Nsiddiqi@worldbank.org
Sun Nov 25 2001 - 19:41:30 EST
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I am writing with reference to Nizar Mecklai's practical and optimistic message on the subject. It is a useful list of what needs to be done, in a systematic manner. However, relating this to our discussion on 'institutions', I would like to quote a recent statement from a leader of the Northern Alliance, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. In an interview reported in the New York Times (Sunday, November 25) lamenting the loss of Ahmed Shah Massoud, he says:"The fact that this one person is not amongst us changes everything... Afghanistan is a country without any institutions, without any systems, and what it needs in such a situation is a leader. We do not have one." He goes on to say that: "Massoud would not have come to Kabul without a political agreement with the Pashtuns"; that Mr. Massoud's compromise "could have included the Talibans"; and that for the moment he, (Mr. Abdullah Abdullah) does not see any candidate at the national level rising to the challenge of leading his country.
My questions:
do we agree that in the absence of institutions and systems, a country needs one strong leader?
if we agree that there are no institutions in (current) Afghanistan, do we think that these need to be 'created' before any sustainable, long-term reconstruction / rebuilding can take place? (this would obviously not apply to meeting short-term, urgent, survival needs of the local population) can external actors and their 'dream political structures / state institutions' actually work? Don't we need to ensure that structures and institutions that are created / revamped are rooted in the local / regional social and political context , no matter how complex this task may be?Waldemar's comment, repeated below, gives us one perspective. Are there any other perspectives on this subject?
"Social and economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan has only a chance, when the tribes and their chieftains can be 'contained' in a sort of federated political structure, which forces them to play the democratic game even inside their own ranks and when they are stripped of some of their (tax) privileges granted by the central government. An interesting discussion on this topic is presently under way in Africa in the framework of the booming decentralisation, especially in states also dominated by tribes (under the assumption that you cannot ignore the tribes)".
--N.Siddiqi
Qaim Shah Qaim.shah@undp.org
Mon Nov 26 2001 - 23:17:38 EST
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The question is what kind/level of institutions we a talking about. If the issue is macro level political, judicial, economic, etc., structures for the purpose of running a stable government and macro level management of development assistance then, yes, there is a need for "creating" government institutions and machinery. I also agree that state institutions shall be build upon indigenous social and political tradition. They should not be created with some kind of standard operating procedures handed over to them for functioning but institutional development shall be part of overall rehabilitation and reconstruction strategy.
As far as local level institutions are concerned, in my view the traditional institutions and systems like Jirga are very much alive and functioning. Strengthening of such institutions would play a very crucial role in reconstruction of the country. There are a number of successful examples from the region where involvement of similar institutions and building upon traditional mechanism, initiated sustainable development processes at local level.
Qaim Shah
Chief Technical Advisor, Human Development Initiative Support Project
UNOPS/UNDP, Myanmar
Javed Khan javedkhan@home.com
Mon Nov 26 2001 - 01:16:39 EST
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Mr Aslamy:
Your personal views are yours to choose, but if you want to recommend them to others you'll need to operate from principle and facts rather than whim. And while you are doing that, perhaps you can also suggest what Pakistan should do with the 3-4 million Afghan refugees that have been enjoying Pakistan's hospitality for the last 20 plus years. Oh and by the way, today's New York Times is reporting that opium farmers in Afghanistan are ramping up and busy planting poppy seeds to reach their peak production of a million tons or so of raw opium a year, and maintain their major world market share of opium & its derivatives. I don't suppose you blame Pakistan for that as well, leaving alone the Kalashnikov culture etc etc.You can read the full NYT story at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/26/international/asia/26POPP.html
Javed Khan
Dear Haider,
I think you are very wrong that Pakistan could have a role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Are you forgetting the facts that it was the Pakistan army, tanks and ammunition that destroyed the people and infrastructure of Afghanistan?
