Showing posts with label Plane Hijacking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Plane Hijacking. Show all posts

Monday, December 8, 2008

Murder, Manslaughter and Terrorism -- All in the Name of Allah

Pakistani Scholar Mr. Jawed Ahmed Ghamdi



Murder, Manslaughter and Terrorism -- All in the Name of Allah by Mr. Jawed Ahmed Ghamdi

Introduction

Often, criminals are of two kinds: there are those who know that the wrong they do is wrong -- and there are those who think -- who actually believe -- that their deeds are virtuous. When those of the latter category have a religious basis for their activities, they can rarely be dissuaded by legal and penal measures alone, for bearing chastisement is in itself sublime to them -- something that gives them a cause to rejoice in being ‘persecuted for righteousness’ sake’ -- something that only adds to their commitment. The best defence against these people is an attack on the religious foundation their leaders use to convince them. A fortiori, legal and penal measures must be accompanied by propagation of counter arguments. For this purpose, arguments developed on the basis of superficial study won’t do. No one is easily convinced into becoming a murderer on religious grounds and no one is easily dissuaded once so convinced. Only arguments truly emanating from the Qur’an and the Sunnah and cogent enough can be effective. Unfortunately, very little work has been done in the regard by government as well as private institutions.

It is important to know what arguments the militants use to justify their deeds and to see whether these arguments have any basis in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. This dissertation discusses some pertinent issues in this regard, including incendiary questions as the following:

Does Islam give an individual or a group the right to use violence to end wrong? What arguments do the militant Islamists have to justify their acts of terrorism and violence? Is the government of Pakistan un-Islamic? When is an individual or a group allowed by Islam to rebel against the State? What are the punishments in Islam for those who rebel against the State or cause disruption in society? What exactly is the meaning of Jihad and who has the right to wage it? Is ‘turning the other cheek’ a Christian belief only? What are the rules for a preacher in Islam? What is the actual responsibility of religious leaders? Does an individual or a group have the right to declare a Muslim a Kafir? What are the rights of the non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic State? Who has the authority to punish a person or a group for blasphemy? What steps does the government need to take to end violence and terrorism now rampant in our society in the name of religion?

This dissertation, a major part of which is based on Javed Ahmad Ghamidi’s research work (a meritorious religious scholar and founder of Al-Mawrid, an institute of Islamic research), has three sections: the first gives a summary of the main conclusions drawn in the article, the second recommends certain strategies to the government for dealing with sectarian violence and terrorism, and the last section contains the main article. An appendix at the end responds to some criticisms on the views expressed in the dissertation.

I. Summary of the main conclusions

1. Taking the law into one’s own hands amounts to either Fasad fi’l-Ard (creating disorder) or Muharabah (rebellion) -- both of which are punishable by death in Islam.

2. The Prophet’s saying (sws) usually cited to give credence to the idea that Islam allows an individual or a group the use of force to end wrong is actually related to the use of power within the confines of the social and legal authority.

3. In Islam, there is no concept of Jihad (Qital to be more precise -- that is militant struggle in the way of Allah) or the implementation of punishments without the authority of the State.

4. The argument that the government in Pakistan is not Islamic is baseless. In an independent State, any government formed on the basis of amruhum shura baynahum (their affairs are by consultation among them) -- in modern times through the vote of the Muslim citizens in an election -- is an Islamic government so long as the rulers do not unequivocally deny Islam or their faith in it.

5. Rebellion against the State (Khuruj) is allowed -- that is it is permissible not obligatory -- only when all of the following three conditions exist:


i) the rulers unequivocally deny Islam.

ii) the government is a dictatorship and does not have the support of the Muslims and cannot be changed by their vote.

iii) the leader of Khuruj is one who, without any doubt, has the support of the majority of the nation.

Moreover, in case of an armed rebellion, there is an additional condition: the leader of the Khuruj must migrate with his followers to another land and form an independent State.

In the absence of even one of these conditions, those leading the Khuruj can be sentenced to death by the State under Islamic law.

6. Allegiance to the Islamic State and obedience to its government are obligatory on a Muslim even if the rulers are morally corrupt. According to a reported saying of the Prophet (sws), he who detaches himself from the collectivity of the Muslims and dies in that condition dies the death of ignorance.

7. No individual or group has the right to declare a Muslim Kafir (one who deliberately denies Islam; plural: Kuffar). Takfir -- declaring someone a Kafir is the prerogative of either the Prophet (sws) -- who does that through Divine revelation -- or that State which represents the collectivity of the Ummah (the whole Muslim community).

8. The argument of the militant Islamists that their aggression is in self-defence is baseless. The difference between self-defence and aggression is manifest. Also, the law of Qisas in Islam is to be implemented by the State not by any individual or group. The aggrieved person has the right to demand Qisas, and it is the responsibility of the State to provide him with justice. The aggrieved or his heir also has the authority to forgive the offender and demand penalty. But there is no room in Islam for personal vendettas, in which people take the law into their own hands.

9. Religious scholars and leaders of religious movements can best serve Islam by staying out of politics and confining themselves to academic work and Da‘wah (propagation of religion). They must remember that their primary responsibility is Indhar (admonition) and Da‘wah. Their goal should be conquering the hearts of people rather than killing them. For the conquest of hearts one has to be slain rather than slaying others. One has to forgive rather than avenge. And one has to repel evil with goodness.

Some other points of relevance to which this article alluded are:

1. Death punishment for apostasy was confined only to the people the Prophet (sws) was directly sent to -- the Banu Isma‘il. No one can now be punished to death on that basis as no one after the Prophet (sws) can claim to have done Itmamu’l-Hujjah (manifesting the truth to such an extent that no excuse whatsoever is left for a person to deny it) in his individual capacity.

2. There are only two valid reasons for Qital: i) injustice and oppression and ii) Itmamu’l-Hujjah. After the Prophet (sws) no individual or group has the position to do Itmamu’l-Hujjah. Itmamu’l-Hujjah is now possible only when the whole Ummah fulfils its responsibility of becoming 'Ummah Wasat (the best community) by living out the true meaning of its creed and thereby fulfils the responsibility of Shahadah ‘ala’l-Nas (bearing witness to the truth of Islam before other peoples of the world). After fulfilling this responsibility, the State representing the collectivity of the 'Ummah has the right to depose such rulers of the vanquished nations as deliberately deny their people access to the message of Islam. But that State does not have the right to coerce people into accepting Islam. These non-Muslims would only be required to remain subservient to the Islamic State and to pay it their equitable dues and in return would receive protection and have all their basic rights ensured.

3. Lynching non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic State for blasphemy is absolutely against Islam even if the criminal is caught red-handed. Punishing a person or a group for any crime against anybody is the prerogative of the Islamic State -- which does that through its organ, the judiciary, after determining for sure that the crime had actually been committed and deciding on the appropriate punishment.a No individual has the right to take the law into his own hands on any account. Even the closest of the Prophet’s companions (sws) never killed a single of his opponents even when invectives were hurled at him day and night in the first thirteen years of his Da‘wah at Makkah. Nor did they kill anyone in retaliation when he was pelted with stones at Ta’if.

II. Recommendations:

In relation to the points discussed above, the following measures are suggested to the government of Pakistan:

i) The government should use its propaganda machinery -- including the mass media -- to dissuade youngsters from falling into the trap of those religious leaders who equate terrorism and sectarian violence with Islam. The government should take help from genuine scholars of Islam for this purpose and present its views on the solid basis of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. It should become obvious to every man and woman -- even to the militant Islamists themselves -- that the violence and terrorism of the militant Islamists is absolutely against Islam.

ii) Known and self-proclaimed offenders should immediately be arrested or shot on sight for Muharabah, and Fasad fi’l-Ard. The arrested criminals should be punished on these bases in an exemplary manner. The government should publicise the reasoning behind these punishments so that everyone is aware of the correct stance in this regard and potential offenders are deterred from the path of violence.

iii) Those religious organisations which believe in rebellion against the State should be given a stern warning. The correct picture of Islam regarding Khuruj should be publicised a great deal so that sufficient ground work is done to make the masses mentally accept the idea of the government crushing the very first insurrection to nip the evil in the bud. And that the government should do: completely crush the first insurrection to emerge so that no one is encouraged by the rebels to follow suit.

iv) The government should take steps to eliminate the duality in our education system. Religious schools breed sectarianism and modern schools breed scepticism. To deal with this problem, our education system needs to be changed. Unless the modern, educated people -- especially those belonging to the elite and affluent classes -- are instructed at least in the basics of religion, the monopoly and influence of sectarian schools is bound to remain.b

v) The mosque has a very important role to play in an Islamic society. Few people today realise the extent to which this institution influences the minds of the masses. Unfortunately, mosques in our society have become citadels of sectarianism. There is great need to overhaul this institution. The key point here is that the Mosque is a State institution and the elected representatives of the people running their State affairs ought to be their leaders in prayer rather than the mullahs. The Sunnah in this regard is that the Head of the State and his representatives in the administration should lead the Friday prayer. On the basis of the Sunnah, one can suggest that the government should supervise the mosques and not let any particular sect control them. A number of steps should be taken in this regard:c

a) The centre of every administrative unit of the State should be a Jami‘ Masjid, and the division of these units should be such that one Jami’ Masjid should suffice for one unit.

b) Within each unit, all the administrative offices and courts should be instituted adjacent to this Jami’ Masjid.

c) The State capital, together with the provincial capitals, should have a central Jami’ Masjid.

d) The address of the Friday prayer should be delivered only by the Head of State and only he should lead this prayer in the central Jami’ Masjid of the capital. The provincial governors should be entrusted with this job in the central Jami‘ Mosques of the provinces, while the representatives of the government should perform this duty in the Jami‘ Mosques of the various administrative units.

e) The Friday prayer should be prohibited in all mosques except the above ones.

f) Mosques should be supervised by the government itself.

g) Any religious scholar should be allowed to teach, educate and instruct his students according to his own views in any of these mosques.

vi) The government should make it clear to all Muslims that there is no room for lynching in Islam. No one can be punished for blasphemy unless his crime is proved in a court of law and only the State has the right to execute the sentence. It should also be made clear that violation of the rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic State is a serious offence.

