Balochistan: Authority stamped? By Syed Shahid Husain

Balochistan: Authority stamped? By Syed Shahid Husain [Former Chief Secretary Balochistan]. Welcome to a generous selection of articles from DAWN's Weekly Magazine. This page is updated every Sunday. http://www.dawn.com/weekly/dmag/dmag1.htm . This article appeared in 2006.

Late. Sardar Akbar Bugti

Akbar Bugti’s death may provide satisfaction to some vengeful souls, but they know not what is afoot. The nawab may have been guilty of many crimes, including murders, but he died a brave man fighting and has left an indelible mark on the psyche of the people of Balochistan as a leader who fought for their rights against an exploitative establishment

They hunted him down and killed him mercilessly. Circumstances are getting murkier by the day. Killing one’s own people and bowing before foreign powers make the pillar of our state policy. Nawab Akbar Bugti, even when he was an octogenarian, was a major political player. Balochistan is afire, and how long this fire will take to burn out is anybody’s guess. But the supreme ruler can congratulate himself that he has removed one-third of the impediments in the way of progress by taking care of one of the three sardars. Now Dera Bugti will march ahead into the 21st century.

I remember having met Mr Bugti for the first time in 1997 when I went to call on him after assuming the charge of the provincial chief secretary. It was on the chief minister’s advice that I had called on him. He received me very cordially at his residence in Quetta, which appeared to be a fortified and well-protected place. Even the streets were closed for reasons of security. He had a large number of enemies. We sat on the neatly-carpeted floor. We had about an hour’s conversation. I found him very articulate, forthright and candid. His was an impressive figure and his white hirsute face added to his almost royal bearing. He told me that before the provincial government agreed to my appointment, the federal government had sent three names including mine. Mr Ilahi Bukhsh Soomro called Mr Bugti asking him to choose Mr Hasan Bhutto, one of the panelists. Mr Bugti refused without a minute’s hesitation. When Mr Soomro insisted that the officer had great merit, Mr Bugti said he would never accept a Bhutto, whatever his merits. Mr Soomro assured him that he had no relation with the famous man, but Mr Bugti was not moved.

It was Nawaz Sharif’s government that had come with a heavy mandate at the Centre which showed a welcome change in the attitude towards smaller provinces. Unlike all his predecessors, Mr Sharif decided to take along with him the ‘nationalist leadership’. Mr Akhtar Mengal, who headed the coalition in the provincial assembly of which Mr Bugti was a part, was allowed to form the government despite misgivings in powerful quarters. Soon after, the coalition partners fell out on something or the other and Bugti and Mengal started a media war. Since I got frequent opportunities of meeting the chief minister, I advised him to hold his punches and not to get into something that could go beyond the point of no return. But Mengal, relatively a young man, insisted on confronting Bugti head-on because, according to him, Bugti was a bully and deserved to be treated as such. I told him that any rift in the coalition partners will help the insidious forces to play their dirty games and install someone incompetent and corrupt to do their bidding and represent them rather than the people of Balochistan. Not long afterwards the inevitable happened and the government was dismissed.

Mr Sharif, as soon as he assumed office, travelled all the way from Islamabad to Dera Bugti on prime minister’s jet along with important members of his government and some senior civil servants to call on Bugti. The gesture did not seem to impress Bugti much who appeared to take it into his stride. After all, this was not the first time that he had been wooed by the mighty and the powerful. The plane landed at the Jacobabad airport and one was surprised that Mr Bugti was not waiting at the tarmac to receive the prime minister. The delegation then boarded the helicopter and took off for Dera Bugti. There was no Mr Bugti to receive the prime minister even at the helipad. The delegation then drove to the Bugti House. He was not there even at the outside gate. It was only after the prime minister and his delegation had entered the house that Mr Bugti emerged to receive him at the entrance to the hall, which was to be the venue of the meeting. The delegation was made to sit in the Balochi tradition on the floor and everyone could share the company of the prime minister and Mr Bugti. For a few minutes the two men went to a separate room to talk. Lunch was served and since Mr Bugti ate very spicy meals, he served the guests the same kind of food. Those who were careful chose to pass up the dishes and relied on yogurt and bread to avoid unpleasant consequences.

Before lunch was served, Mr Bugti called one of his underlings to bring a present for the prime minister. This looked like an ordinary stick and was perhaps hand-carved. Mr Bugti ordered his underling to present the stick to the prime minister that he graciously accepted. The chief minister told me afterwards that Mr Bugti’s gesture violated the traditional Balochi courtesy because not personally handing over the present to the prime minister implied that he treated him not on a par with himself, but at a level lower than himself. Otherwise in the Balochi tradition, if he had treated the prime minister as his equal, he would have presented the carved stick with his own hand. That was Bugti, arrogance incarnate.

When he resigned as governor of Balochistan, he did not address Mr Bhutto as prime minister. Mr Sher Baz Mazari has quoted in his book, A Journey to Disillusionment, an instance: when Bhutto visited him at the Governor’s House and showed some annoyance at children playing on the lawn, Bugti ignored the protest and told the prime minister that it was natural for children to play.

Mr Bugti was a very canny character and a tough negotiator. He knew better than any Baloch sardar how to squeeze his opponent to the limit. The Pakistan Petroleum Limited running Sui Gas fields and the OGDCL running some other wells in the area were made to pay through their nose for their presence in those areas either in terms of rent/lease for the land or the employees who had to be given jobs. Some agreements between Mr Bugti and the OGDCL read like treaties between two sovereign entities. His demands easily qualified as extortion.

Mr Sharif, known to be a man in great hurry, wished to make some amendments to the Constitution for which he had the necessary numbers in the National Assembly, but not in the Senate. Mr Bugti had five senators and so did the MQM. The need for these 10 votes acquired special significance whenever an amendment had to be carried through — and that too in a hurry. The provincial government was totally helpless in ensuring the presence of Mr Bugti’s senators in Islamabad. His five senators would hide and prove to be elusive and inaccessible unless some personal representative of the prime minister had spoken to Mr Bugti and fulfilled his demands; most of them relating to payments which Mr Bugti thought were due to him. Not unlike the World Bank, which has begun insisting on compliance of conditionalities upfront before signing a loan, he wanted payment upfront. Some deputy secretary of Fifinance Department would travel from Islamabad carrying loads of cash before Bugti ordered his henchmen to travel to Islamabad and vote appropriately.

Mr Bugti was a shrewd man. He also knew his limits. Therefore, before he died, he made it known that a stand-off between him and General Pervez Musharaff could be resolved on the basis of proposals made by a committee constituted by the regime. But General Musharaff wanted his precise location in the mountains so as to establish the writ of his government. This he seems to have accomplished by executing Bugti in a military operation involving ground troops, helicopter gunship, missiles and whatever, including satellite monitoring of his presence.

Balochistan is at a standstill; Quetta is under curfew; flights have been cancelled; and rail and road links cut off; university hostels have been vacated; hundreds of students arrested; and property worth millions of rupees damaged. Writ indeed!

Akbar Bugti’s death may provide satisfaction to some vengeful souls, but they know not what is afoot. Mr Bugti may be guilty of many crimes, including murders, but he died a brave man fighting, and has left an indelible mark on the psyche of the people of Balochistan as a leader who fought for their rights against a exploitative establishment. He is a Shaheed in the popular sense and every political leader of Balochistan will have to champion his cause under his rubric and in his name. He ranks next to the Mari Nawab in tribal hierarchy, but his political standing has now surpassed all others.

The future is frighteningly bleak. The situation is reminiscent of 1971 when a military junta was confronting the combined might of public opinion in a particular province only to avoid transferring power to the people.

A turbulent Balochistan hardly suits the United States, which is fighting its war ‘against terror’ in this region by occupying Afghanistan through Nato forces. The statement of the American government spokesman that it “would like to see the Balochistan dispute settled within the framework of strong and united Pakistan” is ominous. Declassified US papers bear close resemblance to the US government position on East Pakistan. The outcome is there for everyone to see. They had Gen Yahya Khan provide Henery Kissinger a safe passage to China and here we have another general fighting their war on terror. Americans are never very squeamish about principles, least of all about democracy.

Balochistan may have slipped out of hand and it is not unlikely that gas supply to the cities of Pakistan may suddenly be disrupted with the government feeling totally helpless.

In such circumstances the United States might have to dust off some of the think-tank reports proposing realignment of boundaries. The Gwadar port has become a hotly contested issue between China and the United States. Pakistan is in no position to upset either side. If the United States offers the lure of independence to the Baloch leadership, they would be happy to hand over Gwadar as well as some districts, say Kharan, for stationing American troops to control the region.

