanders. Security in Afghanistan was apparently their sole purpose.

On 26 September 1996 the Taliban took Kabul. Michael Bearden, a CIA representative in Afghanistan during the war against the USSR and currently the CIA’s unofficial spokesman, recalls how US viewed the situation at the time: the Taliban were not considered the worst: they were young and hot-headed, but that was better than civil war. They controlled all the territory between Pakistan and Turkmenistan’s gas fields, which might be good as it would be possible to build a pipeline across Afghanistan and supply gas and energy to the new market. Everyone was happy (5).

Unocal’s vice-president, Chris Taggart, barely bothered to pretend Unocal was not backing the Taliban; he described their advance as a positive development. Claiming that Taliban seizure of power was likely to help the gas pipeline project, he even envisaged US recognition of the Taliban (6). He was wrong, but no matter: this was the honeymoon between the US and the "theology students". Anything goes where oil and gas are involved. In fact, in November 1997 Unocal invited a Taliban delegation to the US and, in early December, the company opened a training centre at the University of Omaha, Nebraska, to instruct 137 Afghans in pipeline construction technology.

The political and military situation showed no improvement, leading some in Washington to consider support for the Taliban and the oil pipeline a political mistake. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott warned in 1997 that the region could become a centre for terrorists, a source of political and religious extremism and a theatre of war (7). An important new factor was influencing Afghanistan’s internal affairs and external relations: Osama bin Laden had sought refuge in Afghanistan after leaving Saudi Arabia. On 22 February 1998, with the support of the Taliban, he launched al-Qaida, a radical international Islamist movement, from Afghanistan. He also issued a fatwa authorising attacks on US interests and nationals.

During a visit to Kabul on 16 April 1998, Bill Richardson, the US representative to the UN, raised the question of Bin Laden with the Taliban. They played down the problem. Tom Simons, ambassador to Pakistan, said that the Taliban assured him that Bin Laden did not have the religious authority to issue a fatwa. But on 8 August 1998 bombs destroyed the US embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans. The US responded by launching 70 cruise missiles against Afghanistan and strikes on Sudan. Bin Laden became US public enemy number one, although it was more than six months before an international arrest warrant was issued. Having failed to capture Bin Laden, the US hoped to negotiate with the Taliban to have him expelled from Afghanistan. But the attacks did collateral damage: Unocal announced that it was abandoning the Afghan gas pipeline.

In 1997 the Six plus Two Group was set up, made up of Afghanistan’s six neighbours (Iran, Pakistan, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) with Russia and the US. The group acts under the auspices of the UN and its special envoy to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi , a very experienced Algerian diplomat who took the post in July 1998. After the military and political failure of its earlier missions, the UN has again become crucial in the region.

There were several diplomatic initiatives in the region in 1998, then on 12 March 1999, following Iran, the US moved closer to Russia on Afghanistan. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth went to Moscow. Very little divided the Russians and the Americans, including the role they envisaged for Teheran. According to Inderfurth, Iran as Afghanistan’s neighbour could help end conflict. Iran could play a positive role and the Six plus Two Group could provide a structure. Inderfurth saw the irony: Afghanistan was an area where Russians and Americans could work together to end a war in which the Russians were involved, openly supporting the Northern Alliance.

A new diplomatic game

The first signs of current concerns also appeared in 1998. They included initiatives by factions close to supporters of former King Zahir Shah, who was ousted in 1973 and lives in exile in Rome. In a report to the Security Council, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan welcomed "the Loya Jirgah (grand assembly) as an informal, time-honoured method of settling disputes, advocated by leaders of non-warring Afghan factions." He suggested encouraging "the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan to maintain useful contacts with them" (8). Other initiatives were taken around the UN, including a meeting of 21 countries influential in Afghanistan (9).

The new diplomatic game began with the full meeting of the Six plus Two Group on 19 July 1999 in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), the first time representatives of the Taliban and members of the Northern Alliance were to sit at the same table. The Taliban, in control of 90% of Afghan territory, refused to allow the Northern Alliance to be represented. As expected, the meeting was a failure, but from then the Group provided the channel for most diplomatic initiatives.