Whether a Mu‘ahid or a Dhimmi d , the rights guaranteed to a non-Muslim must not be violated by any Muslim. The Qur’an says:

And fulfil the covenant. Verily the covenant shall be questioned about. (17:34)

The Prophet (sws) is reported to have said:

Beware! He who oppresses a Mu‘ahid or does him injustice or burdens him more than his strengthe or takes anything from him without his consent, I myself shall plead against him on the Day of Judgement. (Abu Da’ud, Kitabu’l-Jihad)

These words of the Prophet (sws) should be enough for any Muslim to realise the gravity of the sin of oppressing a Mu‘ahid. Even in case of enmity, the Qur’an does not allow the Muslim to do anything against the principles of equity and justice. f

Therefore, unless a Mu‘ahid is found guilty of some crime by a court of law -- in which case it is up to the court to decide what punishment is to be meted out --, he has the right as a citizen of an Islamic State to demand the protection of his life, honour and property and to demand all his fundamental rights including the right to practice and preach his religion in a manner which does not cause disruption in society.

III. Text of the dissertation:

Murder, Manslaughter and Terrorism
-- All in the Name of Allah

The Qur’an says:

... that whoever took a life1, unless it be for murder or for spreading disorder on earth 2, it would be as if he killed all mankind; and whoever saved a life, it would be as if he saved all mankind. (5:32)

And:

And he who kills a believer intentionally, his reward is Hell; he shall remain therein forever... (4:93)

How can someone who believes in this book commit murder?

Here’s how:

In his mind -- and perhaps even in his heart -- the murder he commits is not murder: it is an act of virtue.

Those who do evil can be of two kinds. There are those who know that the evil they do is evil, and there are those who don’t. In fact, those of the latter kind might even be absolutely certain that the evil they do is not evil but virtue. When that is the case, murder and terrorism can, in their minds, become Jihad.

The good intentions of these ‘pious evil-doers’ might become an excuse for them on the Day of Judgement, but in this worldly life of ours, when murder and terrorism are the issue, their error of judgement -- howsoever noble their intentions might be -- does not, in any way, exonerate them from the responsibility for causing disruption and disorder in society. Therefore, these people need to be dealt with -- and when human lives and law and order are at stake, there can be two ways of doing that: either you succeed in convincing them that their ‘virtue’ is actually evil and that their Jihad is in reality Fasad3 or Muharabah4 or you simply ‘wipe ’em out’.

Two pertinent questions are: how do you convince them? and would the State be morally justified if, after having taken reasonable measures to solve the problem through dialogues and discussions, it has to... well, ‘wipe ’em out’?

To convince such Islamist groups as resort to murder and terrorism that, howsoever noble the goals, their methods are against the teachings of their own religion, one has to understand the arguments they themselves use to justify their deeds. Of such arguments some of the more important ones are discussed here.

One of their arguments is based on a narration in which the Prophet (sws) is reported to have said:


He amongst you who sees any wrong should change it with his hand5; if that is not possible for him, then with his tongue; if that is not possible for him, then [he should condemn it] in his heart -- and that is the weakest level of faith. (Muslim, Kitabu’l-Iman)

This statement of the Prophet (sws) has a specific context in reference to which the statement merely means that it is the duty of every Muslim to try for the eradication of evil within the confines of the social and legal authority he or she has6. For example, parents are afforded the authority by the conventions of society to use some mild form of physical punishment, if required, for the proper upbringing of their children. This obviously does not mean that they have the authority to batter their children. Similarly, the government -- a court of law to be more precise -- has the legal authority to award a suitable sentence to an offender if he is found guilty. Now, if some parents did not use their authority to stop their children from becoming heroin addicts, they would certainly be at a weaker level of faith, especially if physical punishment of a sort would have helped and it were love which stopped them from using their authority. Love does not mean that you let those you love do wrong. Similarly, a judge who, under some pressure, gave a lighter punishment to an offender would certainly be at a weaker level of faith. Indeed, in the absence of a reasonable excuse, he might even be regarded as being devoid of faith altogether on the Day of Judgement.

The Prophet of Allah (sws) never took the law into his own hands. During the thirteen years he preached Islam in Makkah, he never went beyond the confines of the law of the land. The few companions and followers he had during those years were indeed more loyal to him -- and hardly any Muslim would doubt that -- than his followers today can ever claim to be. Many a Muslim today will hardly take any time to decide that it is a matter of his faith to kill anyone -- even the most influential person around -- who blasphemes -- or is even suspected of blaspheming -- against the Prophet (sws). But the followers of the Prophet (sws) never murdered even a single of his opponents even when he was pelted with stones at Ta’if. In Makkah, invectives were hurled against him day and night, yet none of his followers regarded it a matter of his faith to kill a few offenders to avenge the Prophet (sws). Had all of his companions -- even those truly close to him as Abu Bakar (raa) and Ali (raa) -- chosen to remain at a weaker level of faith? And had the Prophet (sws) himself chosen not to do anything about the weak faith of his companions? Why didn’t he exhort them to do something in retaliation?

It was only after the Prophet (sws) had established an independent State at Madinah that laws were enacted and implemented by him -- and that too was done gradually so as to avoid imbalance in society. The reason for this restraint is that in Islam armed struggle is allowed only at the level of the State. An individual or a group is not permitted to wage an armed struggle so that anarchy does not prevail in society.

Militant struggle by an individual or a group in an Islamic State amounts to Fasad (disorder, disruption, etc) or, when it becomes a rebellion against the State, Khuruj (rebellion, revolt, etc). In either case, the Islamic State has the right to give the militants a severe death sentence.7 Only when certain conditions have been met is Khuruj allowed.8

The militant Islamists would argue that (a) the government in Pakistan is not Islamic and (b) they -- the militants -- are fighting against Kuffar (sing. Kafir: infidel), who ought to be killed to save Islam from its enemies.

It should be obvious from the points made above that even if Pakistan were not an Islamic State and some of those accepted by the State as Muslims were Kuffar, there would still be no room in Islam for the militant Islamists to take the law into their own hands and kill people. The militants are not more pious than the Prophet (sws) and his close companions (raa).

But let’s take a look at this stance as well. Does a State having a morally and religiously corrupt government become un-Islamic? And who has the right to declare a group (or a person) in the Ummah (the whole Muslim community) as non-Muslims or Kuffar?

The Islamic principle on which a State is founded is described in the Qur’an in the words amruhum shura baynahum (their affairs are through consultation amongst them)9. This principle entails that the State affairs be run by the vote of the majority of Muslim citizens. A State is formed when a people establish their government in a geographically independent area over which they have power and authority. Therefore, when the majority of Muslims in a geographically independent area, over which they have power and authority, form their own government through consultation -- elections in modern times --, that government, in accordance with the verse quoted above, represents the Islamic State. Therefore, allegiance to that government is a religious obligation on the Muslim citizens of that State:

Obey Allah and the Prophet and those who are in authority among you. Then if there is difference of opinion among you, refer it back to Allah and the Prophet (The Qur’an 4:59)

It is evident from this verse that even in case of any difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of the contents of religion, the matter should be resolved through the Qur’an and the Sunnah10 rather than through guns. And, from the verse quoted earlier (42:38), it is clear that the verdict of the majority of the Muslims regarding the correct interpretation must be accepted as the law of the land. Thereafter, those who dissent do have the right to express their points of view in a peaceful and constitutional manner, but they do not have the right to create a law and order situation or rebel against the State. The Prophet (sws) is reported to have said:

You are organised under the rule of a person and someone tries to break your collectivity apart or disrupt your government, kill him. (Muslim, Kitabu’l-Imarah)

It is only when a Muslim is ordered to do something against the directives of Allah or of the Prophet (sws) is he required to disobey those with political and legal authority in the system he lives in. The Prophet (sws) is reported to have said:

Whether they like it or not, it is obligatory on the faithful to listen to and obey their rulers except that they be ordered to commit sin. If they are ordered to commit sin, they should neither listen nor obey. (Muslims, Kitabu’l-Imarah)

The Qur’anic words ‘obey Allah and the Prophet...’ require that a Muslim not obey any command against the directives of Allah and the Prophet (sws). But even then, he is not allowed to disrupt the system or commit murders. The reason is that when a government is formed in accordance with the Qur’anic principle of amruhum shura baynahum and can be changed or deposed on the same basis, any rebellion against that government amounts to a rebellion against the collectivity of Muslims, which in Islamic terminology, is Muharabah and which, as the statement of the Prophet (sws) quoted earlier explains, is an offence punishable by death.

Prominent people of this Ummah as Abu Hanifah, Imam Malik ibn Anas and Ahmad Ibn Hambal never resorted to violence, vandalism, terrorism or rebellion in spite of facing extreme hardships to propagate the truth.11 In Al-Masa’il al-Rasa’il al Marwiyyah ‘an Ahmad ibn Hambal, Ahmad ibn Hambal is reported to have said:

Far be it from Allah [all that is wrongly associated with Him], blood is but blood12. I do not believe in it nor do I recommend it. Enduring what is on us13 is better than disruption, in which blood is shed, people’s wealth is expropriated and things and matters sacred are desecrated.14

The Prophet (sws) is reported to have said:

I order you five things: pledging allegiance to the State, listening to and obeying [your rulers in that State], Hijrah15 and Jihad in the way of Allah. (Musnad Ahmad Ibn Hambal)

In the same collection of his sayings, the Prophet (sws) is also reported to have said:

He who sees something despicable in his ruler should bear with it, for he who detaches himself to the slightest degree from the State and dies in that condition shall die the death of ignorance. (Kitabu’l-Fitan)

In another version, the Prophet (sws) is reported to have said:

He who sees something despicable in his ruler should bear with it, for he who detaches himself to the slightest degree from the Sovereignty and dies in that condition shall die the death of ignorance (Kitabu’l-Fitan)

In these two versions, the words Al-Jama‘ah (the State) and Al-Sultan (the Sovereignty) have been used interchangeably, which clearly shows that this directive of the Prophet (sws) pertains to such a body as has political sovereignty in a geographically independent area in which there is a system of government.16

It should be obvious from the arguments given above that the government in Pakistan, which is brought to power through the mandate given to it by the majority vote of the Muslim citizens is the embodiment of the sovereignty of the State and as such it represents the State. Therefore, even if the rulers are morally corrupt, a Muslim does not have the right to disrupt the government or resort to terrorism. It is indeed his duty to propagate the truth with wisdom and sagacity and, if need be, with personal sacrifice. The way the likes of Ahmad Ibn Hambal, Malik Ibn Anas and Abu Hanifah bore persecution at the hands of the rulers of their respective times is a testimony to the fact that the prominent scholars of Islam have never shirked from making sacrifices for the sake of truth, yet have always distanced themselves from vandalism, terrorism and disruption. Indeed, it is this kind of propagation which was termed as a great Jihad by the Prophet (sws). He is reported to have said:

Verily, words of truth and justice are a great Jihad especially when said in front of an oppressive ruler. (Tirmidhi, Kitabu’l-Fitan)

Rebellion against the State is allowed only when certain conditions have been met. A brief mention of these conditions would not be out of place here:

The first condition is that the rulers unequivocally deny Islam or any of its directives. The fourth verse of the 59th chapter of Qur’an quoted earlier points out that obedience to rulers is obligatory as long as they are from within the Muslims (‘those in authority among you’).