As things stand today, a dead Bugti is far more dangerous to the writ of the government than when he was alive. One could do business with him. His intransigence was calculated and diacritical. But now ...?

Two sons, one of whom would be a Sardar, survive Mr Bugti; but both lack his competence, stature or charisma and would not be able to carry forward his legacy. Senator Shahid Bugti, his son-in-law, may perhaps represent him, but only for a while, because he lacks tribal roots. People ask, what was Mr Bugti fighting for? The answer is implicit in the question. He was not asking for the moon. Once the state turned its guns on him, made him homeless and forced him to flee into the mountains, he was left with no choice but to present himself as a spokesman for the Balochi people and their rights, and put up a brave fight. The picture of the prickly proud Sardar sitting in a chair in front of a cave somewhere in the mountains would stick indelibly in the minds of the people. Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal and Khair Bukhsh Marri have kept a low profile. Mr Bugti articulated his views on provincial autonomy including the rights of the province to choose mega projects, which the federal government always boasted as its gift to the province, forgetting that the poor province of Balochistan has been subsidising gas all over the country for the last half-a-century.

The province is in a virtual state of occupation with about 100,000 Frontier Constabulary sleuths and army troops. The provincial government does not have any say whatsoever in any matter. It is usually selected by the establishment and installed through devious means. Most of the choices are incompetent and corrupt. Akbar Bugti was the best chief minister Balochistan had besides Mr Mengal; and about others, the less said the better.

What is ahead? What needs to be done? Instead of overcoming tribalism, the state has descended into tribalism. Nothing better illustrates the point than the end of the stand-off between the ruler and the Nawab. The only answer is immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the armed forced from politics, the restoration of full and unguided democracy even if it throws up tribal leaders the military doesn’t like as members of assemblies, the thinning of troops in the province and the equitable as well as fair distribution of resources.

The greatest danger to the federation is the lack of provincial autonomy, and the greatest threat to provincial autonomy is the military, which rules the roost. Some people in the province holding a monopoly over patriotism glibly allege the leadership of smaller provinces of lacking patriotism. That is utter nonsense. The people of the smaller provinces are as patriotic, if not more, as anybody else in Pakistan.

Bugti’s death, particularly the circumstances surrounding it, has created a very dangerous situation, which only genuine representatives of the people can address. One has to read the newspapers to see that Balochistan has been crippled by strikes and violence. If immediate steps are not taken, we may live to rue the day. As the Americans say, “you ain’t seen nothing yet.”

Balochistan: Time to revisit Balochistan By Noman Ahmed

Time to revisit Balochistan By Noman Ahmed

Welcome to a generous selection of articles from DAWN's Weekly Magazine. This page is updated every Sunday. http://www.dawn.com/weekly/dmag/dmag2.htm . This article appeared in 2006.

Tarditional Balochi Prayer Rug

In the last few weeks, one has seen several acts of violence in Dera Bugti, Kohlu and some other areas of Balochistan. Armed skirmishes and bomb blasts have become the order of the day in the region. Repeating follies of the past, the establishment has resorted to brute force to control the situation. As a consequence, casualties are mounting on both sides with different implications. Hatred and vindictiveness is on the rise among the local people.

The establishment has labelled the ongoing violence and sabotage as a localized issue. According to various statements and follow-up actions, it is trying to portray skirmishes as foul acts of a group of miscreants in Dera Bugti and elsewhere. The ruling PML-Q has accused the leadership of the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) of fuelling trouble in order to increase routine extortion grant that is reportedly paid to Nawab Akbar Bugti and his clan for ensuring calm and maintaining order by keeping his men quiet. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) was once painted as the ultimate evil as far as provincial affairs were concerned. All acts of sabotage were attributed to it. However, the BLA seems to have lost its way. The assumption that the establishment fabricates dummy monsters to suit its spot objectives seems to have considerable weight. Agitation and unrest have received assistance from various quarters. Uprisings and direct disruption actions continue to receive some support from the local population and fellow tribal chiefs at least in moral respects.

Whereas the establishment has not been fully able to prove that the trouble is localized, nationalists have also failed to own insurgency or to evolve a mass political campaign for their respective rights. The previous months have displayed an amazing scale of aloofness and discord among the various Baloch ranks. It is most surprising to find that the so-called like-minded Baloch nationalist and liberal groups have not made any worthwhile effort to display solidarity with their political comrades in Kohlu, Dera Bugti and Kharan. Most Baloch leaders have either accepted the prevailing fate of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti as God’s will or consider it as an advantageous factor for their regional or local agendas. A less successful attempt was made by veteran politician Dr Abdul Haye Baloch who proclaimed that the ongoing crisis may defuse petty differences among the nationalists and shall give rise to a lasting consensus usually achieved during war-like situations. So far, this has not been forthcoming.

The different acts of sabotage appear to be actions and reactions within the context of the ongoing political relationship between the establishment and Bugti chieftains. Ever since natural gas was discovered in Sui and surrounding fields, the Sardars made it clear to the establishment that they needed their share. By fanning unrest and killing staff members of the Pakistan Petroleum Ltd and other national agencies in the ‘50s and afterwards, a nuisance value was established which enhanced the bargaining position of the Sardars. Due to the peculiar geo-political status, the establishment found it appropriate to involve the Sardars in clandestine agreements for the development of gas fields. The Sardars have been informally entrusted with the task of supporting peace in the area. Direct monetary benefits, jobs/employment for members of tribal clans concerned and the provision of multifarious hardware by the gas/petroleum companies, such as vehicles, were some of the direct benefits that accrued to the Sardars. It may not be out of place to mention that when the infamous military operation was launched by the Bhutto government in 1973, Nawab Bugti was considered an establishment loyalist rather than an insurgent. The pre-existing association with reference to gas fields and the stretched out perks emanating from the deal were too lucrative to be shed away for any support to the ongoing nationalist struggle by the great Nawab. Against this backdrop, it has become apparent that fostering political alliances on a long-term basis with other lesser privileged sections of the Balochi society has not been on the cards of the Bugti chieftain. While other leaders may be deriving some political mileage from the situation, they are probably clear that it cannot lead to a political relationship with the arrogant tribesmen.

The most disappointing aspect in this whole situation is the use of brute force by the establishment. It has often been proven futile. Fiddling with deep tribal affairs such as promoting migration of anti-Bugti tribes into the conflict zone can turn into dangerous and bloody situations. Extra-judicial killings of activists and abductions must stop

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If the establishment does not show sincerity towards resolving issues
through peaceful means, little stability shall be expected in the
conflict-stricken province of Balochistan
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without delay. Avenues of peaceful settlement of the current crisis are wide open. To begin with, the government may declare a ceasefire, initiate a meaningful dialogue process and involve all the stakeholders who matter in Baloch affairs. Adequate trust must be reposed in political leaders including the present provincial government to play their due role. The issues for discussion may include the share of the province in common financial pools, royalty payments on resource utilization, the share in irrigation water, political autonomy as per proviso of the constitution underdevelopment in several districts and coordination of federal projects — so far initiated without consultation with local partners. If the establishment does not show its sincerity towards resolving issues through peaceful means, little stability shall be expected in the region.

The involvement of Iran in the current wave of violence is another prominent speculation. Given the present political and strategic scenario, this may not sound illogical. The US and its allies in the war on terror have made joint attacks on potential enemies in the recent past. It is also obvious that given the history of the Pakistani establishment buckling under US pressure, any launch of hostility towards Iran may not be a far-fetched option. A politically charged Balochistan with spread out spot uprisings shall be a desirable option for its western neighbour to contain the possibilities of US or allied strategic operations against Iran. It is hitherto an assumption which is cited by many quarters but requires substantiation and solid proof for any extrapolation. The announcement of building a cantonment in the Avaran district by the army is viewed as an indication of the resolve of the establishment to extend strategic presence in a sustained manner.

The response of other provinces and political factions is below the desirable level. The gravity of the situation requires a deeper involvement of both opposition and treasury benches to investigate and analyze the situation for evolving political options. The only worthwhile fact-finding mission that went into the region was sent by the Human Right Commission of Pakistan (HRCP). Most of the findings revealed by Ms Asma Jehangir and her team were serious. Violation of human rights; evictions of Bugti locals who were alleged to be involved in uprisings; kidnappings; abductions of youth by law enforcement agencies and harassment of local population are few important issues revealed by the mission. Attempts were made by the MQM to reach out and probe into the situation but due to the lack of logistic back-up support by the tribal chiefs, it could not materialize. Without objective fact-finding and analysis, political options for the crisis will remain sketchy and ill-prepared.

Balochistan unrest cannot be put on the back burner. It must be made a matter of priority. However, Baloch leadership shall have to demonstrate its commitment to move towards a meaningful dialogue with the establishment for addressing present and pending issues. As far as the establishment goes, a tolerant and patient attitude would do the situation a world of good.