Washington refused to abandon hope that the Taliban would surrender Bin Laden, and continued to maintain contacts and encourage processes directed to a political solution. With US blessing, a meeting to promote the Loya Jirgah was arranged by Zahir Shah and held in Rome, 22-25November 1999. The UN Security Council had adopted a resolution calling upon the Taliban to extradite Bin Laden, and imposing limited sanctions.

On 18 January 2000 Spanish diplomat Francesc Vendrell replaced Lakdhar Brahimi, who, dispirited by the lack of progress, had resigned. Two days later, Karl Inderfurth went to Islamabad to meet Pakistan’s new leader, General Pervez Musharraf. He also met two senior Taliban representatives and demanded: "Give us Bin Laden". In return, he offered to regularise relations between Kabul and the world.

Although Washington denied it, the Taliban, internationally condemned for policies towards women, attitudes to human rights and protection of Bin Laden, were still in talks with the US. On 27 November the Taliban deputy minister of foreign affairs, Abdur Rahman Zahid, gave a lecture at the Washington Middle East Institute, calling for political recognition of the Taliban regime and intimating that the Bin Laden affair could then be settled (10).

On 30 September 2000, on an Iranian initiative, there were fresh negotiations in Cyprus. Among those present were supporters of the former "butcher of Kabul", Islamic extremist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had enjoyed the backing of the US and Saudi Arabia against the USSR, but was now in exile in Iran. The Northern Alliance established contacts with the pro-Zahir Shah Rome delegates. On 6 April 2001 those contacts resulted in an initial joint meeting between the Rome process, in favour of a Loya Jirgah under the auspices of the former King, and the Cyprus process sponsored by the Iranians. Though disagreeing with the pro-Iranian element, the other factions agreed to further meetings. The discussions continued.

On 3 November 2000 Vendrell had announced that the Taliban and the Northern Alliance had jointly considered a draft peace plan under the auspices of the Six plus Two Group (11). That coincided with a hardening of attitude within the Taliban as a result of international sanctions. In the spring, tension erupted in the destruction of the Bamyan Buddhas. Meanwhile the Six plus Two Group had begun a new, and final, stage — so the Americans thought. A sub-group was secretly set up, supposed to be more effective, of diplomats or specialists with the most up-to-date experience of the region. The delegates’ foreign ministries secretly managed its work. Meetings were held in Berlin, with only the US, Russia, Iran and Pakistan present.

The delegates included Robert Oakley, former US ambassador and Unocal lobbyist; Naiz Naik, former foreign minister of Pakistan; Tom Simons, former US ambassador and the most recent official negotiator with the Taliiban; a former Russian special envoy to Afghanistan, Nikolai Kozyrev, and Saeed Rajai Khorassani, formerly the Iranian representative to the UN.

Winning the jackpot

At the first meetings in November 2000 and March 2001, to prepare for direct negotiations between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, the participants discussed a political undertaking to give the Taliban a way out. According to Naiz Naik, the group wanted to respond to what the Taliban would say about their international approach, a broad-based government and human rights. Naik said the idea was that "we would then try to covey to them that if they did certain things, then, gradually, they could win the jackpot — get something in return from the international community".

According to the Pakistanis present at the meeting, if the Taliban agreed to review human rights issues within two or three years and accept a transitional government with the Northern Alliance, they would gain massive (financial and technical) international aid to rebuild the country. According to Naik, the objective was to restore peace and stability, and secure the pipeline. It might, he said, be possible to persuade the Taliban that once a broader-based government was in place and the oil pipeline under way, there would be billions of dollars in commission, and the Taliban would have their own resources — the "jackpot" indeed.

The US was still determined to get hold of Bin Laden. According to Tom Simons, if the Taliban surrendered him or entered into serious negotiations, the US would be ready to embark on a major reconstruction project. In Washington, the State Department was resolute. The administration had changed and the oil industry was over-represented within government, starting with President George Bush. The task of negotiating with the Taliban was given to Christina Rocca, the new assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs, who knew about Afghanistan, a country she had dealt with between 1982 and 1987, when she worked for the CIA.

On 12 February the US ambassador to the UN gave an assurance that, at the request of Vendrell, the US would develop a continuing dialogue on humanitarian bases with the Taliban (12). The US believed so firmly in the future of the negotiations that the State Department blocked the FBI investigation into the possible involvement of Bin Laden and his Taliban accomplices in the attack on the USS Cole, in Aden (Yemen) in October 2000. They had John O’Neill, the FBI’s "Mr Bin Laden", expelled from Yemen to prevent him investigating further (13).