The Prophet (sws) is also reported to have laid down the same condition for refusal to accept the authority of the rulers.

... when you see unequivocal denial by them and in a matter regarding which you have an explicit directive from Allah. (Muslim, Kitabu’l-Imarah)

The second and the third conditions, based on amruhum shura baynahum -- ‘their affairs are by consultation among them’ (the Qur’an 42:38) --, are that the government against which Khuruj is taken place should be a dictatorship which does not enjoy the support of the masses and that the leader of the Khuruj should be a person who has the indubitable support of the nation.

All these conditions are essential in that even if one of them is missing, Khuruj is not permissible.

Furthermore, in case of militant struggle, there is another condition: the rebels must migrate to another land and form an independent State there.

Before discussing the basis and the reason for this condition, it would be pertinent to point out here that the militant Islamists often term all their subversive activities as Jihad. Actually, Jihad is a nomen verbum of Jahada, which means to make one’s utmost effort. In Islamic terminology, the word denotes one’s utmost effort in the way of Allah. One of the connotations of the word is making one’s utmost effort in a militant struggle for Allah. In that sense it is used as a synonym for Qital fi sabil Allah (killing in the way of Allah), which is the more precise term for any kind of militant religious struggle -- be it a battle or war or a rebellion (Khuruj). And in any case, Qital fi sabil Allah is a prerogative of the State. In other words, in Islam there is no concept of Jihad or Qital17 of any kind without the authority of the State.

The basis for this condition is that God Almighty did not ever give the permission to use the sword even to the Prophets (sws), who are the final manifestation of the truth for their people, until they had established their rule over their followers as their political sovereigns after migrating with them to another land and forming an independent State there. Moses (sws) was given the directive for Jihad only after this condition had been met and, similarly, the Prophet (sws) and his followers were also allowed to do Jihad only when after the Pledge of ‘Aqabah they were able to establish an independent State at Yathrib (later known as Madinah).18

The reason for this condition is that without the authority of the State Jihad often becomes Fasad. A group which does not even have the legal authority to sentence a criminal cannot be allowed to gamble with the lives and property of people. For this reason, Muslim jurists have always regarded this condition as essential:

And the third category of collective duties is one in which [the authority] of the Head of the State is a necessary condition, for example Jihad and the implementation of the Islamic law of punishments. (Al-Syyid Al-Sabiq, Fiqhu’l-Sunnah, vol. 3, p.30)

Hamidu’l-Din Farahi writes:

Jihad in one’s own country is not allowed unless one migrates to another land.

Accounts of Abraham’s life (sws) and other verses [of the Qur’an] related to Hijrah19also point up this principle. The events of the Prophet’s life (sws) also corroborate it. The reason for this principle is that without the authority of one who represents the collectivity of the Muslims in the State and has political sovereignty, Jihad is merely chaos and disruption and anarchy and disorder (Majmu‘ah-i-Tafasir-i-Farahi, p. 56)

A prominent exegesist of the Qur’an, Amin Ahsan Islahi, makes the following comments on the same principle:

The first reason [for this condition] is that God Almighty does not like the disruption and disintegration of even an evil system until a strong probability exists that those out to disintegrate the system will provide people with an alternative, righteous system. Anarchy and disorder are unnatural conditions. In fact, they are so contrary to human nature that even an unjust system is preferable to them. For this reason, God Almighty has not given the right to wage war to a group which is dubious and obscure, the power and authority of which is undefined, which is without the sovereignty of a ruler, the loyalty and obedience of which is untested and the members of which are disorganised and undisciplined -- who can disrupt a system but cannot prove that they have the ability to integrate a disintegrated environment. This confidence [that a group will be able to create harmony and integrate a disorganised environment into an organised system] can only be reposed in such a group as has actually formed a political government and has such control and discipline within the confines of its authority that it can be termed as Al-Jama‘ah20. Until a group attains this position, it can strive to become Al-Jama‘ah [through religiously allowable and through legal and constitutional means] -- and that endeavour of its would be its Jihad for that time -- but it does not have the right to wage an armed Jihad and a war.

The second reason is that the import of the authority which a group engaged in war gets over the life and property of human beings is so great that such authority cannot be given to a group in which the authority of the leader over his followers is merely moral21. Mere moral authority is not a sufficient guarantee that the leader will be able to stop his followers from Fasad fi’l-Ard22. Therefore, a religious leader does not have the right to allow his followers to take out their swords23 merely on the basis of his spiritual relationship with them, for once the sword is unsheathed there is great danger that it will not care for right and wrong and that those who drew it will end up doing all [the wrong which] they had sought to end. Those revolutionary groups the object of which is nothing more than disruption of the existing system and deposition of the ruling party to seize power for themselves play such games -- and they can, for in their eyes disruption of a system is no calamity, nor is cruelty of any kind an evil. Everything is right to them [as long as it serves their purpose]. However, the leaders of a just and righteous group must see whether they are in a position to provide people with a system better than the one they seek to change and whether they will be able to stop their followers from doing such wrong as they themselves had sought to root out. If they are not in that position, then they do not have the right to play games with the lives and property of people on the basis of their confidence in mere chances or create greater disorder than the one they had sought to end.24

It should be obvious from the passage quoted above that the right to wage war cannot be given to a group of individuals, who do not even have the legal authority to award punishment to a criminal. Without political sovereignty, Jihad is often nothing short of Fasad. Thus, such militant groups as mislead their followers into believing that their terrorism is a form of Jihad have no Islamic basis whatsoever for their claim.25

Now, let us analyse the next argument of the Islamist militants: that they only kill Kuffar26, who are out to destroy Islam. Let’s see who is really a Kafir (singular of Kuffar) and who is not. And let’s also take a look at whether any individual or group has the authority to declare a Muslim a Kafir.

Takfir, or declaring anyone a Kafir, is the prerogative of either the Prophet (sws) -- who does that on the basis of Divine revelation -- or the Muslim Ummah (the whole Muslim community). No other individual or group has that right.

The reasons for this principle are as follows:

A Kafir in the true sense of the word is one who denies the truth even after it becomes absolutely clear to him. Revealing the truth to a person or a group so clearly that no excuse is left for that person or group to deny it may be termed as Itmamu’l-Hujjah.

The Prophet (sws) was the last messenger of God. With his status as a Rasul,27 the Prophet (sws) was in a position to do Itmamu’l-Hujjah even as an individual.28 No one after him has that privilege. No individual or group can do Itmamu’l-Hujjah now because no individual can claim that his propagation has manifested the truth to the extent that no excuse is left to deny it. Indeed, an individual cannot even be absolutely certain of having understood the truth absolutely correctly. He can only be certain that God will reward him for doing his duty as he has been given the light to see it. Only the Prophet’s word (sws) was final in religion.

After the Prophet (sws), the responsibility of bearing witness to the truth of Islam has been passed on to the Ummah (the whole Muslim Community) rather than to any individual or group as it would have been impossible for anyone to fulfil this responsibility in his individual capacity. For this purpose, it is incumbent upon the Ummah to strive for becoming an Ummah Wasat (the best people) so that by its very existence it can become a living testimony to the truth of its religion. It is the responsibility of every individual in the Ummah to do his part to ensure that the Ummah become and remain Ummah Wasat-- an Ummah which is the paragon of truth, justice and compassion. The Qur’an calls this responsibility Shahadah ‘ala’l-Nas (testimony before the29 people) and the style of the address in the relevant verses clearly shows that after the Prophet (sws) this responsibility has been passed on to the Ummah as a whole.30

An obvious corollary to the points made above is that only the State representing the collectivity of the whole Ummah has the right to declare a person Kafir as no Muslim in his individual capacity and no group of Muslims can possibly fulfil the obligation of Shahadah ‘ala’l-Nas.

However, this principle does not mean that a Muslim should be indifferent to dissents and heresies in religion. It is especially incumbent upon scholars and intellectuals to carry on the task of Da‘wah (propagation of the truth) and of Indhar (admonition).

Experience has shown that scholars and intellectuals can best fulfil this responsibility by staying out of politics. It is indeed very fortunate when a political leader is religious, but when a religious leader is political he usually ends up being neither a politician nor a religious leader. Moreover, religious leaders need to understand that there are occasions when speaking out the truth is a requirement of faith and there are occasions when restraining oneself is a requirement of sagacity -- and that the Qur’an requires Da‘wah with wisdom and sagacity: a Da‘wah which vanquishes the hearts of people rather than killing or battering them.31

Some militant Islamists also argue that their militancy is for self-defence. Their argument is that as a result of their Da‘wah, opposing groups become aggressive, which entails self-defence.

