Kamran Khan [Jang Group]'s Malicious campaign against ISI.

Jang Group particularly Mr Mahmood Sham (Group Editor Daily Jang), Mr Shaheen Sehbai (Group Editor The News International), Mr Kamran Khan (Senior Correspondent Jang/The News and GEO TV) and Mr Rauf Klasra (Senior Correspondent Jang/The News International) played a very dirty role after the murder of US Journlaist Daniel Pearl in Karachi in 2002. This very same Jang Group/GEO TV is now lecturing Pakistanis for Peace with India had itself launched a Vilification Campaign againt PPP and raised doubts on the Patiroitsm and Loyalty of PPP and President Asif Ali Zardari when they tried to formulate a policy on ISI, Kerry Lugar Bill, No First Strike, and Dialogues wih India. Now read what Jang and Times of India have jointly been saying and Jang Group/GEO TV/The News International have introduced a permanent link on their websites to promote Pakistan-India Peace. Now read as to how Kamran Khan with malafide intent involves Pakistan Army/ISI with Militants while giving an Interview to FRONTLINE PBS an American Public Affairs News Organization.

"QUOTE"

Kamran Khan - He is a Pakistani journalist and special correspondent for the Washington Post, based in Karachi. He maintains that Al Qaeda definitely moved into the tribal areas of Pakistan after the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, but that Pakistani officials deny it because they fear U.S. intervention. He argues that at the same time Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has allied himself with the U.S., he also has made an "unwritten compromise" to give more political power to Pakistani Islamist groups. This interview was conducted on Sept. 13, 2002.

Let's talk about Al Qaeda since Sept. 11, and what happened to them.

It has been bruised. It has been hurt, definitely. It lost the main hideout it had. It has lost the main sanctuary. There has been a tremendous blow to the prestige of the organization. So it's a wounded tiger, I would say.


[Is it] even still an organization?

I believe that it's an organization, as long as Osama bin Laden is alive, as long as Ayman al-Zawahiri is alive, as long as the other key players are still alive. I think, as an organization, Al Qaeda is still alive.


You think top leaders still in place?

Yes, Ayman al-Zawahiri is alive; Osama bin Laden is alive. If you talk about the cause and the motives of the organization, Mullah Omar is alive. We have new characters, new players in the game. ...


Many think, after 9/11, Al Qaeda went to the tribal areas [of Pakistan]. What you know about that?

Definitely they did. Definitely. The whole of Al Qaeda's moved into Pakistan. First they moved into the tribal areas. Pretty much they are there -- even today they are there. There is pretty strong evidence available to suggest that some of the Arabs who speak local native language, the Pashto, that wear native dresses, they look like native people. They are the guest of tribal people in South Waziristan and North Waziristan. I've been meeting people who know it for sure in their own areas --there are Arabs living there as guests of some tribal people.



I would think that some people in the government may also know, have some ideas. But as long as these people are not creating trouble and they are just sitting quiet, the government are not ready to confront them. They don't want to create a problem for themselves. So they moved into tribal areas, and then they moved into major cities, urban areas.

The greatest manifestation was the arrest in March this year of Abu Zubaydah in Faisalabad. The key players of Al Qaeda [were] in Faisalabad -- Abu Zubaydah and at least 11 Al Qaeda-ers. Faisalabad is a place -- it won't strike you at the first place that they are hiding at the central Punjab somewhere. So that shows that, yes, they moved across border into Pakistan. They moved into tribal areas, and from there they are now moving towards the cities. And we have very credible info that many of the Arabs were hiding in Karachi and in Lahore; maybe other places. ...

What is it about the tribal areas? I mean, people watching this program don't know what these tribal areas are or what they represent. What is it about these places that makes them such a good hiding place for Al Qaeda?

They are often categorized as semi-autonomous areas. But for all practical purpose, before 9/11, they were autonomous areas. There was no law there. The law was gun and drugs. These people trade in gun and guns only. There was no other thing. Maybe smuggling. So it was a lawless terrain, completely out of Pakistan's control.

These people don't accept any laws. They didn't even accept the Durand Line, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They never had any travel documents to go into Afghanistan or coming back from there. So there are tremendous linkages there. These people have no law, no Pakistani law, government.


And they're in the same tribe as the Taliban?

Yes, in most cases. There are different types, but they share the area. They share the terrain. They share the culture, and they all share a very deep, religious leanings. They consider themselves ultra-religious people. Yes, the rest would like to call them the sheer fundamentalists.


We sent someone with a camera and a list of questions into [the tribal areas] recently. He asked questions of tribal leaders and whatnot, on the record, on camera. And they said, "No, we support the government. We are not going to harbor Al Qaeda." Why would they say that to us and say something different?

No, they are very intelligent people; don't consider them a [naÔve] tribesman and all. They are very intelligent people. They are talking to an American TV crew. They are not stupid. ...

They are serious about the business, what they are doing. There is a fire of remains and settling score with the Americans. Nobody should doubt that at all. That's why you see this activity in the east and in the south and southeast in Afghanistan. It can be that whatever is happening there is not indigenous Afghan reaction. There has to be some sanctuary across the border. There has to be some supplies from across the border. If nothing, some hideouts. ...

The basic thing, the bottom line with Pakistan is that they don't want to have an armed rebellion in the tribal areas. They don't want to take things to a limit where there is an armed rebellion, and there can be, because these people are armed to the teeth. They have heavy machine guns, they have got artillery, they have got light artillery, they have got tremendous amount of firepower with them. So the government of Pakistan is not really to challenge them. ...


So what about the war on terrorism and the coalition and cooperation with the United States?

It will continue. It will continue, but not at the cost of internal strife. Not at the cost of creating anarchy within Pakistan. Not at the cost of creating chaos within Pakistan. Not at the cost of creating the rebellion from the very strong religious lobby in Pakistan.

Mind you, this is the army is half a million, a very, very religious [faction]. I mean, these people are very religious. They cannot stand to any notion that the government or army is challenging the people who are religious people, who are religiously motivated people. So the army and the government, General Musharraf, has to be very cautious. That's why he's walking on a very tight rope. ...


What was [Abu Zubaydah] doing in Faisalabad?

He was just hiding there. They were having a very low profile there. They didn't have weapons, a lot of weapons, with them. They why they wanted to just stay cool there and waiting for their chance to react. ...


They've also come to Karachi, and we had an event here [on Sept. 11. 2002]. What happened?

There were many, many incidents there. The incident two days ago in Karachi, there was an information from neighborhood to the police that there are some suspicious people living here. Police did some reconnaissance, and then they went for a raid early morning Sept. 11. They faced fierce resistance from these guys. They are all definite Al Qaedas in the sense that they are Tajiks and they are Central Asians and two Arabs and all.


And Yemeni, apparently?

Yes. That's an Arab or Yemeni.


Have you received any briefings letting you know what's going on in that case?

They are still questioning these guys. But they have been told that, "We ran from Afghanistan and for the hideout. For us, this is a Muslim country."

Whenever these people are caught, they always play Islamic card. They always play a Muslim card. They like to influence their interrogators, and in many cases, they successfully do that. ...

They say that, "We have devoted our lives to Islam and Quran and Allah. So what problem do you have with us?" They usually ask their interrogators, and these people are very confident.

In most cases, they say, "You can kill us. No problem." That really baffles their interrogators, because if they are questioning a person who is ready to die, who says, "[If] you release me, you leave me, I'll go and I'll hit again." So that really baffled because an interrogator, to go to an extent to use a third degree, which may put some fear in the person he's interrogating that maybe he'll be killed. But these guys say, "Do whatever." These are very, very hard nuts. You can't make them speak without the third-degree measures, which are quite common in Pakistan, you know.


In terms of nationality, who are these people that are coming out of Afghanistan since October and coming to the tribal areas, coming to Faisalabad, coming to Karachi? What nationality are we talking [about]?

Mostly Arabs. Yemenis, I would say, Saudis, some Kuwaitis, some Palestinians.


Gulf Arabs?

Yes, yes, yes. And of course, Pakistanis, and of course, Afghanis, Chechens.


Are they going home? Are they going down to Karachi in order to catch a boat or--

Yes. Basically, it's not stationed to plot more action. These people at the moment who have escaped from Afghanistan -- I'm talking about the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, which escaped from Afghanistan -- is looking for a hideout. It's on the run.

We can't say that they're sitting quiet and they are plotting, and they have been successful and all. We can't say that. They are on the run. They really fear that they may be caught any days. There is a great degree of mistrust in the ranks, because they think that the information going out, these raids and stuff, these arrests and all, it may be coming in from within their ranks. So there is some mistrust. But it's not a very, very well-entrenched organized force at the moment. ...


Any evidence that they're leaving Pakistan and going back to the Gulf?

Yes, yes, yes. There has been, yes. The some people who have their passports intact and all, these people have left and have gone off to Dubai. I understand that some people took also boats from Karachi and went off to the to U.A.E. There are several ports in the U.A.E. which you can access without being severely monitored.


Also, what about Iran?

Iran, of course. I understand that soon after October raids, there was a request made by some key Arabs to the Iranians in asking for passage. There is a Islamic code under which when some Muslims ask you for passage, you are obliged to provide that passage. I understand through a key U.A.E. diplomat that that passage was provided in the early days, and some people really went out. ...


There is talk we've heard that some of the major madrassas in Pakistan have harbored Al Qaeda -- the Haqqania Madrassa up near Peshawar, but also the Binori Madrassa here in Karachi.

I would think that not in the madrassas premises; there's a major intelligence penetration in these madrassas.


The ISI is in the Binori Madrassa?