Balochistan: Nothing but provincial autonomy By Shamim-ur-Rahman

Nothing but provincial autonomy By Shamim-ur-Rahman

Mr. Shamim-ur-Rahman is a Senior Correspondent with Daily Dawn - Pakistan

Welcome to a generous selection of articles from DAWN's Weekly Magazine. This page is updated every Sunday. http://www.dawn.com/weekly/dmag/dmag1.htm

[This artilce appeared in 2006]

‘Whoever comes to Balochistan from outside should not have the right to vote. If this doesn’t happen, then political rights and leadership of the Baloch people will be taken over by those who don’t belong to the province. Once an outsider working in Balochistan is included in the voters’ list, he will usurp political rights of the locals along with their employment opportunities,’ says Hasil Bizenjo.

Typical Baloch Folk Singer

Violence is rampant in Balochistan. Almost on a daily basis people are being killed in the province. As the military operation is going on in the region, both sides — the government and those who are fighting against it — are seen trading allegations. The government is once again blaming the involvement of a ‘foreign hand’ in the situation, calling the attackers terrorists and law-breakers. On the other hand, the government is also being accused of committing excesses against the people as many children and women have lost their lives in the conflict.

Baloch Tribesman in Traditional Balochi Turban

Recently, Dawn Magazine put some questions related to the situation in Balochistan to the Secretary-General of the National Party, Mir Hasil Bizenjo, who believes that the current struggle is not a new phenomenon. It has been going on from the time when the British hadn’t even left the subcontinent. According to him, before partition of the subcontinent the same leadership of the Baloch people was fighting against the British. The first political platform that was formed in Balochistan at that time was “Ustama Gal” (National Party) — Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd, Mir Ghous Baksh Bizenjo, Gul Khan Naseer and Malik Yousufzai were its members.

Mir Hasil Bizenjo says that after the Union Jack was lowered in the subcontinent, three independent states emerged. Burma, the Kalat state and India, and consequently Pakistan came into being. On August 11, Balochistan’s independence was announced because it was among those states that were not under the viceroy’s rule. But when the Quaid-i-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, approached two or three smaller states which were ruled by Kalat but were not a part of it — such as Kharan, Makran and Lasbela — they acceded to Pakistan on their own and without consulting the Kalat state. The other part of Balochistan, which was then called the British Balochistan, comprised lands they had taken from the Khan of Kalat — Quetta, Noshki and Pushtoon — on lease. Marri and Bugti agencies were part of that. The Marris and the Bugtis also joined Pakistan. The Khanate of Kalat’s own parliament had all the Sardars of Balochistan as members of its upper house. And all the political activists who were then called Aalijah were members too. Both the houses rejected the proposal to join Pakistan.

The Quaid-i-Azam’s stand was that a Muslim state was being created which they should join. But in his speech Mir Ghous Baksh Bizenjo, who was a member of the lower house, took the stance that if it was the case of being a Muslim state, then Iran and some others should also be made part of it. If that was not the case, it was not necessary for Balochistan to join Pakistan. Despite that, in Karachi, the Khan of Kalat on his own announced accession to Pakistan under an agreement. It envisaged that the sovereign position of the Kalat state would be maintained and its privileges and laws would not be changed. It would not be completely merged into Pakistan.

After the sad demise of the Quaid-i-Azam difficulties cropped up when Iskandar Mirza came to power. He refused to adhere to previous agreements and said it was part and parcel of Pakistan. And thus he fired the first salvo at Balochistan. In 1958, for the first time the Pakistan Army was asked to move into Balochistan when Ayub Khan took over the reins of the country. As a result, many Balochis went into the mountains. Ayub Khan captured the Kalat state and the Khan of Kalat. Many of his family members were also arrested and killed. During this period, Ustama Gal took the form of a proper political group and it joined hands with G.M. Syed’s and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s party and formed the National Party. As Molana Bhashani joined the party, it was transformed into the National Awami Party at his insistence.

Hasil Bizenjo also refers to the DAC movement against Ayub Khan that led to his and One Unit’s collapse after which Balochistan emerged as a compact entity. In Balochistan and the NWFP, the NAP formed a coalition with the JUI. The first problem the new government faced was that of framing the constitution because if the two units had not signed it, it would not have been possible to frame the constitution. When Z.A. Bhutto dismissed Balochistan and NWFP governments, the people of Balochistan again went into the mountains. This can be termed as the longest military operation in the province. It ended when Ziaul Haq took over. Bhutto was hanged and the Hyderabad tribunal was disbanded. All the allegations that are being levelled against Baloch leaders these days were levelled against them in 1973 as well.

Talking about the genesis of the current crisis, Hasil Bizenjo says since 1973, two types of political thinking in Balochistan have taken root. One was that democratic struggle should continue and through that Balochistan’s rights should be secured and protected. But the proponents of the other type of thinking advocated an armed struggle as the only solution to get rid of dictatorship. They believed that military rulers and dictators only understood that kind of language. The two approaches are different. And the federal government, particularly the military, is playing a significant role in pushing the Baloch people towards militancy. Gen Musharraf has decided that he can herd everyone with the same stick which is evident from the use of brute force in Waziristan and his attitude towards Sindh with respect to the Kalabagh dam and other sensitive issues, not to mention his policies in Balochistan. Mir Hasil Bizenjo believes that if the military continues this operation with the same intensity, then ‘resorting to militancy’ will be the most popular slogan in Balochistan.

The following are excerpts from the interview:

Q: When Mir Ghous Buksh Bizenjo was governor of Balochistan, he raised the slogan “Balochistan first”. It created a lot of tension and was used as a pretext by Bhutto to dismiss the NAP government in the NWFP and Balochistan. Even now it is said that it’s an attempt to get hold of Balochistan’s resources. And that the development projects announced by the government in the province would not benefit the people of Balochistan. How far is this argument credible? Has the process of colonization begun in the province?

A: This is not our argument alone. Sindh and the NWFP speak about the same issues. It is a totally wrong concept that we oppose development. The basic question is about the nature and modalities of development.That is why the basic demand of Balochistan’s political parties is that provinces must be given maximum autonomy. Trust them and give them the authority to undertake development projects in their respective provinces.

Balochistan’s biggest natural resource is gas. It was discovered in 1952 and the federation has earned more than 500 billion rupees from it, but not even its two per cent has been spent on Balochistan. If gas was explored in Balochistan then it’s the right of the Baloch people to be the first beneficiary of this natural resource. It is also the first right of Balochistan as far as its utility is concerned. If gas was not discovered in 1952, then Pakistan would have used some other imported source of energy and its cost would have gone up to trillions of rupees.

After the discovery of gas, development took place in the whole of Pakistan. The Saindak project is in Balochistan. Its raw material and mines are in Balochistan. Ironically, its 50 per cent profit is taken by China, 48 per cent by the federal government, and only two per cent is given to the province. The government should have spent at least 50 per cent of the revenue generated from any natural resource on the province of its origin. Gas is supplied to the whole of Punjab, Sindh and the NWFP, but till 1980 people used coal in Quetta because there was no gas supply. Even today a large portion of Quetta is without gas. We do not oppose development of ports. But the government’s claim of starting mega projects in Balochistan is misleading. They have constructed the Mirani dam costing Rs7 billion. It irrigates 35,000 acres of land. In 1993, Ghulam Ishaq Khan told us in Quetta that he had then visited the Mirani dam site. He retired as president of the country and the dam was still not constructed.

There is no mega project in the region, because the government is constructing its own buildings worth more than nine or 10 billion rupees in other parts of the country. For the first time in the country’s history they have built two roads here. One is the coastal highway, while they are constructing the Gwadar-Khuzdar road as well. These are not mega projects. These are our rights, which we should have had 25 or 30 years ago. Balochistan is almost half of Pakistan. If you can build a network of highways in the rest of the country and are in the process of building just the second such highway in Balochistan, claiming as if something unusual has been given to our people, it is very misleading. We are not opposed to building ports. We have some reservations in this regard. And we think they’re justified.

Q: What are those reservations?

A: The government treats provinces in the One Unit way. If the Nazim of Karachi can manage such a big city, then he can also take care of the port. There are many countries in the world where ports function under local governments. Therefore, we have demanded that instead of giving its control to the Ministry of Communications, it should be given to the Balochistan government. If we can manage the whole province, we can also manage the Gwadar Port. Our argument is that Balochistan is the largest province of the country. Despite this, we don’t have the right to govern and manage our province’s affairs. What will happen if the Punjabis dominate Sindh and plunders its culture or the Sindhis do the same with Punjab? You don’t introduce big industrial ventures that would cause a huge population influx. Our coastal belts are in Bela and Gwadar. If you push about three million people from Sindh, Punjab, the NWFP or Central Asia into Balochistan, then where will the Balochis go? They will be non-existent.