There is a big difference between what can legitimately be termed as ‘self-defence’ and the ‘aggression for the sake of self-defence’ that these Islamists usually commit. Extending the meaning of self-defence to include downright aggression is carrying things too far. Many of these groups argue that not retaliating to aggression is a Christian attitude of ‘turning the other cheek’. Islam gives the concept of Qisas, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

It should be borne in mind that an Islamic State has not only the responsibility but also the sole authority to implement the Law of Qisas. Qisas has often been rendered into English as ‘retaliation’32 -- a translation which has misled many into believing that personal vendettas are allowed -- in fact encouraged -- in Islam (for example, a report on terrorism ‘Bosnia -- A Springboard for Terrorism’ prepared by a special task force of the U S Senate presents the same view of Islam, which viewpoint is further stressed in the Task Force’s reply to a letter of protest by the American Muslim Council). It seems that the argument rests on an incorrect understanding of a Qur’anic verse:

And whoever is killed unjustly, We have given his heir the authority. Therefore, he [the heir] should not exceed in killing, for verily he has been helped. (17:33)

The last part of the verse ‘for verily he has been helped’ refers to the fact that the State and the law are on his side. ‘We have given his heir the authority’ means that the heir has the authority to either demand Qisas or forgive the offender. ‘He should not exceed in killing’ means that since the society is now on the heir’s side he should not exceed the limits either by taking the law into his own hand or by demanding a greater punishment than what the offender actually deserves. The way the whole society has specifically been addressed in other pertinent Qur’anic verses (6:178 & 179 and 5:45) proves beyond doubt that the directive of implementing the law of Qisas pertains to the whole society -- which obviously works through the State and its organs (as the judiciary in this instance). Therefore, lynching and engaging in personal vendettas have no room in Islam. As already explained, prominent Muslim jurists have always maintained that in some matters related to the collectivity of the Muslims, the authority of the Sovereignty is a necessary condition, for example Jihad (that is Qital) and the implementation of the law of punishments (Iqamatu’l-Hudud):

And the third category of collective responsibility is that in which the authority of the Sovereignty is a necessary condition, for example Jihad and the law of punishments.33

Nothing could be farther from the truth than the idea that Qisas refers to retaliation by an individual or a group. Such retaliation, even if equal harm is done to the offender, simply negates the purpose of the law of Qisas. The words of the Qur’an ‘In Qisas there is life for you’ refer to the fact that when the State does not provide the people in a society with justice, they often resort to personal vendettas and revenge, which shake the very foundation on which the edifice of a social set-up rests.

A Muslim who has been wronged has the right to demand Qisas and it is the duty of the State to provide him with justice. The Qur’an entails that much. But the Qur’an also goes further than that. It gives a high place to an attitude of forgiveness. Turning the other cheek is not merely a Christian attitude. Jesus (sws) was not telling the judge in a court of law to turn the other cheek while deciding the fate of a serial killer. He was not telling that to the State facing an enemy State in war. He was telling that to a preacher out to conquer the hearts of people. To conquer hearts one never slays, but is slain. One does not take revenge, but forgives. These are the rules for a preacher. Though not the law, they are a great honour and a great privilege. The Qur’an says:

The good and the evil are not equal. Repel evil with that which is better than all others; then you will see that he, between whom and you there was enmity, has become as if he were a truly close friend. And this sagacity is not afforded to anyone except those who persevere and this wisdom is not granted except to those who are indeed very fortunate. And if you feel any evil incitement from Satan, seek refuge of Allah. Verily, He is the Hearer, the knower. (41:34-36)

This is the attitude of a Muslim towards those who wrong him because of his Da‘wah -- an attitude the Qur’an terms as something truly sublime. With this line of thinking, how is it possible to think of retaliation and personal vengeance? And more than that, how is it possible for any Muslim to believe that he will be able to justify himself on the Day of Judgement for killing innocent people?


Appendix

Response to some criticisms on the views presented in the dissertation

Question:

In your article ‘Terrorism, Murder and Manslaughter -- All in the Name of Allah’ (published March-April, 1997), you have tried to prove that there is no concept of Jihad -- militant struggle to be more precise -- in Islam without the authority of the State. In this regard, I have four questions:


i) Abu Basir, a convert to Islam in the Prophet’s time (sws), formed a base near Duh’l-Marwah and launched guerrilla warfare from there, ultimately forcing the Quraysh to make peace with him. Wouldn’t you agree that his stance proves your point invalid?


ii) Isn’t your idea a negation of the Jihad in Kashmir?


iii) Isn’t your idea a negation of Hadrat Husayn’s stand against Yazid?


iv) Your ideas seem very close to those of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani regarding Jihad. Do you believe in his other ideas as well?

Answer:

Abu Basir was bound by the Pact of Hudaybiyyah to remain in Makkah, but he defected to the Muslims in Madinah. The Prophet (sws), in accordance with the terms of the pact, returned him to the Quraysh by handing him over to two representatives from their side. Abu Basir killed one of them on the way back; the other ran away and came to the Prophet (sws). Abu Basir also returned to the Prophet (sws) and told him that by handing him over to the Quraysh the Prophet (sws) had fulfilled his promise and that thenceforth Abu Basir was himself responsible for all his actions. Thereafter, Abu Basir left Madinah and went to ‘is near Dhul’l Marwah. Soon a number of other defectors joined him and began ambushing the trade caravans of the Quraysh. Finally, the Quraysh relaxed the conditions of the pact for him, and he, along with his companions, settled down in Madinah.34

I find it hard to understand how Abu Basir’s story can become a basis for equating the looting of caravans with Qital fi sabil Allah. How can one ignore the fact that Abu Basir, after killing one man, told the Prophet (sws) that he was then responsible for his own actions and that the Prophet (sws) had fulfilled his promise by handing him over to the Quraysh. The only thing that went in favour of Abu Basir was that he got lucky enough to get a relaxation from the Quraysh, who had become tired of his ambushes.

The chance that God afforded to Abu Basir in the form of pardon by the Quraysh might be indicative of His mercy for a convert to Islam, but it does not in any way negate a principle emanating from the Qur’an and the Sunnah for Qital.

ii) ‘No Qital without the authority of the State’ is not ‘my idea’. It is a deduction from the Qur’an for which deduction detailed arguments were given in the article. Calling this deduction ‘your idea’ does not prove it wrong. You can call it anything that pleases you: your idea, your imagination, your trickery, but only sound counter arguments from the Qur’an and the Sunnah can negate what is presented on these bases.

Regarding the struggle in Kashmir, I should like to ask you if you regard all what Muslims do as truly Islamic. Isn’t it possible -- as has been the case many a time in our history -- that a Muslim or a group of Muslims -- despite our emotional attachment to that person or group -- may be doing something against the Qur’an without realising it? What are the criteria? That is the question. Are the criteria the Qur’an and the Sunnah or actions and emotions of the Muslims? If actions and emotions are the criteria, ‘Umar (raa) should not have submitted to Abu Bakr’s argument (raa) when he recited the Qur’an on the death of our Prophet (sws).

In Kashmir, different factions fighting Indian hegemony have different objectives and strategies. Which objectives and strategies are right and which are wrong? Is Kashmir another Afghanistan in the making (where Muslims fought and killed Muslims)? These questions should be of interest to every patriotic Pakistani Muslim. However, the question here is not Kashmir. It is the Qur’an and the Sunnah. What are the arguments from within the Qur’an and on the basis of the Sunnah which negate the principle of No Qital without the Authority of the State?

I do not deny the plight of the Kashmiri Muslims or the atrocities of the Indians. Indeed, if it were my choice alone, I should like to bomb all the Indians out of Kashmir -- may be even out of India. But again the question is: How do the Qur’an and the Sunnah want me to go about it?

If you look at the article from this angle, you’ll find that it does not negate Jihad in Kashmir. It merely spells out the right way to do it.

My article does not stop Pakistan or any other Muslim State -- from Morocco to Indonesia -- to wage an armed Jihad against India. Indeed, that, according to the article, would absolutely be in accordance with the dictates of Islam provided that the Jihad is morally and tactically justified. If, in that Jihad, my country or ‘the United Muslim States’ asked for my services as an individual, I should regard it as a matter of my faith to render them. In the existing circumstances, however, we must ask ourselves whether or not we are deceiving our conscience with insignificant measures as slogans, seminars and rallies to cover up for the lack of courage and tactical ability at the level of our State -- and even at the level of the Ummah -- to wage an all out Jihad for our Kashmiri brethren.

iii) Regarding Hadrat Husayn’s stand against Yazid, again the first question is related to the criteria?

It is evident from the Qur’an that the Qur’an and the Sunnah are the actual sources of Divine guidance, not history. Not only has the veracity of various historical records been a subject of continual debate, the contexts in which events have been reported are also not always clear. Why then should one rely on a human source of knowledge for deriving religious principles when two indubitable sources of Divine guidance -- the Qur’an and the Sunnah -- are available?

As Muslims, we can assume that Hadrat Husayn did what he thought was correct. But what exactly was it that he did? What actually happened? Much has been written on these issues and much needs to be written. Research on this aspect of our history, it seems, will continue. We, however, have to decide about religion on the basis of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.

As far as history is concerned, who knows further research might confirm for sure that Hadrat Husayn decided to go to Kufa just to form an independent State there for fulfilling a condition of Khuruj and that on finding out that the people of Kufa had backed out from supporting him, he offered to pledge allegiance to Yazid35 (one of the three propositions he made) not as a compromise but as his compliance with the Qur’anic principle of government by the majority-vote of the Muslims (The Qur’an 42:38).

In any case, the fact remains that he did not retaliate militarily against State while going towards Kufa, and, therefore, his stance cannot be equated with that of those who kill innocent people in the name of religion and who, without having formed an independent State, retaliate militarily against established authority.

iv) The views expressed in my article may seem close to those of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani regarding Qital fi sabil Allah but actually they are quite different and based on other premises. You must remember that the views in my article do not negate Qital fi sabil Allah. They only spell out the truly Islamic way of doing it.

I am a Muslim and believe very firmly in the finality of Muhammad’s Prophethood (sws) in all senses of the word. I believe that the Prophet (sws) is now the only and final source of Divine guidance for mankind and that he has passed on the religion of Islam to us through two undeniable sources: the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Apart from these two sources, there is no other undeniable source of the contents of religion.