It was Pakistan who nurtured the beasts and unleashed them to destroy the land with history, culture, and civilization. It is Pakistan who created a friction of ethnic and language among the Afghans that will last forever. Citing a few examples of evil intend of Pakistan, will qualify me to say that Pakistan should stay away from Afghanistan and take your business somewhere else. Afghanistan does not need a country like Pakistan to take part in its reconstruction.
M.N. Aslamy
Colorado
---
Athar Osama osama@rand.org
Mon Nov 26 2001 - 14:26:20 EST
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Dear Respected Members!
I would whole-heartedly second Mr. Javed Khan's opinion on this one. I, for one, was thinking for a couple of days how to respond to Mr. Aslamy's and some other members' very 'callous' remarks about Pakistan's role in the situation of Afghanistan and how "Afghanistan doesnt need a country like Pakistan to take part in its reconstruction" as well as somebody else's comment that "Pakistan is a disgrace to Islam" etc. etc. Mr. Khan puts it very lightly though...
Not only is the Millitarization of Pakistani society i.e. AK-47 culture a gift to us for fighting the Afghan War with the Soviets -- there are a few more very important casualities as well. Not only does Pakistan house 3-4 million Afghan refugees which are a burden on our already weak economy -- to say the least -- but we still manage to pull through as a gesture of Islamic brotherhood and to avoid a human catastrophie in Afghanistan but also the the increasing number of Pakistani heroine addicts (estimated at 3mln or so I think) are a direct cause of the our lax attitude and involvement in the Afghan war. In an interview in a recent newspaper article, when asked whether he thinks poppy is bad for health or not, an Afghan poppy farmer proudly remarked, "Yes it is injurious to health, but we (afghanis) don't use it, it is for the Pakistanis across the border". Going great guns Isn't it?
Add to this the impact of Afghan transit trade and smuggling that keeps our Afghani brethren alive and that has virtually crippled Pakistani industry over the last couple of decades and you'd come to realize the tremendous cost of Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan. And by the way, there the war and post-war situation in Afghanistan has also contributed dramatically to the rise of fundamentalism and religious extremism in Pakistan. While most hypothesize that the causality is from Pakistan to Afghanistan, there is a case to be made for a reverse causality here.
Had these Afghan refugee camps not been there in the first place inside Pakistan and the CIA money (with their consent!) had not been filtered to these Jihadi groups, Pakistani religious-social fabric would have been far better than it is today.
So, for my dear Afghan brethren and sisters...and those who blame Pakistan for their miseries and don't even hesitate to call Pakistan a 'disgrace' to Islam...please look deeper and see what have to done to ourselves in our attempt to help you and support your ever increasing refugee population, to try to fight your war. Yes, Pakistan has perhaps gained economically and military during the cold war but I am sure that gain is much much less as compared to the havoc that has occured to our own social fabric and economy. I would also agree that we had a rather ad-hoc and at times counter-productive policy towards Taliban and Afghanistan after the cold war ... but that was perhaps a 'good-intentioned' policy blunder to bring quick peace and relief to Afghanistan. Don't forget that Taliban was a locally generated movement (initially supported by US itself), that was initially welcomed by the Afghani people themselves, before they ultimately became a repressive and extremist regime. Finally, and this my own personal comment and not a policy position, I think if there exists a bad-will between Afghani people and Pakistan at this point (provided the views on this forum are representative of Afghani population), Pakistan should try to stay away from the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It might be a multi-million $ opportunity for us but we shouldn't try to capitalize on it against the will of Afghani people. At the same time, the international community should also realize its responsibility towards Pakistan. Rebuilding Afghanistan is no doubt a first priority but what about rectifying two-decades of ills and damage caused to Pakistani society and economy? Would Pakistan be left in the lurch again, like it was at the end of cold war? Quick repatriation of Afghani refugees followed by 'reconstruction' of Pakistani institutions that have virtually broken down under the stresses identified above should be undertaken simultaneously with the rebuilding of Afghanistan.