The third meeting was to take place, again in Berlin, between 17 and 21 July, in the presence of the Taliban representative, foreign minister Mullah Mutawkil, and the representative of the Northern Alliance, foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah. In early July, a secret meeting had been held between 21 countries influential in Afghanistan, at Weston Park in the UK. A compromise solution based on the former king was approved, particularly by the Northern Alliance. Naiz Naik explained that it was necessary to tell the Taliban that if they refused to cooperate, the Zahir Shah option would be available. From that point, diplomacy saw Zahir Shah as a possible replacement for the Taliban.

Unfortunately, the plan collapsed. The Taliban first rejected it because of the involvement of Vendrell: he represented the UN, responsible for the international sanctions. And an attempt was being made to get them to talk to parties to whom they objected. According to Naik, at this point Tom Simons referred to an open-ended military option against Afghanistan from bases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The locations seemed plausible, as these were countries known to have military cooperation agreements with the US. But was a specific threat made?

Ambassador Simons dismisses this. He was not there in an official capacity and had no authority to issue threats (but would the Taliban have turned up to meet unofficial delegates with no contact with the State Department?) I He merely stated that the US was looking at evidence relating to the USS Cole, pointing out that if the US established that Bin Laden was behind it, there would be military action. It is worth noting that on 5 July, in the belief that the Taliban were taking part in the negotiations, the US was specifically not looking for evidence in relation to the attack on the USS Cole.

The Pakistani delegation reported what had been said to the ministry and the secret services. They, no doubt, informed the Taliban. In late July, Islamabad and Pakistani military circles were buzzing with rumours of war. According to an unofficial source at the French foreign ministry, it is possible that, by exaggerating what Simons had said, the Pakistani secret services were trying to pressure the Taliban to expel Bin Laden. On one last occasion, on 29 July, Christina Rocca held unsuccessful discussions with the Taliban ambassador in Pakistan. The negotiations were at an end. The FBI began to look for evidence against Bin Laden.

A possibility haunts people. What if, convinced the US was going to war, Bin Laden fired the first shot? On 11 September the towers of the World Trade Centre were destroyed by men activated no earlier than mid-August. Three days later, Unocal announced that the suspended proposal for a gas pipeline would remain on ice and it would refuse to negotiate with the Taliban, in the expectation that the Kabul regime would fall. A month later, US bombing began. The Tajiks and Uzbeks "agreed" to provide military facilities to US forces. To combat terrorism, Russia "spontaneously" promised all the assistance necessary to the US, and the anti-Taliban factions finally reached an agreement. All this happened in two months.

On 27 November 2001 US energy secretary, Spencer Abraham, and a team from the Energy Department, went to Novosibirsk, in Russia, to facilitate the completion and opening of the oil pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) — a link costing eight companies, including Chevron, Texaco and Exxonmobil, $2.5bn. It was, according to Abraham, a fresh start for relations between Russia and the US (14) — and a further foothold for the US in exploiting the vast oil resources of the former Soviet Union.

Hamid Karzai was appointed head of the Afghan interim government agreed at the Bonn meetings. It then emerged that during the negotiations over the Afghan oil pipeline, Karzai had been a consultant for Unocal. Brzezinski must be very amused.

The Taliban Phenomenon - 19

Kaukab wrote:

You know Human Rights Watch [HRW] is a hard core Zionist organization. If you read the garbage Aamir has posted, HRW went door to door to dig up evidence against the Taliban. By contrast, over the last 7 years, HRW has been silent or made only token notes about the bombing of Afghan villages by the U.S. air force in which thousands of cvilians have been killed, including women and children.


kaukab Siddique, Ph.D
----------------------------------

Dear and Respected Kaukab Sahab,

By the way the same Human Rights Watch which you have termed as a Zionist Organization, has also reported this:

The ambassadors and diplomatic missions’ staff are always exempted of laws of the country they are being designated to represent their respective countries.