The views expressed in my article are based on these two bases. I do not care whose ideas they are similar with. My only concern is whether they are a correct interpretation of these two bases or not, and, as a student of religion and as a Muslim, I should be glad to change my views if any argument based on the Qur’an and Sunnah proved them incorrect.


a. Punishment for blasphemy against Islam or any of the Prophets (sws) is a matter for the State to decide. Such punishment, if given, would not be against freedom of expression. Freedom of expression does not mean that a person has the right to stand outside my house and hurl abuses. ‘The freedom to extend your arm ends where the tip of my nose begins’ -- a useful adage to remind us that freedom is a privilege and as any privilege entails responsibility. That responsibility also includes giving due regard to the sentiments and feelings of others. In an Islamic State, the greatest regard the people have is for Allah and the Prophet (sws) and any person -- Muslim or Non-Muslim -- must keep in mind the fact that desecration of Islam is the most provocative act against the collectivity of the Muslims. However, Islam does not entail any punishment for blasphemy. Indeed, on many occasions sagacity demands that acts of blasphemy be dealt with by completely ignoring them. The way the Prophet (sws) and his companions dealt with blasphemy in their time is a good proof of the wisdom in the strategy of ignoring something worthless, which can become a hot issue when given undue attention. (For further details, see Waheed-ud-Din Khan, Shatm-i-Rasul, Lahore: Khak-i-Watan Printers, 1997).


b. For a brief overview of the overall changes required in our education system, see Shehzad Saleem, Our System of Education, Renaissance, February 1997, p. 26-33.

c. From Shehzad Saleem’s The Role of Mosques, Renaissance, February 1997, pp. 34 and 35. For some other pertinent points see this article.

d. Mu‘ahid is a person who belongs to that category of non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic State whose rights have been guaranteed on the basis of an agreement with the State. Non-Muslims in Pakistan belong to this category.

Dhimmi is a person who belongs to that category of non-Muslims who are vanquished by the Islamic State in war and then agree to remain subservient to the State and to pay it Jizyah (a tax on them) for protection and guarantee of their basic rights.

e. This obviously refers to taxes and other demands.

f. See the Qur’an 5:8.

1. That is human life.

2. That is unless it is a case where a court of law awards death punishment to a murderer or to someone who is guilty of creating disorder on earth (for example a dacoit) by taking the law of the land into his own hands.

3. Disorder, anarchy, chaos, etc.

4. Rebellion against an Islamic State.

5. That is eradicate it.

6. Therefore, the 104th verse of the third chapter of the Qur’an refers to such a body as is deputed by the State to see that the good conventions of the society are followed and the evil conventions are eradicated. Using its legal authority for this purpose is the responsibility of the Islamic State and, because of this authority, the right to use force (within the confines of that authority) is its prerogative (see the Qur’an 22:41). However, in the 71st verse of the 9th chapter, the words ‘The believers, both men and women, are comrades of one another’ point out that in this verse ‘enjoining good and forbidding evil’ (amar bi’l-ma‘ruf wa nahi ‘ani’l-munkar) refers to the responsibility one Muslim has towards another as his friend, brother and comrade -- in which relationship one obviously does not have the legal authority or the moral ground to use force the way government or any of its organs can.

7. See the Qur’an 5:33 and 34.

8. Allowed, which means that when the conditions are met it becomes permissible not obligatory.

9. 42:38

10. Religious customs and rituals which were brought into effect by the Prophet (sws).

11. For a contradiction of the view that the Khuruj of Zayd ibn ‘Ali ibn Husayn ibn ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib was supported by Abu Hanifah and that of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah was supported by Abu Hanifah and Malik ibn Anas (for example see Syyid Manazir Ahsan Gilani, ‘Imam Abu Hanifah ki Siyasi Zindigi’, Urdu), see Professor Hakim Syyid ‘Ali Ahmad Abbasi, ‘Mudhhab-i-Imam-i-A‘zam Abu Hanifah’ (Urdu), Mahmud Academy, Nazimabad, Karachi, 1985.

12. That is Allah does not like bloodshed. Bloodshed is after all bloodshed.

13. The evil that is on us.

14. Vol. 2, p. 4.

15. Moving away to another land when one’s faith so entails.

16. The word Al-Jama‘ah (literally: the group or the collectivity) does not therefore refer to a religious group or organisation as some have taken it to mean erroneously.

17. That is ‘killing’ -- in other words a battle or war or any militant struggle.

18. Regarding the Qur’anic verse (22:39) ‘To those against whom war is made permission is given [to fight] because they have been wronged...’, Qadi Abu Bakar Ibnu’l-‘Arabi says:

Our Scholars, may God have mercy on them have said that neither war nor [shedding] blood had been allowed to the Prophet (sws) prior to the Pledge of ‘Aqabah (Akhamu’l-Qur’an, vol. 3, p. 1297).

19. Migration to another land.

20. The government as a representative of the State.

21. As in a contract or agreement by which such groups are formed. The members are bound by promise and agreement not by political and legal authority.

22. Disorder on land, disruption, anarchy etc.

23. That is begin an armed struggle.

24. Da‘wat-i-Din awr us ka tariqah-i-kar (Urdu), chapter 14. pp. 241 and 242.

25. There are only two bases for Qital fi sabil Allah. First, as a measure against some injustice or oppression*. Second, as a measure against those who deny God’s message after Itmamu’l-Hujjah (revealing the truth so clearly that no excuse is left for a person or a people to deny it). Although the details of these bases are beyond the scope of this article, it would not be inappropriate to point out here that Itmamu’l-Hujjah is not possible by any person in his individual capacity or even by a group of people. Only that messenger of God who is sent to a people as the final chance can do Itmamu’l-Hujjah in his individual capacity. When the word Rasul is used as a term by the Qur’an, it refers to such messengers. It is also noteworthy that only in case of Itmamu’l-Hujjah by a such a Rasul all the people of a community he is directly sent to are ultimately always condemned to death -- either through some Divine chastisement or through Qital by the State formed by the Rasul -- unless they accept his Divine message as their faith. In case of Itmamu’l-Hujjah by the 'Ummah (the whole Muslim community) only the rulers of the community on which Itmamu’l-Hujjah is done may be sentenced to death if after the Qital they deny their people access to the message of Islam. The rest of the community are not to be coerced into accepting Islam. However, they are required to remain subservient to the Islamic State and are given all their rights in return. This is why now -- after the Prophet (sws) --, there is no basis whatsoever for death punishment for apostasy (for further details, see Shehzad Saleem The Punishment for Apostasy, Renaissance, November 1996, p. 44-48).

*. That is why the masses in the Roman and the Persian Empires often enthusiastically welcomed the conquests of the companions of the Prophet (sws) when they (raa) waged Jihad against the despotic and oppressive rulers of these lands.

26. Infidels, or those who deny the truth.

27. Here the word has been used as a Qur’anic term for such a messenger of God as is sent to a people for Itmamu’l-Hujjah. (Plural of Rasul: Rusul)

28. See the Qur’an 4:165: ‘... so that after these Rusul no excuse is left with people to present before Allah’.

29. The definite article in Al-Nas here refers to peoples other than the Ummah.

30. See the Qur’an 2:143, 22:178 and 3:110. See also 4:135 and 5:8.

31. See the Qur’an 16:125.

32. Perhaps, it would be more appropriate to refer to Qisas as the Islamic version of Lex Talionis.

33. Al-Syyid Al-Sabiq, Fiqhu’l-Sunnah, Vol. 3, p. 30.

34. Details of the incident can be found in the following sources:

Hafiz al-‘asqalani, Fathu’l-Bari, al-Juz al-hadi‘ashar; Kitabu’l shurut, Bab ma yajuz min al-shurut fi’l-Islam .... (Ahadith 2711 & 2712), Babu’l-shurut fi’l Jihad wa al-masalih ma‘a ahl al-harb wa kitabah al-shurut (Ahadith 2731 & 2732); Kitabu’l sulh, Babu’l-sulh ma‘a al-mushriqin (Hadith 2700); see also Al-Juz al-sabi‘, kitabu’l-maghazi, Bab ghazwatu’l-Hudaybiyyah (Ahadith 4180 & 4182)

and

Al-Shaykh Ahmad ‘abdu’l Rahman al-Bana, Al-Fathu’l-Rabbani litartib Musnad Ahmad ibn Muhammad Ibn Hambal Al-shaybani, Al-Juz al-hadi wa’l-‘ishrun, Bab ma ja’a fi ‘umrah al-Hudaybiyyah ba‘ada al-Hijrah..., and Bab ma ja’a fi ‘umrah al-Hudaybiyyah wa sadda Quraysh al-Nabi (sws) wa ashabihi ‘an dakhul Makkah... (Hadith 305) and Bab ma ja’a fi nass kitab sulh al-Hudaybiyyah. See also Al-Juz al-Rabi‘ ‘ashar, Bab fi ma yajuz min shurut ma’a al-kuffar...

35. For instance see Al-Suyuti, Tarikhu’l-khulafa, Nur Muhammad Karkhana Tijarat-i-Kutub, Aram Bagh, Karachi, p. 207. Other references to this proposition may be found in Al-Tabri, Tarikh al-Umam wa al-Mamluk and Ibn Hajar ‘asqalani, al-Asabah fi tamyi al-Ashabah. (See also Nasikhu’l-Tawarikh).

Thursday, October 16, 2008

Suicide Attacks, Terrorism and Lal Mosque - VII

Jimmy Jumshade wrote:

I have nooooo idea how some people can actually support "LAL MASJID" massacre. I guess, because their own families were not present at Lal Masjid at the time of the assault.
=========================================

Dear Jumshade Sahab,

A similar situation had arisen in Saudi Arabia. Read...

On June 7, 2007, Lal Masjid clerics claimed that Imam-i-Kaaba Dr Sheikh Abdul Rehman Al Sudais supported their struggle for enforcement of Sharia in Pakistan. [Daily Dawn dated June 8, 2007 National]

The Mullahs of Lal Mosque/Jamia Hafsah are agreed upon the Saudi Style Islam, lets have a quick look as to how Saudi Kingdom treat the Dissenting Scholars:

When the Religious Clerics connive with the State to coerce people instead of saying what is right and just as per Quran and Shariah then incidents like the Occupation of Holy Kaaba take place and rogues and US CIA AGENTS like Osama Bin Laden helps in playing havoc in the Muslim World. As per Saudi Fatwa through authentic references of Quran and Hadith all the followers of other sects e.g. Ahmediya or Quadiyani, Barelvi, Deobandi Tableeghi Jamat, Shia, Ismailia are Deviant {Gumrah, Mushrik, Kaafir, Bidaati and what not} but how would they justify Aal-e-Sauds doing business with Late. Agha Hassan Abidi of BCCI {A Shia}, conniving with General Ziaul Haq {A Deobandi follower of Militant Deviant Jamat-e-Islami} to save his dictatorship and their kingdom, 860 Billion US Dollars of Saudi investments in the USA alone, and there are thousands of examples goes on and on…

As per an eyewitness who was there after the blood bath of 1979 in Holy Kaaba that those who had occupied the Kaaba were very simple Muslim rather puritans, one of them was the son of Maulana Badiuddin Shah Rashidi aka Peer Jhanday Shah of Sindh {A top Ahle-Hadith Cleric of Sindh}. During the occupation the leader Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaiba decided to take out a procession outside Holy Kaaba for demanding the better living facilities, jobs, and they further wanted to demand ban on cinemas and other such vices {as per them} but someone amongst the protestors mistakenly rather stupidly raised the slogan of him being Imam Mehdi and that’s where Saudi Mullahs/Mutawwas came in with ready made Fatwa of “BAGHI AND BAGHAWAT {quoting it as Fitnah, Rebellion or Khurooj against the rightful Rulers}”.