I think Pakistan, for all its goodwill, deserves at least that much. Give us a Pakistan minus the ill-effects of the Klashinikoff culture, Afghan Transit trade and smuggling, millions of drug addicts and religious extremism.
Athar
--
Athar Osama
RGS Doctoral Fellow
RAND Graduate School for Policy Analysis
Jon mailto:Clokedamage61@hotmail.com
Mon Nov 26 2001 - 15:00:38 EST
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Since a large part of the Pashtoun peoples live in Pakistan, and another large part live in Afghanistan, and since the border between the two countries is, as I understand it, largely an illusion in an area where family, clan and tribal loyalties are far more important than anything central government says, would you like to explain how Pakistan can possibly avoid having a role in any post-war settlement? A bit like as if we Brits suggested that Eire should have no role to play in any Northern Irish peace settlement, on the grounds that they've interfered enough already. Even if the suggestion were warranted (which it isn't, he said hastily), it would render any future agreements worthless...
Jon Cloke
Doubting D drazawi@yahoo.com
Mon Nov 26 2001 - 15:28:08 EST
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Dear Mr Khan,
I do not see any sign in your respose to show that you are operating from "facts rather than whim." His (Aslamy's) point is very clear, "that Pakistan should stay away from Afghanistan and take your business somewhere else. Afghanistan does not need a country like Pakistan to take part in its reconstruction." Do you agree or disagree?You are talking about refugees and opium. If you do want to reponse, please stay focused on the points raised.
Daud
Doubting D drazawi@yahoo.com
Mon Nov 26 2001 - 16:53:33 EST
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Dear Mr. Osama,
I think most of the points you are mentioning in your mailing are emotionally driven. I cannot (and do not want to) address your patriotism, but I think your perception of Pakistanis ISI and Military is mixed up with the good intentions of the Pakistani people. I have heard from so many Afghans talking so positively about Pakistanis. But this is not the topic of discussion. What the other forum participants are complaining is Pakistani gvernment's adventurous policies that are hurting both countries. You have put it quite mildly, when saying "you would also agree that we had a rather adhoc and at times counter-productive policy towards Taliban and Afghanistan after the cold war ... but that was perhaps a 'good-intentioned policy lunder to bring quick peace and relief to Afghanistan." Would you accept such "good intentioned" policies from, let's say, India toward Pakistan?
Those good intentions included sending thousands of military advisers, draining Afghan struggle from its intellectual and liberal forces. These good intentions were direct involvements of Pakistanis ISI and Military in the war between Afghan warlords. Why else would Pakistan fly them back home now? You must be quite naive if you call the destruction of a war-torn country, first by Hekmatyar in 1992 and in the last 6 years by Taliban, "good intentioned."
Hekmatyar decided to fight a government that had him as the Prime Minister and to throw thousands and thousands of missiles on Kabul, but did not fight the Taliban that you claim was "a locally generated movement" and disappeared for 6 years. Now he is back. Does this make sense to you? Why does Pakistan support "a locally generated movement" like Taliban until their last moments against all the odds, but has strong oppositions to another movements such as the Northern Alliance? Isn't it the Pakistanis political and strategic interest? If a Muslim country steps on another Muslim country's blood to promote its political/economical benefit, would it not be a "disgrace" to Islam?
Daud
Nabi Aslamy zak15@webtv.net
Tue Nov 27 2001 - 03:30:47 EST
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Javced Khan,
The problem of Afghan refugees is intesified when Pakistani Talibs forced millions of Afghans from their villages by burning their crops, slaughtering their animals, killing thousands of men and young Afghans. If we had a normal government since 1996, Pakistan may not have ended in this number of refugees. You produced it you handle it
N Aslamy
Malik, Rehan malik@rand.org
Tue Nov 27 2001 - 12:22:53 EST
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Dear Sirs:
Why are why just forgetting that from 1991 to 1996, it was a coalition led by "mainstream" Afghan leaders not the Taliban which lead to the maintenance of 2 odd million refugees in Pakistan. The instability was even then, when Pakistan supported these leaders the West has suddenly fallen in love with. Pakistan has tried everything with these Afghans, so condenming PK across the board without looking at the facts will be counter-productive. Everybody is howling about Afghanistan today and blaming PK. Where were all the Afghan "nationalists" and "intellectuals" during the Afghan war, and from 1989-2000? It is so easy to point fingers without haven't done anything in real life.