We went into negotiations with the authorities to tell them to respect our rights so that our cultural, linguistic, economic, political, and other identities are protected. We are not yet calling it colonization, but if the government remains stubborn, then it will be the case. We suggested that whosoever came to Balochistan from outside should not have the right to vote. Because if you don’t do that then political rights and leadership of the Baloch people will be taken over by those who don’t belong to the province. Once an outsider working in Balochistan is included in the voters’ list, he will usurp political rights of the Baloch people along with employment opportunities.

Q: But don’t you think that while performing their duties in Balochistan outsiders would spend their income on the province?

A: Those who come to do such jobs usually don’t invest in their place of duty for about 10 to 15 years. They tend to transfer the money to their hometown. Even in Balochistan if a person from Turbat works in Quetta, he will usually send his savings to his village.

Q: During Ghous Buksh Bizenjo’s tenure it was demanded that those outsiders who were serving in Balochistan should pack their bags and leave for their provinces of origin. Is there any such demand now?

A: When the NAP government was formed, all officers in Balochistan, including in the police department, were from Punjab or were Punjabis. When the One Unit was abrogated, there was a provision that such employees in the federating provinces would return to their province of origin. Hence, in Balochistan those belonging to Punjab insisted that they wanted to go back. In the meantime Bhutto, who had ulterior motives, through Ghulam Mustafa Khar manipulated those people. I remember that for the first time in the history of Quetta the police had gone on a strike. The BSO took control of the situation and managed it. Sardar Ataullah in one of his interviews said that we had not decided to throw anybody out. He had even gone to the police bara khana and requested them not to go. But the policemen said they would leave. Perhaps Mr Khar had put in their minds the wrong and baseless assumption that the Baloch people would kill the Punjabis. They were either policemen or teachers. The National Party leadership went to them and asked them not to go. But they insisted that they would like to leave. When we requested teachers not to follow the police, they refused to oblige, knowing well that it would make the education system collapse. They suffered the most in Punjab. Back then, there was no anti-Punjabi mood in Balochistan. When this was going on, Sardar Ataullah Mengal as chief minister moved a resolution in the Balochistan Assembly to do away with the domicile category and suggested that those who had spent several generations in the province should be treated as locals. Saifullah Piracha, who was close to Bhutto and was the representative of settlers, was instrumental in undoing that resolution.

Q: But right now there’s a feeling that whatever is happening in Balochistan is not just anti-government, but is also a resistance movement against Punjab. What’s your take on it?

A: Whenever any problem crops up in smaller provinces, the establishment always plays games with them. Punjab is made to believe that smaller provinces are against it, while the three federating units are made to believe that Punjab and the Punjabis are responsible for all their woes. It is not true. Poverty is rampant in Punjab as well. There are many areas in Punjab which are poorer than Balochistan. Actually, it is not an anti-Punjab movement, but it is against the military establishment, because since 1947 either civil bureaucracy or the military has ruled this country. Democracy was never allowed to function properly. If democratic forces had flourished, the people of Punjab would have been powerful. Unfortunately in Pakistan the military has always ruled, either from behind the scene or otherwise, and it never spared anyone. It has not spared the Punjabis either. Therefore, I think the basic problem here is the military. Unless the four federating units do not send the military back to barracks, these problems will never be solved.

Q: Recently, Gen Musharraf and Sher Afgan Niazi gave statements in which they said that Punjab would not let the federal government survive if it did not pay heed to its demands. Are the mega projects launched in Balochistan Punjab-specific?

A: This impression has gained cogency because the Punjabis dominate bureaucracy and the military. But bureaucracy has its own vested interests and the Sardars and the Chaudhris are its allies. I do appreciate Punjab’s intelligentsia for not supporting Gen Musharraf’s thesis that Punjab will not allow any government to function if it does not support the Kalabagh dam. I believe that the traditional establishment comprising feudals, Sardars and Chaudhris and Islamabad’s establishment (comprising civil and military bureaucracy) are the two biggest monsters of this country.

Q: Keeping in mind the present situation, is there a need for drafting a new social contract or constitution?

A: Our demand is: whether you draft a new constitution or amend the existing one, you must include new realities in it. Now the federating units will not accept absolute power concentrated in the federation. We want the social contract on the basis of the 1940 resolution in which it’s clear that issues regarding foreign affairs, defence and currency should be handled by the federal government, and all tax-collecting and other powers should be given to the federating units.

The problem is that we were not able to resolve the differences that cropped up immediately after independence. As long as the federating units are not given their proper rights, whatever you may do, it will not change the situation and marginalization of democratic forces by militant and extremists forces will become more prominent. In order to resolve the current crisis, implementing the 1940 resolution in letter and spirit is the minimum basic requirement. If you recall, soon after usurping power Pervez Musharraf had talked of provincial autonomy, but he held the local government elections through the Pakistan Election Commission and not the provincial Election Commission. It means that the federal government is directly involved in provincial matters.

Q: Is it possible for political leadership to develop a consensus on the sensitive issue of Balochistan, as it did in the case of the 1973 constitution?

A: We believe that in the situation where we have military dictatorship, consensus would remain a far cry and as long Gen Pervez Musharraf and the military remain at the helm of affairs, animosity would increase and distances between the people would also increase. What you are suggesting is not possible bearing in mind military dictatorship headed by Gen Pervez Musharraf, or any other military man for that matter.

Q: Gen Musharraf has said that only three or four Sardars are responsible for the current turmoil in Balochistan, and the focus is mainly on Dera Bugti and Marri areas. Your comments?

A: The National Party opposes tribalism and the Jagirdari system. Military rulers are not aware of our history and culture which is evident from the manner in which the regime is portraying the Sardars. In the 17th century, the concept of tribal chiefs emerged. It was not a formal institution. It was done by Sandeman. He created and transformed it into a hereditary institution, which was not the case among the Baloch people prior to him. He fixed salaries for them. Those Sardars who opposed the British refused to accept the salary. After the emergence of Pakistan, its bureaucracy continued with the institution of the Sardari system. In fact, it made it stronger. Even today the same thing is happening. Those who are with the government are safe. Bela’s Jam Sahib was in every government since Iskandar Mirza’s time. Now the issue boils down to three Sardars about whom the general is talking. There is no doubt they have their tribal forces. But even if Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Khair Buksh Marri and Akbar Bugti did not have their forces, they would still have assumed the status of legends in Balochistan. They are now our political pundits whether you call them Sardars or traitors. They are the ones who since the ‘60s have fought against Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq and have remained a part of the political process. They have even endured imprisonment. They will always be respected not because they are the Sardars, but because of the role they’ve played in seeking the rights of the Balochis. And if they are killed by the ruling regime, they will be all the more respected among the Baloch people.

Q: Let’s discuss what is happening in Dera Bugti. Is it a fight for getting gas royalty? From where are they getting weapons?

A: When the Hyderabad tribunal was disbanded, Mir Ghous Buksh Bizenjo decided to take another course and Khair Buksh Marri went on a different track. Khair Buksh Marri’s stand was that the rulers would not understand and accept the demands of the Baloch people as long as the Baloch people did not adopt militancy. Ghous Buksh Bizenjo advocated democratic path through public meetings and rallies. Khair Buksh went to Europe and then to Afghanistan where he continuously preached militancy. He never talked about democracy. He set up his organization and now has an organized force. But in the case of Nawab Akbar Bugti, the situation is somewhat different. He had never talked of militancy. In fact, throughout his whole life he had a good relationship with the establishment. That is why he remained governor and chief minister of the province and played a significant role in the formation as well as downfall of different governments. To call him a traitor or a terrorist is the biggest mistake on the part of the ruling regime. During Zia’s rule he never opted for militant course and was a part of Benazir’s and Nawaz Sharif’s first governments. He never uttered things that could be labelled anti-Pakistan. There is an agreement between the PPL and Nawab Sahib which pertains to the rent of land and other services. He for the first time joined nationalist forces when they objected to the federal government’s taking away all the revenue generating from gas and not sharing it with the people of Balochistan. Then they started targeting him. When this happened and he held meetings with representatives of the government, we objected to the fact that why he’ talking to them alone when there’s a four-party alliance in Balochistan. Nawab Bugti said that he had discussed matters pertaining to Dera Bugti and Sui. On the Balochistan issue he’s part of the alliance. It was decided that gas installations would be jointly guarded by Bugti and FC personnel. Nawab Sahib claims that the attack on him was unprovoked and his people only responded to it.

Q: What are Farari camps?