Yes, yes, yes. They know what's going on there. But at the same time, you must understand that some of the key people are already with the ISI. I mean, they report back to the ISI. Maybe they are in the forefront of the anti-U.S. campaign or whatever--


So some of the Islamists are inside the ISI? And the ISI is looking--

And they report back to the ISI, yes, yes.


How does that work?

It works quite good, yes. I think that they have a very reliable penetration source of information. The bottom line here is that, "Look. Whatever you are doing, whatever you do, we understand. But mind you, we cannot afford to harbor Arabs here. We cannot afford to harbor non-Pakistanis here. So please, please cooperate with us on that count." There is a very deep connections between the religious madrassas, and the key religious scholars, and the establishment. ...


Doesn't President Musharraf need the Islamists in order to prosecute the Indians? Doesn't he need them to keep pressure on the Indians in Kashmir?

Absolutely.


So he can't offend these groups that are akin to Al Qaeda in their sympathies?

By all means. ... It's also because there are 50,000 strong, militant, armed people. That most of these people have deep connections with the establishment, with the security--


Security -- ISI?

--operators of Pakistan, the security operators, yes. The intelligence agencies. And they just can't do things which may provoke them, and which may create an internal rebellion of sorts. Not only that. Of course, these people have devoted themselves to jihad in India, at least, to jihad in Kashmir. ...

A lot of Pakistani security people say that no country has such a tremendous fifth column. You have 50,000 armed people who are ready to give their lives without asking for any favor or anything. These motivated people are an asset for any country with such a massive, such a big enemy. And with such a major problem boiling there. Of course, yes.


So can Americans trust Musharraf to crack down on his own people to rat out terrorists in Pakistan?


I don't know, because my perception is the Americans are basically interested in Al Qaeda -- people who were in Afghanistan, who have an anti-West, anti-America agenda. I'm not sure if the U.S. is really terribly interested about the people who were fighting in Kashmir. ...


Yes, but the Americans are concerned, [about] if you have good connections inside the ISI, inside this government. And you're telling me that the government or that the Pakistani militant groups, the fifth column, if you will, is serving as a sort of bed and breakfast for Al Qaeda.

In some cases, yes. But there has been a very intense pressure from the government on these groups -- I would say not pressure, but lobbying -- trying to convince these guys that, "Please don't have connections with Al Qaeda. Please don't have ties with Al Qaeda."

We have reasons to believe that the key jihadi organizations at their top level have severed their ties. Or they are not really to have connection, ties, with the Arabs, but maybe some breakaway factions doing this.


Kind of a messy situation to untangle, if you've got Al Qaeda and these jihadi groups being tight before 9/11, and now, after 9/11, the Americans pressure Musharraf to sort of untangle this mess. It's not something that gets done overnight.

It's very complicated. It's very complicated. It's a very difficult message to convey to these jihadis. But for these jihadi organizations, the focus is Kashmir. The agenda is Kashmir. And they have been told that, "If you have the focus on Kashmir, then you better not compromise your cause." ...

I think that the government is really satisfied that those groups now understand the language, and they don't want to be involved in any active anti-U.S. terrorist operation.


So the line is something like this: If you're fighting India, you're a freedom fighter. If you're fighting the Americans, you're a terrorist?

They have been told that you have been fighting as a freedom fighter in Kashmir, then no problem. It all started in 1990. Since 1990 until September 2001, there was no problem. There was no severe pressure on Pakistan to cut ties with these groups, to rein in these groups. There was some whispers here and there. But nothing serious. That's why it all continued here.


Why should the Pakistanis fight America's war for it?

For its own survival, for the economic reasons, to stay viable. If the country is facing economic crunch before 9/11, and also because General Musharraf, a military leader, wants legitimacy. He wants to survive. He wants to continue as the leader of the country. There are plenty of reasons.


I'm surprised that you think that Al Qaeda has any capability. My sense is that there's only a few hundred guys, they're scattered, they're in a defensive position and aren't in any position to be offensive.

That's very correct. But it doesn't mean that it's a dead organization, it cannot react, it will not react or whatever. The people who are on the run are basically who were in Afghanistan. But the sleepers, the sleeper cells all over the world -- it's not a very tightly knitted organization.

We are talking about people who floated around, who went to Afghanistan and returned back to these places. But these are people who are now self-energized, self-motivated. You don't need a central order to act from Osama bin Laden. So we are talking about loose sleeper cells all over the world.

Even before 9/11, I used to talk [to] people who are supposed to know all that. And they used to say very much before 9/11, that these people are not restricted to Afghanistan. ...


We talked to General Taj of the Frontier Corps in Peshawar. He contradicts you on the tribal areas. He says there's no Al Qaeda.

This is his job.


It's his job to say there's no Al Qaeda in tribal areas?

Absolutely. Because if now, the tribal area belongs to Al Qaeda, it means a direct American intervention. Americans would go mad. They'll say that "Yes, but you also agree with us, you must move fast. Otherwise, we'll come. We are coming. We're going to bomb these places out." So this is crucial for Pakistan to negate this impression that there are any Al Qaeda in Pakistan. ...


What do you know about the decision to let the FBI operate in the tribal areas? That must have been a difficult negotiation.

Oh, yes. But they always say that it's part of the 9/11 agreement which Pakistan had with the U.S., which included providing intelligence, allowing intelligence, technical facilities. They say that allowing Americans to have technical access in Pakistan.

But that's what the repeated assertion is from the government of Pakistan and President Musharraf also, that these people -- yes, they are doing something in tribal areas and other areas. But their work is restricted to technical cooperation.


Well, we know that the troops, the [U.S.] Special Forces come across the border, because the border's not demarcated.

That's right, yes.


Clearly, they're patrolling inside the Pakistani [territory].

Special Forces, they come and they say that "We don't know [whether] this was Pakistan or Afghanistan or whatever." They come and go and they come and go. Pakistan also allowed this to happen, because it gives them some leverage against the tribal leaders. They tell them, "Look. If you don't listen to the Americans, I'm going to come."

Three months ago, about four months ago basically, the tribal leaders were called and told that if you don't listen to the Americans, they are going to bomb you out here. And so you must understand this. That's why this very intelligent face from the tribal leaders. "No, no, no Al Qaedas, no, not at all. We do not provide any shelter. There's nothing."


How come reporters can't go into this area anymore?

Reporters can go. But the government says that we cannot guarantee your safety.


But they won't let me past a roadblock.

Yes. They would say that you have to have a government permission, a written government permission to--


A non-objection certificate?

Yes, that's right, yes.


But I can't get a non-objection certificate.

Yes, because they think that if you go inside, you'll be kidnapped, and you'll be made another Daniel Pearl.


You think that's true?

Partly, yes.


You think it's true that if I went into the--

You run a great risk if you go inside there. Sure. ...


No question in your mind that Al Qaeda has used those tribal areas as a sanctuary?

A sanctuary? Yes, absolutely, yes. Definitely. Oh, sure. Yes.


There's this notion that Musharraf is holding onto power. He's quashing opposition parties. At the same time, that's creating a real valid viable opening for Islamist extremists in the country.

Except for very few months just after 9/11, the Pakistani establishment and army had never had a direct confrontation with the religious groups or religious bodies. ...

You won't find now the government having any crackdown against any of the religious groups or any religious political parties. The religious political parties are much freer today than the Pakistan People's Party, or Pakistan Muslims. Their leaders are much freer than the key, say, the former prime ministers and the former ministers of the government. And now, we don't find any fireworks from the religious parts against Musharraf. ...

I have reason to believe, that there is an unwritten compromise between these religious groups -- erstwhile anti-Musharraf religious parties, and the government. The religious group now are back in action and they are moving freely. They are participating in election. There is no restriction. There has not been a single key religious leader who has been debarred from contesting election. ...


You're saying Musharraf has managed to do the impossible -- to cozy up with the Americans, give the Americans want they want, and at the same time, give more political power and more political space to the radical extremist, to Islamist parties?

Excellent job. Excellent job. I'll give him full marks for that. He is an ally to the U.S. and the war against terrorism, and now the religious parties are also not saying anything against him. This is an ideal situation for him.


It sounds like Saudi Arabia. It sounds like the same sort of power-sharing arrangement that the Saudis have worked out -- loyal to the Americans but give the religious extremists full rein over certain parts of society.

It's a good comparison. I would say it's a good comparison. ...


Do you think President Bush knows what kind of arrangement that he's gotten himself into here?

Oh, sure. He does, but I think he cannot afford to disturb the situation. He just cannot afford to, because he doesn't know. Because if Musharraf goes, what comes next?


But if the Islamist parties become stronger, that's going to end up biting them back as well.

My sense is that the Islamic parties, though they have compromised with Musharraf, but they have not lost the focus. And the campaign at the moment is squarely anti-U.S., is squarely anti-war-against-terrorism. It is overwhelmingly pro-Taliban. It is overwhelmingly pro-Al Qaeda. But nobody's touching them. Nobody's questioning them.


So it just gives them time to regroup?

Yes. These rabble rousers are out there. I mean, look at their statements. Look at their public rallies. Yet, there's no restriction.


It's a funny place, this. I go around, I talk to people. They say, "We like the Americans, we like--"

This is the whole issue, you know. How can this work? How can you be an ally with the U.S., and you have the jihadi parties, you don't have that kind of a comfortable tie with the same government?


And who's the architect of this?

General Musharraf himself.

"UNQUOTE"

COURTESY: FRONTLINE PBS.

