No alliance with MQM: Sana LAHORE, July 29: Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah Khan has said that PML-N has not changed its stance on the MQM despite the visit of a party’s delegation to the MQM headquarters to seek support for its presidential candidate Mamnoon Hussain. Talking to a TV channel on Monday, Mr Sanaullah said PML-N had not changed its views about the MQM as the case of bogus voting in Karachi was still pending with the Election Commission. He denied the PML-N had entered into an alliance with the MQM. Meanwhile, federal Information Minister Pervaiz Rashid rejected Mr Sanaullah’s remarks about the MQM and said they were not in conformity with the official stance of the PML-N. He said MQM enjoyed confidence of the masses since long and the PML-N respected its mandate. He asked the MQM leadership not to let the remarks hurt relations between the two parties, adding that Mr Sanaullah had been directed to support the reconciliation process with the MQM. REFERENCE: No alliance with MQM: Sana 2013-07-30 06:46:03 http://dawn.com/news/1032889/no-alliance-with-mqm-sana
MQM happy as PML-N disowns Sana’s statement LAHORE: The Muttahida Qaumi Movement late Monday welcomed Federal Information Minister Pervaiz Rashid’s statement in which the latter said the PML-N disowned the words uttered by Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah, reports Geo News.
The PML-N has taken notice of Rana Sanaullah’s statements regarding the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), terming it as “incompatible with the party’s position.”Rana Sana had said the PML-N had not entered into an alliance with the MQM and the party only approached the second largest party of Sindh for their support in the presidential election.
He said, “Our opinion of the MQM still remains the same. The Election Commission will investigate the rigging allegations against the MQM during the May 11 general elections.”However, Federal Information Minister Pervez Rasheed said that Rana Sanaullah has been conveyed to support the reconciliation process between the two parties.
The information minister’s statements came soon after the MQM’s Coordination Committee convened an emergency meeting to deliberate on the statements of Rana Sanaullah.Parvez Rasheed asked the MQM not to let the relations affected due to the Punjab law minister’s statements, which he said were incompatible with the party’s position.The minister further stated that his party “highly respected” the mandate of MQM, adding that the MQM has confidence of public since long. REFERENCE: MQM happy as PML-N disowns Sana’s statement Tuesday, July 30, 2013 http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-24485-MQM-happy-as-PML-N-disowns-Sanas-statement
PML-N criticises MQM’s statements against Shahbaz: LAHORE: The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) criticised the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) on Thursday for issuing statements against Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif. Punjab government spokesman Senator Pervaiz Rashid, in a statement, criticised the MQM for issuing statements against Shahbaz without keeping in mind the true facts and the political stature of the Punjab chief minister. Rashid said MQM chief Altaf Hussain should refrain from criticising Shahbaz, as the Punjab chief minister is the most popular politician of the province. The spokesman said the MQM chief had no right to question the patriotism of Shahbaz Sharif, as he was himself in exile for nearly 20 years. staff report REFERENCE: PML-N criticises MQM’s statements against Shahbaz Friday, March 19, 2010 http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/19-Mar-2010/pml-n-criticises-mqm-s-statements-against-shahbaz
Why Altaf Hussain went into Exile, let us refresh the memory of MQM, Nawaz Sharif and PML (N)
Altaf Hussain Interview with Jasmeen Manzoor on Nawaz Sharif (ARY NEWS 2009)
2009: Altaf Hussain asks why then PM Nawaz Sharif did not try to stop the operation: KARACHI, Aug 24 Muttahida Qaumi Movement chief Altaf Hussain has appealed to Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry to constitute a “truth and reconciliation commission” in the light of disclosures made by Lt-Gen (retd) Naseer Akhtar, a former corps commander of Karachi, and Brig Imtiaz Ahmed, a former director-general of the Intelligence Bureau, that the MQM had nothing to do with the “Jinnahpur conspiracy”. Speaking at a press conference through remote video link from London at the Jinnah Ground on Monday, Mr Hussain said that at a talk show aired on a private television channel, the former Karachi corps commander and the former director-general of the intelligence bureau had made it clear that the allegation of the recovery of maps of Jinnahpur from the offices of the MQM in June 1992 was baseless and that the documents were fake. He recalled that Brig Asif Haroon had called journalists from Punjab after the launch of the operation to brief them about the “Jinnahpur conspiracy”, showing them maps of Jinnahpur and other documents found in the offices of MQM. “But on Sunday, Lt-Gen (retd) Naseer Akhtar and Brig (retd) Imtiaz made it clear that it was a false allegation and an attempt to divide the nation,” the MQM chief added. On the basis of the alleged maps of Jinnahpur, action was ordered against the MQM, the Muttahida chief recalled, alleging that 15,000 workers were killed during the operation and its aftermath. Mr Hussain thanked the two former military officials for “speaking the truth about the Jinnahpur conspiracy”, but lamented that it was too late since it cost the MQM heavily. He wondered why then prime minister Nawaz Sharif did not try to stop the operation. Altaf Husain called upon Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to set up a “truth and reconciliation commission” so that “fact could be distinguished from fiction”. “I can make very harsh comments after the disclosures by two senior former military officials, but I am not doing so for the sake of political harmony. “But Mr Chaudhry (Chief Justice of Pakistan), will it not be appropriate to constitute a truth and reconciliation commission. I leave the decision to you.” “I don`t want confrontation….I want unity and therefore I announce that today I pardon the murderers of my brother and nephew,” Mr Altaf said. The MQM supremo appealed to the Army and the ISI not to pay heed to the propaganda against his party. “We are not traitors….we only want to change the corrupt feudal system in the country. I appeal to the army and the ISI to withdraw old allegations, accept the MQM as a patriotic party and allow it to work across the country.” He also urged the ISI to remove from its archives all documents maligning the MQM. Mr Altaf asked CJP Iftikhar Chaudhry to summon Lt-Gen Naseer Akhtar and Brig Imtiaz to hear their versions on the 1992 operation. He called upon the president, the prime minister and the federal cabinet to “take the nation into confidence” about those “testing times”. A large number of relatives of MQM workers who were killed during the military operation were present at the Jinnah ground. REFERENCE: Retired army officers absolve MQM of Jinnahpur plot: Altaf calls for truth and reconciliation commission By Azfar-ul-Ashfaque August 25th, 2009 http://archives.dawn.com/archives/35615http://www.dawn.com/news/849392/retired-army-officers-absolve-mqm-of-jinnahpur-plot-altaf-calls-for-truth-and-reconciliation-commission
Dr. Ishrat ul Ebad and MQM on Nawaz Sharif and Operation against MQM (ARY NEWS 2009)
THE ghosts of Pakistan`s violent political past continue to haunt the country. Extraordinary statements by a former IB chief and a former corps commander of Karachi have triggered a bitter row between the MQM and PML-N this week. First, some history. During Nawaz Sharif`s first tenure as prime minister, Sindh was facing a grave law and order crisis. Banditry had reached epidemic levels in the interior of the province and the cities in the south were unsettled. At the time, the MQM and the Nawaz Sharif-led alliance, the IJI, were in government together, but the MQM was blamed for fomenting the crisis and the army was called in to deal with the issue. As is the nature of such matters, few things are known for certain. It does seem though that the PML and the MQM were sucked into a conflict where other players, such as President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and army chief Asif Nawaz, had other agendas and axes to grind. The upshot was that the MQM was weakened as a party and its reputation sullied by the allegation that it wanted a separate homeland, the so-called Jinnahpur, which stretched from Karachi to Thatta. Now, Brig Imtiaz Ahmed (retd), formerly close to Mr Sharif and rumoured to have had his recent overtures to the PML-N rebuffed, along with Gen Naseer Akhtar (retd) has claimed that the Jinnahpur maps were fake and the separatist claim baseless. The MQM has leapt on the admissions and gone into overdrive to proclaim its bona fides as a Pakistani party that was maliciously slandered by its opponents. Puzzling as the timing of the retired army officials` statements is and unseemly as the MQM-PML-N spat is, Altaf Hussain has perhaps made the most pertinent suggestion the need for a truth and reconciliation commission. In truth, few political parties in this country can claim to have clean hands when it comes to dealing with one another. So perhaps, as they collectively steer the country`s latest transition to democracy, what the parties need most is to demonstrate that they can bury the past and genuinely work with one another towards institutional stability. A truth and reconciliation committee would be an important first step in that direction. REFERENCE: Jinnahpur debunked August 26th, 2009 http://archives.dawn.com/archives/29684
‘Nawaz was well informed about operation on MQM’-- KARACHI: Former corps commander Gen (r) Naseer Akhtar made it clear that former premier Nawaz Sharif was fully informed about the 1992 military operation before it was launched, MQM parliamentarians Ayub Shaikh and Iqbal Qadri said on Tuesday. They said in a joint statement that major decisions such as military operations could not be made without informing the government. PML-N’s Ahsan Iqbal had said earlier that Sharif and his government were not taken into confidence before the operation was launched against the MQM. staff report REFERENCE: ‘Nawaz was well informed about operation on MQM’ Wednesday, August 26, 2009 http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/26-Aug-2009/nawaz-was-well-informed-about-operation-on-mqm
Kamran Khan on Nawaz Sharif , Mehran Bank Scandal, Operation Cleanup
* MQM chief criticises Nawaz Sharif for not stopping military operation against his party in 1992: KARACHI: Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry should conduct a judicial inquiry into the killing of 15,000 Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) workers and uncover the facts behind false claims of the party’s involvement in the Jinnahpur conspiracy, party chief Altaf Hussain said on Monday. Addressing a press conference by telephone, he said former corps commander General (r) Naseer Akhtar and former Intelligence Bureau chief Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmed had vindicated the MQM through interviews broadcast on a private TV channel on Sunday. Operation: Hussain also criticised former premier Nawaz Sharif for not stopping the military operation launched against the MQM for their alleged separatist movement in 1992. “Please come forward and tell the nation why you didn’t stop that operation. You were the prime minister at that time,” he said. He said the MQM should be allowed to work freely across the country, adding the party was planning to organise a convention in Punjab after Ramzan. He also demanded an immediate end to the operation in Balochistan. REFERENCE: Altaf calls for inquiry into Jinnahpur charges against MQM by Irfan Ali Tuesday, August 25, 2009 http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/25-Aug-2009/altaf-calls-for-inquiry-into-jinnahpur-charges-against-mqm
Military launched operation unilaterally: Ahsan Iqbal: LAHORE: The Pakistan Army launched a military operation against the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in 1992 without taking the federal government into confidence, a private TV channel quoted Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) Information Secretary Ahsan Iqbal as saying on Monday. Reacting to a statement by MQM chief Altaf Hussain, Iqbal said then prime minister Nawaz Sharif had no role in the operation. “The MQM is raising all this hue and cry to stall investigations into the May 12 riots in Karachi,” he alleged. He said General Asif Nawaz initiated the operation without any political consultation. daily times monitor REFERENCE: Military launched operation unilaterally: Ahsan Iqbal Tuesday, August 25, 2009 http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/25-Aug-2009/military-launched-operation-unilaterally-ahsan-iqbal
