Showing posts with label Iran-Contra Affair. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran-Contra Affair. Show all posts

Monday, October 15, 2012

Malala Yousafzai & Alleged Ummah (0+0=0)


At times, one can find a Pakistani hesitating to condemn a killer who murdered another person for suspected blasphemy. Though a tragically large number of people jumped with joy when a man assassinated the supposedly blasphemous governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, in January 2011 (he had spoken out against the country's blasphemy laws), even more Pakistanis were thrown into a mental quagmire, trying to figure out if the killer did the right thing. Forget about comprehending the matter through secular reasoning: A man who commits cold-blooded murder deserves to be tried. It was as if many felt that condemning the killer or his act amounted to condemning Islam itself. In Malala's case, thankfully, no one showered rose petals on the perpetrator, like some lawyers did after Taseer's murder. A flood of statements condemning the young girl's shooting came pouring in from politicians, military men, journalists, and common people. But only few were ready to explicitly mention, or even condemn, the perpetrator: the Taliban. Some of Pakistan's gallant politicians and wise ulema refused to speak out from fear. Others kept silent to safeguard their belief that the drones are bigger culprits than men who have thus far killed more than 36,000 civilians, soldiers, and police in our country. I hope it is Malala's fate to convince a confused population that the crisis facing Islam today results not from the intrigues of other faiths or different ways of life, but from those claiming to be its most vehement defenders.  REFERENCE: We Are All Malala Why can't Pakistanis condemn the Taliban for shooting a 14-year-old girl? BY NADEEM F. PARACHA | OCTOBER 10, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/10/We_Are_All_Malala


MUZAFFARABAD, Oct 14: Leaders of the Defence of Pakistan Council (DPC), an alliance of mainly religious organisations, addressed a large gathering here on Sunday and expressed complete support for the ongoing armed struggle in Indian occupied Kashmir and criticised Pakistani rulers for supporting the United States. DPC Chairman Maulana Samiul Haq also spoke about the attack on Malala Yousufzai and its repercussions for the country. The gathering was held in the University College ground which had been decorated with dozens of small and large banners of different outfits inscribed with jihadi slogans and portraits of their leaders. “Malala is (like) our daughter and we condemn the attack on her… But the innocent Swat girl has been used as a tool to pave the way for an operation in South and North Waziristan,” Maulana Haq said. “It is a part of a great game by devilish forces and under its cover they want to bomb us again and defame Islam and Islamic forces.” He pointed out that US President Barack Obama had shed tears for Malala but when around 1,200 innocent girls were burned to death in Jamia Hafsa he had termed it accomplishment of his agenda. The Maulana said: “We feel that the Pakistani rulers have ill intentions towards Kashmir and that’s why they have put it on the back burner. “We have come to assure you that Pakistan’s religious and political forces are behind you and we will sacrifice everything for the freedom of Kashmir.” The DPC chief also said that while Pakistanis had been feeling depressed at the slavery of Kashmiris for over 60 years, today they themselves were facing a similar situation. REFERENCE: Malala issue being used to pave way for Waziristan operation: DPC by Tariq Naqash http://dawn.com/2012/10/15/malala-issue-being-used-to-pave-way-for-waziristan-operation-dpc/


LAHORE: At least 50 Islamic scholars belonging to ‘Sunni Ittehad Council’ on Thursday declared Taliban’s attack on Pakistani children’s rights activist Malala Yousafzai as un-Islamic, DawnNews reported. Sunni Ittehad Council represents ‘Barelvi‘ sect of Islam which is influenced by Sufism and defends the traditional Sufi practices from the criticisms of Islamic movements like the ‘Deobandi’, ‘Wahhabi’ and ‘Ahl al-Hadith’. The scholars issued a combined ‘fatwa’ (Islamic ruling) in Lahore which said that the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam was incorrect and was deviant from the actual interpretation of the Shariah. The fatwa added that Taliban were misguided and their mindset was driven by ignorance. “Islam does not stop women from acquiring education and by attacking Malala the Taliban have crossed the limits of Islam,” the fatwa added. “Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) had regarded the sanctity of Muslim’s life and property more important than the sanctity of the ‘Kaaba’ (sacred Muslim place),” adding that the fatwa stated, “Murder of one innocent human being is equivalent to murder of entire humanity.” The Islamic ruling added that United States was the enemy of Islam and Pakistan; any kind of cooperation with the US was not in compliance with the Shariah. In response to Taliban’s interpretation of killing females for the greater good of the religion, the scholars said that Islam discourages killing of the females. Adding that, they said, “Even apostate women are not allowed to be killed in Islam.” The assassination attempt on the life of the young National Peace Award winner has drawn widespread condemnation from the government, political parties and civil society groups, terming it a bid to silent voice for peace and education. The banned militant organisation Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had issued a statement Wednesday, using Islamic Shariah to defend the attack. Pakistani Taliban had said that although they do not believe in attacking women, “whom so ever leads a campaign against Islam and Shariah is ordered to be killed by Shariah.” TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan had argued that it is “not just allowed … but obligatory in Islam” to kill such a person involved “in leading a campaign against Shariah and (who) tries to involve whole community in such campaign, and that personality becomes a symbol of anti-Shariah campaign.” Malala had won international recognition for highlighting Taliban atrocities in Swat with a blog for the BBC three years ago, when the Islamist militants burned girls’ schools and terrorised the valley. Her struggle resonated with tens of thousands of girls who were being denied an education by the militants across northwest Pakistan, where the government has been fighting the local Taliban since 2007. REFERENCE: Fifty Muslim scholars issue fatwa against Taliban DAWN.COM | 11th October, 2012 http://dawn.com/2012/10/11/fifty-muslim-scholars-issue-fatwa-against-taliban/


January 29th, 2011. MQM lawmaker declines to lead Fateha for Taseer ISLAMABAD: Polarisation on religious issues again became visible at the highest level when lawmakers in Senate stood divided over the issue of offering fateha for a deceased person. When Senator Abdul Khaliq Pirzada of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) was asked to lead the prayers for the soul of the assassinated governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer, he flatly refused. A parliamentarian later termed the incident an “abhorrent aberration” in the country’s parliamentary history. The prayers were requested by Senator Nilofar Bakhtiar of the PML-Q, who requested chairman Senate Farooq H Naek that the house should offer prayers for the late governor’s departed soul. She also urged the upper house of parliament to pass a resolution to condemn elements supporting Taseer’s killer. Offering prayers for persons of national repute is a routine matter. After the MQM lawmaker refused to lead the prayers, the Senate chairman himself led the prayers to avoid further controversy. Published in The Express Tribune, January 29th, 2011. MQM lawmaker declines to lead Fateha for Taseer http://tribune.com.pk/story/110880/intense-polarisation-mqm-lawmaker-declines-to-lead-fateha-for-taseer/