Amazing footage of Juhayman Al Otaybi (sometimes spelled al-Otaibi or numerous other variants), the ringleader behind the disastrous 1979 siege of Mecca. The footage, originally broadcast on Saudi government-controlled TV, also shows the dead body of the alleged Mahdi Juhayman was promoting with the attack. (The Mahdi is an apocalyptic figure in some strains of Islam.)

Footage of Juhayman Al Otaybi

http://intelwire.egoplex.com/2007_09_27_blogarchive.html


Juhayman Bin Mohamed Bin Seif al-Otaibi was born in a Brotherhood settlement in the area of Quseim, close to the city of Ghatghat, the headquarters of Sultan Bin Bijad who was killed by the forces of the founding King Abdel-Aziz during the famous Sibla battle. Juhayman had a strict religious upbringing. He married the daughter of prince Sajer Al Mohaya who was arrested after the Haram incident, then later married the sister of Mohamed Ibn Abdullah al-Qahtani. He work for about two years on the national guard forces. Juhayman studied at the Islamic university in Medina and was the student of Sheikh Abdel-Aziz Bin Baz, former Mufti of Saudi Arabia.

Juhayman returned to Qusaim in 1974 with a number of students and started promoting the establishment of a fundamentalist movement that he called “The Brothers’ Movement” at the time (different from the Egyptian group the Muslim Brotherhood). Juhayman exceeded the teachings and methodology of his teacher Sheikh Bin Baz, expressing direct criticism of Ibn Soud. Juhayman said that Sheikh Bin Baz never objected to the Brothers’ Movement teachings, but that he had blamed them for focusing on Saudi issue alone. Juhayman then stopped attending Sheikh Bin Baz’s meetings and lectures. In his third message “The Brothers’ Call” he said that they (he and his colleagues) had to educate themselves when they couldn’t find “pure” Sharia education in the official Sharia school. They promoted their movement in tribal areas and grew in number.

They then moved to the capital Riyadh in 1976 where Juhayman published his first message under the title “The Law of Loyalty and Obedience: Corrupt Government” in which he attacked jurisprudents. In this message he said “People should not obey, but fight, Muslim rulers who do not adhere to the teachings of Quran and tradition. These corrupt rulers use Sharia to serve their own personal objectives and deal with unbelievers”. These ideas led to his arrest with 98 of his followers in the summer of 1978. However, they were not put on trial.

Sheikh Bin Baz was asked to examine their ideas and discuss with them. After listening to them, Bin Baz refused to consider them traitors, thus the authorities had to release them after they spent six weeks in prison. They promised to stop preaching and attacking rulers. Contrary to Osama Bin Laden who has no significant writings, Juhayman wrote 14 fundamentalist messages that included his ideas, parts of which where published under the title “The Seven Messages”.

The messages were banned in Saudi Arabia. According to these messages, Juhayman believed that Saudi religious education as was conducted at that time should be stopped. Many Wahabis said that Juhayman said that “he saw hundreds of the graduates of these schools became preachers, as if preaching was a government profession where employees look forward to receiving their monthly salaries.” He believed that such schools only produce religious representatives of the government, but not real ulama (religious scholars) or sheikhs, as he believed these should be independent leaders who think and act in accordance with the interests of Islam and society rather than the authorities as was the case in Saudi Arabia.

In his first message Juhayman talked about the emergence of the awaited Mahdi. In 1979 he wrote that prophet Mohamed visited him in a vision, then God talked to him and ordered him to announce that he was the Mahdi, sent to purify the earth from corruption. Qahtani also claimed he had the same vision. Qahtani then married Juhayman’s sister. To be fair, not all Juhayman’s writings were of that type. In his 11 messages he expressed his position towards rulers of Muslim countries in general, and the Saud family in particular; he also addressed major Islamic jurisprudence issues, such as Jihad, in addition to his position towards emirs and obedience. In his message Juhayman wonders: “Can jihad be declared against atheist countries when we have exchanged ambassadors and experts? How can we promote Islam when we have Christians for professors? Can we contradict our professors? Can we call for raising the jihad flag while the Christian flag stands side by side with the monotheism flag? We shouldn’t be deceived to that extent, as there should be a clear distinction between what is right and what is wrong. We should stay away from these people, we should fight them.”

This is the same logic that Bin Laden used 20 years later in the speech broadcast by Al Jazira where he divided the world into two “areas”: the area of Islam and the area of atheism. He described the issue as a “crusade” against Islam and Muslims. Thus he follows the same line as Juhayman, and finds justifications in the older literature of al-Mawdudi, Qutb, and others.

On 20 November 1979, 500 dissidents led by the grandson of the leader of the Ikhwan rebellion – 38-year old Juhayman – seized Mecca’s Grand Mosque. Almost fifty years to the day, Juhayman reiterated his ancestor’s grievances as he grabbed the mosque’s loudspeaker and announced that the House of Saud had lost its claim to legitimacy through corruption, ostentation, and mindless imitation of the West. His words were chilling to the royal family, all the more so because they closely resembled Khomeini’s diatribes against the Shah.

The Saudi leadership was initially paralysed by the takeover. The Grand Mosque surrounds Islam’s holiest shrine. Accordingly, no non-Muslim may enter the city of Mecca and shedding blood on such holy grounds is considered blasphemy. The Saudi royal family’s hands were tied for days as they deliberated how to dislodge the dissidents. The Ulema had to issue a dispensation to allow the bearing of arms in a holy place before any military move could be authorized.

Once more, the traditional alliance of convenience between the religious establishment and the House of Saud served its purpose. The fatwa issued by the highest religious authority, Mufti Bin Baz, legitimised the unthinkable – spilling blood in Islam’s holiest site. But even when the religious dilemma was solved, the Saudi military failed to end the siege. This time, the House of Saud had to ask the Ulema to sanction that the mosque be stormed by ‘infidels’. This second fatwa set a precedent that was to be invoked again during the Gulf War.


When the Saudi Forces couldn’t control the situation good old Pakistan came up with help French Military/General Zia ul Haq {Commander of the faithful} sent troops there and they used the Nerve Gas in Kaaba;

وَإِذْ جَعَلْنَا الْبَيْتَ مَثَابَةً لِّلنَّاسِ وَأَمْناً وَاتَّخِذُواْ مِن مَّقَامِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ مُصَلًّى وَعَهِدْنَا إِلَى إِبْرَاهِيمَ وَإِسْمَاعِيلَ أَن طَهِّرَا بَيْتِيَ لِلطَّائِفِينَ وَالْعَاكِفِينَ وَالرُّكَّعِ السُّجُودِ


[And when We made the House (at Makkah) a resort for mankind and a sanctuary. Sorrah Al-Baqara - The Cow - Verse 125]

and electrocuted the floors of Kaaba and threw water, which resulted in catastrophe;


وَإِذْ قَالَ إِبْرَاهِيمُ رَبِّ اجْعَلْ هَـَذَا بَلَدًا آمِنًا وَارْزُقْ أَهْلَهُ مِنَ الثَّمَرَاتِ مَنْ آمَنَ مِنْهُم بِاللّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الآخِرِ قَالَ وَمَن كَفَرَ فَأُمَتِّعُهُ قَلِيلاً ثُمَّ أَضْطَرُّهُ إِلَى عَذَابِ النَّارِ وَبِئْسَ الْمَصِيرُ


[And when Abraham prayed: My Lord! Make this a region of security. Sorrah Al-Baqara - The Cow – Verse 126].

The smell of the gas lasted for days in a house, which is the holiest place on earth. Almost 90 % of Salafi, Deobandi, Barelvi and other Mullahs and Clerics were supporting General Ziaul Haq and nobody from religious lobbies came out against Zia on this.

Since all the Muslims around the world except Saudi Muslims are Infidel as per Saudi Interpretation of Islam but again where would you put this Quranic Verse rather a clear decree of Allah and it may be mentioned here when there is something very clear in Quran then there are no Hadiths, Fatwas, and Interpretation valid. There was just once stance when War was allowed around Holy Kaaba and that was the first and last time and allowed by Allah and that was during Fateh Makkah and that permission was granted to Prophet Mohammad {PBUH} and after that it is strictly forbidden to kill someone in the House of Allah and that decree is indefinite.


INTERNAL STRIFE IN SAUDI ARABIA:

On November 20, 1979 at least 500 dissidents invaded and seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The leader of the dissidents, Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaiba, a Sunni, was from one of the foremost families of Najd. His grandfather had ridden with Abd al Aziz in the early decades of the century, and other family members were among the foremost of the Ikhwan. Juhaiman said that his justification was that the Al Saud had lost its legitimacy through corruption, ostentation, and mindless imitation of the West--virtually an echo of his grandfather' s charge in 1921 against Abd al Aziz. Juhaiman's accusations against the Saudi monarchy closely resembled Ayatollah Ruhollah Musaui, Khomeini's diatribes against the Shah. Furthermore, all holy places come under a special injunction in Islam. It is forbidden to shed blood there or to deface or to pollute them in any way. Despite careful planning on Juhaiman's part, a guard was shot dead by one of the nervous dissidents.

Such a desecration is a major violation under Islamic law and merits crucifixion for the convicted offender. Juhaiman's party included women as well as men, other peninsular Arabs, and a few Egyptians. A score of the dissidents were unemployed graduates of the kingdom's seminary in Medina. They had provisions for the siege they expected as well as extensive supplies of arms.