WHO was Master Abdul Qudoos Ahmad? How would you know even if you care? The 43-year-old schoolteacher’s story received scant attention in the media. Described by his students and peers as a well-known and ‘much-loved’ schoolteacher, perhaps far more ominously for him, he was also the president of the Nusratabad chapter of the Jamaat-i-Ahmadiyya in Rabwah. He was taken into custody on Feb 10 after a murder in his area. There were no warrants, no police remand. Since the man was never formally charged or even remanded in police custody, wouldn’t one be right in assuming him to be innocent? While in custody, apart from the routine ‘hang him upside down and beat him black and blue till he confesses’, the schoolteacher was also pinned to the floor by policemen holding his legs and arms and a weighted wooden down roller run over him causing untold internal injuries. He was released without charge some 46, yes 46, days later. In fact, his family were told by the police to take him home as he was unwell. He had been subjected to severe torture. The family were made to sign a blank piece of paper. From the police station, the family took Master Qudoos to hospital where doctors tried to revive his crushed body. Four days later, ongoing ‘internal bleeding and severe loss of blood’ drained whatever life the police had left in his body.There may be elements of the case I may not be familiar with but it is clear he was kept in illegal confinement for a month and a half and subjected to torture. The local community believes he was thus treated because biased policemen wanted to defame and humiliate the Ahmadis and did so by targeting a respected community leader. The police have now admitted Master Abdul Qudoos was ‘innocent’ and have promised action against some constables (with no known arrests) but crucial questions remain about the level of involvement as an innocent man was held and tortured at a police station not in some private jail. Surely, some senior officers would have heard him screaming for mercy, been aware of the torture. Would you blame members of the persecuted and hounded Ahmadi community for believing they won’t get justice because soon the case will be forgotten by all but the victim’s widow and four children? I wouldn’t because they are right in all probability. Let me share with you why I feel so. The incident came into focus because activists raised it on social media though to be fair a Pakistani TV channel or two also covered the story in passing.However, one’s attention was drawn to it, as a Twitter discussion developed on why the media and others weren’t following up on a police torture death in custody with the same vigour as a slap by a Sindh Assembly candidate, or for example the killing of a suspect by the Rangers in a Karachi park. The obvious question was whether the human rights of some — in this case the most basic right to life of an Ahmadi — had precedence over the others’. Despite being nearly certain this was the case, one still put the hypothesis to test, perhaps rather naively. REFERENCE: No looking back for us Abbas Nasir | 7th April, 2012 http://dawn.com/2012/04/07/no-looking-back-for-us/
The government of Pakistan has not held the presenter of a popular TV program on Geo TV, accountable for stoking the already-prevalent religious hatred of Pakistan's beleaguered Ahmadi minority, on 7 September, 2008. Anchor person Dr Amir Liaquat Hussain declared, on air, the murder of Ahmadi sect members to be the religious duty of devout Muslims. He made the statement on Alim Online, a religious affairs program on Geo TV, which is a prominent Dubai-based Pakistani television channel. Hussain urged his two co-presenters to agree, and in a show on 9 September, he repeated the suggestion. In the 48 hours after the first broadcast, two Ahmadi community leaders were lynched and murdered, bringing the total number of targeted Ahmadi killings this year to four. Hussain, a self-titled doctor, was, ironically, the minister for religious affairs in the Musharraf government. He regularly expresses an open hatred of Pakistan's minority groups, and his influence stretches far by way of daily on-air sermons and articles he writes for the Daily Jang newspaper, published by the same media house. The AHRC considers freedom of speech to be an important right, but it also insists on the right of the individual to personal safety and freedom from persecution. That Pakistan allows the use of broadcasting tools to spread direct messages of intense harm and hatred as a religious duty, is utterly disturbing. Religious intolerance flourishes in Pakistan, and there is very little done to temper the hatred felt by some Muslims for Ahmadi followers, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and other minorities. In some cases the government clearly tries to court fundamentalists with its leniency regarding these crimes. The two most recent Ahmadi deaths were carried out in broad daylight, in public, but no arrests have been made. Dr Hussain has not been held accountable in any way, either by his employer or the government. The AHRC demands that a case be initiated and Dr Hussain be produced before the law. Geo TV must, at the very least, offer a full apology for its involvement in two murderous lynching cases, and must present a new list of broadcasting standards that it pledges to uphold. That religious hatred can bloom so publicly and remain unpunished is an embarrassment to a country that hopes to be taken seriously outside of its borders. REFERENCES: PAKISTAN: No action taken against Geo TV presenter who incited Muslims to murder members of Pakistan minority on air September 18, 2008 http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-244-2008http://www.humanrights.asia/news/urgent-appeals/AHRC-UAC-203-2008
DERA ISMAIL KHAN/ FAISALABAD, Feb 28 Dera Ismail Khan and Faisalabad districts were in the grip of tension following clashes and attacks on processions taken out on Saturday to celebrate Eid Miladun Nabi (peace be upon him). A curfew was imposed in three tehsils of D. I. Khan and Section 144 was imposed in Faisalabad. Troops were deployed in the troubled Dheki town of D. I. Khan after clashes between two sectarian groups. Police and hospital sources said that seven people had been killed and 32 others injured in an attack on a procession and an exchange of fire between law-enforcement personnel and rioters. Trouble started when the procession passing by a seminary came under attack. Witnesses said that two men in the procession were killed and five others injured. Immediately after the incident, a charged mob attacked the seminary. A police contingent trying to bring the situation under control also came under attack and five people were killed and 27 others injured when police fired back. The town was calm but tense on Sunday with troops patrolling the streets.The main Dera city, Proa and Paharpur tehsils were under strict curfew. NWFP Chief Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti discussed the situation with Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman on phone and appealed to him to cooperate with the government to promote sectarian harmony in the area. According to a handout issued in Peshawar, Mr Hoti assured the Maulana that the government would take action against trouble-makers. DIG Feroz Shah said that over 50 people had been arrested for firing at the procession and cases had been registered against them. Officials said that a curfew had also been imposed in the adjacent Tank town. The administration convened meetings of elders, Ulema and politicians to seek their help in maintaining peace in the town which has a history of sectarian clashes. Police said a pick-up truck loaded with weapons was seized near the Cawar checkpost and a man was arrested. In Faisalabad, four people were injured when a group of people believed to be hiding in Gol Mosque opened fire on an Eid Miladun Nabi (PBUH) procession in Ghulam Mohammadabad locality of the city. Some men in the procession allegedly vandalised the mosque and pelted it with stones. A Gol Mosque spokesperson said that people in the procession had provoked them by throwing stones at the mosque. After the firing, a large number of people besieged the Ghulam Mohammadabad police station and set more than 200 vehicles and motorbikes on fire. The protesters also ransacked the police station, forcing the personnel run away. Official vehicles of Gulberg traffic sector were also torched by the mob. Police tried to disperse the mob with teargas, but failed. The charged mob also pelted policemen with stones, injuring a few constables. The protesters blocked the Saddar Bazaar Road, Latif Chowk and Chandni Chowk and burned tyres. A number of shells fired by police also landed in houses. The mob also attacked and allegedly looted the house of Gol Mosque khateeb Zahid Mehmood Qasmi. About 48 people belonging to both sects, including Mr Qasmi, were arrested. Punjab Inspector-General of Police Tariq Saleem Dogar arrived in the city on Saturday night. Officials of police and district administration held a meeting with Ahmed Ludhianvi, chief of the proscribed Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, and urged him to help calm the situation. On Sunday, a mob attacked a mosque in Usman Town on the Millat Road and burned a motorcycle and a generator. Police arrested 12 people. SSP (operations) Sarfraz Falki suspended Sargodha Road SHO Zahid Hussain for dereliction of duty. Despite the imposition of Section 144, people belonging to the Gol Mosque sect took out a procession and held a meeting at the Clock Tower intersection. The eight bazzars emanating from the Clock Tower remained closed. REFERENCE: Violence mars Milad celebrations in D. I. Khan, Faisalabad March 1, 2010 http://archives.dawn.com/archives/33043
Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan - 2 (Choraha 10 July 2010)
7 killed, 44 injured in DI Khan, Faisalabad sectarian violence * Barelvi Eid Miladun Nabi rally comes under fire, mob attacks Deobandi seminary in DI Khan * Six injured in Faisalabad violence, scores of vehicles torched PESHAWAR: Authorities on Sunday lifted a curfew imposed earlier in the day in Dera Ismail Khan after at least seven people were killed in clashes and gunfights described as sectarian violence, according to officials and police. The violence erupted in Paharpur on Saturday as hundreds rallied to celebrate Eid Miladun Nabi. Gunmen started firing at a rally of the Barelvi sect, killing one person and prompting the angry crowd to attack a seminary of the Deobandi sect. “Seven people were killed and 38 others injured ... all the dead are Sunnis, there are some Shias among the injured,” district police chief Gul Afzal Afridi told AFP. An official at the hospital Dera Ismail Khan hospital confirmed the death toll, and said the 38 people wounded were still being treated. The authorities on Sunday ordered people to remain in their houses night and day in the main city and other parts of the district, including Paharpur. Security forces patrolled the streets. “We have arrested more than 20 suspects and are conducting more raids. There is a curfew in the main city and some of the outskirts,” said Afridi. Afridi had refused to comment on Saturday on who might be responsible for the initial shooting, saying the area was troubled by both sectarian unrest and attacks by militant groups. In Faisalabad, at least six people were injured in sectarian violence over 24 hours, according to a private TV channel. It said more than two dozen people had also been taken into custody. Faisalabad DCO Saeed Iqbal said Section 144 had been imposed in the city. Top district administration officials also held a meeting with representatives of various religious organisations in a bid to facilitate the return of normalcy in the area. The channel said although Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah and Home Secretary Nadeem Hassan Asif were present in Faisalabad, they did not attend the meeting. Furious protesters set a police station and dozens of vehicles on fire after an Eid Miladun Nabi procession came under firing. The attack was preceded by a clash between rival groups, one of which fired at the procession. Police have arrested more than 15 people, including a cleric for allegedly to instigating violence. Meanwhile, Interior Minister Rehman Malik has ordered an investigation into the violence in Dera Ismail Khan and Faisalabad. agencies REFERENCE: 7 killed, 44 injured in DI Khan, Faisalabad sectarian violence Monday, March 01, 2010 http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C03%5C01%5Cstory_1-3-2010_pg1_4
Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan - 3 (Choraha 10 July 2010)
KARACHI: A US official in a cable sent to the State Department stated that “financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith clerics in south Punjab from organisations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments.” The cable sent in November 2008 by Bryan Hunt, the then Principal Officer at the US Consulate in Lahore, was based on information from discussions with local government and non-governmental sources during his trips to the cities of Multan and Bahawalpur. Quoting local interlocutors, Hunt attempts to explain how the “sophisticated jihadi recruitment network” operated in a region dominated by the Barelvi sect, which, according to the cable, made south Punjab “traditionally hostile” to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith schools of thought. Hunt refers to a “network of Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith mosques and madrassahs” being strengthened through an influx of “charity” which originally reached organisations “such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Al-Khidmat foundation”. Portions of these funds would then be given away to clerics “in order to expand these sects’ presence” in a relatively inhospitable yet “potentially fruitful recruiting ground”.