IN SEARCH OF AL-QAEDA -INTERVIEW KAMRAN KHAN

URL: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/search/interviews/khan.html

U.S. offers new role for Pakistan By Karen DeYoung

U.S. offers new role for Pakistan - A BROADER PARTNERSHIP Importance of country to Afghan effort recognized By Karen DeYoung Washington Post Staff Writer Monday, November 30, 2009

President Obama has offered Pakistan an expanded strategic partnership, including additional military and economic cooperation, while warning with unusual bluntness that its use of insurgent groups to pursue policy goals "cannot continue." The offer, including an effort to help reduce tensions between Pakistan and India, was contained in a two-page letter delivered to President Asif Ali Zardari this month by Obama national security adviser James L. Jones. It was accompanied by assurances from Jones that the United States will increase its military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan and that it plans no early withdrawal. Obama's speech Tuesday night at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., will address primarily the Afghanistan aspects of the strategy. But despite the public and political attention focused on the number of new troops, Pakistan has been the hot core of the months-long strategy review. The long-term consequences of failure there, the review concluded, far outweigh those in Afghanistan.

"We can't succeed without Pakistan," a senior administration official involved in the White House review said. "You have to differentiate between public statements and reality. There is nobody who is under any illusions about this."

This official and others, all of whom spoke about the closely held details of the new strategy on the condition of anonymity, emphasized that without "changing the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a new direction, you're not going to win in Afghanistan," as one put it. "And if you don't win in Afghanistan, then Pakistan will automatically be imperiled, and that will make Afghanistan look like child's play."

Proffered U.S. carrots, outlined during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's October visit to Islamabad, center on a far more comprehensive and long-term bilateral relationship. It would feature enhanced development and trade assistance; improved intelligence collaboration and a more secure and upgraded military equipment pipeline; more public praise and less public criticism of Pakistan; and an initiative to build greater regional cooperation among Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.

Obama called for closer collaboration against all extremist groups, and his letter named five: al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Pakistani Taliban organization known as Tehrik-e-Taliban. Using vague diplomatic language, he said that ambiguity in Pakistan's relationship with any of them could no longer be ignored.

Jones, a retired Marine Corps general, was more precise in conversations with top Pakistani government and military leaders, U.S. and foreign officials said, stating that certain things have to happen in Pakistan to ensure Afghanistan's security. If Pakistan cannot deliver, he warned, the United States may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan's western and southern borders with Afghanistan.

Current U.S. policy includes the use of missiles fired from unmanned drones on insurgent locations limited to roughly 50 miles inside the western border; training in two military camps for the Pakistani Frontier Corps; and intelligence exchanges. It prohibits kinetic, or active, operations by U.S. ground forces inside Pakistan.

While praising Pakistani military offensives against groups that pose a domestic threat -- primarily the alliance of groups known as Tehrik-e-Taliban, in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan -- Jones made it clear that the administration expects more.

The rollout of the new strategy is being coordinated with principal U.S. allies, including Britain, whose prime minister, Gordon Brown, said Sunday, "People are going to ask why, eight years after 2001, Osama bin Laden has never been near to being caught."

"Al-Qaeda has a base in Pakistan," Brown said in an interview with Sky News. "That base is still there -- they are able to recruit from abroad. The Pakistan authorities must convince us that they are taking all the action that is necessary to deal with that threat."

Expansion of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will require overcoming significant public and political mistrust in both countries. Officials said that they recognize the difficulty in delivering on either U.S. promises or threats, and that "our leverage over Pakistan is very limited," the senior administration official said.

At the same time, although the administration's goal is to demonstrate a new level and steadfastness of support, short-term U.S. demands may threaten Pakistan's already fragile political stability.

"It's going to be a game of cat-and-mouse with them for a while," another official said, adding that "what we're trying to do is to force them to recalculate" where their advantage lies.

The Pakistan strategy is complicated by a number of factors, including the fact that any indication of increased U.S. involvement there generates broad mistrust. Zardari's political weakness is an additional hazard for a new bilateral relationship. He is disliked by the military and is challenged by the political opposition and his own prime minister; he also remains under a cloud of long-standing corruption charges. Less than a third of Pakistan's population voices approval for him in polls. Obama is even less popular there, with approval ratings in the low double digits.

Many of the broad powers that Zardari assumed from his predecessor, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a 1999 military coup and was forced to resign last year, are being whittled away. On Friday, Zardari turned over control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal to Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, who is held in much higher favor by the military.

Zardari's Musharraf-era powers to fire the elected government and appoint top military officials are also under challenge, and a law protecting government officials from corruption prosecution expired Saturday. On Sunday, the leading political opposition group called for him to give up the additional powers, and Zardari, who had pledged to do so, said he will act "soon." The administration expects Zardari's position to continue to weaken, leaving him as a largely ceremonial president even if he manages to survive in office.

Senior U.S. officers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen, have made repeated relationship-building trips to Pakistan, and training programs in this country for Pakistani officers are expanding after being moribund for years.

U.S. officials have long referred to Pakistani military and intelligence officers who are sympathetic to or actively support insurgent groups fighting in Afghanistan as "rogue elements." More recently, they have described those relationships as more direct and institutional within a divided military. "For the things that we care about," a U.S. official said, "the real decision-maker is the military." It has long been hedging its bets in Afghanistan; the military has positioned itself to prevent inroads by India in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, and against a 30-year history of being used and then rejected by shifting U.S. policy aims.

"Our game is to convince them that our commitment to Afghanistan and the region is long-term," the official said of the military. "We're not going to pack up our bags and leave them as soon as we're done. We have to create a situation in which they see a much more positive interest in closer relations with us than they do in trying to play us. But it requires time."

India is skeptical of any U.S. involvement in its relationship with Pakistan. Bilateral attempts to resolve the long-standing border dispute in Kashmir were put on hold after last year's terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which were blamed on Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The group has long been active in the Kashmir conflict and is said to have close ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency.

Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh treaded carefully on the issue in public during Singh's state visit to Washington last week. "It is not the place of the United States to try to, from the outside, resolve all those conflicts," Obama said during their news conference here. "On the other hand, we want to be encouraging of ways in which both India and Pakistan can feel secure."

Correspondent Pamela Constable in Islamabad contributed to this report.

Karen J. DeYoung - Associate Editors; National Senior Diplomatic Correspondent Karen DeYoung, author of Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell, is senior diplomatic correspondent and an associate editor of The Washington Post. From 1990 to 1999, she served as assistant managing editor for national news, for 10 years directing the Post's award-winning coverage of the White House, Congress and national policies and politics as well as the paper's domestic bureaus. From 1977 through 1988, she worked for the foreign news operation, as bureau chief for Latin America, foreign editor, and bureau chief in London. DeYoung joined the Post in 1975 after working as a non-staff stringer in West Africa. She grew up in St. Petersburg, Florida and holds a degree in journalism and communications from the University of Florida. She lives with her husband and two children in Washington, D.C.

SOURCE: The Washington Post

URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/29/AR2009112902934.html

URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/29/AR2009112902934_2.html

Blackwater's Secret War in Pakistan by JEREMY SCAHILL

At a covert forward operating base run by the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, members of an elite division of Blackwater are at the center of a secret program in which they plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, "snatch and grabs" of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan, an investigation by The Nation has found. The Blackwater operatives also assist in gathering intelligence and help direct a secret US military drone bombing campaign that runs parallel to the well-documented CIA predator strikes, according to a well-placed source within the US military intelligence apparatus. The source, who has worked on covert US military programs for years, including in Afghanistan and Pakistan, has direct knowledge of Blackwater's involvement. He spoke to The Nation on condition of anonymity because the program is classified. The source said that the program is so "compartmentalized" that senior figures within the Obama administration and the US military chain of command may not be aware of its existence.

The White House did not return calls or email messages seeking comment for this story. Capt. John Kirby, the spokesperson for Adm. Michael Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told The Nation, "We do not discuss current operations one way or the other, regardless of their nature." A defense official, on background, specifically denied that Blackwater performs work on drone strikes or intelligence for JSOC in Pakistan. "We don't have any contracts to do that work for us. We don't contract that kind of work out, period," the official said. "There has not been, and is not now, contracts between JSOC and that organization for these types of services."

The previously unreported program, the military intelligence source said, is distinct from the CIA assassination program that the agency's director, Leon Panetta, announced he had canceled in June 2009. "This is a parallel operation to the CIA," said the source. "They are two separate beasts." The program puts Blackwater at the epicenter of a US military operation within the borders of a nation against which the United States has not declared war--knowledge that could further strain the already tense relations between the United States and Pakistan. In 2006, the United States and Pakistan struck a deal that authorized JSOC to enter Pakistan to hunt Osama bin Laden with the understanding that Pakistan would deny it had given permission. Officially, the United States is not supposed to have any active military operations in the country. Blackwater, which recently changed its name to Xe Services and US Training Center, denies the company is operating in Pakistan. "Xe Services has only one employee in Pakistan performing construction oversight for the U.S. Government," Blackwater spokesperson Mark Corallo said in a statement to The Nation, adding that the company has "no other operations of any kind in Pakistan."

A former senior executive at Blackwater confirmed the military intelligence source's claim that the company is working in Pakistan for the CIA and JSOC, the premier counterterrorism and covert operations force within the military. He said that Blackwater is also working for the Pakistani government on a subcontract with an Islamabad-based security firm that puts US Blackwater operatives on the ground with Pakistani forces in counter-terrorism operations, including house raids and border interdictions, in the North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere in Pakistan. This arrangement, the former executive said, allows the Pakistani government to utilize former US Special Operations forces who now work for Blackwater while denying an official US military presence in the country. He also confirmed that Blackwater has a facility in Karachi and has personnel deployed elsewhere in Pakistan. The former executive spoke on condition of anonymity.