2011: US aided Pakistan group which supported extremists AP | 11th January, 2012 ISLAMABAD: The US gave money to a Pakistani Muslim group that organised anti-Taliban rallies, but which later demonstrated in support of an extremist who killed a leading liberal politician, the US Embassy in Pakistan said Wednesday. US government website Usaspending.gov shows that the group, the Sunni Ittehad Council, received $36,607 from Washington in 2009. A US diplomat said that the embassy had given money to the group to organise the rallies, but that it had since changed direction and leadership. He said it was a one-off grant, and wouldn’t be repeated. He didn’t give his name because he wasn’t authorised to speak about the issue on the record. The grant was first reported by the Council of Foreign Relations on its website. The Ittehad council was formed in 2009 to counter extremism. It groups politicians and clerics from Pakistan’s traditionalist Barelvi Muslim movement, often referred to as theological moderates in the Pakistani context. The American money was used to organise nationwide rallies against militants and suicide bombings, the embassy official said. The demonstrations received widespread media coverage, and were some of the first against extremism in the country. The rhetoric at the rallies was mostly focused on opposing militant attacks on shrines, which Barelvis frequent but are opposed by Deobandi Muslims, Pakistan’s other main Muslim sect. REFERENCE: US aided Pakistan group which supported extremists AP | 11th January, 2012 http://dawn.com/2012/01/11/us-aided-pakistan-group-which-supported-extremists/


 In 2011 and also this month, however, the council led demonstrations in support of the killer of Salman Taseer, a governor who was killed a year ago for his criticism of anti-blasphemy laws. The displays have appalled Pakistani liberals and stoked international fears that the country is buckling under the weight of extremism. Taseer’s assassin, Mumtaz Qadri, is a Barelvi. He claimed he acted to defend the honour of Prophet Mohammed. At its rallies, the group maintains its criticism of the Taliban even as it supports Qadri — a seemingly contradictory stance that suggests its leaders may be more interested in harnessing the political support and street power of Barelvis than in genuinely countering militancy. Two leading members of the council who have been with the group from the beginning of its existence denied receiving any American funds. The apparent discrepancy could be explained by lack of transparency within the organisation. However, given the current anti-American climate, owning up to receiving funds from the United States would invite criticism. ”This propaganda is being unleashed against us because we are strongly opposed to Western democracy and American policies in the region and in the world,” said Sahibzada Fazal Karim, the head of the council, before reiterating the group’s support for Qadri. ”We are against extremism, but we support Qadri because he did a right thing,” he said. REFERENCE: US aided Pakistan group which supported extremists AP | 11th January, 2012 http://dawn.com/2012/01/11/us-aided-pakistan-group-which-supported-extremists/


A new low even for the Jamat-e-Islami and others like Jamat-e-Islam and PTI. Rather disgusting campaign on twitter, implicitly justifying the attack on Malala, tagging various TV journalists with "Malala amreekee foji hukkam k sath" ("Malala with American army rulers") - While conveniently forgetting that these very Mullahs have also been benefited from USA and even Fought the Alleged Jihad with US Funding and that is not enough Hafiz Muhammad Saeed's real brother used to live in USA. Even the so-called Taliban Fighters were regular visitors of US State Department way back in 90s. During 80s the Cutthroat Irani Ayatullahs even dined with Israeli Spies to settle score with another American Agent Saddam Hussein. 



2011: With $30 Billion Arms Deal, U.S. Bolsters Saudi Ties  HONOLULU — Fortifying one of its key allies in the Persian Gulf, the Obama administration announced a weapons deal with Saudi Arabia on Thursday, saying it had agreed to sell F-15 fighter jets valued at nearly $30 billion to the Royal Saudi Air Force. The agreement, and the administration’s parallel plans to press ahead with a nearly $11 billion arms deal for Iraq, despite rising political tensions there, is dramatic evidence of its determination to project American military influence in an oil-rich region shadowed by a threat from Iran. Though the White House said the deal had not been accelerated to respond to threats by Iranian officials in recent days to shut off the Strait of Hormuz, its timing is laden with significance, as tensions with Iran have deepened and the United States has withdrawn its last soldiers from Iraq. “This sale will send a strong message to countries in the region that the United States is committed to stability in the gulf and the broader Middle East,” said Andrew J. Shapiro, the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. “It will enhance Saudi Arabia’s ability to deter and defend against external threats to its sovereignty.” The agreement also suggests that the United States and Saudi Arabia have moved beyond a bitter falling-out over the uprisings in the Arab world. Though the two countries continue to differ on how to handle the popular revolts in the region, American and Saudi officials said, the disagreement has not fractured a strategic alliance based on a common concern over Iran. Saudi Arabia is a longtime foe of Iran, with relations souring further last fall after the United States broke up what it said was an Iranian-backed plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington. Iran has denied the accusations. “When you look at the size of this package, what does it tell you about U.S.-Saudi relations?” said a senior Saudi official, who spoke anonymously because he was not authorized to speak publicly. “It says it’s very strong and very solid. Any disagreements from time to time don’t affect the core relationship.” The weapons package is remarkable, both for its size and for its technical sophistication. Under the terms of the $29.4 billion agreement signed on Dec. 24, Saudi Arabia will get 84 new F-15SA jets, manufactured by Boeing, and upgrades to 70 F-15s in the Saudi fleet with new munitions and spare parts. It will also get help with training, logistics and maintenance. 


The new F-15s, which will be delivered in 2015, are among the most capable and versatile fighter jets in the world, Pentagon officials said. They will come with the latest air-to-air missiles and precision-guided air-to-ground missiles, enabling them to strike ships and radar facilities day or night and in any weather. Though Mr. Shapiro and other officials said the planes were intended to help Saudi Arabia protect its sovereignty, military analysts said they would be effective against Iranian planes and ships anywhere in the Persian Gulf. They are part of a 10-year, $60 billion weapons package for Saudi Arabia that was approved last year by Congress. At the time, there was a vigorous debate, with some lawmakers arguing that such a huge arms package would threaten the military position of Israel. Mr. Shapiro, speaking at a State Department briefing, said the administration was satisfied that the sale of the F-15s would not diminish “Israel’s qualitative military edge.” The White House portrayed the arms sale as part of a concerted effort to shore up its relationship with Saudi Arabia. President Obama has made several telephone calls to King Abdullah, a senior official said; the national security adviser, Thomas E. Donilon, traveled twice to the Saudi capital, Riyadh; and Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. led a high-level delegation to the funeral of Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz in October. Early this year, the Saudis were furious when Mr. Obama withdrew support for Egypt’s embattled president, Hosni Mubarak, after he faced massive protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Later, it was the White House’s turn to be upset, when Saudi tanks rolled into neighboring Bahrain to help quash a mainly Shiite rebellion against that kingdom’s Sunni monarchy. 