Outlining the process of recruitment for militancy, the cable describes how “families with multiple children” and “severe financial difficulties” were generally being exploited for recruitment purposes. Families first approached by “ostensibly ‘charitable’” organisations would later be introduced to a “local Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith maulana” who would offer to educate the children at his madrassah and “find them employment in the service of Islam”. “Martyrdom” was also “often discussed”, with a final cash payment to the parents. “Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rs 500,000 (approximately USD 6,500) per son,” the cable states. Children recruited would be given age-specific indoctrination and would eventually be trained according to the madrassah teachers’ assessment of their inclination “to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture” versus their value as promoters of Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith sects or recruiters, the cable states. Recruits “chosen for jihad” would then be taken to “more sophisticated indoctrination camps”. “Locals identified three centres reportedly used for this purpose”. Two of the centres were stated to be in the Bahawalpur district, whereas one was reported as situated “on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city”. These centres “were primarily used for indoctrination”, after which “youths were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas”.
The cable goes on to quote local officials criticising the PML-N-led provincial and the PPP-led federal governments for their “failure to act” against “extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-i-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar”. The Bahawalpur district nazim at the time told Hunt that despite repeatedly highlighting the threat posed by extremist groups and indoctrination centres to the provincial and federal governments, he had received “no support” in dealing with the issue unless he was ready to change his political loyalties. The nazim, who at the time was with the PML-Q, “blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties…neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan People’s Party federal governments would take his requests seriously”. REFERENCE: Saudi Arabia, UAE financing extremism in south Punjab By Qurat ul ain Siddiqui 22nd May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/22/saudi-arabia-uae-financing-extremism-in-south-punjab/
Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan - 4 (Choraha 10 July 2010)
1. (S/NF) Summary: During recent trips to southern Punjab, Principal Officer was repeatedly told that a sophisticated jihadi recruitment network had been developed in the Multan, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan Divisions. The network reportedly exploited worsening poverty in these areas of the province to recruit children into the divisions’ growing Deobandi and Ahl-eHadith madrassa network from which they were indoctrinated into jihadi philosophy, deployed to regional training/indoctrination centers, and ultimately sent to terrorist training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Locals believed that charitable activities being carried out by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith organizations, including Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Al-Khidmat Foundation, and Jaish-e-Mohammad were further strengthening reliance on extremist groups and minimizing the importance of traditionally moderate Sufi religious leaders in these communities. Government and non-governmental sources claimed that financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from “”missionary”" and “”Islamic charitable”" organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments. Locals repeatedly requested USG support for socio-economic development and the promotion of moderate religious leaders in the region as a direct counter to the growing extremist threat. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) During a recent visit to the southern Punjabi cities of Multan and Bahawalpur, Principal Officer’s discussions with religious, political, and civil society leaders were dominated by discussions of the perceived growing extremist threat in Seraiki and Baloch areas in southern and western Punjab. Interlocutors repeatedly stressed that recruitment activities by extremist religious organizations, particularly among young men between the ages of 8 and 15, had increased dramatically over the last year. Locals blamed the trend on a strengthening network of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith mosques and madrassas, which they claimed had grown exponentially since late 2005. Such growth was repeatedly attributed to an influx of “”Islamic charity”" that originally reached Pakistani pseudo-religious organizations, such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Al-Khidmat foundation, as relief for earthquake victims in Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province. Locals believe that a portion of these funds was siphoned to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in southern and western Punjab in order to expand these sects’ presence in a traditionally hostile, but potentially fruitful, recruiting ground. The initial success of establishing madrassas and mosques in these areas led to subsequent annual “”donations”" to these same clerics, originating in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The value of such donations was uncertain, although most interlocutors believed that it was in the region of $100 million annually.
3. (S/NF) According to local interlocutors, current recruitment activities generally exploit families with multiple children, particularly those facing severe financial difficulties in light of inflation, poor crop yields, and growing unemployment in both urban and rural areas in the southern and western Punjab. Oftentimes, these families are identified and initially approached/assisted by ostensibly “”charitable”" organizations including Jamaat-ud-Dawa (a front for designated foreign terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyaba), the Al-Khidmat Foundation (linked to religious political party Jamaat-e-Islami), or Jaish-e-Mohammad (a charitable front for the designated foreign terrorist organization of the same name).
4. (S/NF) The local Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith maulana will generally be introduced to the family through these organizations. He will work to convince the parents that their poverty is a direct result of their family’s deviation from “”the true path of Islam”" through “”idolatrous”" worship at local Sufi shrines and/or with local Sufi Peers. The maulana suggests that the quickest way to return to “”favor”" would be to devote the lives of one or two of their sons to Islam. The maulana will offer to educate these children at his madrassa and to find them employment in the service of Islam. The concept of “”martyrdom”" is often discussed and the family is promised that if their sons are “”martyred”" both the sons and the family will attain “”salvation”" and the family will obtain God’s favor in this life, as well. An immediate cash payment is finally made to the parents to compensate the family for its “”sacrifice”" to Islam. Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rps. 500,000 (approximately USD 6500) per son. A small number of Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in Dera Ghazi Khan district are reportedly recruiting daughters as well.
5. (S/NF) The path following recruitment depends upon the age of the child involved. Younger children (between 8 and 12) seem to be favored. These children are sent to a comparatively small, extremist Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa in southern or western Punjab generally several hours from their family home. Locals were uncertain as to the exact number of madrassas used for this initial indoctrination purpose, although they believed that with the recent expansion, they could number up to 200. These madrassas are generally in isolated areas and are kept small enough (under 100 students) so as not to draw significant attention. At these madrassas, children are denied contact with the outside world and taught sectarian extremism, hatred for non-Muslims, and anti-Western/anti-Pakistan government philosophy. Contact between students and families is forbidden, although the recruiting maulana periodically visits the families with reports full of praise for their sons’ progress. “”Graduates”" from these madrassas are either (1) employed as Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics or madrassa teachers or (2) sent on to local indoctrination camps for jihad. Teachers at the madrassa appear to make the decision based on their read of the child’s willingness to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture versus his utility as an effective proponent of Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith ideology/recruiter.
6. (S/NF) Children recruited at an older age and “”graduates”" chosen for jihad proceed to more sophisticated indoctrination camps focused on the need for violence and terrorism against the Pakistan government and the West. Locals identified three centers reportedly used for this purpose. The most prominent of these is a large complex that ostensibly has been built at Khitarjee (sp?). Locals placed this site in Bahawalpur District on the Sutlej River north of the village of Ahmedpur East at the border of the districts of Multan, Bahawalpur, and Lodhran. The second complex is a newly built “”madrassa”" on the outskirts of Bahawalpur city headed by a devotee of Jaish-e-Mohammad leader Maulana Masood Azhar identified only as Maulana Al-Hajii (NFI). The third complex is an Ahl-e-Hadith site on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city about which very limited information was available. Locals asserted that these sites were primarily used for indoctrination and very limited military/terrorist tactic training. They claimed that following several months of indoctrination at these centers youth were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas. Many worried that these youth would eventually return to try and impose their extremist version of Islam in the southern and western Punjab and/or to carry out operations in these areas.
7. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly chastised the government for its failure to act decisively against indoctrination centers, extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar. One leading Sufi scholar and a Member of the Provincial Assembly informed Principal Officer that he had personally provided large amounts of information on the location of these centers, madrassas, and personalities to provincial and national leaders, as well as the local police. He was repeatedly told that “”plans”" to deal with the threat were being “”evolved”" but that direct confrontation was considered “”too dangerous.”" The Bahawalpur District Nazim told Principal Officer that he had repeatedly highlighted the growing threat to the provincial and federal governments but had received no support in dealing with it. He blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties — he is currently with the Pakistan Muslim League — neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan Peoples Party federal governments would take his requests seriously. The brother of the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, and a noted Brailvi/Sufi scholar in his own right, Allama Qasmi blamed government intransigence on a culture that rewarded political deals with religious extremists. He stressed that even if political will could be found, the bureaucracy in the Religious Affairs, Education, and Defense Ministries remained dominated by Zia-ul-Haq appointees who favored the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious philosophies. This bureaucracy, Qasmi claimed, had repeatedly blocked his brother’s efforts to push policy in a different direction.
8. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly requested USG assistance for the southern and western Punjab, believing that an influx of western funds could counter the influence of Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics. Principal Officer was repeatedly reminded that these religious philosophies were alien to the southern and western Punjab — which is the spiritual heartland of South Asia’s Sufi communities. Their increasing prominence was directly attributed to poverty and external funding. Locals believed that socio-economic development programs, particularly in education, agriculture, and employment generation, would have a direct, long-term impact in minimizing receptivity to extremist movements. Similarly, they pressed for immediate relief efforts — particularly food distribution and income support — to address communities’ immediate needs. Several interlocutors also encouraged direct USG support to Brailvi/Sufi religious institutions, arguing that these represented the logical antithesis to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith philosophy and that if adequately funded, they could stem the tide of converts away from their moderate beliefs.
Comment
9. (S/NF) A jihadi recruiting network relying on Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious, charitable, and educational institutions is increasing its work in impoverished districts of southern and western Punjab. Local economic conditions coupled with foreign financing appear to be transforming a traditionally moderate area of the country into a fertile recruiting ground for terrorist organizations. The provincial and federal governments, while fully aware of the problem, appear to fear direct confrontation with these extremist groups. Local governments lack the resources and federal/provincial support to deal with these organizations on their own. The moderate Brailvi/Sufi community is internally divided into followers of competing spiritual leaders and lacks the financial resources to act as an effective counterweight to well-funded and well-organized extremists.