His account and that of the military intelligence source were borne out by a US military source who has knowledge of Special Forces actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan. When asked about Blackwater's covert work for JSOC in Pakistan, this source, who also asked for anonymity, told The Nation, "From my information that I have, that is absolutely correct," adding, "There's no question that's occurring." "It wouldn't surprise me because we've outsourced nearly everything," said Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, who served as Secretary of State Colin Powell's chief of staff from 2002 to 2005, when told of Blackwater's role in Pakistan. Wilkerson said that during his time in the Bush administration, he saw the beginnings of Blackwater's involvement with the sensitive operations of the military and CIA. "Part of this, of course, is an attempt to get around the constraints the Congress has placed on DoD. If you don't have sufficient soldiers to do it, you hire civilians to do it. I mean, it's that simple. It would not surprise me."

The Counterterrorism Tag Team in Karachi

The covert JSOC program with Blackwater in Pakistan dates back to at least 2007, according to the military intelligence source. The current head of JSOC is Vice Adm. William McRaven, who took over the post from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who headed JSOC from 2003 to 2008 before being named the top US commander in Afghanistan. Blackwater's presence in Pakistan is "not really visible, and that's why nobody has cracked down on it," said the source. Blackwater's operations in Pakistan, he said, are not done through State Department contracts or publicly identified Defense contracts. "It's Blackwater via JSOC, and it's a classified no-bid [contract] approved on a rolling basis." The main JSOC/Blackwater facility in Karachi, according to the source, is nondescript: three trailers with various generators, satellite phones and computer systems are used as a makeshift operations center. "It's a very rudimentary operation," says the source. "I would compare it to [CIA] outposts in Kurdistan or any of the Special Forces outposts. It's very bare bones, and that's the point."

Blackwater's work for JSOC in Karachi is coordinated out of a Task Force based at Bagram Air Base in neighboring Afghanistan, according to the military intelligence source. While JSOC technically runs the operations in Karachi, he said, it is largely staffed by former US special operations soldiers working for a division of Blackwater, once known as Blackwater SELECT, and intelligence analysts working for a Blackwater affiliate, Total Intelligence Solutions (TIS), which is owned by Blackwater's founder, Erik Prince. The military source said that the name Blackwater SELECT may have been changed recently. Total Intelligence, which is run out of an office on the ninth floor of a building in the Ballston area of Arlington, Virginia, is staffed by former analysts and operatives from the CIA, DIA, FBI and other agencies. It is modeled after the CIA's counterterrorism center. In Karachi, TIS runs a "media-scouring/open-source network," according to the source. Until recently, Total Intelligence was run by two former top CIA officials, Cofer Black and Robert Richer, both of whom have left the company. In Pakistan, Blackwater is not using either its original name or its new moniker, Xe Services, according to the former Blackwater executive. "They are running most of their work through TIS because the other two [names] have such a stain on them," he said. Corallo, the Blackwater spokesperson, denied that TIS or any other division or affiliate of Blackwater has any personnel in Pakistan.

The US military intelligence source said that Blackwater's classified contracts keep getting renewed at the request of JSOC. Blackwater, he said, is already so deeply entrenched that it has become a staple of the US military operations in Pakistan. According to the former Blackwater executive, "The politics that go with the brand of BW is somewhat set aside because what you're doing is really one military guy to another." Blackwater's first known contract with the CIA for operations in Afghanistan was awarded in 2002 and was for work along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

One of the concerns raised by the military intelligence source is that some Blackwater personnel are being given rolling security clearances above their approved clearances. Using Alternative Compartmentalized Control Measures (ACCMs), he said, the Blackwater personnel are granted clearance to a Special Access Program, the bureaucratic term used to describe highly classified "black" operations. "With an ACCM, the security manager can grant access to you to be exposed to and operate within compartmentalized programs far above 'secret'--even though you have no business doing so," said the source. It allows Blackwater personnel that "do not have the requisite security clearance or do not hold a security clearance whatsoever to participate in classified operations by virtue of trust," he added. "Think of it as an ultra-exclusive level above top secret. That's exactly what it is: a circle of love." Blackwater, therefore, has access to "all source" reports that are culled in part from JSOC units in the field. "That's how a lot of things over the years have been conducted with contractors," said the source. "We have contractors that regularly see things that top policy-makers don't unless they ask." According to the source, Blackwater has effectively marketed itself as a company whose operatives have "conducted lethal direct action missions and now, for a price, you can have your own planning cell. JSOC just ate that up," he said, adding, "They have a sizable force in Pakistan--not for any nefarious purpose if you really want to look at it that way--but to support a legitimate contract that's classified for JSOC." Blackwater's Pakistan JSOC contracts are secret and are therefore shielded from public oversight, he said. The source is not sure when the arrangement with JSOC began, but he says that a spin-off of Blackwater SELECT "was issued a no-bid contract for support to shooters for a JSOC Task Force and they kept extending it." Some of the Blackwater personnel, he said, work undercover as aid workers. "Nobody even gives them a second thought."

The military intelligence source said that the Blackwater/JSOC Karachi operation is referred to as "Qatar cubed," in reference to the US forward operating base in Qatar that served as the hub for the planning and implementation of the US invasion of Iraq. "This is supposed to be the brave new world," he says. "This is the Jamestown of the new millennium and it's meant to be a lily pad. You can jump off to Uzbekistan, you can jump back over the border, you can jump sideways, you can jump northwest. It's strategically located so that they can get their people wherever they have to without having to wrangle with the military chain of command in Afghanistan, which is convoluted. They don't have to deal with that because they're operating under a classified mandate."

In addition to planning drone strikes and operations against suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Pakistan for both JSOC and the CIA, the Blackwater team in Karachi also helps plan missions for JSOC inside Uzbekistan against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, according to the military intelligence source. Blackwater does not actually carry out the operations, he said, which are executed on the ground by JSOC forces. "That piqued my curiosity and really worries me because I don't know if you noticed but I was never told we are at war with Uzbekistan," he said. "So, did I miss something, did Rumsfeld come back into power?"

Pakistan's Military Contracting Maze

Blackwater, according to the military intelligence source, is not doing the actual killing as part of its work in Pakistan. "The SELECT personnel are not going into places with private aircraft and going after targets," he said. "It's not like Blackwater SELECT people are running around assassinating people." Instead, US Special Forces teams carry out the plans developed in part by Blackwater. The military intelligence source drew a distinction between the Blackwater operatives who work for the State Department, which he calls "Blackwater Vanilla," and the seasoned Special Forces veterans who work on the JSOC program. "Good or bad, there's a small number of people who know how to pull off an operation like that. That's probably a good thing," said the source. "It's the Blackwater SELECT people that have and continue to plan these types of operations because they're the only people that know how and they went where the money was. It's not trigger-happy fucks, like some of the PSD [Personal Security Detail] guys. These are not people that believe that Barack Obama is a socialist, these are not people that kill innocent civilians. They're very good at what they do."

The former Blackwater executive, when asked for confirmation that Blackwater forces were not actively killing people in Pakistan, said, "that's not entirely accurate." While he concurred with the military intelligence source's description of the JSOC and CIA programs, he pointed to another role Blackwater is allegedly playing in Pakistan, not for the US government but for Islamabad. According to the executive, Blackwater works on a subcontract for Kestral Logistics, a powerful Pakistani firm, which specializes in military logistical support, private security and intelligence consulting. It is staffed with former high-ranking Pakistani army and government officials. While Kestral's main offices are in Pakistan, it also has branches in several other countries.

A spokesperson for the US State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), which is responsible for issuing licenses to US corporations to provide defense-related services to foreign governments or entities, would neither confirm nor deny for The Nation that Blackwater has a license to work in Pakistan or to work with Kestral. "We cannot help you," said department spokesperson David McKeeby after checking with the relevant DDTC officials. "You'll have to contact the companies directly." Blackwater's Corallo said the company has "no operations of any kind" in Pakistan other than the one employee working for the DoD. Kestral did not respond to inquiries from The Nation.

According to federal lobbying records, Kestral recently hired former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega, who served in that post from 2003 to 2005, to lobby the US government, including the State Department, USAID and Congress, on foreign affairs issues "regarding [Kestral's] capabilities to carry out activities of interest to the United States." Noriega was hired through his firm, Vision Americas, which he runs with Christina Rocca, a former CIA operations official who served as assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs from 2001 to 2006 and was deeply involved in shaping US policy toward Pakistan. In October 2009, Kestral paid Vision Americas $15,000 and paid a Vision Americas-affiliated firm, Firecreek Ltd., an equal amount to lobby on defense and foreign policy issues.

For years, Kestral has done a robust business in defense logistics with the Pakistani government and other nations, as well as top US defense companies. Blackwater owner Erik Prince is close with Kestral CEO Liaquat Ali Baig, according to the former Blackwater executive. "Ali and Erik have a pretty close relationship," he said. "They've met many times and struck a deal, and they [offer] mutual support for one another." Working with Kestral, he said, Blackwater has provided convoy security for Defense Department shipments destined for Afghanistan that would arrive in the port at Karachi. Blackwater, according to the former executive, would guard the supplies as they were transported overland from Karachi to Peshawar and then west through the Torkham border crossing, the most important supply route for the US military in Afghanistan.