Plus the message below is totally baseless, rich in rhetoric, poor in analysis.
-----Original Message-----
From: zak15@webtv.net
Javced Khan,
The problem of Afghan refugees is intesified when Pakistani Talibs forced millions of Afghans from their villages by burning their crops, slaughtering their animals, killing thousands of men and young Afghans. If we had a normal government since 1996, Pakistan may not have ended in this number of refugees. You produced it you handle it.
---
Doubting D drazawi@yahoo.com
Wed Nov 28 2001 - 15:51:46 EST
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For those who were considering Pakistan's action in Afghanistan as perhaps "well intentioned" here is some more enlightenment. I would be very interested if somebody tried to argue the points raised in this article. Unfortunately mass media (strangely enough) did not want to cover it. So we are left with a whole lots of questions about who is doing what in this war, and why?
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/tvaradarajan/?id=95001523
Regards,
Daud
Athar Osama osama@rand.org
Wed Nov 28 2001 - 16:35:24 EST
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Dear D!
So far so good for the Indian Propaganda against Pakistan. I also wonder why the mass media hasn't been reporting all this...But I've heard statements coming out of Pentagon saying that this was not true and that there was no such operation undertaken by Pakistan. Yes, if you search hard-enough you'll find something out there that would serve your purpose but you really have to look deeply at the source of information, the vested interests of the person's affiliations who claim it, whether or not there exist any independent verifications of the news item etc. etc. I am sure my friends across the border would love to see Pakistan getting into trouble due to their mis-guided reporting and distorting of facts. Instead of trying to answer this point by point, I'd love to see some independent account of what you present.
Yellow journalism is not on.By the way, you're doing quite a bit of hair-splitting here. Pakistan did take positions in Afghanistan and I did mention the word 'Policy blunders' in my email. But that doesnt mean that Pakistan's intention was to exterminate the Afghani population and impose a foreign regime on them. It was a stupid thing to do, I accept but then...who was doing 'sane' things in the entire scheme of things. Don't forget that Taliban, initially, was a locally generated movement and there are independent accounts that attest to that...and don't forget that virtually everybody involved in one way or the other in Afghanistan has a vested interest...be it India, Iran, Russia, CAS, America or whoever. So, nobody is an angel out there....
Athar Osama
Doubting D wrote:
For those who were considering Pakistan's action in Afghanistan as perhaps "well intentioned" here is some more enlightenment. I would be very interested if somebody tried to argue the points raised in this article. Unfortunately mass media (strangely enough) did not want to cover it. So we are left with a whole lots of questions about who is doing what in this war, and why?
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/tvaradarajan/?id=95001523
Regards,
Daud
kausar.s khan (kausar.skhan@aku.edu
Mon Nov 26 2001 - 14:53:49 EST
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There is a saying we often use in community development trainings:
YOU MAY HAVE THE ANSWER, BUT THE SOLUTION LIES WITH THE COMMUNITY.
Kausar.
Mark McKenna (MMcKenna@sl.asiafound.org
Mon Nov 26 2001 - 16:05:48 EST
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Dear Forum Members,
Contributions to our discussion of how events are shaping the possibilities for social, economic and political development in Afghanistan and Pakistan have raised a number of critical issues. For Pakistan, participants have pointed to the need to restore the legitimacy of democratic institutions, ensure free and fair elections, devolve power, strengthen judicial independence, and reform the civil service. Attention has also been drawn to the need to confront the historical legacy of past human rights violations, to hold corrupt leaders accountable, to reduce the availability of weapons, to reduce communal tensions and to confront feudalism. In particular, it has been suggested that multi-lateral institutions in their efforts to promote social, economic and political development need to ensure that their efforts address and are responsive to the aspirations of the rural poor.