The government's initial attempts to rout the dissidents were stymied. Before any military move could be authorized, the ulama had to issue a dispensation to allow the bearing of arms in a holy place. When the religious problems were solved by announcement of the ulama's ruling, logistical problems bogged down the efforts of the military and the national guard for several days. Finally, two weeks later the military effort succeeded, and the dissidents were dislodged. All the surviving males were eventually beheaded in the squares of four Saudi cities. Far from discounting the efforts of the rebels, the leaders examined themselves and their policies more closely. Khalid, particularly, was sensitive to their complaints. Many of the dissidents had come from two of the tribes that traditionally have been recruited for the national guard. Khalid had spent much time with these people in the desert. Compounding the nightmare for the regime were Shia riots in Al Qatif in the Eastern Province two weeks after the siege of the Grand Mosque.


Many of the rioters bore posters with Khomenini's picture. Although these were not the first Shia protests in the kingdom (others had occurred in 1970 and 1978), the December rioters had become emboldened by Khomeini's triumphal return to Iran in early 1979. Up to 20,000 national guard troops were immediately moved into the Eastern Province. Several demonstrators were killed and hundreds reportedly arrested. Almost visibly shaken by the takeover of the mosque and the Shia disturbances, the Saudi leadership announced in the aftermath of these events that a consultative assembly (majlis ash shura) would soon be formed. The Shia disturbances in the Eastern Province encouraged the government to take a closer look at conditions there.


Although it was clear that the Shia had been radicalized by Khomeini, it was also obvious that repression and imprisonment were stop-gap solutions and as likely to promote further resistance as to quell it. Further, the Shia lived in the area of the kingdom most vulnerable to sabotage, where numerous oil and gas pipelines crisscross the terrain. Aramco had adamantly refused to discriminate against the Shia in their hiring practices, as had Saudi governmental agencies. Aramco had a preponderance of Shia employees--not only because of Aramco's location but also because Aramco employment offered a Shia the best chance for mobility. Compared with other towns in the Eastern Province, the Shia towns of Al Qatif and Al Hufuf were depressed areas.

The Shia lacked decent schools, hospitals, roads, and sewerage and had inadequate electrification and water supplies. Violent Shia demonstrations occurred once against in February 1980, and, although they were as harshly repressed as the previous ones, the deputy minister of interior, Amir Ahmad ibn Abd al Aziz, was directed to draw up a comprehensive plan to improve the standard of living in Shia areas. His recommendations, which were immediately accepted and implemented, included an electrification project, swamp drainage, the construction of schools and a hospital, street lighting, and loans for home construction.


It is Jewish conspiracy', was the common reaction in Pakistan; perhaps across the Muslim world. The uprising was crushed leaving 200 dead (figures however vary from 75 to 500). Leaders on the leaders of 'uprising' were publicly beheaded, as is the 'ritual' in the kingdom. Taliban later on were just imitating Sauds. In 1980, a Shia uprising in south of the kingdom also met the same fate. Saudi Shias, oppressed and deprived as they are even today, enthused by Khomeni's return started an uprising. Shah Khalid moved 200,000 National Guards and it was brutally crushed. The kingdom was again 'peaceful', ruled with an iron fist by corrupt House of Sauds until 1996.


Much of the opposition in the kingdom in 1980s was externalized. It was diverted towards Soviet Union through Afghan war. The oppositionists were encouraged to reach Pakistan to join 'Jihad 'against Soviet 'infidels'. The kingdom stayed peaceful until 1996 when a bombing in Riyadh reminded Sauds of al-Utaiba. This time it was Osama bin Laden playing al-Utaiba. Osama however survived the fate al-Utaiba met. It was because Osama, deprived of his Saudi nationality in the wake of first Gulf War, had been exiled. Interestingly, Osama, like al Utaiba, was a friend of Saud family too. {1}.


Notes and References.

1- HOLY QURAN.

2- INTERNAL STRIFE IN SAUDI ARABIA {1}


3- Al Khobar: Sins of Parents Visting Upon Children Farooq Sulehria LABOUR PARTY PAKISTAN {1}


4- CORRUTION IN THE HOUSE OF AAL-E-SAUD:


5- HUMAN RIGHT ABUSES IN SAUDI ARABIA:


6- FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN SAUDI ARABIA:



7- POLITICAL DISSIDENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA:



8- ECONOMY OF SAUDI ARABIA:



9- PRINCE AND PRINCES IN SAUDI ARABIA:



10- BLOOD, OIL AND CYNICISM:



11- THE SAUDIS: INSIDE THE DESERT KINGDOM:



12- THE BCCI AND SAUDI ARABIA:
13 - RULE OF LAW:



14 - Lal Masjid clerics claim support of Imam-i-Kaaba By Syed Irfan Raza

June 08, 2007 Friday Jamadi-ul-Awwal 22, 1428

http://www.dawn.com/2007/06/08/nat7.htm

Hi AM Sahib:

I remember that "similar situation" However no women & children were involved at that situation only "Anti-Monarchy" armed disidents. Dissent is an integral part of Democracy.

============================

Dear Jumshade Sahab,

There were Pilgrims and many were women and children.

More Details

"QUOTE"

Juhayman Bin Mohamed Bin Seif al-Otaibi was born in a Brotherhood settlement in the area of Quseim, close to the city of Ghatghat, the headquarters of Sultan Bin Bijad who was killed by the forces of the founding King Abdel-Aziz during the famous Sibla battle. Juhayman had a strict religious upbringing. He married the daughter of prince Sajer Al Mohaya who was arrested after the Haram incident, then later married the sister of Mohamed Ibn Abdullah al-Qahtani. He work for about two years on the national guard forces. Juhayman studied at the Islamic university in Medina and was the student of Sheikh Abdel-Aziz Bin Baz, former Mufti of Saudi Arabia.

Juhayman returned to Qusaim in 1974 with a number of students and started promoting the establishment of a fundamentalist movement that he called “The Brothers’ Movement” at the time (different from the Egyptian group the Muslim Brotherhood). Juhayman exceeded the teachings and methodology of his teacher Sheikh Bin Baz, expressing direct criticism of Ibn Soud. Juhayman said that Sheikh Bin Baz never objected to the Brothers’ Movement teachings, but that he had blamed them for focusing on Saudi issue alone. Juhayman then stopped attending Sheikh Bin Baz’s meetings and lectures. In his third message “The Brothers’ Call” he said that they (he and his colleagues) had to educate themselves when they couldn’t find “pure” Sharia education in the official Sharia school. They promoted their movement in tribal areas and grew in number.

They then moved to the capital Riyadh in 1976 where Juhayman published his first message under the title “The Law of Loyalty and Obedience: Corrupt Government” in which he attacked jurisprudents. In this message he said “People should not obey, but fight, Muslim rulers who do not adhere to the teachings of Quran and tradition. These corrupt rulers use Sharia to serve their own personal objectives and deal with unbelievers”. These ideas led to his arrest with 98 of his followers in the summer of 1978. However, they were not put on trial.

Sheikh Bin Baz was asked to examine their ideas and discuss with them. After listening to them, Bin Baz refused to consider them traitors, thus the authorities had to release them after they spent six weeks in prison. They promised to stop preaching and attacking rulers. Contrary to Osama Bin Laden who has no significant writings, Juhayman wrote 14 fundamentalist messages that included his ideas, parts of which where published under the title “The Seven Messages”.

The messages were banned in Saudi Arabia. According to these messages, Juhayman believed that Saudi religious education as was conducted at that time should be stopped. Many Wahabis said that Juhayman said that “he saw hundreds of the graduates of these schools became preachers, as if preaching was a government profession where employees look forward to receiving their monthly salaries.” He believed that such schools only produce religious representatives of the government, but not real ulama (religious scholars) or sheikhs, as he believed these should be independent leaders who think and act in accordance with the interests of Islam and society rather than the authorities as was the case in Saudi Arabia.


In his first message Juhayman talked about the emergence of the awaited Mahdi. In 1979 he wrote that prophet Mohamed visited him in a vision, then God talked to him and ordered him to announce that he was the Mahdi, sent to purify the earth from corruption. Qahtani also claimed he had the same vision. Qahtani then married Juhayman’s sister. To be fair, not all Juhayman’s writings were of that type. In his 11 messages he expressed his position towards rulers of Muslim countries in general, and the Saud family in particular; he also addressed major Islamic jurisprudence issues, such as Jihad, in addition to his position towards emirs and obedience. In his message Juhayman wonders: “Can jihad be declared against atheist countries when we have exchanged ambassadors and experts? How can we promote Islam when we have Christians for professors? Can we contradict our professors? Can we call for raising the jihad flag while the Christian flag stands side by side with the monotheism flag? We shouldn’t be deceived to that extent, as there should be a clear distinction between what is right and what is wrong. We should stay away from these people, we should fight them.”


This is the same logic that Bin Laden used 20 years later in the speech broadcast by Al Jazira where he divided the world into two “areas”: the area of Islam and the area of atheism. He described the issue as a “crusade” against Islam and Muslims. Thus he follows the same line as Juhayman, and finds justifications in the older literature of al-Mawdudi, Qutb, and others.

On 20 November 1979, 500 dissidents led by the grandson of the leader of the Ikhwan rebellion – 38-year old Juhayman – seized Mecca’s Grand Mosque. Almost fifty years to the day, Juhayman reiterated his ancestor’s grievances as he grabbed the mosque’s loudspeaker and announced that the House of Saud had lost its claim to legitimacy through corruption, ostentation, and mindless imitation of the West. His words were chilling to the royal family, all the more so because they closely resembled Khomeini’s diatribes against the Shah.

The Saudi leadership was initially paralysed by the takeover. The Grand Mosque surrounds Islam’s holiest shrine. Accordingly, no non-Muslim may enter the city of Mecca and shedding blood on such holy grounds is considered blasphemy. The Saudi royal family’s hands were tied for days as they deliberated how to dislodge the dissidents. The Ulema had to issue a dispensation to allow the bearing of arms in a holy place before any military move could be authorized.

Once more, the traditional alliance of convenience between the religious establishment and the House of Saud served its purpose. The fatwa issued by the highest religious authority, Mufti Bin Baz, legitimised the unthinkable – spilling blood in Islam’s holiest site. But even when the religious dilemma was solved, the Saudi military failed to end the siege. This time, the House of Saud had to ask the Ulema to sanction that the mosque be stormed by ‘infidels’. This second fatwa set a precedent that was to be invoked again during the Gulf War.