10. (S/NF) Post believes that this growing recruitment network poses a direct threat to USG counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts in Pakistan. Intervention at this stage in the southern and western Punjab could still be useful to counter the prevailing trends favoring extremist organizations. USAID development resources in agriculture, economic growth, education, and infrastructure development are useful and necessary and will address some of the immediate needs. In post’s view short-term, quick impact programs are required which focus on: (1) immediate relief in the form of food aid and microcredit, (2) cash for work and community-based, quick-impact infrastructure development programs focusing on irrigation systems, schools, and other critical infrastructure, and (3) strategic communication programs designed to educate on the dangers of the terrorist recruiting networks and to support counter-terrorist, counter-extremist messages. HUNT REFERENCE: 2008: Extremist recruitment on the rise in south Punjab madrassahs DAWN.COM | 22nd May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/22/2008-extremist-recruitment-on-the-rise-in-south-punjab-madrassahs/ 2009: Was Qaddafi funding Sipahe Sahaba? From the Newspaper | 26th May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/26/2009-was-qaddafi-funding-sipahe-sahaba/
Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan - 5 (Choraha 10 July 2010)
The Role of the State: The complexities of Pakistan’s centralized militarist state have encouraged the rise of both Islamism and its sectarian manifestations. According to Vali Nasr, two distinct factors account for this development. The first involves the state’s attempt to increase its own power by manipulating the rifts in society. The post-colonial state, though large and interventionist, has only limited capabilities. By manipulating social and cultural divisions and using a divide-and-rule strategy, however, the government is able to create a sphere in which it becomes the arbiter in any conflict. The state and its wings thus acts as an agent of identity mobilization and intensifies sectarian conflict. [16] The second factor involves the Pakistani state’s use of Islam or religious nationalism to bind the country together—which, in turn, gives impetus to fundamentalism and sectarianism. Since the days of Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the country’s military-technocratic elite or “establishment” has believed that Pakistan is difficult to govern. They consider the masses not to be ready or .t for democracy, and they are in constant fear that ethnic and regional centrifugal tendencies will pull the country apart. The Pakistani state has, therefore, consistently felt the need for an ideology to bind Pakistan—and Pakistanis—together. Islam is seen as fulfilling that role. The ties connecting the state, the military and the Islamists have strengthened over the years to combat the growing power of secular and ethnic-based political parties that often do not share the Pakistani establishment’s hostility toward India. Throughout the 1980s the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supported militant Sunni Islamist groups in the northwest frontier bordering Afghanistan, as well as in Punjab and Baluchistan. And the government has funded Sunni madrasas, which in addition to preparing cadres for jihad in Afghanistan and India, have also become bastions of sectarianism. The Iranian revolution and the reaction it caused in the Gulf states, especially in Saudi Arabia, also contributed to sectarian violence in Pakistan. The Gulf states with Shi’a minorities were worried about domestic rebellion and civil war. Iran challenged Saudi Arabia’s pre-eminent position and status in the Muslim world—a replay of the Ottoman-Safavid power struggle of long ago. This led to large-scale pan-Islamization attempts by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, as well as by Libya and Iraq, to export Sunni-Wahhabi Islamism to other parts of the Muslim world. Pakistan was one of the key battlegrounds in this Iran-Saudi battle. In 1984 the Deobandi scholar Muhammad Manzur Numani wrote a tract asserting that the excesses of the Iranian revolution proved that Shiism was un-Islamic. The preface to this work was written by Sayyid Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, rector of the Nadwatul Ulema and recipient of Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal Prize for Service to Islam. The fact that Nadvi was associated with the Saudi Rabita al-Alam al-Islami (Muslim World League) raised the suspicion that Gulf politics had a lot to do with the timing and virulence of the tract. Another pro-Saudi religious leader in Pakistan, Asrar Ahmed, went so far as to argue that Shiism, which originated soon after the demise of Prophet Mohammed, was part of an early Jewish conspiracy against Islam. The assumption that Islamist forces and sectarian militias could be used and controlled has backfired against Pakistan’s government and—especially—its military, which now face the serious challenge of rolling back extremist beliefs. So far the state is not doing well. The government is finding it difficult to shut down or control the numerous radical and militant madrasas that were set up during the Afghan jihad. As the Islamists have increased their ability to raise funds globally, their madrasas have become less dependent on zakat assistance and hence less amenable to state influence. In the case of militant groups, the state’s periodic resort to force seems merely to substitute one combatant for another. The jihadis eliminated through the use of force are quickly replaced by more virulent cadres, who are constantly being produced. The Islamists know their strengths and the government’s weaknesses. They also know that until Pakistan’s government decides, once and for all, not to rely on Islam for nation-building and state consolidation, it will continue to court Islamist partners. For the foreseeable future, then, sectarian Islamist militancy will remain a serious threat to Pakistan’s stability. In 1954 the Pakistan government appointed a court of inquiry into the anti-Ahmadi violence. The Munir Commission, named after the Supreme Court chief justice who headed it, published a report that contained a very prescient assessment of future Islamist politics in Pakistan. It concluded that the government should keep out of the business of defining who is, or is not, a Muslim and of how Islam is to be enforced as the state religion: Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulema (of who is a Muslim) need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental? If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulema, we remain Muslims according to the view of that alim but kafirs according to the definition of everyone else…. What is happening now seems almost the writing on the wall, and God help us if we do not stop these…people from cutting each other’s throat.” [17] This article first appeared in Volume 4 of Current Trends in Islamist Ideology published November 1, 2006. REFERENCE: "Weeding Out the Heretics": Sectarianism in Pakistan by Husain Haqqani Published on Wednesday, November 01, 2006 Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol. 4 http://currenttrends.org/research/detail/weeding-out-the-heretics-sectarianism-in-pakistan
Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan - 6 (Choraha 10 July 2010)
ISLAMABAD, Oct 6: The reported statement of the Punjab Chief Minister, Mian Shahbaz Sharif, in which he had accused the Taliban of backing sectarian violence in Pakistan, has stunned the high authorities here. The Foreign Office has formally regretted what it termed "the baseless speculation and incorrect reporting in some sections of the media, claiming that the Taliban government of Afghanistan is allegedly involved in recent incidents of terrorist violence in the country." Sources in the relevant agencies of the federal government have
expressed complete ignorance about the availability of any intelligence report that could support what the Punjab CM was reported to have said in his talk with newsmen at Lahore on Tuesday. They said the Punjab delegation which had attended an inter- provincial meeting on Monday, a day before the CM's reported statement, did not mention a word about the Taliban backing the sectarian violence in Pakistan.
"There was absolutely no mention of the Taliban in the meeting which was called merely to discuss sectarianism," a source who attended the meeting said. The Punjab Chief Secretary, A.Z.K. Sherdil, however, told Dawn by telephone from his Lahore residence that some intelligence reports did suggest that religious extremists from Pakistan got training in Afghanistan and before joining sectarian violence in the country.
He said these intelligence reports maintained that such elements received training in camps inside Afghanistan, had fought along with the Taliban against the Afghan opposition, and had infiltrated into Pakistan and were involved in sectarian violence. "We are quite concerned about this situation and want a comprehensive policy to check this movement across the Pakistan-Afghan border," Mr Sherdil said. He, however, denied that there was any mention, in these intelligence reports, about Riaz Basra's protection by the Taliban. The chief secretary said there was massive gun-running from Afghanistan to the tribal areas in Pakistan from where the weapons came to the NWFP and then supplied to other provinces. He said since the Pakistan-Afghan border was not properly manned, this practice continues. However, official sources in the federal government totally deny having seen any such intelligence report. But some sources believe that the Punjab chief minister who has recently returned from an "important US trip" had taken an initiative to dissociate Pakistan from the Taliban and Afghanistan. Meanwhile the Foreign Office, in a press statement issued here on Wednesday evening, regretted "the baseless speculation and incorrect reporting in some sections of the media, claiming that the Taliban government of Afghanistan is allegedly involved in recent incidents of terrorist violence in the country." REFERENCE: Shahbaz Sharif talks of intelligence report; flat denial by FO Ansar Abbasi DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending : 09 October 1999 Issue : 05/41 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1999/09oct99.html#shah
KARACHI, July 30: The Lashkar-i-Jhangvi has claimed responsibility for the murder of PSO managing director Shaukat Mirza and the defence ministry official, Syed Zafar Hussain. In a joint press statement, chief of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Riaz Basra and Lashkar's divisional chief, Lal Mohammed have claimed responsibility for both the killings. They also warned that any government functionary resorting to abuse of power would face the same fate. "We had urged the President, General Pervez Musharraf, not to implement the death sentence awarded to Sheikh Haq Nawaz as it could prove harmful for the integrity of the country but the government went ahead with its plan to appease a neighbouring country," said the statement. -NNI REFERENCE: Jhangvi group says it is responsible DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending : 4 August 2001 Issue : 07/31 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2001/aug0401.html#jhan
MULTAN, May 14: Riaz Basra, the alleged mastermind behind hundreds of sectarian killings, was killed with three of his accomplices in an 'encounter' in Mailsi. The 'shootout' took place at Dakota, which had been targeted twice in the past by Lashkar-i-Jhangvi militants. Riaz Basra headed Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Sources claimed that Basra was in the Faisalabad police custody for the last five months and was being interrogated for the activities of his network. According to the police, four heavily armed outlaws came to Chak Kot Chaudhry Sher Mohammad Ghalvi at about 3:15am in a Toyota Corolla and stopped near the house of Chaudhry Fida Hussain Ghalvi, the district chief of the banned Tehrik-i-Jaferia. Being on the hit-list of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi militants, villagers used to keep vigil round the clock and were helped by the police at night. Mr Ghalvi told Dawn that he was on guard on the rooftop of his house when the assailants arrived. He said when he questioned the purpose of their visit at the odd hours, they came out of the car and opened fire. Mr Ghalvi said that he and other villagers returned the fire and informed the police control. Police said that SP Syed Javed Shah of Vehari was patrolling the area with some police officials and "therefore, he arrived at the spot in no time." Known in police circles as encounter- friendly, SP Javed has already to his credit scores of encounters.
In a crossfire that lasted nearly an hour, the outlaws died. The bodies were taken to the Vehari DHQ hospital for a post-mortem examination. Police said they had recovered some fake number-plates from the car. Chaudhry Iftikhar Ahmed, DIG of the Multan range, told Dawn that the police had also recovered a rocket-launcher, four rockets, four Kalashnikovs and a huge quantity of live rounds from the scene. Mr Ghalvi claimed that the assailants had come to kill him. He said that Lashkar-i-Jhangvi had killed his brother, Mukhtar, in 1997. It is suspected that Lashkar-i-Jhangvi was involved in two strikes in Dakota. On Aug 18, 1996, it killed 12 people at a Majlis and on July 23, 1997, it slew five people, including TJP leader Mukhtar Husain Ghalvi. On Feb 18, 1999, unknown assailants gunned down three more Shias near Pul (bridge) 14 in the vicinity of Dakota. Later, at a press conference in Vehari, SP Javed identified one of the dead as Riaz Basra. He said Riaz Basra's identity was established by one of his accomplices, Kashif, who is under detention for his alleged involvement in the killing of Siddiq Kanju in Lodhran. SP Javed said that Basra carried a head money of Rs500,000. His body was identified earlier by a police officer who had met him some years ago in Afghanistan. REFERENCE: Riaz Basra, 3 others die in 'encounter' Dawn Report DAWN WIRE SERVICE Week Ending : 18 May 2002 Issue : 08/20 http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2002/may182002.html#riaz
FAISALABAD: Media-men and even some top ranking police officials were shocked when they received the news on government controlled television and radio about the killing of a most wanted and desperate criminal, Riaz Basra, in a police encounter in Mailsi near Multan, because there had been solid information and reports that he had been in police custody for the last five months. The “encounter” was staged at Dakota in Mailsi, some 65 kilometres away from Multan, a place where the terrorists of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi allegedly murdered over a dozen persons in the past. Giving details of the incident, a senior police officer of Multan claimed that four heavily armed outlaws came to Chak Kot Chaudhry Sher Muhammad Ghalvi, at about 3:15am in a Toyota Corolla (DGA-9520) and stopped near the house of Chaudhry Fida Hussain Ghalvi, the district chief of the banned Tehrik-i-Jaafria Pakistan. Being on the hit list of the Lashkar, the villagers used to keep vigil round the clock and were helped by the police at night. Ghalvi was on the rooftop when the alleged assailants arrived. When he questioned the purpose of their visit at that time, they came out of the car and opened fire. Villagers returned the fire and informed the area police. A police patrolling team rushed to the spot and during cross firing all the four terrorists died. Two of them had beards and the other two including Riaz Basra were clean-shaven. First of all, the superintendent of police Vehari reportedly identified one of the dead as Riaz Basra, saying that one of Riaz Basra’s accomplices who was under detention for alleged involvement in the killing of Siddiq Kanju had identified him.