For Afghanistan, attention has been drawn to the need for immediate measures to provide food, shelter, and security for the people of Afghanistan. These ought to include, the disarmament of combatants, provision of emergency health care, mine clearing, provision of food and agricultural inputs, investments in education and communications, reconstruction of roads and irrigation systems, and assurance of macro-economic stability. The long term challenges of institution building have also been highlighted, from the lack of effective leadership, and the persistence of factionalism and ethnic/group rivalries, to the continuing destabilizing effects of foreign involvement in Afghan affairs.
Notably, two contributors put forward contrasting visions of future developments in Afghanistan. Marco Giagoni suggested that the most likely future for Afghanistan was continuing great power engagement to ensure national stability and security, while commercial classes from neighboring states exploit the available economic opportunities and the masses of the poor are left to fend for themselves. Nizar Mecklai put forward a more hopeful vision in which international agencies provide a protective umbrella under which local communities are empowered to gain control of their own resources and invest in socio-economic development, supported by commercial interests from neighboring countries. Along with a dynamic private sector, national institutions would thus emerge organically from below in response to enlightened local self-interest. (I hope they will accept my apology if this summary does not fully capture their views.)
The discussion has also touched on a number of regional and international issues, including the importance of peace for all the countries in the region, and the illusiveness of borders and boundaries, the physical border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, on the one hand, and mental boundary between Pakistani and Indian identities, on the other. For Pakistan, peace in Afghanistan was seen as a potential economic boon, while the failure of peace was seen as a potential quagmire. Some expressed support for a more active role in the regional by international powers, while others questioned the sincerity of world leaders who appear motivated solely be self-interest, and some suggested that the only hope for Afghanistan was if they were left to work out the future for themselves, without outside interference.
Some further questions:
With regard to Pakistan, there does not seem to have been a fundamental shift in the development challenges post Sept. 11. Do the events since September, however, create the potential for new solutions? With the collapse of the Taliban, how should Pakistan deal with Islamic militants within its own borders? Are there reasons to reconsider the timetable or approach to the restoration of democracy in Pakistan? If bilateral and multi-lateral donors are to provide substantial assistance, how should it be managed to ensure that the benefits reach the mass of the population that has been historically excluded from power and access to resources?
With regard to Afghanistan, the consequences of Sept. 11 appear to have been more radical, as if the last thirty years of Afghan history had been swept away in less than three months. Should the coalition now seek to restore Afghan self-government at the earliest possible date, or should Afghanistan continue as an "international protectorate" for some time until stronger national institutions can emerge? Would such an arrangement be acceptable to Afghans who have fiercely defended their independence? In the leadership vacuum that has been created by the death of Masood and the collapse of the Taliban, from where should we expect new Afghan leaders to emerge? Does the Afghan diaspora represent a potential resource for the future of Afghanistan? Or will Afghans who remained behind be resentful of those who found education and opportunity abroad? How can ordinary Afghans be given an effective voice in shaping the social, economic and political development of their country?
On a regional/international level, it has been suggested that peace in Afghanistan is in everyone's interest. Yet within neighboring countries, and among the coalition partners, there will be winners and losers depending on what kind of peace prevails and how it comes about. If a peaceful, prosperous, united Afghanistan is in the best interests of the Afghan people, and the world community, what regional and international interests might be opposed to such an outcome, and how might they seek to influence events to ensure an outcome that is more in their favor?
Understanding the interests and capabilities of the forces presently at work in the region, and within Pakistan and Afghanistan, is essential for understanding how we can design practical measures for improving the prospects for future peace and prosperity in the region.
I look forward to your concluding comments on this phase of our discussions.
Sincerely,
Mark Reade McKenna
Moderator
Cont/P-6
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