RECAPTURING THE GRAND MOSQUE


Following two weeks of unsuccessful attempts to dislodge Juhayman, the king was forced to call for foreign help. It was clear that the Saudi Royal Guard was ill-equipped to face the situation. The French GIGN was chosen for the task. They went through a brief ceremony of conversion to Islam. The hastily-issued fatwa allowed French forces to enter the site armed, although they were able to force the rebels to surrender using only ‘incapacitating gases’.


This incident, the details of which have been kept a state secret, inspired what was to become a movement of clandestine Islamic opposition within the Kingdom. Juhayman’s public beheading only served to turn him into a martyr for many disgruntled youth. It is this same group of Islamic militants who lay the groundwork for organisations like that of Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaida.


The timing of Grand Mosque’s capture is crucial. 1979 was the year in which various events came together to sow the seeds of Moslem fundamentalism that pose a serious threat today.


If the Iranian revolution opened the way to Islamic movements, Egyptian President Sadat’s separate peace treaty with Israel sent critics and dissidents flocking to the embrace of political Islam. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided the sanctuary in which these Moslemdissidents would receive military training and religious indoctrination.


If the GIGN came to the Saudis’ rescue, it was a measure of the western world’s interest in the
Kingdom’s stability and oil. But the Saudi-U.S. friendship was a solid anchor on which the Saudis
could count upon for their security.

The events of the Grand Mosque worried America almost as much as the House of Saud. For the U.S., the fall of Iran was a disaster which they could not allow to be repeated in Saudi Arabia. If the price of keeping the House of Saud in power was to provide the country with the kind of sophisticated weapons that had been withheld until then out of concern for Israel’s security, then so be it.

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Suicide Attacks, Terrorism and Lal Mosque - VI

Jimmy Jumshade wrote:

When it comes to personal revenge, "The name of the Lord & book" are out the
window...... ......... .......it is a combinaton of:

Lal masjid & pakistani army operations in north & American killings of innocents while targeting imaginary "Al-Qaeeda", American obedience, & slavery by the government.. ......... ..OK if not, then you tell us what the heck is it??!! maybe you can throw a better light on it.
============ ========= ========= ========

Dear Jumshade Sahab,

Another view on this:

"QUOTE"

AT-TAFJEERAAT WA TAHLEELAAT AL-MUNAAFIQEEN

All praise is due to Allaah, the Lord of all the Worlds, and salaat and salaam be upon the trustworthy Prophet, our Prophet Muhammad, upon his family, his companions and [all] those following them in goodness, until the Day of Judgement. To proceed:

Verily, when the shocking event occurred, the event of the bombings in the city of Riyaadh undertaken by the violent and barbarious (savage) hands, in the capital of the land of tawheed, they turned upon the religion, and upon humanity (by way of this act of theirs), and the Kuffaar have taken them as riding animal in order to attack Islaam and the Muslims. And this action of their was a result of their ignorance, their being deceived and their evil nurturing, and their breaking off from the society and their turning away from learning the beneficial knowledge, and taking it from those who (truly) possess it, and also restricting themselves to their own faulty understandings and their stagnant views.

And their affair in this matter, is the affair of the Khawaarij Renegades, those who killed the two Rightly Guided Caliphs, Uthmaan and Alee (radhi-yallaahu 'anhumaa), and also their concern with killing Mu`aawiyah and `Amr bin al-Aas (radhi-yallaahu 'anhumaa), and killing others from the leaders of the Muslims.

I say that when this repugnant action occurred in these days of ours, the Hypocrites took a deep breath and made a sigh, and they carried the responsibility of this action upon the religion, and that it (i.e. Islaam) was the reason for their transgression (i.e. that of the Khawaarij), upon the Muslims and upon humanity as a whole. And they said, may Allaah make them ugly, that this action of theirs (i.e. of those Khawaarij) was due to their embracement of the views of Shaykh ul-Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah and Shaykh ul-Islaam Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhaab, and other than them both from amongst the Scholars of Islaam.

This is how they lie in wait with pessimism and ascription of evil to Islaam and for the Scholars of Islaam, just like Aal Fir`awn, those about whom Allaah said:

{And if evil afflicted them, they ascribed it to evil omens connected with Mûsa (Moses) and those with him} (Soorah Al-A'raf, Aayah 131).

And just like the Mushriks, they also ascribed the occurrence of evil to Muhammad (sal-Allaahu `alayhe wa sallam), just as Allaah said about them:

{...But if some evil befalls them, they say, “This is from you”} (Soorah An-Nisa, Aayah 78)

...and just as the Hypocrites said in the expedition of the confederates (al-ahzaab), when the Muslims were afflicted with whatever afflicted them of hardship and severity, just as Allaah said about them:

{And when the hypocrites and those in whose hearts is a disease (of doubts) said: “Allaah and His Messenger promised us nothing but delusions!} (Soorah Al-Ahzab,
Aayah 12)

...and just as they said on the day of (the battle of) al-Badr, concerning the Muslims:

{These people (Muslims) are deceived by their religion} (Soorah Al-Anfal, Aayah 49)

...and they also said, on the day of Uhud:

{If we had anything to do with the affair, none of us would have been killed here} (Soorah Aali Imran, Aayah 154).

So the saying of these Hypocrites (in our times) concerning these events is nothing but the statement of their predecessors in the events that occurred previously, and every nation has an inheritor.

Certainly, the religion of Islaam prohibits transgression in all of its types and its
manifestations, Allaah, (Subhaanahu wa Ta'aala) said:

{And transgress not. Verily, Allaah does not like the transgressor} (Soorah Al-Ma'idah, Aayah 87)

...and He said:

{And let not the enmity and hatred of others make you avoid justice. Be just: that is nearer to piety, and fear Allaah} (Soorah Al-Ma'idah, Aayah 8).

And those subverters, vandals, they took their destructive ideology from the ideology of the Khawaarij Renegades before them who unleashed it upon Islaam, and they took it from the callers of misguidance, those whom the Messenger (sal-Allaahu `alayhe wa sallam) described as

((Callers at the gates of Hellfire, whoever obeys them, they will throw him into it)), so it is was said, ((Describe them to us O Messenger of Allaah)), he said:

((They are a people of our skin (i.e. lineage) and they will speak with our tongue...)).

And these Hypocrites have requested the abolition of the necessary allegiance (al-walaa) and enmity, disavowal (al-baraa), both of which are from the strongest handholds of Islaam, and they requested the abolition of the commandment to good and forbiddence of evil, both of which comprise the guarantee of the maintanenance and lasting of the Islamic society, and they also requested the abolition of jihaad in the path of Allaah, which is the peak of the matter of Islaam, and they also requested that the methodologies (of Islaam) be purified from any resemblances of
loving necessitated by the Sharee'ah, and they called to allegiance (i.e. loving) of the Disbelievers and the Pagans, and to the absence of differentiating between them and the Muslims. So what means of deliverance then have they left for the Muslims?

Indeed, they did not say these repugnant sayings except because they are restricted and confined by Islaam and its people, and when the chance became available to them, they began to reveal the enmity and jealousy they had towards Islaam and the Muslims, just as Allaah said concerning them:

{But surely, you will know them by the tone of their speech! And Allaah knows all your deeds} (Soorah Muhammad, Aayah 30).

However, their affair will be just like the affair of their predecessors, that of humiliation, lowliness, and they do not harm except themselves:

{Say: “perish in your rage. Certainly, Allaah knows what is in the breasts (all the secrets)} (Soorah Aali Imran, Aayah 119).

And certainly, the severe hardships and afflictions do not increase the Muslims except in steadfastness in their religion, and following their Prophet and their Scholars, the Imaams of Guidance, and the Illuminators of the darkness, such as Shaykh ul-Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah and Shaykh ul-Islaam Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhaab, both whom those Hypocrites have made as examples of extremism and exaggeration, and in such a way because of their blindness, they considered the sources of good and guidance to be sources of evil and beguilement, just like their predecessors were pessimistic towards the Prophets (ascribing evil outcomes to them), and to their followers.

And say [those of] sore eyes,


the sun has eyes also,

you see them when it disappears and when it rises

And pardon those eyes whose light Allaah has taken away

So they do not contract and they do not comprehend…

And indeed, it is from the blindness of insight (i.e. intellect and understanding) that person believe falsehood to be truth and truth to be falsehood, and we invite these people to repent and return to their guidance and to withhold their tongues, otherwise they will not be harming except themselves, and Islaam has a Lord that will protect it and the Scholars have a Lord that will aid them:

{They had nothing against them, except that they believed in Allaah, the All-Mighty, Worthy of all Praise! Who, to Whom belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth! And Allaah is Witness over everything} (Soorah Al-Buruj, Aayaat 8- 9).

And it is not a departure – O noble reader – that there should be found some coarseness in my speech, for verily the speech of those people is more coarse, and the author (of those words) is more unjust, and Allaah is sufficient for us, and how excellent a one is He to place trust in.

And indeed from that which expands the chest and gives satisfaction and rest to the heart is the answer given by the esteemed Ministor of the Interior (Hafitha-hullaah) to one of these people, when this person suggested that the Committee for the enjoinment of good and forbiddence of evil be abolished, so he (Hafitha-hullaah) replied that commanding of the good and forbiddence of the evil shall remain in his land as long as Islaam remains, and he (Hafitha-hullaah) gave an upright, straight answer and was correct and successful in this definitive answer. For verily this
state was built upon Islaam and its foundations, and amongst them is the commanding of good and forbiddence of evil, and there is no continuance for this state except with thecontinuance of its foundations that it is built upon.

O Allaah protect for us our religion and our security, and our firm establishment in our lands, and do not empower over us due to our sins those who do not fear you and who will not show mercy to us, and save us from the evil of the tribulations, those which are apparent and those that are hidden, and protect those in authority over us, and grant them success in that in which their rectitude lies, and the rectitude of Islaam and the Muslims. O Allaah, whoever intends evil for us, and for Islaam and for the Muslims, then occupy him with his own self and throw his plot back at him, indeed you are powerful over everything, and salaat and salaam be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family and companions.

Shaykh Saalih al-Fowzaan on the Riyadh Bombings Shaykh Saalih al-Fowzaan on the Khawaarij, the Bombings (in Riyaadh) and the Sanctioning of the Hypocrites Translated by: Abu 'Iyaad

"UNQUOTE"