In April, 1999, the Sargodha police had shot dead two persons - Shahzad Warraich and Azizur Rehman who were said to be close friends of Riaz Basra - in an encounter and claimed to have killed Riaz Basra due to his resemblance to Shahzad. Similarly, the Punjab police claimed to have killed Riaz Basra six times. But the “drama” of Mailsi staged in early hours of May 14 this year was very close to reality as the person who was killed in the shootout was really believed to be Riaz Basra. No doubt the credit of ending the mystery of Riaz Basra, the most wanted proclaimed offender who carried Rs5 million on his head, goes to Punjab police and more accurately to Faisalabad police, but the drama was directed very poorly by those behind the screen. The real story started when the Faisalabad police arrested a terrorist Ajmal alias Sheikh Jamshaid of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi from somewhere. Ajmal, a close friend of Riaz Basra, was interrogated by special teams of police and a secret agency at local headquarters of the CIA in January this year, due to which another terrorist Liaqat Ali son of Sohnay Khan, resident of Karore Pacca, wanted by police in a triple murder case, was arrested. Two hand-grenades with live pins, a kalashnikov, and two pistols of 30 bore were seized from his possession. The ATC team continued the interrogation of the arrested terrorist and raided a number of locations in Faisalabad, Lahore, Jhang, Sargodha and some other parts of the country. The hectic efforts made by the interrogation team and information received from both the arrested terrorists led to the arrest of Riaz Basra.
Sources in the local police disclosed what they called the true story of the arrest of Riaz Basra, saying that after the arrest of two friends, Ajmal and Liaqat Ali, the police teams started tracking down Riaz Basra. They learnt that Basra was residing in Chaman in Balochistan, due to extensive bombing in Afghanistan by the American forces. “The entire matter was brought to the notice of high-ups of the interior ministry and a national secret agency asked permission to launch an operation in Chaman for capturing him. The team consisting of personnel of the Punjab and Balochistan police under supervision of the national secret agency conducted the operation in Chaman and arrested 16 persons from two hideouts. The arrested persons were immediately shifted to an investigation centre of the Punjab police at Lahore where one of them was identified as Riaz Basra. He was clean-shaven and wore shalwar-qameez,” sources disclosed. Here comes the conflict between reports in the print media and the police claim as the police high-ups, including inspector general of police, Punjab, categorically denied the arrest of Riaz Basra when some leading newspapers published the stories in the second week of January this year. Reporters of newspapers claiming the arrest of Basra presented different proofs and information. But all their claims were rejected by the police.
During his first visit to Faisalabad, Governor Khalid Maqbool was briefed about the major achievements of the district police in an in-camera meeting at local circuit house on Jan 10, including the claim that Riaz Basra had been arrested. According to a report on the briefing: “Inspector Naveed Younis, incharge, anti-terrorist cell, headed by SP/CIA apprehended a terrorist Ajmal alias Sheikh Jamshaid of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi r/o Faisalabad, who was reportedly a close friend of Riaz Basra (sectarian P.O.). The terrorist with the technical assistance of ISI was interrogated. Resultantly, the accused Liaqat Ali s/o Sohnay Khan r/o Karore Pucca, an accused of a sectarian triple murder case of FIR No. 27/01 u/s 302 PS Gulberg, Faisalabad, was arrested. Two hand-grenades with live pins, one kalashnikov and two pistols 30- bore were recovered from his possession. The sequence of interrogation ultimately led to the arrest of Riaz Basra.”
This correspondent possesses a copy of the said briefing. Riaz Basra was born in Chak Chah Thandiwala, Sargodha, in 1967. He was the youngest of four sons and two daughters born to Ghulam Muhammad and Jalal Bibi. His eldest brother is an employee of the Auqaf department in Lahore while the other family members are living in the hometown. Riaz Basra got religious education from different deeni madressahs of Lahore and Sargodha and joined the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan in 1985, and played an active role in enrolment and fund raising for his organization in Lahore and other parts of the province. Riaz Basra also contested the 1988 general elections for a provincial assembly seat but lost. He, according to police, got arms training in Jihadi camps in Afghanistan and also took part in Jihad in Afghanistan where he sustained a bullet injury to his leg. He constituted a militant group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi after the name of his late chief commander, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, who was assassinated. The members of his group allegedly started killing shia leaders and activists all over the country and became a terrorist organization.
The Lahore Police arrested Riaz Basra after his conviction by a court on charge of murdering Iranian counsel, Aqai Sadiq Ganji. He was produced before a court in Lahore during trial of a murder case of a central leader of Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqa Jaafria, Syed Sikandar Shah. He escaped from police custody in May, 1994. After his escape from police custody, he reportedly strengthened the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and enrolled many extremists. This group gunned down hundreds of shia leaders and activists in 1996, 1997 and 1998 under direct command of Riaz Basra. Top ranking government officials and religious scholars of Fiqa Jaafria were target of the militant group. Riaz Basra allegedly himself killed the commissioner of Sargodha division, Syed Tajammal Abbas, in August, 1996. There were strong indications and reports about Riaz Basra’s links with government agencies as Qari Abdul Hai alias Talha who was a close friend of Basra parted his ways over this issue and set up his own camp. Talha was of the view that Basra was playing in the hands of government agencies. But the arrest and killing of Riaz Basra in a staged encounter finished all hopes of exposing those responsible for keeping alive the sectarian conflict in the country. REFERENCE: Basra encounter: a poorly staged drama By Shamsul Islam Naz May 17, 2002 Friday Rabi-ul-Awwal 4, 1423 http://archives.dawn.com/2002/05/17/fea.htm#1
ISLAMABAD: Saudi Arabia looks askance at Pakistan’s commitment to pursue energy cooperation with Iran and is nudging the government to reconsider its decision. This was the essence of a message from the Saudi King conveyed by Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Prince Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz in his meetings with Pakistani leaders on Tuesday, Arab diplomatic sources based in Islamabad said. Riyadh is said to have offered an ‘alternative package’ to meet Islamabad’s growing energy needs in an effort to persuade it to abandon the Iran gas pipeline and electricity/oil import deals. The deputy foreign minister’s visit closely follows a trip by Saudi Culture and Information Minister Dr Abdul Aziz bin Mohiuddin Al-Khoja last week, which coincided with Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s visit to Saudi Arabia. The exchanges took place against the backdrop of an intensifying cold war between Tehran and Riyadh over Syria with smaller versions of the proxy being played out in Bahrain, Yemen and other parts of the region. The meetings are also taking place at a time when diplomatic efforts for dealing with the Syrian crisis have picked momentum. Riyadh sees the situation in Syria as key to the future of the Middle East and has been spearheading efforts to isolate Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The statements issued by the Presidency, Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Office all spoke about the cordial ties between the two countries and noted the discussions on “regional and international challenges”. Mr Aziz also had a one-to-one interaction with Prime Minister Gilani, besides the delegation meeting, during which, a prime ministerial aide said, a “special message” from the Saudi monarch was delivered. A senior Foreign Ministry official confirmed that Iran and the situation in Syria were on the agenda of the talks. “They have a position. We reiterated our desire for the issues relating to Muslim Ummah to be peacefully resolved through dialogue,” he added. President Zardari, in his meeting with Mr Aziz, also stressed the need for regional countries to find regional solutions to their problems.The Saudi delegation was informed that maintaining neighbourly relations with Iran did not mean endorsing its position or actions on other issues. Mr Aziz was quoted in a Foreign Office statement as having said: “Pakistan and Saudi Arabia enjoyed commonality of views on regional and international challenges and the visit afforded him an opportunity to discuss these, and how to address them.” Saudi Arabia is said to have offered a loan and oil facility to bail Pakistan out of its financial and energy crises. A Pakistani official said the offer would be discussed at the Pak-Saudi joint ministerial meeting, which is being planned. Referring to the ministerial meeting, Prime Minister Gilani told the Saudi minister that it was important for “working out mechanism to give impetus to trade compatible with the exemplary relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. REFERENCE: S. Arabia offers help to tide over energy crisis Baqir Sajjad Syed http://dawn.com/2012/04/11/move-to-keep-pakistan-off-iran-pipeline-s-arabia-offers-help-to-tide-over-energy-crisis/
Punjabi Taliban: Here they came in contact with Taliban militants; both influenced each other and a new sectarian breed came into being in the form of the Punjabi Taliban, now led by Asmatullah Muavia and loyal to Hakimullah Mehsud. Initially based in South Waziristan, the Punjabi Taliban were ousted after the military operation in 2009. In reprisal, they carried out high-profile attacks such as the one on GHQ in Rawalpindi. Sources say that that particular incident was the turning point and led to a re-think by the establishment. Security officials — who wish to remain anonymous — say this was because the GHQ standoff was resolved not just by army commandos but mainly through negotiations by Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, chief of the SSP, who convinced those inside to surrender. Army officials dismiss these claims. They say military action broke the siege and that the so-called Punjabi Taliban remains their number one enemy. It may well be that both stories are true, as one security official points out. Ludhianvi’s intervention — while crucial — was definitely only limited to the GHQ attack. He appears to have little control over the Punjabi Taliban leadership, which continues to wreak all sorts of havoc across Pakistan. However, it’s also clear that Ahmed Ludhianvi now enjoys official protocol. The SSP and Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, Sipah-i-Sahaba’s current title, are both supposedly proscribed, yet these organisations hold rallies in major cities with ease where arms are openly displayed. Today it’s clear that the SSP and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, an even more extreme sectarian outfit, are inter-linked. Maulana Ludhianvi admitted as much to the BBC when he said in an interview that Malik Ishaq, the LJ chief, was released on his guarantees and that the notorious militant now answers to him. Since Malik Ishaq’s release it’s become easier for the LJ leaders to move around, and they have since started expanding and setting up cells in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. These cells are made of locals and have been greatly strengthened, especially in Balochistan — where they operate independently of the LJ central command. There the traditionally secular Baloch — and particularly Brahui — are increasingly turning to the radical Islamist militancy espoused by SSP/LJ. Security officials — and Shia leaders — say this turn of events is complemented by the growth of sectarian madressahs there. Perhaps the largest Sipah-i-Sahaba seminary outside southern Punjab is in Mastung, in the heart of territory controlled by the Raisani tribe. Another major reason, according to Shia leaders, is the alleged support by intelligence agencies to groups of pro-government Baloch tribesmen. Most of these have dual identities — the second being outright sectarian and extremist. It is no surprise, then, that the largest of the groups is considered to be the de facto Lashkar-i-Jhangvi in Balochistan. All that is perhaps irrelevant for the intelligence agencies, whose main aim is the tried tactic of using religion to suppress nationalism. Led by a close relative of a senior politician from the province, some of LJ Balochistan’s more high-profile attacks include the killing of Baloch nationalist leader Habib Jalib Baloch and the attacks on the Hazara Shias pilgrims in Mastung. A senior member of the group accepts it has been involved in attacks to protect the Baloch community – it denies it’s carried out attacks on Shias. “We are only carrying out defensive actions against people who are supported by foreign intelligence services. The Baloch people are with Pakistan – it’s just that they are scared of the militants.” He adds that while their group isn’t anti-Shia — the community has elements that act as agents of Iran in Pakistan and they should refrain from this. REFERENCE: Sectarian militancy thriving in Balochistan By Syed Shoaib Hasan http://dawn.com/2012/04/11/sectarian-militancy-thriving-in-balochistan-fm/