A: I can’t say whether such camps exist. Nawab Akbar Bugti does not have such camps. But the BLA claims that it does have such camps.

Q: Who is running the BLA?

A: Khair Buksh Marri’s sons claim they are running the BLA.

Q: The government says there is foreign involvement in the situation. It suggests that perhaps India is funding militants through its missions in Afghanistan.

A: I am not aware of it. I don’t blame anyone. If anyone is prepared to give his life for a cause, he will accept assistance from whatever source it’s coming.

Q: Does it have to do with the new Great Game? Sardar Ataullah Mengal had once said that he couldn’t see Pakistan on world map in the next five years or so. Do you share his views?

A: Whenever someone talks of Pakistan’s disintegration his basic argument appears to be that Pakistan is a multi-nation country. To say that balkanization would definitely happen in our country is also wrong because it could happen anywhere in the world. But it is also wrong to assume that if we continue to adopt the same course, this country would survive the jolts of the historical process. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq have entered a new scene. Iraq’s future is becoming increasingly uncertain. Hammas victory in the Palestinian elections also points to something that would lead to uncertainty. Similarly, Iran’s nuclear issue is pushing the region towards another kind of uncertainty. Anything can happen in such a situation.

Q: Is it happening because Pakistan is the frontline state in the war against terrorism?

A: I think that by becoming the frontline state we’ve made it a no-man’s land and Pakistan’s cause has taken a back seat. It seems that we have become another state of the United States. This implies that the rulers have no faith in Pakistan’s people.

Balochistan: Conflict and Solution - 5

On Tue, 4/14/09, Hasan Shabbir wrote:

Why Balochi Sardars are earning millions and billions of dollars and arms from USA,India and Russia?
=========================

Dear Hasan Sahab,

Lets assume its correct then you like to define the War on Terror which is being founght by Pakistan since the days of that Lowly Grunt Musharraf for some coins. Buffoon like Scholars who appear on TV Channels and their hateful analysis and articles in Newspapers had pushed Bengalis to the wall and your stupid comment will ignite hate and not Extenguish the fire of Hate.

I wonder have you ever been to Dera Bugti, Qallat, Sui, Naal, Wadh, Punjgoor, Jhat Pat, Temple Dera, Sibbi or even near Hub to know as to how miserable the life of a common Baloch Labour is [I dont mean that rivers of Milk and Honey are flowing in Punjab] but please read some history before condemning the entire community, haven't you had enough. Do you define Baluch Community by just watching a TV Drama e.g. Dasht or would you define them by going deep into details.

Dear Hasan Sahab,

Your several posts were quite evident that you were quite in love with Cutthroat Irani Ayatullahs and Iran. Your above argument can be raised about Worse Human Rights Situation for Baluchis of Iran [predominantly sunnis], Sunnis, Bahais, and other communities. Why this Iran [also a Land of Allah] is so restricted for the minorities in Iran??? I can give you references of Human Rights Abuses in Iran and I will give from a source which is quoted by Pakistani Fundos on Human Rights Abuses of Kashmiris in India. So don't try to even whisper that Human Rights Organizations all over the world are Zionist Agents because Pakistanis often quote these very Organizations on Camp X Ray and Indian Held Kashmir..

You say Baluchistan's complain are unjust. Very well, I will quote a News Column of a Momin not a Nasibi Sunni so that you are satisfied as to why Baluchistan is angry. Please stop using this cliche' of Islamic Ideology, Two Nation Theory and Muslims are united, these slogans are outdated and have lost charm. Invent some new slogans for looting and plundering.

Article by a follower of "AHL AL BAYT" and I dare you to refute him.

M.B. Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.

What, Balochistan again? PLAIN WORDS M B Naqvi

This article had appeared on 28-12-2005 in The News International

For the fifth time since 1947, Islamabad is using military force against Baloch nationalists. Indeed, the soldiers have to unavoidably target ordinary Baloch as well. The ongoing 'operation' marks the second occasion during General Pervez Musharraf's rule that military force is being applied against Balochistan. Why does the Pakistani state resort to use of force in Balochistan?

The Baloch are certainly alienated. There is said to be a Balochistan Liberation Army and a Balochistan Liberation Front. They engage in ambushes, bomb blasts, rocket attacks and sabotage. Even Karachi is not outside their ambit. Why are the people of Balochistan so antagonised with the Centre?

Let's pause and think. Perhaps the federal authorities have resorted to force so many times in Balochistan because its people tend to protest in less peaceful ways. And what do the Baloch people want, some of whom are now insurgents? Is there something strange about Balochistan? Or is there some peculiar trait in the central authorities? In any case, what has Islamabad achieved through the use of force?

What is certain is that the reactions of the common Baloch people to the Centre's politics have been adverse. But that is not strange. Of all the three minority provinces, Balochistan is about the most discontented. Currently, news of ambushes, rocket attacks on military targets, and sabotage of railway tracks and gas pipelines is frequent. True, many Baloch leaders doubt whether the BLA exists. But the evidence of actions does amount to a low-level insurgency. It is therefore urgent to repeat: what does Islamabad gain through frequent use of force? Military actions involve killing of unproven 'miscreants' that may include any number of innocents. That has a political cost. The story of the army's deployment in Balochistan has been decades in the making.

The Pakistan Army's show of force ensured the accession of Balochistan soon after independence, though happily no blood was shed. Then, President Ayub Khan used the army to put down what were perhaps isolated dissident protests. In 1973 the PPP government launched a major four-year-long operation. The fourth time was last year, under Musharraf, when the army killed many locals in the Kohlu and Dera Bugti areas. And now Musharraf is again quelling the 'miscreants'.

An attempt on the president's life in Kohlu last month shows how grim the situation is. Eight rockets were fired and one landed just two hundred yards from the president. Within days a rocket fired by insurgents hit a helicopter carrying two top officers of the Frontier Constabulary; both were wounded. The fighting as I write is extensive and also bloody. One wonders how many innocent Pakistanis who may not be BLA members are being killed. Obviously the quest for establishing the writ of the authority is the motive behind such use of force. But the fact of the matter is that every use of force has been progressively less effective. Nobody seems to believe that the threat of force is far more effective than its use. Somehow that notion has not penetrated the rarefied atmosphere surrounding Pakistan's rulers.

One wonders why General Ayub shifted the capital from Karachi to Rawalpindi which lies squarely in the territory of the martial races. This creates a militaristic psychosis among those living in the area. Dissent seems to them an insult and their impulse is to lash out. Anyway, Islamabad could never perceive the political dimensions of the Balochistan problem.

What are the reasons for the antagonism in Balochistan? The Baloch are angry, but Islamabad sees only the foreign hand. Earlier, Afghans and Soviets were blamed for spreading 'disaffection'. Later it was the Shah of Iran as well as the US itself that appeared to have interests in Balochistan. Indeed, the Shah is on record as having said as much.

In the 1980s, Balochistan acted as one of the sanctuaries for attacks on Afghanistan, which was Islamabad's design. That fomented Islamic extremism, the progenitor of the Taliban, and then the Taliban themselves who tend to double as sectarian terrorists. The Taliban were projected as the army's success story. The so-called 'agencies' have continued to call the shots in Balochistan and have mightily manipulated political developments in the province. Many Baloch nationalists believe and say that their provincial government comprises a bunch of toadies. Real power, they say, resides in the 'agencies'.

Anyway, the province is seething with discontent. Its Pashtun belt is quiet so far but divided between supporters and opponents of the Taliban. Pashtuns have been generally well adjusted in Pakistan, though they are dissatisfied with their share in power and pelf. Coincidentally, the distinction between two types of Pashtun nationalists needs to be noted: the secular Pashtun nationalism of the NAP, ANP and PMAP is under attack from the Taliban who exemplify a Pashtun nationalism rooted in Islamic consciousness and goals. But Balochistan's discontent has many other sources.

Sindh is also seething with anger. President Musharraf's campaign to popularise Kalabagh Dam is seen as a challenge and an insult; anyone visiting Kotri can see what the mighty Indus has been reduced to. The cause is said to be heavier withdrawals upstream of Sukkur Barrage. Lower Sindh has been woefully short of water while shortages are being felt in upper Sindh as well. New canals leading off from KBD would mean even less water for Sindh. There is no arithmetic which proves that if more water is used upstream, it will increase water flows downstream of Sukkur. It is a zero-sum game. Water is a finite commodity.

The president promises Sindh that the Punjab will not reduce its water supplies. 'Iron-clad' constitutional guarantees are being offered. It is unclear if this includes a guarantee against new canals taking away water for use in southeast Punjab. At any rate, there is a huge deficit of trust in the three provinces where the Punjab is concerned. At least four unconstitutional military governments have shown that constitutions mean nothing in Pakistan; they have been prostituted so many times. Who will trust a constitutional guarantee for Sindh, Balochistan and the NWFP after what has been seen as the army's twitch to take over. Then, Musharraf's words to the effect that "no Islamabad government can survive against the Punjab's wishes" is sure to erode national unity and the trust sustaining it.