Yet Saudi Arabia and the United States continue to cooperate in areas like counterterrorism. In recent weeks, the two have worked to resolve the crisis in Yemen, where President Ali Abdullah Saleh has formally agreed to cede power in a Saudi-brokered agreement and has applied for a visa to travel to the United States for medical treatment. “The agreement reinforces the strong and enduring relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia,” Joshua R. Earnest, the White House’s deputy press secretary, said in a statement issued in Hawaii, where Mr. Obama is on vacation. With the United States pulling out of Iraq, the administration has been eager to demonstrate that it will remain a presence in the region. It is proceeding with weapons sales to Iraq, despite fears that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki may abandon his American-backed power-sharing government in favor of a Shiite-dominated state. The administration has weighed stationing combat troops in Kuwait in case of a military confrontation with Iran or a collapse in security in Iraq. It is also seeking to expand military ties with other gulf countries, including Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. “I see this more in the longer-term effort by the administration to signal that even with the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the U.S. is still committed to the defense of its allies in the gulf and to the containment of Iran,” said F. Gregory Gause III, an expert on Saudi affairs at the University of Vermont. The weapons deal, Mr. Gause said, also illustrated that the two countries could put aside their differences and focus on larger strategic priorities. “After some tension-filled months this year over Egypt and Bahrain, both sides have agreed to disagree on that, and agree on their common interests,” he said. REFERENCE: With $30 Billion Arms Deal, U.S. Bolsters Saudi Ties By MARK LANDLER and STEVEN LEE MYERS Published: December 29, 2011 A version of this article appeared in print on December 30, 2011, on page A10 of the New York edition with the headline: Healing a Rift, U.S. Agrees to $30 Billion Fighter Jet Sale to Saudi Arabia. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/world/middleeast/with-30-billion-arms-deal-united-states-bolsters-ties-to-saudi-arabia.html?_r=1


David Kimche David Kimche, who died on March 8 aged 82, was a British-born Israeli spy and diplomat who slipped between the covert and overt domains of foreign affairs, building both the fearsome reputation of his country's intelligence service and its valuable official ties to other nations. : As deputy head until 1980 of the Israeli external security service, the Mossad, Kimche was deeply involved in Operation Wrath of God – the plot to assassinate the terrorists who had killed 11 members of the Israeli team at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Kimche ensured that, rather than eliminating the terrorists with a straightforward sniper's bullet, Mossad used more sophisticated methods (booby-trapped mattresses or telephones) that both burnished the agency's own reputation and struck fear into potential future targets. "We wanted to make them afraid of being a terrorist," he said. "We wanted to make them look over their shoulders and feel that we are upon them. This was a message that they can be got at anywhere, at any time and therefore they have to look out for themselves 24 hours a day." Long before the recent furore over the use of foreign passports by Mossad for its assassination operations abroad, Kimche was at the heart of a similar scandal. As Mossad was being ticked off by Whitehall for using fake British documents for Wrath of God "hits", Kimche was applying to have his own, genuine, British passport renewed. "This is really extraordinary," one Foreign Office official noted. "At the same time as the minister is about to protest to the Israeli ambassador over the misuse of British passports for Israeli intelligence operations, we are apparently contemplating issuing a British passport to a man who may well have been in charge of the operation complained of." But Kimche was by no means a stereotypical Israeli blood-and-guts man of war.


He was an urbane and cultivated official diplomat, who, as director general of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1980 to 1987, drew on his extraordinary contacts to bring his nation out of the cold at a time when many foreign partners, fearful of an Arab oil-embargo, were minded to shun the Jewish state. No one will now be able to say for sure exactly where Kimche exerted most influence. But it is certain that he had long experience dealing with the Soviet Union and African nations. Inevitably he focused on building ties with the Arab world: "You have to be very sensitive. You have to understand Arab society," he once said. "Above all, you have to be sensitive to their feelings and their attitudes. I've had a lot of dealings with the Arab world. I find it interesting." This boundless interest in people and places was one of Kimche's great assets both in the overt and covert domains. His friends said he was a well-rounded man, not purely focused on operational intrigue. "The fact is that I know the world fairly well," Kimche conceded. "The fact is that I know how to make contacts with people. This enables me to do things that many others don't know how to do." David Kimche, usually known as Dave, was born in London in 1928 to an aristocratic Jewish family with Swiss roots. His parents and brother, Jon, were active Zionists, and Dave left Britain Palestine in 1946, fighting in the war two years later that accompanied Israel's creation. He then joined the Jerusalem Post before joining Mossad in 1953. His postings to Africa and Asia, often under journalistic cover and using the name David Sharon, were designed to create an Israeli sphere of influence on the periphery of the Arab world. A frequent tactic was to approach Christian ethnic groups and offer support in civil wars or uprisings against Muslim rivals. In this role Kimche became known as the "Man with the Suitcase", appearing in various African states shortly before dramatic coups and disappearing again quickly afterwards. There was rarely room for scruple in this "Great Game" strategy, and among the Israeli proteges on the continent was the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. No state was too remote to prove useful, however, and Israel sought and secured allies from Central America to South East Asia. By the late 1970s, Kimche's covert work was proving crucial in the delicate peace negotiations with Egypt. Using contacts in north Africa, he is thought to have convinced Morocco's King Hassan to broker talks between Jerusalem and Cairo. But Kimche, by then deputy-director of Mossad, fell out with his boss, Yitzhak Hofi, and, in 1980, he resigned to join the Foreign Ministry. It was there that he almost came unstuck. The caution inherent to covert work seemed to give way to adventurism as he championed an Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 where, true to form, he backed Christian militias – which then went on to carry out massacres at Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Chatila. It was in Lebanon too, that Kimche almost became snared by a web of intrigue that stretched from Nicaragua to Tehran. Following the suggestion that Iran could use its influence with Hizbollah to win the release of American hostages held by the Lebanese militant group, Israel agreed to sweeten Tehran by supplying the regime there with weapons, in defiance of an arms embargo.



The CIA funnelled profits from the deals to anti-communist rebels, or Contras, that it was backing in Nicaragua. Fall out from the so-called Iran-Contra affair proved deeply damaging, and afterwards there was a suspicion that the idea had originated with Kimche. But he retained his contacts in Iran. In 1991, after he had officially retired to pursue "business interests", an American television team reporting in Tehran found that, "whenever we went to interview Islamic revolutionary government officials, David Kimche seemed to be just leaving their offices". But an undercover relationship with a sworn enemy inevitably produced worrying and comical moments. "I was in Hamburg for discussions with a certain ayatollah," he once recalled. "The talks went on into the night, ending at 2am. Then the Iranians beckoned us to go with them.'We have something to show you,' they said, and drove us into the depths of Hamburg's dockland. We stopped outside a warehouse and were led up an unlit staircase. I felt quite nervous when we suddenly emerged into a huge chamber. The light went on – and spread before us was an extraordinary spectacle: a huge collection of magnificent carpets once owned by the Shah of Persia. They had been shipped out for sale to finance the Mullahs' revolution." Sadly for Kimche, his salary could not stretch to meet the price of the treasures on display. In his later years, Kimche, ever the pragmatist, focused on achieving a peace settlement with the Palestinians. He had previously sought to destroy the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) of Yasser Arafat ("Arafat was our mortal enemy" he said). But having weakened the PLO, he later accepted that "like it or not, Mr. Arafat is the only Palestinian leader with the power to curb violence and work out an enduring ceasefire, let alone a peace accord." Even after Arafat's death, and despite endless failures that hardened mistrust among people on both sides, Kimche kept at behind-the-scenes peace efforts. In his last years, and as informed as anyone of Israel's capacity to strike at its enemies if need be, he was in a position, perhaps, to be more trusting than most. "I do not share what I regard as the Diaspora mentality of seeing danger under every rock we pick up," he says. "I do not believe that a Palestinian state poses a danger in any way or form. Whether the territories become a part of Jordan or a Palestinian state, neither will pose a threat to Israel." David Kimche, the author of several books on foreign affairs, married twice. He is survived by his wife, Ruth, and four children.REFERENCE : David Kimche David Kimche, who died on March 8 aged 82, was a British-born Israeli spy and diplomat who slipped between the covert and overt domains of foreign affairs, building both the fearsome reputation of his country's intelligence service and its valuable official ties to other nations. 7:15PM GMT 11 Mar 2010 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/7423398/David-Kimche.html

Tuesday, February 7, 2012

Shah of Iran & Ayatollah Khomeini.