According to the former executive, Blackwater operatives also integrate with Kestral's forces in sensitive counterterrorism operations in the North-West Frontier Province, where they work in conjunction with the Pakistani Interior Ministry's paramilitary force, known as the Frontier Corps (alternately referred to as "frontier scouts"). The Blackwater personnel are technically advisers, but the former executive said that the line often gets blurred in the field. Blackwater "is providing the actual guidance on how to do [counterterrorism operations] and Kestral's folks are carrying a lot of them out, but they're having the guidance and the overwatch from some BW guys that will actually go out with the teams when they're executing the job," he said. "You can see how that can lead to other things in the border areas." He said that when Blackwater personnel are out with the Pakistani teams, sometimes its men engage in operations against suspected terrorists. "You've got BW guys that are assisting... and they're all going to want to go on the jobs--so they're going to go with them," he said. "So, the things that you're seeing in the news about how this Pakistani military group came in and raided this house or did this or did that--in some of those cases, you're going to have Western folks that are right there at the house, if not in the house." Blackwater, he said, is paid by the Pakistani government through Kestral for consulting services. "That gives the Pakistani government the cover to say, 'Hey, no, we don't have any Westerners doing this. It's all local and our people are doing it.' But it gets them the expertise that Westerners provide for [counterterrorism]-related work." The military intelligence source confirmed Blackwater works with the Frontier Corps, saying, "There's no real oversight. It's not really on people's radar screen." In October, in response to Pakistani news reports that a Kestral warehouse in Islamabad was being used to store heavy weapons for Blackwater, the US Embassy in Pakistan released a statement denying the weapons were being used by "a private American security contractor." The statement said, "Kestral Logistics is a private logistics company that handles the importation of equipment and supplies provided by the United States to the Government of Pakistan. All of the equipment and supplies were imported at the request of the Government of Pakistan, which also certified the shipments."

Who is Behind the Drone Attacks?

Since President Barack Obama was inaugurated, the United States has expanded drone bombing raids in Pakistan. Obama first ordered a drone strike against targets in North and South Waziristan on January 23, and the strikes have been conducted consistently ever since. The Obama administration has now surpassed the number of Bush-era strikes in Pakistan and has faced fierce criticism from Pakistan and some US lawmakers over civilian deaths. A drone attack in June killed as many as sixty people attending a Taliban funeral.

In August, the New York Times reported that Blackwater works for the CIA at "hidden bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the company's contractors assemble and load Hellfire missiles and 500-pound laser-guided bombs on remotely piloted Predator aircraft." In February, The Times of London obtained a satellite image of a secret CIA airbase in Shamsi, in Pakistan's southwestern province of Baluchistan, showing three drone aircraft. The New York Times also reported that the agency uses a secret base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, to strike in Pakistan.

The military intelligence source says that the drone strike that reportedly killed Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, his wife and his bodyguards in Waziristan in August was a CIA strike, but that many others attributed in media reports to the CIA are actually JSOC strikes. "Some of these strikes are attributed to OGA [Other Government Agency, intelligence parlance for the CIA], but in reality it's JSOC and their parallel program of UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] because they also have access to UAVs. So when you see some of these hits, especially the ones with high civilian casualties, those are almost always JSOC strikes." The Pentagon has stated bluntly, "There are no US military strike operations being conducted in Pakistan." The military intelligence source also confirmed that Blackwater continues to work for the CIA on its drone bombing program in Pakistan, as previously reported in the New York Times, but added that Blackwater is working on JSOC's drone bombings as well. "It's Blackwater running the program for both CIA and JSOC," said the source. When civilians are killed, "people go, 'Oh, it's the CIA doing crazy shit again unchecked.' Well, at least 50 percent of the time, that's JSOC [hitting] somebody they've identified through HUMINT [human intelligence] or they've culled the intelligence themselves or it's been shared with them and they take that person out and that's how it works."

The military intelligence source says that the CIA operations are subject to Congressional oversight, unlike the parallel JSOC bombings. "Targeted killings are not the most popular thing in town right now and the CIA knows that," he says. "Contractors and especially JSOC personnel working under a classified mandate are not [overseen by Congress], so they just don't care. If there's one person they're going after and there's thirty-four people in the building, thirty-five people are going to die. That's the mentality." He added, "They're not accountable to anybody and they know that. It's an open secret, but what are you going to do, shut down JSOC?"

In addition to working on covert action planning and drone strikes, Blackwater SELECT also provides private guards to perform the sensitive task of security for secret US drone bases, JSOC camps and Defense Intelligence Agency camps inside Pakistan, according to the military intelligence source.

Mosharraf Zaidi, a well-known Pakistani journalist who has served as a consultant for the UN and European Union in Pakistan and Afghanistan, says that the Blackwater/JSOC program raises serious questions about the norms of international relations. "The immediate question is, How do you define the active pursuit of military objectives in a country with which not only have you not declared war but that is supposedly a front-line non-NATO ally in the US struggle to contain extremist violence coming out of Afghanistan and the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan?" asks Zaidi, who is currently a columnist for The News, the biggest English-language daily in Pakistan. "Let's forget Blackwater for a second. What this is confirming is that there are US military operations in Pakistan that aren't about logistics or getting food to Bagram; that are actually about the exercise of physical violence, physical force inside of Pakistani territory."

JSOC: Rumsfeld and Cheney's Extra Special Force

Colonel Wilkerson said that he is concerned that with General McChrystal's elevation as the military commander of the Afghan war--which is increasingly seeping into Pakistan--there is a concomitant rise in JSOC's power and influence within the military structure. "I don't see how you can escape that; it's just a matter of the way the authority flows and the power flows, and it's inevitable, I think," Wilkerson told The Nation. He added, "I'm alarmed when I see execute orders and combat orders that go out saying that the supporting force is Central Command and the supported force is Special Operations Command," under which JSOC operates. "That's backward. But that's essentially what we have today." From 2003 to 2008 McChrystal headed JSOC, which is headquartered at Pope Air Force Base and Fort Bragg in North Carolina, where Blackwater's 7,000-acre operating base is also situated. JSOC controls the Army's Delta Force, the Navy's SEAL Team 6, as well as the Army's 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and the Air Force's 24th Special Tactics Squadron. JSOC performs strike operations, reconnaissance in denied areas and special intelligence missions. Blackwater, which was founded by former Navy SEALs, employs scores of veteran Special Forces operators--which several former military officials pointed to as the basis for Blackwater's alleged contracts with JSOC.

Since 9/11, many top-level Special Forces veterans have taken up employment with private firms, where they can make more money doing the highly specialized work they did in uniform. "The Blackwater individuals have the experience. A lot of these individuals are retired military, and they've been around twenty to thirty years and have experience that the younger Green Beret guys don't," said retired Army Lieut. Col. Jeffrey Addicott, a well-connected military lawyer who served as senior legal counsel for US Army Special Forces. "They're known entities. Everybody knows who they are, what their capabilities are, and they've got the experience. They're very valuable."

"They make much more money being the smarts of these operations, planning hits in various countries and basing it off their experience in Chechnya, Bosnia, Somalia, Ethiopia," said the military intelligence source. "They were there for all of these things, they know what the hell they're talking about. And JSOC has unfortunately lost the institutional capability to plan within, so they hire back people that used to work for them and had already planned and executed these [types of] operations. They hired back people that jumped over to Blackwater SELECT and then pay them exorbitant amounts of money to plan future operations. It's a ridiculous revolving door."

While JSOC has long played a central role in US counterterrorism and covert operations, military and civilian officials who worked at the Defense and State Departments during the Bush administration described in interviews with The Nation an extremely cozy relationship that developed between the executive branch (primarily through Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld) and JSOC. During the Bush era, Special Forces turned into a virtual stand-alone operation that acted outside the military chain of command and in direct coordination with the White House. Throughout the Bush years, it was largely General McChrystal who ran JSOC. "What I was seeing was the development of what I would later see in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Special Operations forces would operate in both theaters without the conventional commander even knowing what they were doing," said Colonel Wilkerson. "That's dangerous, that's very dangerous. You have all kinds of mess when you don't tell the theater commander what you're doing." Wilkerson said that almost immediately after assuming his role at the State Department under Colin Powell, he saw JSOC being politicized and developing a close relationship with the executive branch. He saw this begin, he said, after his first Delta Force briefing at Fort Bragg. "I think Cheney and Rumsfeld went directly into JSOC. I think they went into JSOC at times, perhaps most frequently, without the SOCOM [Special Operations] commander at the time even knowing it.

The receptivity in JSOC was quite good," says Wilkerson. "I think Cheney was actually giving McChrystal instructions, and McChrystal was asking him for instructions." He said the relationship between JSOC and Cheney and Rumsfeld "built up initially because Rumsfeld didn't get the responsiveness. He didn't get the can-do kind of attitude out of the SOCOM commander, and so as Rumsfeld was wont to do, he cut him out and went straight to the horse's mouth. At that point you had JSOC operating as an extension of the [administration] doing things the executive branch--read: Cheney and Rumsfeld--wanted it to do. This would be more or less carte blanche. You need to do it, do it. It was very alarming for me as a conventional soldier." Wilkerson said the JSOC teams caused diplomatic problems for the United States across the globe. "When these teams started hitting capital cities and other places all around the world, [Rumsfeld] didn't tell the State Department either. The only way we found out about it is our ambassadors started to call us and say, 'Who the hell are these six-foot-four white males with eighteen-inch biceps walking around our capital cities?' So we discovered this, we discovered one in South America, for example, because he actually murdered a taxi driver, and we had to get him out of there real quick. We rendered him--we rendered him home."

As part of their strategy, Rumsfeld and Cheney also created the Strategic Support Branch (SSB), which pulled intelligence resources from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA for use in sensitive JSOC operations. The SSB was created using "reprogrammed" funds "without explicit congressional authority or appropriation," according to the Washington Post. The SSB operated outside the military chain of command and circumvented the CIA's authority on clandestine operations. Rumsfeld created it as part of his war to end "near total dependence on CIA." Under US law, the Defense Department is required to report all deployment orders to Congress. But guidelines issued in January 2005 by former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone stated that Special Operations forces may "conduct clandestine HUMINT operations...before publication" of a deployment order. This effectively gave Rumsfeld unilateral control over clandestine operations. The military intelligence source said that when Rumsfeld was defense secretary, JSOC was deployed to commit some of the "darkest acts" in part to keep them concealed from Congress. "Everything can be justified as a military operation versus a clandestine intelligence performed by the CIA, which has to be informed to Congress," said the source. "They were aware of that and they knew that, and they would exploit it at every turn and they took full advantage of it. They knew they could act extra-legally and nothing would happen because A, it was sanctioned by DoD at the highest levels, and B, who was going to stop them? They were preparing the battlefield, which was on all of the PowerPoints: 'Preparing the Battlefield.'" The significance of the flexibility of JSOC's operations inside Pakistan versus the CIA's is best summed up by Senator Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "Every single intelligence operation and covert action must be briefed to the Congress," she said. "If they are not, that is a violation of the law."