The outlook for Pakistan politics is bleak. No state can survive through force alone. The Centre does possess plenty of military might -- in fact, more than is normally needed in a democracy. The force that Islamabad possesses is predicated on the perceived Indian threat. The fact now is that war between India and Pakistan is now inconceivable after the 2002 crisis; neither can start a war again. The current size of forces is now distorting politics and conditioning minds in Islamabad. Pakistan does not need an armed forces of this size.

The problem of Balochistan, all said and done, is mainly political. All that Baloch nationalists want is the power to make decisions in Balochistan and a share at the Centre. Their self-rule aims to prevent exploitation of resources that does not benefit them. This is their right and they should get it. They also do not want outsiders to outnumber them. This too is justified. They do not want their government to be run by outside bureaucrats and 'agencies'. These 'agencies' have to be reigned in anyhow and brought firmly under parliament's control. If they are secret and are only meant for gathering information, then they had better stay secret and not interfere in politics. Period.

Dialogue with the nationalists is needed. Governments in Quetta must have as much autonomy as would reassure them that their resources, particularly gas and oil, are not being used only to the benefit of others. They want a development that is determined by the Baloch people. The shortage of Baloch engineers and technologists needs to be removed by training more Baloch students through a crash programme in higher institutions. Let the Baloch people do it themselves.

Balochistan: Conflict and Solution - 4

On Tue, 4/14/09, Humanist wrote:

Why Balochi Sardars are earning millions and billions of dollars and arms from USA,India and
Russia?
=========================

Dear Hasan Sahab,

Lets assume its correct then you like to define the War on Terror which is being founght by Pakistan since the days of that Lowly Grunt Musharraf for some coins. Above there are at least 70 Tribal Chief in Baluchistan and majority of them were with General Musharraf's Marital Law Regime and only three were opposing:

Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal, Former Cheif Minister Balochistan.

Sardar Khair Bux Marri.

Late. Sardar Akbar Bugti.

Buffoon like Scholars who appear on TV Channels and their hateful analysis and articles in Newspapers had pushed Bengalis to the wall and your stupid comment will ignite hate and not Extenguish the fire of Hate. I wonder have you ever been to Dera Bugti, Qallat, Sui, Naal, Wadh, Punjgoor, Jhat Pat, Temple Dera, Sibbi or even near Hub to know as to how miserable the life of a common Baloch Labour is [I dont mean that rivers of Milk and Honey are flowing in Punjab] but please read some history before condemning the entire community, haven't you had enough. Do you define Baluch Community by just watching a TV Drama e.g. Dasht or would you define them by going deep into details.

Read to learn more...Bugti wanted to resume talks and he was more then ready to Trust Captain [Retd] Ayaz Amir [Dawn and The News Columnist and PML-MNA] but that Lowly Grunt General Musharraf was too happy with the trigger and results are before us.

Foreign hand in Balochistan? Dr Farrukh Saleem [The writer is an Islamabad-based Freelance columnist] Article appeared in The News International on 08-01-2006.

India on the east, China in the north and Iran and Afghanistan on the west. Which foreign hand has an interest in destabilising Balochistan? Is Iran arming Baloch insurgents? Here are a few facts: Sistan va Baluchestan, with an area of 187,502 kilometres, is the third largest province in Iran. Sistan va Baluchestan has a population of nearly two million and occupies 11.4 per cent of Iranian territory. Will Iran prop up Baloch nationalism in Pakistan at the risk of encouraging nationalist fervour in Iranian Balochistan? As a matter of record, the Iranian Air Force actually helped us quell the 'rebellion' during the 70s (by loaning us their helicopters).


Furthermore, Iran now has an economic interest in the stability of Pakistan's Balochistan or her dream of selling hundreds of millions of dollars worth of natural gas will evaporate in thin air.

Is Afghanistan arming Baloch insurgents? Here are a few facts: Lt General David Barno is the top commander of American forces in Afghanistan. The US has the Bagram Air Base (Parvan, Charikar), Kandahar Air Base, Khost Airbase (Paktia) and Mazar-e-Sharif Airbase. There is a large contingent of US National Guard soldiers embedded with Afghan units, and Lt General David Barno is training a 70,000 strong Afghan government force. Can the state of Afghanistan arm Baloch separatists without the explicit authorisation of Lt General David Barno? Then there is Hamid Karzai, so deeply engulfed in troubles of his own neither interested nor capable of arming Baloch insurgents.

Is America arming Baloch insurgents? Right now, a stable Pakistan is in America's best strategic interest. Bush needs Musharraf to be focused on Bush's 'war on terror' rather than a powerful distraction elsewhere. And, if Uncle Sam wanted Baloch insurgents to win there is little we can do anyway.

Is al-Qaeda arming Baloch insurgents? Baloch nationalists are secular al-Qaeda is not; the two have very different agendas and goals.

Is China arming Baloch insurgents? Here are a few facts: The total cost of the Gwadar Port Project is estimated at $1.6 billion. In the first phase, China has put in $198 million and Pakistan $50 million. Additionally, China is investing $200 million toward the building of a coastal highway. Gwadar is China's strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea. An instable Balochistan is not in China's interest.

Finally, is India arming Baloch insurgents? The only way that India can arm Baloch insurgents is either through Iran or through Afghanistan. Clearly, India cannot support Baloch insurgents through Iran without the explicit permission of the supreme leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei. Again, Indian cannot arm Baloch insurgents through Afghanistan without the explicit permission of Lt General David Barno. Additionally, an instable Balochistan jeopardises India's pipeline dreams and is not in India's long-term economic interests.

There is little doubt that arms are flowing into Pakistan's Balochistan both through Iran and Afghanistan. That, however, in no way means that the states of Iran or Afghanistan are directly involved. Surely, the entire region has long been flooded with Kalashnikovs, heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, landmines and mortars. Every kind of killing machine is available to anyone who is willing to pay the price, and then Pakistan's border with Afghanistan is a rugged 2,430 kilometres long, the one with Iran is 909 kilometres (even America has failed to block the supply of arms to Iraqi 'insurgents').

"We don't face any external threat," said General Musharraf (Agence France-Presse; December 12, 2003). To be certain, the real threat in Balochistan is from DDP; deprivation, discrimination and poverty. According to a recent estimate, "89 per cent of rural Balochistan is in high deprivation areas." Gas from Sui (Balochistan), for instance, is valued at Rs 47 per million BTU, Qadirpur (Sindh) at Rs145 per million BTU and from Ratana (Punjab) at Rs217 per million BTU.

Looking at poverty, the incidence of poverty in Balochistan is 50 per cent of the population, twice that of Punjab (the literacy rate of females in Balochistan is at 16 per cent, the lowest in Pakistan and worse than what it is in Ethiopia).

The very structure of the state of Pakistan is such that authority is extremely centralised, and the needs of large segments of Pakistani population outside the power structure are not responded to until they go violent. When Balochistan goes violent, gunship helicopters with automatic cannons are sent in. There is no military solution to deprivation, discrimination and poverty.

Balochistan: Conflict and Solution - 3

-- On Tue, 4/14/09, Humanist wrote:

Why do Balochi want to split up and break Pakistan when they did not do anything for Pakistan's betterment in anytime. Why do Balochi Sardars consider national assetts as the personal property. Why do Balochi Sardars cannot see their people getting education? Why do they threat govt when govt open any school in their areas?Why Balochi Sardars kept innocent baloch masses as their slaves for centuries and want to continue this habbit? Why Balochi Sardars are earning millions and billions of dollars and arms from USA,India and Russia?
=============================================

Baloch and their sardars By Anwar Syed [The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, US]

http://www.dawn.com/2006/01/29/op.htm#1

GENERAL Musharraf would have us believe that the current insurrection in Balochistan is primarily the work of a few self-serving tribal sardars. They hold their tribesmen in utter subjection, exploit them, and force upon them a life of ignorance and misery. They oppose the government’s moves to bring modernization to the province, because they fear that the resulting awakening of the people will make for their (sardars’) eventual demise.

Khan of Qallat with Muhammad Ali Jinnah

Actually, there is a lot more to the situation. Baloch grievances are well known, and I do not wish to repeat them here. I shall instead explore the Baloch political culture.

Baloch society is largely tribal. Beyond the family, tribe is the oldest social unit in human experience, and it continues to exist in several regions of the world. It is usual for a tribe, wherever it may be, to have a headman or chief and some sort of a council of elders to settle disputes and manage its collective affairs. It has been the same way in Balochistan.