Mawdudi’s works began to appear in Iran in the 1960s. They were translated into Persian from Arabic by Ayatollah Hadi Khusrawshahi and members of a translating team working with him. Articles on Mawdudi and excerpts from his works also appeared in various issues of Khusrawshahi’s journal Maktab-i Islam. Following the revolution of 1978–1979, a number of Mawdudi’s works were translated into Persian from Arabic by Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Khamana’i. Interestingly, the first Persian translation of a work of Mawdudi was done in Hyderabad, Deccan, by Mahmud Faruqi in 1946; RJI, vol. 4, 90. REFERENCES: The Vangaurd of the Islamic Revolution - The Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan Seyed Vali Reza Nasr UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley · Los Angeles · London © 1994 The Regents of the University of California - Should we just condemn only Khomeini and condone Mawdudi knowing well that Mawdudi was a close friend of Khomeini and was sympathetic to his course. In a book titled, 'Two brothers - Maududi and Khomeini' page 129, the following statement of Dr Ahmad Farouk Maududi (son of Abul-A'ala Maududi) was published in Roz Naame, Lahore - 29 September 1979, "Allama Khomeini had a very old and close relationship with Abba Jaan (father). Aayaatullah Khomeini translated his (fathers) books in Farsi and included it as a subject in Qum. Allama Khomeini met my father in 1963 during Hajj and my father's wish was to create a revolutionary in Pakistan similar to Iran. He was concerned about the success of the Iranian revolution till his last breath.'


Ronald Reagan on Shah of Iran, Khomeini & Ugly US Role in Iran

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gp0F-SrOhKc


The Iran-Contra Affair was a clandestine action not approved of by the United States Congress. It began in 1985, when President Ronald Reagan's administration supplied weapons to Iran¹ — a sworn enemy — in hopes of securing the release of American hostages held in Lebanon by Hezbollah terrorists loyal to the Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran's leader. This article is rooted in the Iran Hostage Crisis. The U.S. took millions of dollars from the weapons sale and routed them and guns to the right-wing "Contra"² guerrillas in Nicaragua. The Contras were the armed opponents of Nicaragua's Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction, following the July 1979 overthrow of strongman Anastasio Somoza Debayle and the ending of the Somoza family's 43-year reign. The transactions that took place in the Iran-Contra scandal were contrary to the legislation of the Democratic-dominated Congress and contrary to official Reagan administration policy. Part of the deal was that, in July 1985, the United States would send 508 American-made TOW anti-tank missiles from Israel to Iran for the safe exchange of a hostage, the Reverend Benjamin Weir. After that successful transfer, the Israelis offered to ship 500 HAWK surface-to-air missiles to Iran in November 1985, in exchange for the release of all remaining American hostages being held in Lebanon. Eventually the arms were sold with proceeds going to the contras, and the hostages were released. In February 1986, 1,000 TOW missiles were shipped to Iran. From May to November, there were more shipments of various weapons and parts. Eventually Hezbollah elected to kidnap more hostages following their release of the previous ones, which rendered meaningless any further dealings with Iran. REFERENCE: Iran-Contra Affair Foreign Affairs, 1985-1992"Irangate" http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1889.html Iran-Contra Affair Foreign Affairs, 1985-1992 "Irangate" http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1889.html

Mike Wallace and H.I.M Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dl9_t3UjetM

LETS GO BACK TO HISTORY

Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, Former Prime Minister of Iran [28 April 1951 – 19 August 1953]Mosaddeq was removed from power in a 19 August 1953 coup supported and funded by the British and U.S. governments and led by General Fazlollah Zahedi.[Secrets of History: The C.I.A in Iran By JAMES RISEN http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html







Secrets of History: The C.I.A in Iran By JAMES RISEN http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html


Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, [26 October 1919, Tehran – 27 July 1980, Cairo] with his wife.

The Central Intelligence Agency's secret history of its covert operation to overthrow Iran's government in 1953 offers an inside look at how the agency stumbled into success, despite a series of mishaps that derailed its original plans. Written in 1954 by one of the coup's chief planners, the history details how United States and British officials plotted the military coup that returned the shah of Iran to power and toppled Iran's elected prime minister, an ardent nationalist.

The document shows that:

Britain, fearful of Iran's plans to nationalize its oil industry, came up with the idea for the coup in 1952 and pressed the United States to mount a joint operation to remove the prime minister. The C.I.A. and S.I.S., the British intelligence service, handpicked Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi to succeed Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and covertly funneled $5 million to General Zahedi's regime two days after the coup prevailed. Iranians working for the C.I.A. and posing as Communists harassed religious leaders and staged the bombing of one cleric's home in a campaign to turn the country's Islamic religious community against Mossadegh's government. The shah's cowardice nearly killed the C.I.A. operation. Fearful of risking his throne, the Shah repeatedly refused to sign C.I.A.-written royal decrees to change the government. The agency arranged for the shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf Pahlevi, and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the father of the Desert Storm commander, to act as intermediaries to try to keep him from wilting under pressure. He still fled the country just before the coup succeeded.


“What’s New on the Iran 1953 Coup in the New York Times Article (April 16, 2000, front page) and the Documents Posted on the Web” By Professor Mark Gasiorowski
19 April 2000
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/

There is not much in the NYT article itself that is not covered in my article on the coup (“The 1953 Coup d’Etat in Iran” published in 1987 in the International Journal of Middle East Studies, and available in the Gulf2000 archives) or other sources on the coup. The most interesting new tidbit here is that the CIA’s agents harassed religious leaders and bombed one’s home in order to turn them against Mossadeq. The article does not say, but this was probably done by Iranians working in the BEDAMN network, which is described in my article. There are also some new details on how that US persuaded the shah to agree to the coup, including a statement that Assadollah Rashidian was involved in this effort and that General Schwartzkopf, Sr. played a larger role in this than was previously known. There are also a few details reported in the article that I knew about but chose not to reveal, including that Donald Wilber and Norman Derbyshire developed the original coup plan and that the plan was known as TPAJAX, rather than simply AJAX. (The TP prefix indicated that the operation was to be carried out in Iran.) The NYT article does not say anything about a couple of matters that remain controversial about the coup, including whether Ayatollah Kashani played a role in organizing the crowds and whether the CIA team organized “fake” Tudeh Party crowds as part of the effort. There may be something on these issues in the 200-page history itself.

Much more important than the NYT article are the two documents appended to the summary document giving operational plans for the coup. These contain a wealth of interesting information. They indicate that the British played a larger—though still subordinate—role in the coup than was previously known, providing part of the financing for it and using their intelligence network (led by the Rashidian brothers) to influence members of the parliament and do other things. The CIA described the coup plan as “quasi-legal,” referring to the fact that the shah legally dismissed Mossadeq but presumably acknowledging that he did not do so on his own initiative. These documents make clear that the CIA was prepared to go forward with the coup even if the shah opposed it. There is a suggestion that the CIA use counterfeit Iranian currency to somehow show that Mossadeq was ruining the economy, though I’m not sure this was ever done. The documents indicate that Fazlollah Zahedi and his military colleagues were given large sums of money (at least $50,000) before the coup, perhaps to buy their support. Most interestingly, they indicate that various clerical leaders and organizations—whose names are blanked out—were to play a major role in the coup. Finally, the author(s) of the London plan—presumably Wilber and Derbyshire—say some rather nasty things about the Iranians, including that there is a “recognized incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner.”