Dear Friends,

For your kind perusal:

III. Living conditions

The first incarnation of the detention facility at Guantanamo was the makeshift Camp X-Ray, consisting of small cages with chain-link sides, concrete floors and metal roofs, offering scant shelter from the elements, and with very basic sanitary facilities. Not only the living conditions, but some of the practices applied to prisoners appear to have been harsher than in the facility that later replaced it, Camp Delta. Two of the detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch described how initially they were not allowed to pray. One, Mohammad Sangir, claimed that he witnessed Arab detainees being beaten for having prayed (for more on allegations of beatings, see below).20

Shah Mohammed Alikhil, a Pakistani who was interviewed by Human Rights Watch, described his introduction to life in Camp X-Ray:

A person came to my cell and explained the rules and regulations to me. I was told not to talk with any other persons or shout or make noise or get close to the iron bars of my cell or the door of my cell… My cell was one of ten cells that were located on both sides of a narrow corridor with five rooms on each side. We could see each other, but we were prohibited to talk.21

Asif Iqbal, a British detainee, described Camp X-Ray:

http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/gitmo1004/3.htm

Human Rights Watch Demolishes US Case On status of Prisoners in Camp X-Ray By Kenneth Roth Human Rights Watch January 28, 2002

January 28, 2002
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, DC


Dear Ms. Rice, We write concerning the legal status of the Guantanamo detainees. Our views reflect Human Rights Watch's experience of over twenty years in applying the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to armed conflicts around the world. We write to address several arguments advanced for not applying Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, which, as you know, requires the establishment of a "competent tribunal" to determine individually whether each detainee is entitled to prisoner-of-war status should any doubt arise regarding their status. Below we set forth each of the arguments offered for ignoring Article 5 as well as Human Rights Watch's response. we hope the U.S. government will agree to establish the
"competent tribunal" required by Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention for the purpose of determining case by case whether each detainee in Guantanamo is entitled to prisoner-of-war status.

Kenneth Roth Executive Director Human Rights Watch

http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/liberties/2002/0128hrw.htm

IV. Impunity for the Architects of Illegal Policy To date, with the exception of one major directly implicated in abuse, only low-ranking soldiers — privates and sergeants have been prosecuted. No officer has been charged in connection with detainee abuse by people under his command. No civilian leader at the Pentagon or the CIA has been investigated.

Commanders and superiors can be held criminally liable if they order, induce, instigate, aid, or abet in the commission of a crime. This is a principle recognized both in U.S. law80 and international law.81

In addition, the doctrine of “command responsibility” or “superior responsibility” holds that individuals who are in civilian or military authority may under certain circumstances be criminally liable not for their actions, but rather for the crimes of those under their command. As explained in the annex to this report, three elements are needed to establish such
liability:

1. There must be a superior-subordinate relationship;

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/6.htm

USA: NEW REPORT FINDS CAMP X-RAY AND CAMP RHINO UNDERMINE HUMAN RIGHTS

Amnesty International today published a 62-page Memorandum sent to the US Government detailing the organisation's concerns over detainees in US custody in Afghanistan's Camp Rhino and Guantánamo Bay's Camp X-Ray.

"The US government must ensure that all its actions in relation to those in its custody in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay comply with international law and standards," Amnesty International said. "This is crucial if justice is to be done and seen to be done, and if respect for the rule of law and human rights is not to be undermined."

The organisation is also renewing its 22 January request for access to the detainees held in Camp X-Ray, as no reply has been received from the US authorities.

Amnesty International's Memorandum accuses the USA of denying or threatening to deny the internationally recognised rights of people taken into its custody in Afghanistan and elsewhere - some 300 of whom have been transferred to Camp X-Ray - in particular by:

- transferring and holding people in conditions that may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and that violate other minimum standards relating to detention;

- refusing to grant people in its custody access to legal counsel, despite ongoing interrogations which may lead to prosecutions;

- refusing to grant detainees access to courts to challenge the lawfulness of their detention;

- refusing to disclose full information about the circumstances of many of the arrests, including whether they occurred in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or elsewhere;

- undermining human rights protections in cases of people taken into custody outside Afghanistan and transferred to Camp X-Ray and elsewhere, including six Algerian nationals seized in Bosnia in apparent violation of Bosnian and international law;

- undermining the presumption of innocence through a pattern of public commentary on the presumed guilt of the Camp X-Ray detainees;

- threatening to apply an unfair justice system, in selecting foreign nationals for trial before military commissions lacking clear independence from the executive and with the power to hand down death sentences without the right of appeal to an independent, impartial court;

- raising the prospect of indefinite detention without charge or trial, or continued detention after acquittal by military commission, or repatriation threatening the principle of non-refoulement;

- failing to show that it conducted an impartial and thorough investigation into allegations of human rights violations against Afghan villagers detained by US soldiers in Afghanistan.