There are nomadic tribes that go from place to place in search of pasture to feed the animals they raise. The difference of possessions (goat, sheep, etc.) between members is not substantial. All are nearly equal, and all may participate in deciding how any particular problem is to be handled. The tribe is thus democratic in its ethos. There is little scope for the sardar in this situation to become a tyrant.

Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal, Former Cheif Minister Balochistan.

Then there is the “sedentary” tribe. It is pretty much settled in one place. Some of its members may still roam around, looking for grasslands for their sheep and goat, but many of them may also do a bit of farming. Differences of possessions, and the resulting gradations of status, here can be substantial. Disputes among members are more frequent and so is crime. The sardar is likely to become more a ruler than a first among equals. There is also the opportunity for him to become a tyrant. Tribes in Balochistan used to be largely nomadic, but that does not appear to be the case any more: most of them are now sedentary.

Tribes in parts of Africa are inclined to be pacific. But more often, and in most places, they tend to be warlike. Even if violence within a tribe is controlled, inter-tribal warfare is common, and that remains the case in Balochistan as well. In speaking of the Baloch in this regard, I shall rely on Justice Khuda Bakhsh Marri’s eminent work, entitled Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan (1974).

“The principal occupation of Baloches” he says, “has been, and to a great extent still is, constant inter-tribal and clan warfare. If, however, opportunities for such indulgences are not available, a Baloch will occupy himself with a family feud.” This “wild drama of blood-letting” may subside as social conditions change, “but the pace of progress is painfully slow.” In the same vein a characterization of the Baloch written by Sir Charles Napier around 1848 (which Justice Marri says still holds good for the most part) may be instructive for our present policy makers:

“The Baloochee, though fierce and habituated to acquire property by violence, is shrewd, and has a strong, though savage, sense of dignity and honour. A combination of coercion, respectful treatment, generosity and temptation, may therefore bend him to better habits. To fight and plunder is his vocation. The Baloochee warrior loves his race, his tribe, not the general community which he regards but as a prey and a spoil. With men of his temper a change of dynasty (government) will be little regarded if their own dignities and possessions are respected.”

Late. Sardar Akbar Bugti.

(If the Baloch have always been, and still are, the fighting sort, one may wonder why they have no noticeable presence in Pakistan’s armed forces.)

Generally speaking, each tribe possesses a specific tract of territory, originally taken by conquest or through bargaining with the neighbouring tribes. The sardar, whose office is hereditary, is assigned a portion of the land that is the tribe’s common property, but he cannot sell it. He and heads of clans within the tribe (“Mukkadams”), also hereditary, constitute a council that settles issues, including those of war and peace. The Mukkadam is assisted by a “Wadera” in each clan and by “Motabars” in the sub-clans or groupings of families.

As the British saw it, Balochistan had strategic value in that it provided gateways to Afghanistan and Iran; otherwise it was a vast but barren, unyielding, and unprofitable region. They did not want to put money into building the infrastructure needed to govern its small population. They opted for a system of indirect rule. They moved to strengthen the tribal system and its hierarchy. They gave the sardars and mukkadams stipends, pensions, grants, and other privileges and sought to control the tribes through them.

The Frontier Crimes Regulation Act (1901) recognized the sardars and other functionaries in the tribal hierarchy, and allowed its customary law to prevail. The government did not interfere with its operation. The council of elders (‘jirga’) settled disputes subject to the British political agent’s approval, which he gave routinely except in politically sensitive cases.

A sardar retained his office on condition of loyalty to the British government. Doubt on that score could result in his removal and replacement by one of his more trusted relatives or tribesmen. The sardars were, in return, expected to maintain peace and order in their respective tribes. They were left free to burden their tribesmen with heavy taxes, and they were under no obligation to provide education, health care, or any other amenities to their people, who remained ignorant and economically deprived.

Their deprivation did not abate much even after independence. Steps should have been taken to disestablish the sardari system. Successive governments denounced it, and some of them issued declarations that it was about to be abolished. But nothing of the kind ever happened. The ruling politicians, both civil and military, and the higher bureaucrats, partook of the British outlook and attitude towards Balochistan: too large an area, too few people, too expensive to develop and modernize.

The system of indirect rule continued in parts of Balochistan, and so did the British practice of dispensing funds to tribal chiefs and other notables in the expectation that they would keep the peace, which sometimes they did and other times they didn’t. The Frontier Crimes Regulation, under which the jirgas administered justice, remained in operation, and the laws of Pakistan did not apply, in territories designated as “tribal areas,” for instance, the lands occupied by the Bugti and Marri tribes. I gather that even at this time regular police establishments and courts are missing in 14 of the 28 districts of the province, and that qazi courts function in Gwadar.

The foregoing should not be taken to mean that no social change whatsoever has taken place in Balochistan during the last 50 years. A university in Quetta has been functioning for quite some time, and numerous new colleges and schools have been established, even though the level of literacy here is still the lowest in the country, quite a few among the younger generations have had college education and become politically aware. Un-fortunately, most of them have nowhere to go, because the economy has remained stagnant, and jobs have been hard to find. The sardars, when they are dissatisfied with their receipts from the government, or when their dominance is threatened, proceed to make alliances with the educated, but frustrated, younger folks, as they are doing at this time.

How is the sardars’ alleged opposition to economic development and modernization to be overcome? The sardari system is still with us because those in power did not have a strong enough interest in abolishing it. I see no evidence to suggest that the present government wants to do away with it. Musharraf only wants the sardars to stop making trouble for him.

There are scores of tribes in Balochistan and as many sardars. The larger ones (e.g., Marris, Bugtis, Mengals) and their sardars are politically significant: they constitute centres of power not only because of their numbers but because they are armed with modern weapons. Many observers are telling us that resort to military force is not a viable strategy for dealing with the Baloch sardars and dissidents. It has not worked in the past (1973-77), and it will not work now. They warn also that the attempt to suppress the Baloch dissidents may take us to a replay of the tragedy of 1971.

What is then to be done? It may be useful to revisit Sir Charles Napier’s prescription quoted above. Leave coercion out, and take the rest: respectful approach, generosity and temptation. In other words, the government could compensate its opponents for their acquiescence without hurting their sense of honour and dignity. It may be said that the government has indeed been following this approach, but that the sardars now say its offerings are not good enough. Moreover, their alliance with the politicized classes calls for a different modus operandi.

Two other approaches come to mind. The more notables of the sardars, or their designees, and leaders of the dissident groups may be inducted as participants in the making and implementation of development and modernization plans for Balochistan. Let them be the ones to award contracts, sell or allot plots of land, direct the hiring of the needed workforce, and generally supervise the implementation process. If gains are to be made for those who manage it, let them be the ones to make those gains.

Dissidents in Balochistan and elsewhere complain that they were cheated out of power through rigged elections. That the elections were rigged is generally conceded. The resulting estrangement from the present political system acts like a cancer that threatens to destroy the body politic. If its health is to be restored, free and fair elections must be held as soon as possible. No individual’s notion that his continuance in office is essential to the country’s well-being, and no group’s lust for power, should be allowed to stand in the way.

Sardars and the nationalists By Kunwar Idris [Former Chief Secretary Sindh]

http://www.dawn.com/2005/12/18/op.htm#2

THE grievance of Sindh and Balochistan against Punjab and the army (both are viewed as one and the same) for their stranglehold on political power and natural resources is as old as Pakistan itself. The discontent, never far from the surface, at intervals erupts into a loud protest emanating from Sindh and a low-level insurgency in Balochistan as is the case now.

The grievance is nurtured and _expression given to it by the sardars, or tribal chieftains in Balochistan, and in Sindh by the youth, writers and lawyers. Mumtaz Bhutto, perhaps, is the only sardar among them. Quite understandably, then, the thrust of the struggle in Balochistan is on political power but on economic rights in Sindh.

In Balochistan, the most influential among the sardars and their tribes (Marri, Bugti, Mengal and Achakzai Pathan) have little say in the administration of the province. The governor doesn?t belong to the province (in the other three provinces they do) and the chief minister, too, belongs to a subsidiary tribe. In Sindh, the primary concern is about the lands being grabbed and industry and business being dominated by people who are not sons of the soil or even permanent inhabitants of the province.

Sardar Khair Bux Marri.

The causes of discontentment and its intensity may vary but, assuredly, they reinforce the cultural and lingual affinities that already exist between the people of the two provinces. Only their leaders, because of their diverse backgrounds, interests and aims have not been able to harness it to their common advantage.