Perhaps the most general conclusion that can be drawn from these documents is that the CIA extensively stage-managed the entire coup, not only carrying it out but also preparing the groundwork for it by subordinating various important Iranian political actors and using propaganda and other instruments to influence public opinion against Mossadeq. This is a point that was made in my article and other published accounts, but it is strongly confirmed in these documents. In my view, this thoroughly refutes the argument that is commonly made in Iranian monarchist exile circles that the coup was a legitimate “popular uprising” on behalf of the shah.

In reply to Nikki Keddie’s (UCLA) questions about whether the NYT article got the story right, I would say it is impossible to tell until the 200-page document comes out. Nikki’s additional comment that these documents may not be entirely factual but may instead reveal certain biases held by their authors is an important one. Wilber was not in Iran while the coup was occurring, and his account of it can only have been based on his debriefing of Kermit Roosevelt and other participants. Some facts were inevitably lost or misinterpreted in this process, especially since this was a rapidly changing series of events. This being said, I doubt that there will be any major errors in the 200-page history. While Wilber had his biases, he certainly was a competent historian. I can think of no reason he might have wanted to distort this account.

Here are a few other notes. It is my understanding that these documents were given to the NYT well before Secretary Albright’s recent speech, implying that they were not an attempt to upstage or add to the speech by the unnamed “former official” who provided them to the NYT. I think there is still some reason to hope that the 200-page document will be released with excisions by the NYT. I certainly hope they do so.


The Last Shah - Iran History BBC Documentary (Part 1)



Ayatollah Ruhollah KhomeinI was not an easy man. Stern and vengeful, he was not an easy man to like. Single-minded in his thinking, he was not an easy man to negotiate with. He certainly was not an easy man to interview. I remember the second time I interviewed him, in his exile in a village outside of Paris in the months before the 1979 revolution. He didn't like one of my questions. So he simply stood up from his cross-legged position on the floor and, without a word, wrapped himself in his cloak and left the room. Yet during his lifetime the ayatollah achieved near-mythic status, and he was revered, even worshiped, by Iranians who saw him as their savior on earth. Night after night before the revolution, many people swore that they saw Khomeini's face -- his turban, his eyes, his nose, his beard -- in the moon. In his biography of Khomeini, Baqer Moin describes the harsh side of the cleric who forever changed the course of Iran's history. ''Khomeini had never been particularly interested in discussion and dialogue,'' Moin writes. ''He was an introvert; his dialogue was with himself rather than with others.'' But then Moin, correctly, finds the key to understanding the ayatollah elsewhere: ''His approach was intuitive.'' It was Khomeini's extraordinary intuition, his innate sense that a cleric should be more than a person who leads prayers every Friday and conducts rituals for pay, that propelled him to lead a country into one of the most far-reaching revolutions of modern history. True, Khomeini was a man of religion; but even more important, he was a gifted and shrewd politician, skilled in mobilizing his supporters and isolating his opponents, supple in decision making when it served his goal of making and consolidating a theocracy. He appealed to the masses with promises to liberate them from oppression, surrounded himself with loyal clerical lieutenants and attracted the religious bazaar merchants, who began to offer him money, which in turn increased his following and influence. And he had no patience with the clerics of his day, even his more senior peers, who were determined to stay out of politics and were willing to share power with a traditional Shiite monarchy as their predecessors had done for over four centuries. ''Politics and religion are one,'' Khomeini often declared. Baqer Moin is ideally placed to have written a biography of one of the most complicated political figures of the 20th century. Moin grew up in Iran, where he learned Persian and Arabic poetry, mysticism and philosophy from his father, who was trained as a cleric but earned a living as a farmer. Moin himself studied in the religious seminaries of Mashad before becoming a journalist. He now heads the BBC's Persian service (even Khomeini listened to it). Moin has produced the first serious and accessible examination of the ayatollah's life. The most interesting parts of the book deal with the human side of a man who was little known before his ascent to power and widely misunderstood both before and after. Born into a family of clerics descended from the prophet Muhammad, Khomeini enjoyed a comfortable childhood in the village of Khomein in central Iran, where he was raised in a large fortified compound with a vast garden, courtyards, balconies and watchtowers. He was cared for by servants and protected by armed guards. As a young man, Khomeini developed an interest in poetry and wrote poetry himself, even using the language of love and drink. (''Keep the door of the tavern open for me night and day, / Farewell seminary, farewell mosque, / Let me go my way'' was typical of his style of verse.) Later, dissatisfied with the orthodox version of Islam practiced by the clergy, Khomeini became an intellectual rebel, plunging into mysticism. Moin argues that he owed his fearlessness as a political leader to his mystical sense of oneness with God. ''Intoxicated by the cosmic vision of a mystic and bound by the firm belief of a jurisprudent who carries out God's command, Khomeini the politician was a powerful fusion. As a mystic, Khomeini was an elitist, but as a theologian he was expedient and as a politician a calculating populist to the point of being opportunistic. . . . For Khomeini, there was no distinction between the persona of the jurist, the mystic and the politician.'' In his first news conference in Iran, four days after his return in February 1979, he unveiled the world's first modern theocracy. ''This is not an ordinary government,'' he declared. Rather, it would be ''God's government.'' That meant, he added, that opposition to the government was opposition to God -- in other words, ''blasphemy.'' Moin evokes Khomeini's rigidity through the memories of his host in Turkey, where Khomeini lived for several months in 1964 after the shah sent him into exile. When Ali Cetiner, a Persian-speaking colonel in Turkish military intelligence who was assigned to be Khomeini's minder, couldn't find a suitable place for him to stay he took him into his secular middle-class home in the city of Bursa. Cetiner's wife installed a new bed, bought new sheets and even put a Koran at Khomeini's bedside. She cooked dinner and put on her best dress to greet their Iranian guest. But when Khomeini arrived, he began protesting to Colonel Afzali, the minder from Iranian intelligence who had accompanied him there. ''He says the woman with the uncovered head should leave,'' Afzali explained to Cetiner, whose wife replied: ''I am not his housekeeper here. I am the lady of the house.'' Still, she put on a long nightdress and covered her head. Over time, Khomeini came to respect her, standing up when she entered the room, chatting with her amiably and even smiling as he looked her in the eye. Moin provides a deft account of Khomeini's emergence as a political leader: his writings, the dissemination of his ideas through audiocassette tapes while he was in exile in France and Iraq, his triumphal return to Iran, the hardening of his positions after the revolution. But some of the central chapters in recent Iranian history receive only the most cursory treatment. One of those chapters was the 444-day seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran, which Khomeini blessed and then used to consolidate his power and purge his enemies. Another was the Iran-contra affair, in which the United States secretly sold weapons to Iran in violation of its stated policy and used the profits to finance anti-Communist rebels in Nicaragua. Iran's purchase of weapons from the country Khomeini assailed as the ''Great Satan'' underscored the regime's pragmatic streak. A third was Khomeini's ambitious but unsuccessful campaign to export his version of Islamic revolution to the rest of the Muslim world. Still, Moin does capture many things well -- for instance, Khomeini's antipathy to Israel. The Ayatollah's early writings and sermons have a distinctly anti-Semitic tone, which he muted as he became more of a political leader. Yet even today, Iran views the United States and Israel as enemies and is uneasy with its Jewish population, as demonstrated by the recent closed trial of 13 Jews on charges of spying for Israel. Not that Jews are the only victims of intolerance in Iran. As Eliz Sanasarian points out in her short but indispensable study, ''Religious Minorities in Iran,'' Iran has been uncomfortable with its other minorities as well, including the Zoroastrians, the Bahais, the Armenians and other Christians, and has repressed and marginalized them to varying degrees over the years. Sanasarian's book is an important contribution to understanding the relationship between Iran's religious minorities and the Tehran government. One can only imagine how Khomeini would deal with the battles being waged on various fronts today -- the press, the courts, the Parliament, the cinema, the universities, the streets. As early as 1942, he wrote in an anonymous tract that he expected the government of Islam to ''follow religious rules and regulations and ban publications which are against the law and religion and hang those who write such nonsense in the presence of religious believers.'' So he would probably approve of the closures of all reformist publications in the last few months and the trials and convictions of some of their editors and publishers. Perhaps Khomeini would also have had them executed. But then, Khomeini once protested the shah's enfranchisement of women, and then encouraged women to participate in his revolution and vote for his government when he needed their numbers. He once promised that clerics would hold only temporary positions in government and then allowed them to hold the most senior positions. He pledged to continue the war against Iraq until its defeat and then abruptly made peace. He once said that the fact that ''I have said something does not mean that I should be bound by my word.'' Indeed, it is that suppleness, that ability to improvise that has outlived Khomeini and that continues to pervade the Islamic Republic, keeping it going. REFERENCE: The People's Shah By Elaine Sciolino Published: August 27, 2000 Khomeini Life of the Ayatollah. By Baqer Moin. http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/27/books/the-people-s-shah.html?src=pm