Blackwater: Company Non Grata in Pakistan

For months, the Pakistani media has been flooded with stories about Blackwater's alleged growing presence in the country. For the most part, these stories have been ignored by the US press and denounced as lies or propaganda by US officials in Pakistan. But the reality is that, although many of the stories appear to be wildly exaggerated, Pakistanis have good reason to be concerned about Blackwater's operations in their country. It is no secret in Washington or Islamabad that Blackwater has been a central part of the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan and that the company has been involved--almost from the beginning of the "war on terror"--with clandestine US operations. Indeed, Blackwater is accepting applications for contractors fluent in Urdu and Punjabi. The US Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, has denied Blackwater's presence in the country, stating bluntly in September, "Blackwater is not operating in Pakistan." In her trip to Pakistan in October, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dodged questions from the Pakistani press about Blackwater's rumored Pakistani operations. Pakistan's interior minister, Rehman Malik, said on November 21 he will resign if Blackwater is found operating anywhere in Pakistan.

The Christian Science Monitor recently reported that Blackwater "provides security for a US-backed aid project" in Peshawar, suggesting the company may be based out of the Pearl Continental, a luxury hotel the United States reportedly is considering purchasing to use as a consulate in the city. "We have no contracts in Pakistan," Blackwater spokesperson Stacey DeLuke said recently. "We've been blamed for all that has gone wrong in Peshawar, none of which is true, since we have absolutely no presence there."

Reports of Blackwater's alleged presence in Karachi and elsewhere in the country have been floating around the Pakistani press for months. Hamid Mir, a prominent Pakistani journalist who rose to fame after his 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden, claimed in a recent interview that Blackwater is in Karachi. "The US [intelligence] agencies think that a number of Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders are hiding in Karachi and Peshawar," he said. "That is why [Blackwater] agents are operating in these two cities." Ambassador Patterson has said that the claims of Mir and other Pakistani journalists are "wildly incorrect," saying they had compromised the security of US personnel in Pakistan. On November 20 the Washington Times, citing three current and former US intelligence officials, reported that Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, has "found refuge from potential U.S. attacks" in Karachi "with the assistance of Pakistan's intelligence service."

In September, the Pakistani press covered a report on Blackwater allegedly submitted by Pakistan's intelligence agencies to the federal interior ministry. In the report, the intelligence agencies reportedly allege that Blackwater was provided houses by a federal minister who is also helping them clear shipments of weapons and vehicles through Karachi's Port Qasim on the coast of the Arabian Sea. The military intelligence source did not confirm this but did say, "The port jives because they have a lot of [former] SEALs and they would revert to what they know: the ocean, instead of flying stuff in."

The Nation cannot independently confirm these allegations and has not seen the Pakistani intelligence report. But according to Pakistani press coverage, the intelligence report also said Blackwater has acquired "bungalows" in the Defense Housing Authority in the city. According to the DHA website, it is a large residential estate originally established "for the welfare of the serving and retired officers of the Armed Forces of Pakistan." Its motto is: "Home for Defenders." The report alleges Blackwater is receiving help from local government officials in Karachi and is using vehicles with license plates traditionally assigned to members of the national and provincial assemblies, meaning local law enforcement will not stop them.

The use of private companies like Blackwater for sensitive operations such as drone strikes or other covert work undoubtedly comes with the benefit of plausible deniability that places an additional barrier in an already deeply flawed system of accountability. When things go wrong, it's the contractors' fault, not the government's. But the widespread use of contractors also raises serious legal questions, particularly when they are a part of lethal, covert actions. "We are using contractors for things that in the past might have been considered to be a violation of the Geneva Convention," said Lt. Col. Addicott, who now runs the Center for Terrorism Law at St. Mary's University School of Law in San Antonio, Texas. "In my opinion, we have pressed the envelope to the breaking limit, and it's almost a fiction that these guys are not in offensive military operations." Addicott added, "If we were subjected to the International Criminal Court, some of these guys could easily be picked up, charged with war crimes and put on trial. That's one of the reasons we're not members of the International Criminal Court."

If there is one quality that has defined Blackwater over the past decade, it is the ability to survive against the odds while simultaneously reinventing and rebranding itself. That is most evident in Afghanistan, where the company continues to work for the US military, the CIA and the State Department despite intense criticism and almost weekly scandals. Blackwater's alleged Pakistan operations, said the military intelligence source, are indicative of its new frontier. "Having learned its lessons after the private security contracting fiasco in Iraq, Blackwater has shifted its operational focus to two venues: protecting things that are in danger and anticipating other places we're going to go as a nation that are dangerous," he said. "It's as simple as that."

About Jeremy Scahill

Jeremy Scahill, a Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army, published by Nation Books. He is an award-winning investigative journalist and correspondent for the national radio and TV program Democracy Now!. http://www.thenation.com/directory/bios/jeremy_scahill

SOURCE: THE NATION

URL: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091207/scahill

Pashtun Folklore Yousaf Khan aw Sher Bano - Da Abay Qissay (Folklore)

Afridi Pashtun Warriors - Courtesy: NAVRAS नवरस نورس נברס
http://navrasaafreedi.blogspot.com/2007/03/afridi-pathan-warriors.html

Da Abay Qissay (Folklore)

یوسف خان اوشیربانوقیصه

Yousuf Khan was a handsome young man from a village near Mardan. The people of Turlandi claim their village to have been his home. His father Mahmud Shah had died and left a young Yousaf Khan with the responsibility of supporting his mother and his sister Boolanda. He would hunt and bring home fresh meat for them every other day.

Yousaf Khan would go hunting in the Kharamar hills. Now nearly barren, the hills are said to have been thickly covered in trees and thorny thickets, with lots of wild olive trees, and among this forest roamed dear, partridges, rabbits and hares. He would take his fathers hunting dogs, head to the hills and bring back what he had hunted. These dogs were very loyal and being his fathers, Yousaf Khan took great care of them. He made them beautiful collars, that were hung with silver bells. The jingle of those bells would alert everyone to the coming and goings of the handsome man on his travels.

On his way to his hunting grounds, Yousaf Khan would pass through a village, and it was in this village that he one day he saw a very beautiful girl called Sher Bano. How they first met I do not recall, but have heard that Sher Bano would eagerly wait for the jingle of the dogs collars heralding his arrival to her village. They never spoke to each other, but quietly stole glances.

Sher Bano sighed all day long and stopped eating, she would hear nothing but the jingle of those bells. Seeing her waste away like this her friend took her on the pretense of visiting a saint's grave through Yousaf Khan's village. They made it a point to stop at Yousaf Khan's house on the pretext of drinking water. Sher Bano's friend asked whose house they were in and Boolanda proudly told him it was Yousaf Khan the hunter's house. Laughingly the friend said, "tell your brother that there is a girl in the next village who pines for him with such longing that the flame of love so bright and strong that it consumes her and now she looks ill. Her parents are worried that she is possessed with peryan."

When her brother came that night, Boolanda told him what had happened. Yousaf Khan gave her a beating and told her never to repeat such idle gossip in front of him again.

Next day Sher Bano's friend stopped by to see what Yousaf Khan had to say, but Boolanda only cried and told her to leave. Confused by this, Sher Bano decided to confront him that day on his way back from hunting.

Mean while, Yousaf Khan's cousins had gone hunting with him that day. A lone hunter by nature he did not want to take them, but agreed against his better judgment. Since his father's death they had put aside their hostilities and had reached out to him. While his father had been alive, there had been daily skirmishes between Yousaf Khan and his cousins over petty things, but now it seemed they had all put those days behind them.

The hunt did not go as well as anticipated, even the dogs were jumpy and after a long day just as they were about to give up, Yousaf Khan shot a wild ram. The ram did not stop but kept running until it finally fell into a steep ravine. The cousins stood looking down and finally they convinced Yousaf Khan that he being the strongest and most agile should be lowered into the ravine to retrieve the ram. Tying rope around him they started lowering him, and as soon as he was a third of the way down they let go of the rope and fled.

Sher Bano waiting by her wall was surprised to see the lone dogs run barking with out their master. Yousaf Khan's mother seeing the dogs return without her son knew something awful must have befallen him. She ran out bare head and bare foot, wailing and crying she ran towards the hills, followed closely by Boolanda, both following the dogs that were barking like crazy. People stopped what they were doing to see why the two were running like mad women through the streets. Sher Bano on recognizing them took to the street after them.

The dogs stopped at the edge of the steep ravine. There they saw a very wounded Yousaf Khan, stuck in a tree, that had saved his life by breaking his fall. Together the women and the villagers pulled him back to safety and while they fashioned a crude stretcher for him, Sher Bano cradled her beloveds head in her lap. This did not go unnoticed and when they returned to he village, Sher Bano found her father standing full of wrath, ready to kill her. Yousaf Khan's mother quickly took Sher Bano's hand and said that she was now Yousaf Khan's honor and pride and as soon as possible she would come with the elders of their village and take her away honorably.

A wedding was arranged, and so many people came to wish them their best that the festivities spread out through many days. Sadly though, Yousaf Khan was so consumed by thoughts of revenge that he did not enjoy any of it, nor would he look at or touch his beautiful wife.