In dealing with the occasional outbursts of violence or sabotage in Balochistan, the federal authority, or the Punjabi-army juggernaut as the sardars and nationalists call it, has to rely entirely on the paramilitary forces or on the military itself. The elements opposed to the sardars are too weak to rally round and help the government and the clerics wield no influence on the fiercely secular tribes. Such has been the strategy in the past and it is no different this time round. In fact, the reliance on the use of force is increasing as the authority of the political agent and his levies is on the wane.

The sardars may have been sidelined politically but their hold on the tribes remains intact. They may not be doing much for the welfare of their isolated, primitive folks but government officials do even less while extorting more. That is why the sardars last and rule. The brief army forays or long-lasting garrisons, thus, have not made much of a dent in the tribal structure nor impaired the authority of the sardar, although when the troops camp in his area he himself might be camping in Karachi or in London.

In Sindh, on the other hand, hardly ever is the use of force necessary to deal with nationalists whose protest seldom goes beyond fiery rhetoric. They do not have the leisure, money or armed retinues of the Baloch sardars. Most among them are always able to reconcile their nationalist fervour with a role in the government. They might be ardent nationalists but suffer no qualms of conscience when working as ministers in a highly centralized system.

If insurgency in Balochistan is a recurring phenomenon which can be easily quelled and if Sindhi nationalists are generally peaceable in pursuing their agenda, why put this issue under the spotlight now? There have been some recent developments which should induce Punjab, the army and indeed all mainstream forces of the country to sit up and take notice.

After a long and frustrating effort, Mumtaz Bhutto seems to be succeeding in bringing Sindh?s well-known nationalist thinkers, and rabble-rousers on to one platform under the name of the Sindh Qaumi Ittehad. The sardars and other nationalists of Balochistan, too, are engaged in a similar enterprise. The nationalists of the two provinces plan to forge a united front. Time and emerging issues are on their side.

The nationalists should not be treated as mavericks or secessionists but as exponents of regional identity, rights and powers. Their demand for a confederation or restricting the centre to three or four subjects may be on the extreme but in the present situation the provincial governments are no more than field offices of the federal authority and that is also wholly untenable.

The situation calls for a compromise. But a stray remark recently made by the president that opposing the army amounts to opposing democracy is an invitation to confrontation. No less confrontational is a statement by Makhdum Amin Fahim that if the Kalabagh dam is built the smaller provinces would secede from the federation.

When a cool-headed and committed Pakistani like Makhdum Amin Fahim is driven to talk of secession, Punjab and the army should not remain indifferent. He may be reacting to frequent and insulting insinuations made by some ministers against those who oppose the dam but his statement mirrors the dissatisfaction of the intelligentsia and also of the common people with the legal and administrative position of Sindh in the present federal arrangement. The provincial leaders, indeed, feel insulted when Information Minister Sheikh Rashid challenges them (the source of his confidence should be in no doubt) that ?we? will build not one but three dams on the Indus. And another minister, Sher Afgan, tells them that it is not the people but the big landlords of Sindh who are against the dam because the surplus water flowing down the Indus irrigates their illegally occupied (kutcha) lands in the riverine tract. Both ministers seem to be unaware of the depth of public feeling against the dam or are insensitive to it. If they are not perturbed by what Makhdum Amin Fahim says they should ask Illahi Buksh Soomro or any other Sindhi considered more moderate than him that they may know of.

Similar ministerial disdain marks the attitude of the federation when Balochistan asks for greater say in control over its natural gas and coastal waters. It hardly has any other resource. Defiance is in the blood and in the bones of the Baloch and nationhood is still a dream with them but the battle hardened sardars are getting weary. One of them, Ataullah Mengal, said in private the other day that they do not want to leave the federation but are being pushed out of it.

The president and his men might still insist that reason is on their side. But has reason alone ever held a country together? We ourselves reasoned with the Bengalis for 24 years but never spared a moment for their sentiments.

Balochistan: Conflict and Solution - 2

On Tue, 4/14/09, Humanist wrote:

Dear Humera,

Why can't Balochi allow people of any other nationality/origin except balochis on land of Allah. Why do they call it land of Balochs?
===================

Dear Hasan,

This may help and if you would go to any good library then you may find that it is also true.

'مذاکرات جاری ہیں۔۔۔'

حسن مجتییٰ 2009-04-13, 10:29

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/urdu/2009/04/post_435.html

پاکستان میں گزشتہ ساٹھ سال سے بلوچوں کو بزور بندوق پاکستانی بنائے جانے کی قومی و نظریاتی کوششیں جاری ہیں۔ اس ہفتے تین بلوچ رہنماؤں غلام محمد بلوچ، منیر مینگل اور شیر محمد بلوچ کے ساتھ بھی ایسا ہی ہوا۔ محمد علی جناح، سکندر مرزا، ایوب خان، یحیٰی خان ، بھٹو، ضیاء، پرویز مشرف اور زداری سب کے سب یہی کام کرتے آئے ہیں۔

Khan of Qallat with Muhammad Ali Jinnah

خان آف قلات نے اپنے محل میں ملک کے بانی محمد علی جناح کے لاغر و کمزور جسم کو سونے سے تولا تھا تو پاکستانی ریاست نے وہ احسان اسی وقت بلوچستان کو مملکت خداد کا حصہ بنانے کیلیے اسکندر مرزا کی قیادت میں توپخانہ بھیج کر قلات اسمبلی پر سبز پرچم لہرا کر اتار دیا تھا۔

Major-General Sahibzada Sayyid Iskander Ali Mirza [First Dictator of Pakistan and Descendant of Famous "Betrayer" Mir Jafar] (November 13, 1899 – November 12, 1969) was the last Governor-General of the Dominion of Pakistan (6 October 1955 to 23 March 1956) and the first President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (23 March 1956 to 27 October 1958).

General and self-appointed Field Marshal in Pakistan's military history. He was also the first Pakistani military commander to seize power through a coup. First Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan and he was American Backed

[1958 - 1969]

ایوب خان نے ایک قومی حکمت عملی کے تحت اسی سالہ نوروز خان کو قرآن بھیجا تھا کہ وہ پہاڑوں سے اتر آئے تو اسے کچھ نہیں کہا جائے گا۔ بعد میں نوروز خان کے سامنے اسکے بھائیوں اور بھتیجوں کو پھانسی دے دی گئی تھی۔
ذوالفقار علی بھٹو نے قوم کو متفق دستور دینے کے لیے ایک حکمت عملی کے تحت نیپ کے بلوچ اور پختون رہنماؤں غوث بخش بزنجو، ولی خان وغیرہ کو آئین پر دستخط کرنے کے لیے رام کر ہی لیا تھا۔ ابھی اس آئین پر دستخطوں کی سیاہی ہی خشک نہیں ہوئی تھی کہ بلوچستان میں مینگل اور بزنجو کی حکومت ختم کر کے جنرل ٹکا خان کی قیادت میں بلوچستان پر فوج کشی کردی تھی۔ عطاء اللہ مینگل کا جواں سال بیٹا اسد اللہ مینگل آج تک لاپتہ ہے۔

Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal, Former Cheif Minister Balochistan.

Sardar Khair Bux Marri.

Late. Sardar Akbar Bugti.

General Pervez Musharraf, American Backed Pakistani Military Dictator (1999 - 2008).

جب بھٹو حکومت پر بن آئی تو پی این اے سے بات چیت میں بلوچستان سے فوج کی واپسی پر ضیاءالحق اڑ گئے۔ لگتا ہے کہ تب سے بلوچستان سے فوج واپس نہیں ہوئی، لیکن مذاکرات تا ہنوز جاری ہیں۔

General Tikka Khan, HJ, HQA, SPk, (b. 1915 d. March 28, 2002) was Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff from March 1972–March 1976). Later became Pakistan Peoples Party Leader and also known as Butcher of Balochistan and Bangal.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (January 5, 1928–April 4, 1979) was a Pakistani politician who served as the President of Pakistan from 1971 to 1973 and as Prime Minister from 1973 to 1977. He was the founder of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the largest and most influential political party in Pakistan and also ordered Military Operation in Balochistan.

'دیکھ نہیں رہے مذاکرات جاری ہیں'، نواب اکبر بگٹی نے بی بی سی کے جاوید سومرو سے کہا تھا۔ 'مذاکرات ٹینکوں سے، بندوقوں سے جاری ہیں'۔ پھر بندوقوں کی زبان میں بولنے والے بوڑھے سردار کو خاموش کر دیا گيا۔
لیکن مذاکرت جاری ہیں۔ اب پھر تین بلوچ رہنماؤں کی لاشیں بھیجی گئی ہیں تاکہ وہ آنے والی نسلوں کو فوجی قبیلے کی ہیبت سے ڈرا سکیں

NOTE: Pictures and English Text are inserted by by me. [Courtesy: Wikipedia]