The Last Shah - Iran History BBC Documentary (Part 2) 



CHILDREN as young as 13 were hanged from cranes, six at a time, in a barbaric two-month purge of Iran's prisons on the direct orders of Ayatollah Khomeini, according to a new book by his former deputy. More than 30,000 political prisoners were executed in the 1988 massacre - a far larger number than previously suspected. Secret documents smuggled out of Iran reveal that, because of the large numbers of necks to be broken, prisoners were loaded onto forklift trucks in groups of six and hanged from cranes in half-hourly intervals. Gruesome details are contained in the memoirs of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, The Memoirs of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of the founders of the Islamic regime. He was once considered Khomeini's anointed successor, but was deposed for his outspokenness, and is now under house arrest in the holy city of Qom. Published privately last month after attempts by the regime to suppress it, the revelations have prompted demands from Iranian exiles for those involved to be tried for crimes against humanity. The most damning of the letters and documents published in the book is Khomeini's fatwa decree calling for all Mojahedin (as opponents of the Iranian regime are known) to be killed. Issued shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war in July 1988 and an incursion into western Iran by the Iranian resistance, the fatwa reads: "It is decreed that those who are in prisons throughout the country and remain steadfast in their support for the Monafeqin (Mojahedin) are waging war on God and are condemned to execution." It goes on to entrust the decision to "death committees" - three-member panels consisting of an Islamic judge, a representative of the Ministry of Intelligence, and a state prosecutor. Prisoners were to be asked if they had changed loyalties and, if not, were to be executed. Montazeri, who states that 3,800 people had been killed by the end of the first fortnight of executions, includes his own correspondence with Khomeini, saying that the killings would be seen as "a vendetta" and would spark opposition to the regime. He wrote: "The execution of several thousand prisoners in a few days will not have positive repercussions and will not be mistake-free." The massacres, which came just before the Lockerbie bombing, were seen as a sop to the hardliners at a time when Khomeini was already in failing health and the battle for succession had begun between fundamentalists and moderates. He died the following year. According to testimony from prison officials - including Kamal Afkhami Ardekani, who formerly worked at Evin prison - recently given to United Nations human rights rapporteurs: "They would line up prisoners in a 14-by-five-metre hall in the central office building and then ask simply one question, 'What is your political affiliation?' Those who said the Mojahedin would be hanged from cranes in position in the car park behind the building." He went on to describe how, every half an hour from 7.30am to 5pm, 33 people were lifted on three forklift trucks to six cranes, each of which had five or six ropes. He said: "The process went on and on without interruption." In two weeks, 8,000 people were hanged. Similar carnage took place across the country. Many of those in the ruling council at the time of the 1988 massacre are still in power, including President Mohammed Khatami, who was the Director of Ideological and Cultural Affairs. "The massacre may have happened 12 years ago, but the relevance is that these atrocities are still happening", said Mohammad Mohaddessin, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Iranian National Council of Resistance (NCRI), the main opposition group, who was in London last week to present evidence to MPs. The NCRI has prepared files on 21 senior members of the regime whom it alleges were "principal protagonists of the massacre", including Mr Khatami and Ayatollah Ali Khameini, Iran's "Supreme Leader". Mr Mohaddessin will travel to New York to present the files to the UN and call for a tribunal to try them for crimes against humanity. Mr Mohaddessin said human rights abuses were continuing in Iran despite the election of Mr Khatami, who "presents himself as a reformist". REFERENCE: Khomeini fatwa 'led to killing of 30,000 in Iran' By Christina Lamb, Diplomatic Correspondent 12:00AM GMT 04 Feb 2001 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/1321090/Khomeini-fatwa-led-to-killing-of-30000-in-Iran.html

The Last Shah - Iran History BBC Documentary (Part 3) 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17F1-v10G8s




The Last Shah - Iran History BBC Documentary (Part 4) 


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVBYLEdN2hk





The Last Shah - Iran History BBC Documentary (Part 5) 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xmIZJRQE8yU

Stop Fundamentalism, 4 September 2011 - A group of human rights activists in Iran are calling on international community to form a truth finding committee in order to investigate the 1988 massacre of political prisoners in Iran, reports HRA news agency on the 23rd anniversary of incident. During the summer of 1988, on a religious decree issued by the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, thousands of political prisoners were executed during a period of less than two months. Those executed were mostly from among the supporters and members of the main Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) Organization. The MEK estimates the number of executions at about 30000. During the said period, political prisoners were executed in groups and mostly were buried in mass graves without any means of identification. Many families of the victims are still unaware of the location where their loved ones have been buried. The executions aimed to physically wipe out the MEK from Iran’s political scene. The group later took refuge in Camp Ashraf Iraq. Part of the religious order by the Ayatollah Khomeini stated that, “those in jails all over the country who continue to insist on their political stance, are Mohareb (one who wages war on God) and are condemned to execution.” The order clearly stressed on the speed the mass exactions were to be carried out. Most executions of MEK and their supporters took place without any due process of law. Kangaroo courts condemned prisoner to death in matters of minutes before the prisoner was taken for execution. Jeffery Robertson, a well-known law expert, calls the mass executions to be the most horrifying incidents following the World War Two Genocides. The right group called on the United Nations Human Rights Council to stop ignoring the 1988 massacres and establish an investigating commission on the subject. The group also calls on Mr. Ahmed Shaheed, the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran to start a comprehensive look into finding those responsible for the crime. REFERENCE: Mass Execution of Political Prisoners in Iran Left Unanswered Sunday, 04 September 2011 20:52 http://www.stopfundamentalism.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1172:mass-execution-of-political-prisoners-in-iran-left-unanswered&catid=44:human-rights&Itemid=39