GILGIT: Thirty-four people kidnapped from Hunza on April 3 in the wake of violence and bloodshed in Gilgit and Chilas were released on Tuesday as a result of successful talks between kidnappers and cleric Aga Rahat ul Hussain, police said. Member of the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly Deedar Ali Shah said the 34 hostages had been released unconditionally. The kidnapped men — the district health officer, a civil judge, truck drivers, cleaners and labourers working in flour mills — had been taken to Nagar valley. On Tuesday, they were brought to Gilgit where they were received by the deputy speaker of the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly, home secretary, finance secretary and the DIG. Police said Aga Rahat, accompanied by Sheikh Mirza Ali and a number of other religious scholars, went to Nagar valley after the kidnappers had said that they would hand over the hostages only to him. A team earlier constituted by the Gilgit-Baltistan chief minister had failed to persuade the kidnappers to free the hostages. The hostages were first taken to the Chief Minister’s House where they met the CM and later transferred to a hotel. They are expected to go to their homes on Wednesday. Meanwhile, a curfew imposed eight days ago remained in force on Tuesday, without any relaxation. Since the outbreak of violence, Gilgit has remained cut off from the rest of the country with no vehicle plying on the Karakoram Highway and PIA not operating its flights. When contacted, SP Diamer district Bashir Ahmed said road traffic would not resume without improvement in the security situation. He said about 27 trucks loaded with foodstuff had left for Gilgit, but they were not allowed to enter the city because all entry points were closed. People in Skardu, Ghizer, Astore, Ghanche and Hunza Nagar are facing a shortage of food and medicines. Tens of thousands people held a sit-in in Skardu and called for arrest of the killers of bus passengers in Bonar Das near Chilas. REFERENCE: Curfew continues in Gilgit, Kidnappers free 34 hostages Farooq Ahmed Khan http://dawn.com/2012/04/11/curfew-continues-in-gilgit-kidnappers-free-34-hostages/
Former ISI Chiefs Exposing Sectarian Terrorists (ARY Dr. Shahid Masood)
The Shi’a Awakening: General Ziaul Haq, who ruled Pakistan with an iron hand from 5 July 1977 to 17 August 1988, believed that “a state that is construed as a legitimate Islamic actor can both ride the tiger of Islamism and harness its energies in the service of the state.” [10] Islamization under General Ziaul Haq affected four areas—judicial reform, the penal code, economic activity and educational policy. Two decisions that had a particularly significant, long-term impact on the rise of sectarianism were the imposition of zakah or zakat (a 2.5 percent annual contribution Muslims must make toward charity based on their net asset value) and the expansion and radicalization of traditional religious schools called madrasa. The state funded the madrasas through zakat. In 1984, 9.4 percent of zakat funds went to madrasas, and in 1996, long after Ziaul Haq was gone, the government was giving various madrasas 3.5 million dollars a year. [11] In 1982 the government had announced that madrasa diplomas would be considered equivalent to formal school certificates as long as the madrasas reformed their curricula according to state demands. As the state and the Islamists collaborated during the Ziaul Haq years, many madrasas changed their focus from traditional religious education to training an Islamic bureaucracy that could assume positions in the lower and middle echelons of the government, thus creating a social base for a future Islamic state. Islamist groups set up numerous madrasas with government zakat funding. The Jamaat-e-Islami, which had set up its first madrasa—the Ulema Academy at Lahore—in 1976, ran seventy-.five madrasas by 1990. The Barelvis set up a new network of madrasas called Ziaul-Quran (the Light of the Quran) in response to the government initiative, which was primarily benefiting politicized groups such as the Deobandi, Ahl-e Hadith and Jamaat-e-Islami. The Shi’a were not too keen on Ziaul Haq’s Islamization from the top, particularly when it strengthened Sunni Islamist groups. The Shi’a and Sunnis differ in their understanding of zakat. Unlike the Hanafi school of Sunnis, which accepts the government’s right to collect and distribute zakat, the Shi’a consider zakat to be an individual obligation. They may voluntarily entrust the collection and spending of zakat to the Shi’a clergy, but Shi’a jurisprudence gives the state no role in the matter. This communitarian and voluntary approach to zakat among the Shi’a is probably a reaction to centuries of domination by Sunni rulers over most of the Muslim world. When Ziaul Haq decreed that 2.5 percent of all bank savings would be forcibly deducted every year and deposited in the government’s zakat account, therefore, the Shi’a protested. An important Shi’a cleric, Mufti Jaafar Husain (1916-1983), had argued for a long time that if Pakistan was to have Islamic law, the Shi’a should be allowed to follow their own jurisprudence—known as Jaafari fiqh after the sixth Shi’a imam, Jaafar al-Sadiq. Husain formed the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Fiqh-e-Jaafariya (TNFJ), the Movement for the Enforcement of Jaafariya Law, which was later shortened to Tehrik-e-Jaafariya. Soon after Ziaul Haq’s decree authorizing the forcible deduction of zakat, the TNFJ started agitating against the decision. From Ziaul Haq’s point of view, and that of other Sunni Islamists, the Shi’a demand was unjustified. Iran had just had an Islamic revolution the year before (in 1979) and had implemented the Shi’a interpretation of Islamic law. If the majority’s jurisprudence prevailed in Iran, Pakistan’s Sunni Islamists believed the majority should prevail in Pakistan as well, and they saw no reason to make special provisions for the Shi’a minority. The state had become not only more Islamized, but it was also now adopting a sectarian preference within the Islamic context. Ziaul Haq’s preference for an across-the-board enforcement of Sunni law in relation to zakat was challenged by large Shi’a demonstrations. On 5 July1980 the TNFK brought tens of thousands of Shi’a from all over the country and laid siege to the government headquarters in Islamabad. The government backed down and exempted the Shi’a from the compulsory deduction of zakat. Although this measure appeased the Shi’a, it did not please the Sunni Islamists. They saw it as a dilution of Ziaul Haq’s commitment to Islamizing the Pakistani state with their support. For his part, in an effort to limit any damage to his reputation among the Sunni Islamists, Ziaul Haq made a point of venerating Prophet Mohammed’s earliest successors, the first three caliphs whom the Shi’a consider usurpers of political power from their first imam, Ali. In articulating its ideology and position, the TNFJ avoided expressly sectarian arguments. It insisted that, like every other Muslim group in Pakistan, it considered the Quran and the Sunnah to be the fundamental sources of law. It sought only for the right of “all recognized schools of Islamic thought” to be governed by their own interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah. The TNFJ also talked about the creation of a popular Islamic army. Both these ideas—the concept of a popular army, as opposed to the professional one that dominated Pakistan, and the support for multiple interpretations of Islamic law—were viewed as dangerous by the army-run Pakistani state and its Sunni Islamist allies. REFERENCE: "Weeding Out the Heretics": Sectarianism in Pakistan by Husain Haqqani Published on Wednesday, November 01, 2006 Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol. 4 http://currenttrends.org/research/detail/weeding-out-the-heretics-sectarianism-in-pakistan
The Emergence of Sunni Militancy: Ziaul Haq’s policies of Islamization had strengthened Sunni Islamist institutions, especially the madrasas, and given influence to Islamist political parties disproportionate to their electoral strength. Even before their Iranian-inspired political awakening, Pakistan’s Shi’a had been wary of the Islamist political formations and had tended to support secular political parties, notably the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ziaul Haq had deposed Bhutto and executed him. The PPP and the pro-democracy movement it led were seen by Ziaul Haq as major challenges to his authority. It suited Ziaul Haq, therefore, to advertise himself as the defender of Sunni Islam and to identify the pro-democracy movement with Shiism for the purpose of mobilizing Sunni Islamists on his behalf. And it was not difficult to spread fear among Sunni Islamists about the Shi’a minority’s possible rise to power. The Shi’a were an influential minority, prominent in the arts and literature. Several leading Pakistani politicians were Shi’a, and Shi’a support for the pro-democracy movement meant that Sunni Islamists would never have as much influence under a democratic government as they wielded under Ziaul Haq’s Islamizing regime. More significantly, the number of Shi’a in Pakistan was rising. In addition to making gains through effective proselytizing and natural growth, Shi’a ranks were swelling through conversions of convenience. Well-to-do secular Sunnis did not think much of declaring themselves Shi’a to enable their daughters to benefit from a larger share of their inheritance. While Islam’s laws of inheritance are defined in the Quran, the Shi’a interpret them more favorably for women. The compulsory deduction of zakat from bank accounts, so essential to generating funds for Sunni Islamist madrasas, also became a reason for defections from Sunni ranks. Many non-practicing Muslims decided to become Shi’a, not necessarily to observe the sect’s faith or practices, but to avoid having zakat deducted from their savings each year. These circumstances, which appeared to threaten Sunni dominance and identity, provided an environment conducive to Islamist political activism and militancy. A Deobandi cleric, Maulana Saleemullah Khan, founded Sawad-e Azam Ahl-e Sunnat (Greater Unity of the Sunnis) in 1980, demanding that Pakistan be declared a Sunni state and that the Shi’a be declared non-Muslims. [12] Soon after, sectarian riots erupted in the port city of Karachi, and Sawad-e Azam followers attacked Shi’a neighborhoods and religious gatherings. The Sawad-e-Azam was later instrumental in creating the strongest Sunni sectarian militia—the Anjuman-e Sipah-e Sahaba (ASS), or Society of the Army of the Prophet’s Companions. Both organizations were run by Deobandi clerics who had little or no knowledge of English, and once the militant leaders learned the connotation of their English language abbreviation, they changed the name of their organization to Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Pakistan Army of the Prophet’s Companions.