The US government has refused to grant any of the detainees in Afghanistan or Guantánamo Bay prisoner of war status, or to bring any disputed cases before a competent tribunal as required under the Geneva Conventions.

"The USA's 'pick and choose' approach to the Geneva Conventions is unacceptable, as is its failure to respect fundamental international human rights standards," Amnesty International said.

Read the Memorandum

http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news/press/14132.shtml

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Memorandum to the US Government on the rights of people in US custody in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay

''The United States cannot expect to reap the benefits of internationally recognized human rights – in the form of greater worldwide stability and respect for people – without being willing to adhere to them itself.'' US Senior District Judge, New York, January 2002(1)

* Introduction - All detainees and prisoners have rights

More than 3,000 people lost their lives in the United States of America (USA) on 11 September 2001 as a result of the deliberate crashing of four hijacked commercial airliners in New York City, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania. In a televised address from the White House that evening, President Bush said: ''I have directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice.'' Military action began on 7 October 2001 with the first air strikes in Afghanistan that, with the use of ground forces, continued into March 2002.

Amnesty International has condemned the atrocities of 11 September and has consistently urged that the search for justice be conducted in strict compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law. It is concerned that the USA has failed to meet this obligation. On several occasions, the organization has raised its concern that international law and standards have been violated or are under threat of violation, including in the context of the more than one thousand foreign nationals arrested and detained in the USA in post-11 September sweeps,(2) and the situation of people taken into US custody in Afghanistan and elsewhere outside the USA, some 300 of whom had been transferred to the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba at the time of writing.(3) It is these detentions in Afghanistan and Guantánamo that are the focus of this memorandum – which seeks to remind the US Government of its stated commitment to international law and standards, and provides detail on the ways in which its actions are failing to match this rhetoric. The memorandum concludes with Amnesty International's recommendations. The organization is separately requesting information from the authorities on cases raised in this paper.

All persons under any form of detention or imprisonment, including prisoners of war and other persons arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to an armed conflict, have numerous fundamental rights recognized under international human rights and humanitarian law.(4) Indeed, these rights are recognized even with respect to persons suspected of the worst possible crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. This law includes treaties ratified by the USA, as well as customary international law recognized by the USA. Furthermore, international humanitarian law recognizes that certain groups of people taken into custody, such as persons detained in an international or non-international armed conflict, have similar or additional rights. In particular, Amnesty International believes that those captured and held by the USA in the armed conflict in Afghanistan must be presumed to be prisoners of war. Under the Third Geneva Convention, any dispute about their status must be determined by a ''competent tribunal'' (which necessarily must fully respect the right to a fair trial). Despite claiming to fully support the Geneva Conventions, the US Government has refused to grant prisoner of war status to any of the people in its custody in Afghanistan or Guantánamo Bay, or submit the question of each person's status to a competent tribunal to resolve the doubts about their status that plainly exist.

http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR510532002?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\USA

Even the Taliban leader Mullah Omar got away. All they got was the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan, a relatively minor functionary.

The price of this American disaster for the people of Afghanistan was, according to a recent study at the University of New Hampshire, at least 5,000 civilian lives.

For all the posed photographs of American troops against desert landscapes, hardly any of them have seen combat. Instead, impoverished people in dusty villages are killed from the sky.