The Last Shah - Iran History BBC Documentary (Part 6)


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cXI0A-A2ZpY


In 1988, the Iranian government summarily and extrajudicially executed thousands of political prisoners held in Iranian jails. The government has never acknowledged these executions, or provided any information as to how many prisoners were killed. The majority of those executed were serving prison sentences for their political activities after unfair trials in revolutionary courts. Those who had been sentenced, however, had not been sentenced to death. The deliberate and systematic manner in which these extrajudicial executions took place constitutes a crime against humanity under international law. On July 18, 1988, Iran accepted the United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, calling for a cease-fire in the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq. On July 24, the largest Iranian armed opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO or MEK), based in Iraq since 1986, launched an incursion into Iran in an attempt to topple the government. Although this offensive was easily repelled by Iranian forces, it provided a pretext for the authorities to physically eliminate many political opponents then in prison, including many MKO members captured and sentenced years earlier. In the absence of any official acknowledgement of the 1988 prison massacre, the most credible account of these events comes from the memoirs of Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, who was at the time one of the highest ranking government officials in Iran and the designated successor of Ayatollah Khomeini, then the Supreme Leader. According to Ayatollah Montazeri, the government formed a three-person committee to oversee the purge in each prison.6 The authorities told these committees to interview all political prisoners and to order the execution of those deemed “unrepentant.” These committees became known as “Death Committees” [Heya’t Marg]. Each comprised a prosecutor, a judge, and a representative of the Ministry of Information. Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi represented the Ministry of Information on the committee at Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison. In a letter of protest addressed to Ayatollah Khomeini, dated August 4, 1988, Ayatollah Montazeri wrote: “The principal role [in determining which prisoners to execute] is played by the representative of the Ministry of Information everywhere and others are effectively under his direct influence.”

Ayatollah Montazeri recounts the unfolding events that led to the massacre of prisoners:

A letter was produced on behalf of the Imam [Khomeini] stating that based on the discretion of a panel composed of a prosecutor, a judge, and a representative of the Ministry of Information, imprisoned members of the hypocrites [monafeghin, a term used by the government to refer to the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization] who are still believers in their cause should be executed. Decisions were to be reached based on the majority vote. Thus if two out of the three members reached a decision that a prisoner is still a believer in his cause, even though the prisoner may have already been sentenced to two or five years in prison, he would be executed.

Ayatollah Montazeri further details the arbitrary and summary character of this process:

Visits to prisoners were suspended for a period of time and, according to people responsible for carrying out these orders, approximately two thousand and eight hundred or three thousand and eight hundred – I can not recall exactly – women and men were executed, relying on the authority of [Ayatollah Khomeini’s] letter. Even people who practiced religious rituals of prayer and fasting were asked to repent, and they would be offended and refuse. Then [the committee] would conclude that the prisoner is still a believer in his cause and ordered their executions!

In his August 4, 1988 letter to Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Montazeri gives an example of the process of questioning prisoners and determining their fates, writing:

Three days ago a religious judge from one of the provinces – a man who is trustworthy – came to Qum and complained to me of the way your orders are being implemented. The judge told me: The Ministry of Information representative or the prosecutor – I don’t recall which one – in order to determine if a prisoner is a believer in his cause asked the prisoner: “Are you willing to condemn the hypocrites [monafeghin] organization?” The prisoner answered positively. Then, the prisoner was asked: “Are you willing to give an interview?” The prisoner answered positively. He was asked: “Are you willing to go to the war front and fight the Iraqis?” He answered yes. Subsequently, the prisoner was asked: “Are you willing to walk over a mine field?” The prisoner answered, “Not everyone is willing to walk over a mine field.” Following this exchange, it was determined that the prisoner is still a believer in his cause. The judge said that he insisted on reaching a decision by consensus and not by majority vote, but his request was not accepted.

Ayatollah Montazeri identified Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi as the representative of the Ministry of Information in charge of questioning prisoners in Evin Prison and saw him as being a central figure in the mass executions of prisoners in Tehran. He recounts a meeting with Pour-Mohammadi and the two other members of the Evin Prison committee:

After my second letter of protest [to Ayatollah Khomeini], there was no change and [the executions] continued. On August 15, 1988, I met with Mr. Nayeri, who was the religious judge in Evin, Mr. Eshraghi who was the prosecutor, and Mr. Pour-Mohammadi who was the representative of the Ministry of Information. I told them that they should stop the executions during the month of Moharram. Mr. Nayeri responded: “We have so far executed seven-hundred and fifty people in Tehran, and we have identified another two-hundred and fifty people. Allow us to get rid of them and then we’ll listen to you…!

Montazeri provides a memorandum of protest addressed to Pour-Mohammadi and the other two members of the Evin Prison “Death Committee” that he wrote on August 15, 1988. In this memorandum to Pour-Mohammadi, Montazeri wrote:

Carrying out a massacre of prisoners and captives without due process or trail will certainly help our opponent’s cause in the long term. It will also encourage them to carry on armed resistance. The international community will condemn our actions.

With regard to the 1988 mass prison executions, Amnesty International reported in 1990:

The political executions took place in many prisons in all parts of Iran, often far from where the armed incursion took place. Most of the executions were of political prisoners, including an unknown number of prisoners of conscience, who had already served a number of years in prison. They could have played no part in the armed incursion, and they were in no position to take part in spying or terrorist activities. Many of the dead had been tried and sentenced to prison terms during the early 1980s, many for non-violent offenses such as distributing newspapers and leaflets, taking part in demonstrations or collecting funds for prisoners' families. Many of the dead had been students in their teens or early twenties at the time of their arrest. The majority of those killed were supporters of the PMOI [People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, another English-language name for the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, or MKO]; but hundreds of members and supporters of other political groups, including various factions of the PFOI [People’s Fedayeen Organization of Iran], the Tudeh [Communist] Party, the KDPI [Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran], Rah-e Kargar [Workers Party] and others, were also among the execution victims.

Ayatollah Montazeri, citing officials in charge of carrying out the executions, puts the number of executed prisoners between 2,800 and 3,800, but he acknowledges that his recollection is not exact. Iranian activists have published the names of 4,481 executed prisoners. As long as the government refuses to announce a complete list of those executed or even to acknowledge that these executions took place, the extent of this massacre remains unknown.