He even heard the wind and birds taunting him and the leaves shaking at him as if he was not a man. Not being able to stand it anymore Yousaf Khan left for Delhi. He had heard that his cousins were hiding there. Leaving behind his beautiful bride and his mother and sister, he set off telling them not to expect him back till he had avenged himself or died trying.

There was no news of Yousaf Khan at the village for many years and his cousins seeing the opportunity pronounced him dead. They shared out amongst themselves all that had been his. the marriage not being consummated left Sher Bano in a precarious position, her father came and took her back to his house. Sher Bano refused to accept this and insisted that Yousaf Khan was alive because she would have known if it was otherwise.

Sher Bano grieved for all that could have been and for the man who she loved so deeply and had left her in such a predicament. She would cry all night and wait all day for any news of her beloved. At first her elders kindly tried to tell her to stop her grieving, and that they would arrange a suitable match for her. She was young and untouched and many a man would find her worthy of a wife. Not able to persuade her with their soft words they resorted to cruel taunts, telling her that because of her emotions and sentiments they had been forced to marry her to a worthless, irresponsible man who had deserted her. Now she should listen to them and marry someone else who could provide her a roof and protection.

Seeing that none of these words had any effect on her, Sher Bano's father came and put his pagri at her feet and said, "I am an honorable man, and all my life I have managed to stay slander free, but I am old and do not know how long I have. Who will protect you once I am gone? Do not let my honor become the laughing stock of the village."

Sher Bano quickly lifted her father pagrai and dusting it off put it on his head saying, 'Only God knows what has happened to my husband, but may I never be cause of slander to your pride and honor sire. But in my heart I believe him to be alive even though there has been no word of him. Grant me a year to cry my grief and at the end of this year you may choose for me any man that you see fit and I will do as you wish"

Her father was heartened by these words and smiling said, 'You have made me happy my child. I can not bear the thought of your hair turning grey waiting for a worthless man who whether dead or for shame has not dared shown his face again. Don't talk to me of him coming back and you waiting, but choose one of these handsome men in our village and go on with your life, but if you think it is a year you need then take a year, but get over him.'

Mean while Yousaf Khan had traveled far from the lands of the Pukhtuns, he came across a village that was in the grip of terror due to some dacoits that had moved into the neighboring forest. Having to spend the night there he asked what was going on. They told him that many of their young men had died at the hands of the wicked men and the rest afraid to take them on had moved away. Seeing that there was no one to protect them Yousaf Khan bravely offered to help them. Hidden away the villagers watched sceptically as Yousaf Khan took on the dacoits. He made fast work of them and as he wiped his sword clean the villagers rushed out to carry him back a hero to the village. News of his bravery and valor spread quickly and soon reached Akbar the Mughal who happened to be journeying by.

Akbar ordered Yousaf to be presented to him immediately. When Yousaf came to his court the Mughal threw him a sword and sent one of his best swordsman against him. Yousaf easily overpowered him and looked up at the emperor to see what he wanted. Akbar was clapping and bid him to come closer, and he put a garland of precious jewels around his neck and gifted him with costly clothes, as well as making him in charge of a big regiment. Posted far and near, Yousaf carried out Akbar's orders.

Yousaf Khan with his valor and handsomeness became a court favorite and was soon ordered to stay close to the emperor at all times. This gave the emperor a chance to observe him up close and personal first hand. He found Yousaf to be brave as rumored, but also that he did not partake in the revelry of the court. Yousaf Khan seemed to be a loner who sighed often and was lost in thought with a sad look on his face. He asked his courtiers, but none could answer him, so Akbar summoned Yousaf Khan and asked what was it that troubled him so?

Yousaf Khan told the king of how he was once a reputed hunter, how he went out to hunt, and how a beautiful girl had fallen in love with him. How his cousins treachery had prevented him from returning her love and had left her untouched. He had a concurrent dream of his mother and sister crying beside a broken swing. He lay awake wondering what had become of Sher Bano, had she remarried or was she still waiting for him? He had no news of how his mother and sister fared, or news of his village in over five years and neither had he found his cousins. He showed Akbar a cap that Sher Bano had embroidered for him.

Akbar told him that it was high time he returned home, not only for his peace of mind but for the women he had left so helpless. Yousaf Khan was allowed to take as many of his men as he wanted. They made great haste towards the land of the Pukhtuns and on entering it they dressed into rags and made their way unnoticed to Yousaf Khan's village. It is said that they spent a night at Dobian, where Yousaf Khan bade his men to stay as he made his way alone to his village.

That evening Yousaf Khan offered prayers at his village mosque, but none there seemed to recognize him. He discreetly walked past his house and was dismayed to find that there was a barn there instead. He stopped a man on the street and asked what had become of the people that lived there. The man looked at him suspiciously and asked, 'Did you know them?'

Yousaf Khan said that many years ago he had stopped at their door and they had been kind enough to offer him a place to sleep and a warm meal.

The man shaking his head sadly said, 'the young man here fled to Hindustan, and no one knows what became of him. His cousins took over all his property and forced his mother and sister into labor in their house. His wife was taken back by her parents and today she is getting married to some one. Do you hear those drums? They are beating for her wedding.'

Yousaf Khan hastily went to Sher Bano's village where people had turned out in force to witness it. There he met his sister Boolanda who did not recognize him either, he stopped her and asked her who had claimed Sher Bano in marriage. She sadly told him of how her brother had left and her cousins in his absence had taken over and now were forcing Sher Bano to marry one of them, but Sher Bano was refusing to get into the dolay and making a spectacle of them all by refusing to so much as brush her hair or wash her face. She told him that she had to hurry now or her cousins would not only beat her but also her blind mother.

Yousaf Khan stopped her said "sister so you not recognize me? " Boolanda wept with joy on recognizing him and after promising him not to tell another sole she went off with a lightness in her step and hope i her heart. Yousaf pulled out his worn cap and handing it to a child told him to take it to Sher Bano.

The child handed the dirty cap to Sher Bano, who on seeing it leapt up, and asked to be immediately cleaned up and made ready. Everyone was relieved to see the change in her and joyfully they washed and combed out her hick black hair. Sher Bano kept on giggling and joking with her friends and family as they gathered around her. Someone made up her eyes with kohl and someone marked a beauty spot between her brows for her. She was dressed in red and adorned with jewelry.

Boolanda came in to watch and both embraced and happily laughed with no one none the wiser. She then went out to tell her brother of the miraculous transformation and of Sher Bano's fear for him being discovered.

Yousaf had sent a message to his troops who had silently slid into the village and taken up posts. Such was Yousaf Khan's rage that he ordered no man to be spared. The wives and daughters of the men ran into the field bare had and bare feet begging and beseeching him to spare them but it was not till Sher Bano intervened on behalf of the villagers and convinced him not to make widows out of women that day for she knew first hand how intolerable the life of a widow could be. She told him that his beef was only with his cousins not with the other men who had been bystanders.

Yousaf Khan then gave in to Sher Bano's request but only after he made the men agree that a jirga would convene immediately. The jirga conceded that Yousaf Khan has been wronged and that he should not be punished for the deaths of his cousin and his lands and property be returned to him immediately.

One day Yousaf Khan went out to hunt, but returned empty handed. Sher Bano getting up to remove the pot she had been heating for the meat, Yousaf thinking that she was taunting him rushed out in anger to hunt again. Sher Bano ran after him to tell him that he was mistaken and that she did not mean it as a taunt but to save the pot that would have burnt had she not removed it.

Yousaf Khan never returned, he was found dead in the same ravine that he had been left for dead in. Some say he slipped in the dark others say that his cousins got a chance to get even. Whatever the cause of his death, Sher Bano, the woman who had faihfully waited those years, died within days heart broken and bereft.

COURTESY: Yousaf Khan aw Sher Bano Posted in by Bibi Jan on Tue, 2006-11-21 16:13

URL: http://www.pukhtunwomen.org/node/108

SONG: lowangeen

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tp_55OdHuDs&feature=related

Classic Folk Pashtu Tappa (Song) by Maestro Sardar Ali Takkar

Pakistani Pashtun Folk Maestro Sardar Ali Takkar

Pakistani Pashtun Folk Maestro Sardar Ali Takkar

SARDAR ALI TAKKAR ENDEAVORING TO RAISE PASHTO MUSIC TO NEW HEIGHTS By: Zafar Ali Usafzai

Takkar, a small village in District Mardan, may be known to many of the Historians because of the Tragic War that took place between the British Army and the Villagers and which resulted in a mass bloodshed of the innocent villagers. But almost every Pakhtun around the world knew Takkar because of a veteran personality, which opened her eyes in this village. Long ago in the decade of 1960’s, when this child used to play in the streets of his village, perhaps none of the villager would have thought that this child would become the identity of their village, all over the world. This child when grew, decided to adopt singing, not as a profession but as a challenge to serve the Pashto music and raise it to new heights.

Today the world knows this personality with the name of Sardar Ali Takkar. A veteran of the Pashto singing scene, Takkar is practically a household name almost all over the country among the Pakhtuns. Every Pakhtun feels pride on having his cassette with himself. He has been plying his trade since early 1980s, and has earned his big break by singing a veteran poets like Rahman Baba, Khushal Khan khattak, Khatir Afridi, Hamza Shinwari and of course the great Ghani Khan. Like a wild flower, which sprouts from the virgin soil and blossoms to full ambience untended, he became one of the most sought after Pashto singer. Born in 1956 at Takkar village (Thakt Bahi) Mardan, he passed his metric examination from his village school and did his F.Sc. from Government College Mardan. He completed his graduation in Mechanical Engineering from University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar. Aside from this he has also attended special courses in U.K and Canada.