THE CAMP X-RAY CONCENTRATION CAMP

by John Pilger Daily Mirror (London) March 01, 2002

http://www.zmag.org/content/TerrorWar/pilgercampx.cfm

VII. Beatings and other inappropriate use of force

Asif Iqbal, a British detainee, claims that a guard punched him in the face numerous times and kneed his thigh, leaving a huge bruise, on one occasion.73

Shah Mohammed Alikhil told Human Rights Watch that he had witnessed the beating of detainee Abdul Salam Zaeef, who had been the Taliban’s ambassador to Pakistan, while they were both in the punishment cells:

He along with other prisoners shouted at one of the guards who threw down a holy Koran one day. He and other prisoners had shouted as a way to show their anger and protest. So he was put in this cell. I saw him one day while he was circled by many guards equipped with protection guards [shields] which were like reflecting mirrors. He was resisting getting into the cell, but the guards were pushing him forward. During this time I saw that one guard got angry and hit Abdul Salam Zaeef with a punch and then other guards also beat him with the protecting guards.74

Afghan former detainee N.H. told Human Rights Watch:

Sometimes the prison guards would throw water bottles or other things at prisoners to agitate them, and then two or three of them would badly beat the angry prisoner. In many instances, I have seen prisoners badly injured with blood coming out of their mouths, noses and ears.75

http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/gitmo1004/9.htm

Mr Ayaz Amir had written on September 22, 2006 Friday in Daily Dawn

The ordeal of Mullah Zaeef By Ayaz Amir

http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/20060922.htm

"On the morning of January 2, 2002, three officials of a secret agency arrived at Zaeef’s house in Islamabad with this message: “Your Excellency, you are no more excellency.” One of them said, no one can resist American power, or words to that effect. “America wants to question you. We are going to hand you over to the Americans so that their purpose is served and Pakistan is saved from a big danger.” Zaeef could have been forgiven for feeling stunned. From the “guardians of Islam” this was the last thing that he expected, that for the sake of a few “coins” (his words) he would be delivered as a “gift” to the Americans. Under heavy escort he was taken to Peshawar, kept there for a few days and then pushed into his nightmare. Blindfolded and handcuffed, he was driven to a place where a helicopter was waiting, its engines running. Someone said, “Khuda hafiz” (God preserve you).

There were some people speaking in English. “Suddenly I was pounced upon and flung on the ground, kicked and pummelled from all sides. So sudden was the attack that I was dumbfounded... My blindfold slipping, I saw a line of Pakistani soldiers to one side and some vehicles including one with a flag...My clothes were stripped from my body and I was naked but ‘my former friends’ kept watching the spectacle. The locks on their lips I can never forget... The (Pakistani) officers present there could at least have said he is our guest, in our presence don’t treat him like this. Even in my grave I will not be able to forget that scene.”

"UNQUOTE"

Ex-Taliban envoy freed from Guantanamo - Afghan TV KABUL, Sept 12 (Reuters) - The former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan has been released from a U.S. military prison in Cuba under an Afghan government reconciliation programme, Afghan state television said on Monday.Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef became the Taliban's spokesman after the Sept. 11 attacks and held regular news conferences at his Islamabad embassy at which he tried to convince the world the Taliban's guest, Osama bin Laden, was not responsible. "The Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, who had been in Guantanamo prison for some time, has been released with the help of the reconciliation programme," state run Kabul National Television said.Zaeef had met the head of the reconciliation programme, former president Sibghatullah Mojadidi, the television said. It gave no details and Mojadidi was not immediately available for comment.Four prominent former Taliban members are running in the election. Among them is Zaeef's old boss, former foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil who surrendered to U.S. troops after the Taliban's ouster and was detained for about two years.(Posted @ 21:58 PST)

September 12, 2005 Monday

http://www.dawn.com/2005/09/12/welcome.htm+Mullah+Abdul+Salam+Zaeef+is+released&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

Ex-envoy Zaeef narrates tale of woes ISLAMABAD Oct. 04 (PPI) Former Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan Mulla Abdul Salam Zaeef recently released from the Guantanamo prison has said he was treated like a hardened criminal in the prison and lost one ear and got deaf due to US soldiers’ torture in Pakistan. He narrated to the VOA in an interview the details from the day the Pakistani authorities handed him over to the US and the final release upon being absolved of all the charges levelled against him. "I was the man who tried his best for reconciliation. I was not in favour of imposition of a second war on Afghanistan”, he said. (Posted @ 18:45 PST)

http://www.dawn.com/2005/10/04/welcome.htm+Mullah+Abdul+Salam+Zaeef+is+released&hl=en&ie=UTF-8