The families of executed prisoners have repeatedly written to the government officials asking for the number of executed prisoners and their place of burials. In January 2003, they also wrote to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time, Mary Robinson, and the then-chairman of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions, Louis Joinet, seeking their help in determining the truth behind the mass executions. According to the families of some of the executed prisoners, the bodies of many are buried in unmarked graves and mass graves in the hills of Tehran’s Khavaran district. Families often congregate in Khavaran to remember their executed relatives. Families of some of the executed prisoners told Human Rights Watch that in September 2005 the new government started to reconfigure the Khavaran site and that makeshift gravestones, put in place by the families, have been destroyed. They said that the government is preparing for a major overhaul of this area to destroy any evidence of burials. REFERENCE: Human Rights Watch Pour-Mohammadi and the 1988 Prison  Massacres http://www.1980smassacre.com/report_hrw.html Ministers of Murder: Iran’s New Security Cabinet http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/iran1205/iran1205.pdf http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/iran1205/2.htm

Saturday, October 1, 2011

Across The Board Accountability :)

ISLAMABAD: The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) said on Friday that the PM’s decision to extend the term of a civilian accused in the National Logistic Cell (NLC) case was tantamount to a “slap on the face.” The comments from the PAC come as an army court of inquiry begins proceedings against three military generals. The NLC scam involved a military-run organisation’s investment of billions of rupees in risk-prone stocks in the financial market. The office of the AGP had unearthed that the NLC invested Rs4.3 billion in the stock market without full adherence to rules and regulations. Eventually, losses reached Rs1.83 billion. Several other irregularities were also found in the internal affairs of the NLC. While the PAC was appreciative of the positive role played by the military, it came down hard on the civilian government for making a ‘mockery’ of the PAC directives with its reinstatement of the accused. The PM recently extended the contract of Saeed-ur-Rehman as Member Finance of the Capital Development Authority. “It is a matter of disappointment that, on one hand, the PAC’s authority has been accepted by GHQ and, on the other, the country’s prime minister has gone against the PAC directions,” said PAC Chairman Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan. Nisar said he has been informed by the ministry of defence that a court of inquiry has started proceedings. “It is truly an historical chapter in the history of parliamentary oversight”, he added. The court of inquiry, formed by Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani to probe the NLC scam, is headed by a serving corps commander along with two major generals as members. Parliament’s most powerful accountability arm also called for the Supreme Court of Pakistan to accept parliament’s authority in checking financial affairs. Nisar said that, in June, the PAC had filed a review petition against the court’s decision not to allow the Supreme Court registrar to appear before the PAC. The issue of Nisar’s expected resignation from the post of chairman was also discussed. Nisar has reportedly decided to resign in protest against the appointment of a controversial Auditor General of Pakistan (AGP) – following which the PPP and its allied parties requested Nisar to continue as PAC chairman. Despite requests, however, Nisar did not clarify his position. Published in The Express Tribune, October 1st, 2011. REFERENCE: Dodgy dealing: Army court of inquiry takes up NLC case By Shahbaz Rana Published: October 1, 2011 http://tribune.com.pk/story/264497/dodgy-dealing-army-court-of-inquiry-takes-up-nlc-case/ 

Bush Drugs and Pakistan by Lawrence Lifschultz (The Nation 1988) http://www.scribd.com/doc/174992551/Bush-Drugs-and-Pakistan-by-Lawrence-Lifschultz-The-Nation-1988



Way back in 1980s

State welcomes notorious Pakistani - Lieutenant-General Fazle Haq, governor of Pakistan's opium-ridden North West Frontier Province, arrived in Washington the week of April 12 as the "honored guest" of the U. S. State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. According to the State Department, Fazle Haq is here to "observe the drug enforcement agency's methods of preventing drug inflow into the U. S." EIR reported last October that Fazle Haq's brother, Fazle Hussein, is wanted by Interpol in connection with various narcotics-trafficking-related cases, and that Governor Fazle Haq himself is linked to illegal drug traffickers. According to New York sources, Fazle Haq told Washington that he could do very little to stop drugs in the tribal areas unless the U. S. poured large amounts of money into the region. Fazle Haq also met with Undersecretary of State James Buckley, and Assistance Secretary Nicholas Veliotes to discuss security affairs. Fazle is thought to represent that faction of the ruling Pakistani junta which wants Pakistan to allow U. S. military bases on its territory. REFERENCE: International Intelligence 27 Apr 1982 Issue of EIR Volume 9, Number 16, April 27, 1982 http://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1982/eirv09n16-19820427/eirv09n16-19820427_052-international_intelligence.pdf





































BCCI Bank Financed Covert CIA Terrorist And Drug Smuggling Operations In Afghanistan In The 80s

URL: http://youtu.be/4ChOWrdG0mU



Corruption reigns because accountability is not credible. It is not credible because it doesn’t catch men in uniform the same way it catches civilians. Then even among the armed forces some sectors are less vulnerable to accountability than others. Some generals are allowed ‘time-out’ so that they can flee the country. Accountability in Pakistan has been problematic. Even after recovering hundreds of billions of rupees from the corrupt, NAB doesn’t get full marks. The truth is that the yardstick doesn’t apply uniformly. The armed forces seem to be exempt. Within them, the navy may say they have been targeted while the other arms have it easy. But the ‘principle’ of exemption has always been there. Writing in ‘Nawa-e-Waqt’ (9 May 2004), Major (Retd) Amir Afzal stated that General Fazle Haq was a Pushtun who had studied at Dehra Doon but took his commission at Kakul after 1947. He was clever but a completely dishonest man who exploited every occasion to his own advantage. He was from cavalry and was General Zia’s junior. Zia wanted to use him to tame the NWFP but Fazle Haq damaged the province by opposing Kalabagh Dam and spreading the Shia-Sunni conflict of Parachinar to the rest of the country. His brother General Fazle Raziq was WAPDA chief and failed to acquaint the Frontier people about the benefits of the Dam to them. Zia tried to send him as ambassador to the US but the US was too scared of his corruption. The US was more interested in General Ejaz Azim, another man from Zia’s unit. REFERENCE: SECOND OPINION: Some generals get away with corruption? —Khaled Ahmed’s Urdu Press Review Friday, July 16, 2004 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_16-7-2004_pg3_3

BCCI Bank Florida CIA Cocaine Money Laundering Busts (1988) Clip 1

URL: http://youtu.be/DQHY99_-MwA


BCCI Bank Florida CIA Cocaine Money Laundering Busts (1988) Clip 2

URL: http://youtu.be/yXls9nIn2x0


BCCI Scandal CIA Connections 7 8 1991 NBC

URL: http://youtu.be/SVXroOSAqMU


CIA AND ISI NURTURED MUJAHIDEEN AND TALIBAN

URL: http://youtu.be/tzlV3y-NE1w



Fazle Haq had some leverage on Zia and it could be related to drugs. (Narcotics smuggler Mushtaq Malik alias ‘Black Prince’ told ‘Herald’ of July 2004 that he had got into trouble after disclosing in 1985 that the topmost generals were involved in heroin smuggling. Black Prince, who has done nine years in the US prison for narcotics after getting caught in Brazil, has recently resiled from his statement that Asif Ali Zardari was a part of his racket. He has however maintained that Fawzi Ali Kazmi was involved in narcotics smuggling with him and that Zardari was unfairly punished for keeping his company.) Fazle Raziq took over WAPDA when corruption had receded as a concern in the face of enthusiasm for Islam. Post Fazle Raziq, action against General Zahid Ali Akbar has been subject to fits and starts, implying reluctance and actually meaning time-out for escape. REFERENCE: SECOND OPINION: Some generals get away with corruption? —Khaled Ahmed’s Urdu Press Review Friday, July 16, 2004 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_16-7-2004_pg3_3


War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century (War and Peace Library) BY Mark Selden http://www.amazon.com/War-State-Terrorism-Asia-Pacific-Twentieth/dp/0742523918