From the very beginning, he had developed a flavor for music. Takkar had a natural flair for singing. He used to take part in Naat, Qirat and singing competitions during his school time. When he was in class 8th, he played mouth organ on the stage for the first time. He used to play different musical instrument stealthily at that time. He often used to play “Sitar” (a musical instrument) at one of the peasants home, namely Anwar Khan in the nearby village. Because of the social and political affiliations of his family, it was very difficult to play these musical instruments in the traditional Hujra. While in college, he started fiddling with the rabab, another stringed instrument.

At university level, when Takkar was away from his family’s norms and values, he started giving full intention to this art. As a first step he joined the Abaseen Arts Council for formal musical training. Here he learnt playing different instruments like Rabab, Harmonium from Sardar Ustad. He also learnt from some of the great masters of the period: Khalid Haider Malik and Sultani Sahib.

His University life provided him more chances to exhibit his hidden talent. Initially he used to present his skills before his friends, in different musical programme in the university. But it was in 1982 when Yar Muhammad Maghmum, a professor at the historic Edward College Peshawar, wanted to celebrate an evening with the great legendry and dynamic philosopher Ghani Khan, but was unable to find a singer who was ready to meet the challenge of putting Ghani’s poetry in music. When Takkar became aware of the situation, he agreed to sing in that programme. Some people also recorded this programme on audiocassette, which got so prominence that even the music stores started selling it on regular basis. In this way, his debut album (solely based on Ghani khan’s poetry) touched the market, so incidentally. It was in those days when a programme for youths named “Zalmey Kool” (Young Generation) used to broadcast from the Radio Pakistan. Takkar for the first time not only played different instruments but also sang two ghazals in that programme. After that, he also had the opportunity to record a programme at the Peshawar Center of Pakistan Television Vision (PTV). In 1984, Takkar left for Afghanistan. His stay in Afghanistan helped him in a way that he became able to sing poetry of those poets who were banned in Pakistan and his singing from Afghanistan also brought him prominence back at home.

Kundan Lal Sehgal (1904-1947) had remained a great source of inspiration for Takkar. The sphere of K.L. Sehgal’s recorded music was very vast, as he had sung in Hindi, Urdu, Pashto, Punjabi, Bengali and Tamil. Takkar was so much inspired by Sehgal that at very young age he used to listen a music programme comprising of one of the Sehgal’s song, which was broadcasted from the radio daily in the morning. Such was the power and mystique of Sehgal's singing that Takkar too started his career singing in the 'Sehgal style' before etching out his own identity. Aside from Sehgal, he also got inspired from Jugjeth Singh, Punkaj Udhas and Mehdi Hassan.

The major feature, which became the hallmark of his singing, was the selection of Ghani Khan’s poetry. From the very beginning, Takkar had an inclination towards Philosophy and used to read the Poet of the East i.e. “Allama Mohammad Iqbal” when he was in class 8th at his village school. After that he had also studied the poetry of Rahman Baba and Khushal Khan Khattak, but when he read Ghani Khan he felt him as the one whom he was searching for. This is due to the reason that in Ghani Khan’s poetry, he had found so many shades -- ranging from freedom, love of God, land and people, nationalism, fate, the mysteries of life and death, the joys of communion, and the woes of separation to beauty. Ghani khan was a true poet of modernism who was at home in variety of subjects like mysticism, romanticism, nationalism, skepticism, aestheticism, and philosophy.

Terming his stance and love towards Ghani Khan, he often narrates an interesting story. He recalls that one day while roaming in the hostel at University, he got a verse of Ghani Khan written on one of the door. Which was

Che Da Taqwa Zaar Sajde She Jama, Da Ishq Yo Saat Thre Jor She.”

[One thousand prostrations (bows) when combined, give birth to a lone moment of love]

Seeing this verse gave birth to a motion and zeal in him, compelling him to search out for Ghani Khan’s poetry. As in those days, the government had banned Ghani Khan, therefore Takkar found it difficult to get any book comprising of his poetry. But this did not force him to stop there and he continued his search. At last, he succeeded in finding a book of Ghani Khan in the library of Area Study Center, University of Peshawar. Although this gave an extreme happiness to him, but to his sheer disappointment he was not allowed to borrow that book, being a reference book. For this Takkar had a novel solution, he used to stay till evenings in the library, noting down Ghani’s Poetry in his diary.

Takkar is the first well-educated Pashto singer. Before him, the sphere of Pashto music listeners was very limited in which the educated class was next to none but it was Sardar Ali Takkar who not only compelled the educated people to listen Pashto music, but also paved the way for educated ones who wanted to adopt Pashto singing. The main reason for which is that before him, the Pashto singers were mostly uneducated who did not paid much heed towards the selection of poetry for songs. They used to sing in those few traditional styles, which were prevalent from centuries. They also did not tried to expose the great poets to general masses through music, which resulted in the immature and bad taste for Pashto music. Contrary to them, Takkar having inclination towards literature, selected genre like philosophy and mysticism and that too were presented in an innovative style that is why these trends were acknowledged by the masses immediately. They started listening him, not only for his melodious voice but also for his selection of the best poetry. Takkar had always focused on the content of poetry along with music, as he believed that quality poetry is must for quality music. Takkar has strived in almost all the genre of Pashto poetry, which include ghazal, rubayi, charbeta, tappa, nemake and badala.

Takkar has also strived hard in selection and singing of ghazals, which has a special place in the literary universe. He has got a matchless style for presenting rubayi, which is developed by him lonely. His rubayi style had remained a striking force in shooting his fame.

But the most laudable and inimitable aspect of Takkar singing is “Azad Nazam” which he put in the musical tones. Although Azad Nazam has proved too difficult to be understand but it was Takkar’s tireless efforts, which resulted in recognition of Azad Nazam in the general public. Regarding “Azad Nazam”, Takkar opines that until the singer gets over the original message contained in it, it is impossible to sing it. All it need is great willpower and mindset. In his opinion, the singer must strive to put his mind behind each word he renders. Even now when the moment he sings Azad Nazam, the clamor in the surrounding gives way to complete silence. After almost stumbling into a singing career, Takkar quickly touched the apex of success and his soulfully rendered Pashto rubahis and specially Azad Nazams of the great Ghani Khan, touched responsive chords among music buffs in the province. The mellifluous quality and timbre of his natural voice have a special appeal for the serious folks and students specially.

In the beginning, Takkar was very selective regarding his selection of poetry and mostly serious people enjoyed it, but when in one of the TV programme, he sang tappe, majority of the common folk also liked him and wished him to continue singing for common folk also. It is pertinent to mention here that tappa is the lone genre of Pashto poetry, which does not exist in any other language. He had also attributed to the great singers of the past whose aura and charisma still remains intact including Muzaffar Khan, Gulnar Begum, Rafiq Shinwari etc by remixing their legendry songs.

Being, himself a candidate of mysticism, it credits for Takkar who not only went for Rahman Baba’s mystic poetry but also acknowledged the elegant mysticism of Ghani Khan. Of the two, he terms the poetry of the later as the best regarding mysticism, which according to him is nothing but the acquaintance to the GOD Almighty. Regarding services for music, Takkar does not seem happy with most of the past singer who although bestowed with melodious voice, left singing but did not tried to serve their language in real meaning. He also feels uneasy with the present day Pashto music, prevailing in the market place, where by no heed is given to the selection of poetry and mostly substandard poetry is selected for singing. He considers it a serious threat to the Pashto music, which instead of promotion is causing huge loss to it.

Looking in to the history of Pashto music, it become obvious that up till now none of the singer worked with proper planning for the development of Pashto language and music i.e. most of them have not taken this profession as a mission. They adopted it merely as their source of income. But when it comes to Takkar, he kept on doing new experiments in the Pashto music. He has intentionally tried to add the musical flavors of different languages in to the Pashto music. He has added the Arabic, Turkish, Spanish and African beat to his compositions. At the same time, Takkar’s outwit is that he has kept the identity of Pashto music intact.

Takkar keeps on doing new experiments in the Pashto music with a missionary zeal. For instance he has recently come up with a new album (No.81) containing classical Pashto songs. The most interesting part is that he developed different tones (Raygs) and presented the poetry of the great mystic Rahman Baba in it. These raygs consists of Darbari, Shankara, beharwi, Meaig, Peelo Tumri, Classical Tarana and Istahani Antyra. It was his these efforts which led a Denmark based organization to confer him a special award for singing Rahman Baba’s poetry. In order to produce a quality music and carry forward his musical skills to the new generation, Takkar has established a studio named “Takkar Rhythms” where he keeps on doing new experiments regarding music. Presently he also participates in the “Khyber Beats- Classic” (a musical programme) of the lone private Pashto TV Channel. He also has intends to establish a video studio for making videos of songs. In his opinion, the videos, which are prepared presently, are not in conformity with what the singer sings. The singer sings something while the video comprises of totally different thing. According to him, a successful video is the one, which is made according to the urgency and spirit of “subjective music”.

Unassuming, friendly and down-to-earth Takkar is a born and self-taught vocalist whose vocal resources have equipped him to also fluently render songs in languages other than Pashto like Farsi and Urdu. He had also held concerts not only in Pakistan, but also in Dubai, Britain, Canada, Germany and Afghanistan. In recognition of his unforgettable services to Pashto Music, the government of Pakistan awarded him with the Pride of Performance. He is also a recipient of numerous awards and certificates from a number of cultural organizations.

Courtesy: Khyber Watch

URL: http://www.khyberwatch.com/interviews/Takar.htm

Courtesy: shafi1990

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJQnxlv1aHc&feature=related

Courtesy: CarterKhan

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vu9n7JqWtvw&feature=related