The Sipah-e Sahaba was formally established by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (1952-90) in 1985 in Pakistan’s central Punjab province. According to the organization’s literature, it is part of the global struggle between Western materialism and the true faith:
The greatest evil of our age is atheism, irreligion and the revolt against the true faith. Although those (in the west) who revolted against religion at the beginning of the twentieth century are now returning to religion themselves, the poison of their ideologies has seeped into our society’s thinking. We need to generate the antidote… Just as the Muslim Ummah got rid of the yoke of British and French colonialism, we need a major effort to protect ourselves from the demon of irreligion and secularity and immerse ourselves into the beauty of Islam and Quranic injunctions. [13]
Sipah-e Sahaba opposed the notion of freedom of religious observance if it meant that the Shi’a would be free to criticize the early caliphs and companions of the Prophet. “True faith is only that following the way of the Prophet’s companions; anything else is heresy,” declared Ziaur Rehman Faruqui, who took over as SSP chief after Jhangvi’s assassination in 1990. The emphasis on following the Prophet’s early companions is simply a subtle way of condemning the Shi’a as heretics. The SSP’s goals are to combat the Shi’a at every level of society, to have them declared a non-Muslim minority like the Ahmadis, and to proscribe their processions of self-flagellation during the month of Muharram. Sipah-e Sahaba also wants to impose its own version of Sunni Islam on the state and society. Its ideal polity is the Khilafat-i-Rashida, the rightly guided Caliphate that succeeded Prophet Mohammed and lasted for only thirty-one years. SSP justifies its virulent anti-Shiism as crucial to protecting Islam from Persian influence and saving the Muslim world from Khomeini’s pernicious, heretical ideology. The SSP gained influence in the rural parts of Pakistan’s central Punjab province, partly by criticizing the influence of Shi’a landowners. They accused the Shi’a of having maintained their large land holdings through close ties with the British, which made them representative of secular culture. It did not occur to SSP’s militant Sunni followers that focusing on the large Shi’a estates might inadvertently endorse Shi’a inheritance laws, which prevented the kind of fragmentation of property that inevitably resulted from Sunni laws of inheritance. SSP also attacked traditional, custom-based, mystical Sufi Islam that often allowed Sunnis and Shi’a in rural Pakistan to merge in their common reverence for particular saints and shrines. Seeking to impose a standardized, ritual-free, text-based Islam, SSP took pride in articulating the anti-Shi’a puritanism that other Islamist organizations shared but were unable to voice for the sake of political correctness. SSP maintained close ties with the leading Deobandi organization, Jamiat-e Ulema-e Islam (JUI), and all its leaders were graduates of Deobandi madrasas. Almost all Sunni Islamist organizations quietly supported SSP’s anti-Shi’a rhetoric and campaigns. The Ziaul Haq regime saw the SSP as a check on the rise of Shi’a influence and gave it a free hand. Soon covert links had been established between SSP and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which managed official Pakistani support of jihadi operations in Afghanistan and Indian-controlled Kashmir. SSP cadres attended Afghan mujahidin training camps and returned to kill Shi’a leaders within Pakistan. The rise of the Taliban in the 1990s further deepened the ties among Pakistan’s various jihadi groups (see Current Trends, vol. 1), Deobandi madrasas and Sunni sectarian organizations like Sipah-e Sahaba. SSP’s lethal attacks on Shi’a ulema and professionals generated a violent Shi’a backlash, however. The Shi’a Sipah-e Mohammed Pakistan (SMP)—Army of Mohammed in Pakistan—surfaced in 1991, almost a year after the assassination of SSP founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. Sipah-e Mohammed claimed to have more global aims than just protecting Pakistan’s Shi’a. Its founder, Ghulam Raza Naqvi, declared that he wanted to set up a Quds-force of both Sunnis and Shi’a to liberate Palestine. [14] But in practice SMP did little more than retaliate for SSP’s assaults on Shi’a by killing SSP leaders and cadres, and occasionally by mounting attacks on Deobandi mosques in reprisal for attacks on Shi’a mosques. The violence between Shi’a and Sunni extremist groups escalated further once Ziaul Haq’s military regime came to an end and civilian rule was restored in Pakistan. Worried about the sectarian violence, the civilian political leaders attempted to co-opt the SSP into the political system. The group’s candidates won some seats in the Punjab Assembly, and they were offered positions in the government in exchange for renouncing violence. One segment of the SSP found this bargain unacceptable, however, and responded by creating the secretive and uncompromisingly violent Lashkar-e Jhangvi (JI)—Jhangvi’s Army. This group, founded by Riaz Basra in 1994, consisted mainly of Afghan jihad veterans and worked closely with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It is important to note that since the collapse of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Baluchistan province has become a major center of anti-Shi’a militants. Their main targets have been the anti-Taliban Shi’a Hazara community. [15] Sectarian conflict in Pakistan has not remained confined to the sphere of Sunni-Shi’a rivalry. Violence has erupted among competing Sunni organizations as well. Once the floodgates of discussion over who is or is not a Muslim are opened, any number of claims for excluding heretics from the mainstream can emerge. Although sectarian violence in Pakistan began with demands to declare Ahmadis and Shi’a non-Muslims, the rising tide of Sunni extremism has led the various Sunni organizations to vie with one another for the right to decide who can legitimately be considered a true Sunni Muslim. As Deobandi and Wahhabi groups expanded through state patronage and organized militias, the traditionalist Barelvis found themselves marginalized. By the middle of the 1990s, a militant organization called the Sunni Tehreek (Sunni Movement) was founded in Karachi by Saleem Qadri. This movement sought to roll back the rising tide of Wahhabi and Deobandi influences and to restore the South Asian tradition of devotional and festive observance of Islam. This effort did not sit well with the Deobandi and Wahhabi groups, of course, who saw the revival of traditionalism as a setback to their successful imposition of fundamentalism in the preceding two and a half decades. On 11 April 2006 a massive bomb blast in Karachi on the occasion of Eid Milad-un Nabi (celebration of Prophet Muhammad’s birthday), which the Deobandis and Wahhabis view as sinful, killed about fifty people and injured many more. Most of the casualties belonged to the Barelvi sub-sect of Sunni Islam, and many were affiliated with the Sunni Tehreek. REFERENCE: "Weeding Out the Heretics": Sectarianism in Pakistan by Husain Haqqani Published on Wednesday, November 01, 2006 Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol. 4 http://currenttrends.org/research/detail/weeding-out-the-heretics-sectarianism-in-pakistan
Punjab Govt & Rana Sanaullah Lie Exposed on Malik Ishaq received monthly stipend (GEO TV)
KARACHI: A US official in a cable sent to the State Department stated that “financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith clerics in south Punjab from organisations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments.” The cable sent in November 2008 by Bryan Hunt, the then Principal Officer at the US Consulate in Lahore, was based on information from discussions with local government and non-governmental sources during his trips to the cities of Multan and Bahawalpur. Quoting local interlocutors, Hunt attempts to explain how the “sophisticated jihadi recruitment network” operated in a region dominated by the Barelvi sect, which, according to the cable, made south Punjab “traditionally hostile” to Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith schools of thought. Hunt refers to a “network of Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith mosques and madrassahs” being strengthened through an influx of “charity” which originally reached organisations “such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Al-Khidmat foundation”. Portions of these funds would then be given away to clerics “in order to expand these sects’ presence” in a relatively inhospitable yet “potentially fruitful recruiting ground”.
Outlining the process of recruitment for militancy, the cable describes how “families with multiple children” and “severe financial difficulties” were generally being exploited for recruitment purposes. Families first approached by “ostensibly ‘charitable’” organisations would later be introduced to a “local Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith maulana” who would offer to educate the children at his madrassah and “find them employment in the service of Islam”. “Martyrdom” was also “often discussed”, with a final cash payment to the parents. “Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rs 500,000 (approximately USD 6,500) per son,” the cable states. Children recruited would be given age-specific indoctrination and would eventually be trained according to the madrassah teachers’ assessment of their inclination “to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture” versus their value as promoters of Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith sects or recruiters, the cable states. Recruits “chosen for jihad” would then be taken to “more sophisticated indoctrination camps”. “Locals identified three centres reportedly used for this purpose”. Two of the centres were stated to be in the Bahawalpur district, whereas one was reported as situated “on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city”. These centres “were primarily used for indoctrination”, after which “youths were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas”.
The cable goes on to quote local officials criticising the PML-N-led provincial and the PPP-led federal governments for their “failure to act” against “extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-i-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar”. The Bahawalpur district nazim at the time told Hunt that despite repeatedly highlighting the threat posed by extremist groups and indoctrination centres to the provincial and federal governments, he had received “no support” in dealing with the issue unless he was ready to change his political loyalties. The nazim, who at the time was with the PML-Q, “blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties…neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan People’s Party federal governments would take his requests seriously”. REFERENCE: Saudi Arabia, UAE financing extremism in south Punjab By Qurat ul ain Siddiqui 22nd May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/22/saudi-arabia-uae-financing-extremism-in-south-punjab/
1. (S/NF) Summary: During recent trips to southern Punjab, Principal Officer was repeatedly told that a sophisticated jihadi recruitment network had been developed in the Multan, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan Divisions. The network reportedly exploited worsening poverty in these areas of the province to recruit children into the divisions’ growing Deobandi and Ahl-eHadith madrassa network from which they were indoctrinated into jihadi philosophy, deployed to regional training/indoctrination centers, and ultimately sent to terrorist training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Locals believed that charitable activities being carried out by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith organizations, including Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Al-Khidmat Foundation, and Jaish-e-Mohammad were further strengthening reliance on extremist groups and minimizing the importance of traditionally moderate Sufi religious leaders in these communities. Government and non-governmental sources claimed that financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from “”missionary”" and “”Islamic charitable”" organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments. Locals repeatedly requested USG support for socio-economic development and the promotion of moderate religious leaders in the region as a direct counter to the growing extremist threat. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) During a recent visit to the southern Punjabi cities of Multan and Bahawalpur, Principal Officer’s discussions with religious, political, and civil society leaders were dominated by discussions of the perceived growing extremist threat in Seraiki and Baloch areas in southern and western Punjab. Interlocutors repeatedly stressed that recruitment activities by extremist religious organizations, particularly among young men between the ages of 8 and 15, had increased dramatically over the last year. Locals blamed the trend on a strengthening network of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith mosques and madrassas, which they claimed had grown exponentially since late 2005. Such growth was repeatedly attributed to an influx of “”Islamic charity”" that originally reached Pakistani pseudo-religious organizations, such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Al-Khidmat foundation, as relief for earthquake victims in Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province. Locals believe that a portion of these funds was siphoned to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in southern and western Punjab in order to expand these sects’ presence in a traditionally hostile, but potentially fruitful, recruiting ground. The initial success of establishing madrassas and mosques in these areas led to subsequent annual “”donations”" to these same clerics, originating in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The value of such donations was uncertain, although most interlocutors believed that it was in the region of $100 million annually.
3. (S/NF) According to local interlocutors, current recruitment activities generally exploit families with multiple children, particularly those facing severe financial difficulties in light of inflation, poor crop yields, and growing unemployment in both urban and rural areas in the southern and western Punjab. Oftentimes, these families are identified and initially approached/assisted by ostensibly “”charitable”" organizations including Jamaat-ud-Dawa (a front for designated foreign terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyaba), the Al-Khidmat Foundation (linked to religious political party Jamaat-e-Islami), or Jaish-e-Mohammad (a charitable front for the designated foreign terrorist organization of the same name).
4. (S/NF) The local Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith maulana will generally be introduced to the family through these organizations. He will work to convince the parents that their poverty is a direct result of their family’s deviation from “”the true path of Islam”" through “”idolatrous”" worship at local Sufi shrines and/or with local Sufi Peers. The maulana suggests that the quickest way to return to “”favor”" would be to devote the lives of one or two of their sons to Islam. The maulana will offer to educate these children at his madrassa and to find them employment in the service of Islam. The concept of “”martyrdom”" is often discussed and the family is promised that if their sons are “”martyred”" both the sons and the family will attain “”salvation”" and the family will obtain God’s favor in this life, as well. An immediate cash payment is finally made to the parents to compensate the family for its “”sacrifice”" to Islam. Local sources claim that the current average rate is approximately Rps. 500,000 (approximately USD 6500) per son. A small number of Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in Dera Ghazi Khan district are reportedly recruiting daughters as well.
5. (S/NF) The path following recruitment depends upon the age of the child involved. Younger children (between 8 and 12) seem to be favored. These children are sent to a comparatively small, extremist Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa in southern or western Punjab generally several hours from their family home. Locals were uncertain as to the exact number of madrassas used for this initial indoctrination purpose, although they believed that with the recent expansion, they could number up to 200. These madrassas are generally in isolated areas and are kept small enough (under 100 students) so as not to draw significant attention. At these madrassas, children are denied contact with the outside world and taught sectarian extremism, hatred for non-Muslims, and anti-Western/anti-Pakistan government philosophy. Contact between students and families is forbidden, although the recruiting maulana periodically visits the families with reports full of praise for their sons’ progress. “”Graduates”" from these madrassas are either (1) employed as Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics or madrassa teachers or (2) sent on to local indoctrination camps for jihad. Teachers at the madrassa appear to make the decision based on their read of the child’s willingness to engage in violence and acceptance of jihadi culture versus his utility as an effective proponent of Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith ideology/recruiter.
6. (S/NF) Children recruited at an older age and “”graduates”" chosen for jihad proceed to more sophisticated indoctrination camps focused on the need for violence and terrorism against the Pakistan government and the West. Locals identified three centers reportedly used for this purpose. The most prominent of these is a large complex that ostensibly has been built at Khitarjee (sp?). Locals placed this site in Bahawalpur District on the Sutlej River north of the village of Ahmedpur East at the border of the districts of Multan, Bahawalpur, and Lodhran. The second complex is a newly built “”madrassa”" on the outskirts of Bahawalpur city headed by a devotee of Jaish-e-Mohammad leader Maulana Masood Azhar identified only as Maulana Al-Hajii (NFI). The third complex is an Ahl-e-Hadith site on the outskirts of Dera Ghazi Khan city about which very limited information was available. Locals asserted that these sites were primarily used for indoctrination and very limited military/terrorist tactic training. They claimed that following several months of indoctrination at these centers youth were generally sent on to more established training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as suicide bombers in settled areas. Many worried that these youth would eventually return to try and impose their extremist version of Islam in the southern and western Punjab and/or to carry out operations in these areas.
7. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly chastised the government for its failure to act decisively against indoctrination centers, extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar. One leading Sufi scholar and a Member of the Provincial Assembly informed Principal Officer that he had personally provided large amounts of information on the location of these centers, madrassas, and personalities to provincial and national leaders, as well as the local police. He was repeatedly told that “”plans”" to deal with the threat were being “”evolved”" but that direct confrontation was considered “”too dangerous.”" The Bahawalpur District Nazim told Principal Officer that he had repeatedly highlighted the growing threat to the provincial and federal governments but had received no support in dealing with it. He blamed politics, stating that unless he was willing to switch parties — he is currently with the Pakistan Muslim League — neither the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan Peoples Party federal governments would take his requests seriously. The brother of the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, and a noted Brailvi/Sufi scholar in his own right, Allama Qasmi blamed government intransigence on a culture that rewarded political deals with religious extremists. He stressed that even if political will could be found, the bureaucracy in the Religious Affairs, Education, and Defense Ministries remained dominated by Zia-ul-Haq appointees who favored the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious philosophies. This bureaucracy, Qasmi claimed, had repeatedly blocked his brother’s efforts to push policy in a different direction.
8. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly requested USG assistance for the southern and western Punjab, believing that an influx of western funds could counter the influence of Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics. Principal Officer was repeatedly reminded that these religious philosophies were alien to the southern and western Punjab — which is the spiritual heartland of South Asia’s Sufi communities. Their increasing prominence was directly attributed to poverty and external funding. Locals believed that socio-economic development programs, particularly in education, agriculture, and employment generation, would have a direct, long-term impact in minimizing receptivity to extremist movements. Similarly, they pressed for immediate relief efforts — particularly food distribution and income support — to address communities’ immediate needs. Several interlocutors also encouraged direct USG support to Brailvi/Sufi religious institutions, arguing that these represented the logical antithesis to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith philosophy and that if adequately funded, they could stem the tide of converts away from their moderate beliefs.
Comment
9. (S/NF) A jihadi recruiting network relying on Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith religious, charitable, and educational institutions is increasing its work in impoverished districts of southern and western Punjab. Local economic conditions coupled with foreign financing appear to be transforming a traditionally moderate area of the country into a fertile recruiting ground for terrorist organizations. The provincial and federal governments, while fully aware of the problem, appear to fear direct confrontation with these extremist groups. Local governments lack the resources and federal/provincial support to deal with these organizations on their own. The moderate Brailvi/Sufi community is internally divided into followers of competing spiritual leaders and lacks the financial resources to act as an effective counterweight to well-funded and well-organized extremists.
10. (S/NF) Post believes that this growing recruitment network poses a direct threat to USG counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts in Pakistan. Intervention at this stage in the southern and western Punjab could still be useful to counter the prevailing trends favoring extremist organizations. USAID development resources in agriculture, economic growth, education, and infrastructure development are useful and necessary and will address some of the immediate needs. In post’s view short-term, quick impact programs are required which focus on: (1) immediate relief in the form of food aid and microcredit, (2) cash for work and community-based, quick-impact infrastructure development programs focusing on irrigation systems, schools, and other critical infrastructure, and (3) strategic communication programs designed to educate on the dangers of the terrorist recruiting networks and to support counter-terrorist, counter-extremist messages. HUNT REFERENCE: 2008: Extremist recruitment on the rise in south Punjab madrassahs DAWN.COM | 22nd May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/22/2008-extremist-recruitment-on-the-rise-in-south-punjab-madrassahs/
Wiki Leaks on Saudi Arabian & UAE funding to Sectarian Groups in Pakistan
1. (S) Summary: A well-placed Deobandi religious leader told Principal Officer in a meeting on March 18 that extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) was increasing its activities in the central Punjab city of Faisalabad, the province’s second largest, in collaboration with elements of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a splinter group from the banned terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). The cleric reported that SSP had recently launched a pamphlet campaign across the city in which it called for people to take steps to enforce Islamic law including: (1) cease business and social activities at the five daily calls to prayer, (2) remove all sources of “”vulgarity”" such as televisions, cd players, and radios from their homes, (3) seek dispute resolution through local imams rather than the courts, (4) take Friday rather than Sunday as the weekly holiday, and (4) strictly enforce purdah for female family members. The pamphlet states that it comes from SSP with support from the TTP and specifically praises “”the enforcement of Sharia in Swat”" and recommends it as a model for Faisalabad. According the religious scholar, a number of girls’ educational institutions in Faisalabad have received letters stating that if they fail to observe purdah, they could be attacked by suicide bombers. The cleric surmised that SSP activities would increase in Faisalabad on the return of its leader Maulana Ludhianvi from a Libyan-government sponsored trip to that country. End Summary.
2. (S) Leading Faisalabad-based Deobandi scholar and IVLP alumnus Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX called on the Principal Officer on March 18 to discuss his concerns regarding what he termed as “”growing extremist activity”" in Punjab’s second-largest city Faisalabad. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that in the last month he has observed a dramatic increase in propaganda activities from Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). He believed that this increase coincided with a number of visits to Faisalabad from activists both of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a splinter group from the southern Punjab-based Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). XXXXXXXXXXXX believed that the activists were involved in recruiting for TTP militant operations in the FATA and NWFP through madrassas in southern Punjab and hoped to replicate that success in Faisalabad. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that SSP leaders had long-standing ties with JeM, as both were Deobandi organizations that had collaborated in the past in anti-Shia and anti-India activities.
3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with Principal Officer an Urdu-language sticker that he claimed he had confiscated from several of his madrassa students in Faisalabad. The sticker, which he stated was also being printed and distributed as a pamphlet, praised the implementation of Sharia law in Swat and exhorted Muslims to pursue the same sort of Sharia law in Faisalabad. It then recounted five steps that every Faisalabad based Muslim should take to begin the process of implementation in the district. The steps were: : (1) cease business and social activities at the five daily calls to prayer, (2) remove all sources of “”vulgarity”" such as televisions, cd players, and radios from their homes, (3) seek dispute resolution through local imams rather than the courts, (4) take Friday rather than Sunday as the weekly holiday, and (4) strictly enforce purdah for female family members.
4. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX told Principal Officer that he had initially dismissed the pamphlet campaign, but became increasingly concerned after learning of specific threats received by several girls’ schools (NFI) in Faisalabad. He claimed that these schools had received letters sent from SSP, referencing the situation in Swat, and warning that if these schools did not begin having their students observe complete purdah, the schools could be the target of violence, including suicide bombing. Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX did not produce a copy of the threat letter. Principal Officer inquired whether any violence had yet occurred in Faisalabad in connection with the SSP campaign. Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX responded that to his knowledge it had not, but he believed that it could occur in short order if police did not check SSP activities.
5. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that in addition to its pamphlet campaign, SSP had organized a number of traditional religious conferences in Faisalabad during the Islamic month of Rabwa (currently ongoing). Traditionally such conferences are organized in this month of the Prophet’s birth to discuss the model life that the Prophet lead and to exhort Muslims to follow his example. According to Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX, this year during the SSP conferences, the organizers have exhorted attendees to follow the Prophet’s example and press for the adoption of complete shariah law in Faisalabad, using Swat as a model. These exhortations specifically call for action against vulgarity and women not observing purdah. In one case, Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that he learned that leaders of the recently banned al-Rashid Trust were coming to address a March 8 SSP conference. He stated that he had informed the District Police Officer, who cancelled the event.
6. (S) Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX shared that he had received reliable information that SSP leader Maulana Ludhianvi was on a fundraising trip to Tripoli sponsored by the Libyan government. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that Ludhianvi had made contact with Libyan officials in the guise of working against Iran and Shia agents in Pakistan. (Note: SSP was originally founded as a violent anti-Shia organization and has, in the past, received extensive foreign funding from a variety of Sunni states, including Saudi Arabia. End Note). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ludhianvi was scheduled to return to Pakistan in “”a few days”" and was bringing with him a “”donation”" from the Libyan government valued at nearly 25 million Pakistani rupees (approximately $312,000) that XXXXXXXXXXXX was certain would be used to increase further SSP activities.
7. (S) Comment: Maulana XXXXXXXXXXXX is a long-standing contact of Consulate Lahore, who visited the United States in XXXXXXXXXXXX as part of our International Visitor Leadership Program. XXXXXXXXXXXX repeatedly credits his trip to the United States and particularly his discussions with Muslim leaders there for changing his previously anti-Western views. XXXXXXXXXXXX has numerous ties within the broader Deobandi community and is well-positioned to obtain information on activities of Deobandi-linked terrorist/extremist groups such as SSP and JeM. He has not/not previously shared such extensive information with post about these groups’ activities in Faisalabad. Post believes he has done so on this occasion largely out of concern for his and other moderate Deobandi leaders’ safety if these groups expand activities in Faislabad. The significant decline in the Pakistani textile industry and accompanying large-scale lay-offs in Faisalabad –the center of that industry in Punjab — provides groups like SSP with a ready pool of unemployed recruits, who are susceptible to these groups’ rhetoric about an Islamic utopia based on Sharia and prepared to engage in violence to bring it about. End Comment. HUNT “ REFERENCE: 2009: Was Qaddafi funding Sipahe Sahaba? 26th May, 2011 http://dawn.com/2011/05/26/2009-was-qaddafi-funding-sipahe-sahaba/
